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THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008 
on living standards in the developing world has given renewed emphasis 
to the importance of social safety net programs. The right policies can 
be a smart investment in an uncertain world. This report reviews the 
evidence on conditional cash transfers (CCTs)—safety net programs 
that have become popular in developing countries over the last decade. 
It concludes that CCTs generally have been successful in reducing 
poverty and encouraging parents to invest in the health and education 
of their children. 
The CCT programs studied in the report span a range of low- and 
middle-income countries; large and small programs; and those that 
work at local, regional, and national levels. Although there are impor-
tant differences between countries and regions in how CCTs are used, 
they all share one defi ning characteristic: they transfer cash while asking 
benefi ciaries to make prespecifi ed investments in child education and 
health. 
The largest CCTs, such as Brazil’s Bolsa Família and Mexico’s 
Oportunidades, cover millions of households. In Chile and Turkey, 
CCTs are focused more narrowly on extremely poor and socially 
excluded people, whereas CCTs in Bangladesh and Cambodia have 
been used to reduce gender disparities in education. Most recently, 
CCT pilot programs are being implemented in Sub-Saharan Africa 
to help alleviate the plight of millions of orphans in the wake of the 
continent’s devastating HIV/AIDS epidemic. CCTs are proven versatile 
programs, which largely explains why they have become so popular 
worldwide. 
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This report considers the impact that CCTs have had on current 
poverty, education, health, and nutrition outcomes. It draws heavily 
on a large number of carefully constructed impact evaluations of CCT 
programs. As the authors note, it would not have been possible to write 
this report without the efforts made by the administrators of CCT 
programs themselves, a number of academics, and staff at international 
organizations, including the World Bank, to encourage and sustain 
these evaluations, and to make the results widely available. This clearly 
is a legacy worth sustaining.
By and large, CCTs have increased consumption levels among the 
poor. As a result, they have resulted in sometimes substantial reductions 
in poverty among benefi ciaries—especially when the transfer has been 
generous, well targeted, and structured in a way that does not discour-
age recipients from taking other actions to escape poverty. Because 
CCTs provide a steady stream of income, they have helped buffer poor 
households from the worst effects of unemployment, catastrophic ill-
ness, and other sudden income shocks. And making cash transfers to 
women, as virtually all CCTs do, may have increased the bargaining 
power of women (itself an important goal in many contexts).
In country after country, school enrollment has increased among 
CCT beneficiaries—especially among the poorest children, whose 
enrollment rates at the outset were the lowest. CCT benefi ciaries also 
are more likely to have visited health providers for preventive checkups, 
to have had their children weighed and measured, and to have com-
pleted a schedule of immunizations. These are important accomplish-
ments. Nevertheless, the report shows that the evidence of CCT impacts 
on fi nal outcomes in health and education—achievement and cognitive 
development rather than school enrollment, child height for age rather 
than growth monitoring—is more mixed. An important challenge for 
the future is better understanding what complementary actions are nec-
essary to ensure that CCTs have greater impact on these fi nal outcomes. 
This report argues that these complementary actions broadly fall into 
two categories: policies that improve the quality of the supply of health 
and education services, and policies that help promote healthier and 
more stimulating environments for children in their homes.
Even the best-designed CCT program cannot meet all the needs of a 
social protection system. It is, after all, only one branch of a larger tree 
that includes workfare, employment, and social pension programs. The 
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report therefore considers where CCTs should fi t within a country’s 
social protection strategy.
As the world navigates a period of deepening crisis, it has become 
vital to design and implement social protection systems that help vul-
nerable households weather shocks, while maximizing the efforts of 
developing countries to invest in children. CCTs are not the only pro-
grams appropriate for this purpose, but as the report argues, they surely 
can be a compelling part of the solution. 
Justin Lin
Senior Vice President and Chief Economist 
The World Bank 
Joy Phumaphi
Vice President, Human Development Network 
The World Bank
January 2009 
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1Overview
CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS (CCTS) ARE PROGRAMS THAT 
transfer cash, generally to poor households, on the condition that those 
households make prespecifi ed investments in the human capital of their 
children. Health and nutrition conditions generally require periodic 
checkups, growth monitoring, and vaccinations for children less than 
5 years of age; perinatal care for mothers and attendance by mothers 
at periodic health information talks. Education conditions usually 
include school enrollment, attendance on 80–85 percent of school days, 
and occasionally some measure of performance. Most CCT programs 
transfer the money to the mother of the household or to the student in 
some circumstances.
Countries have been adopting or considering adoption of CCT pro-
grams at a prodigious rate. Virtually every country in Latin America 
has such a program. Elsewhere, there are large-scale programs in 
Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Turkey, and pilot programs in Cambodia, 
Malawi, Morocco, Pakistan, and South Africa, among others. Interest 
in programs that seek to use cash to incentivize household investments 
in child schooling has spread from developing to developed countries—
most recently to programs in New York City and Washington, DC.
In some countries, CCTs have become the largest social assistance 
program, covering millions of households, as is the case in Brazil 
and Mexico. CCTs have been hailed as a way of reducing inequality, 
especially in the very unequal countries in Latin America; helping 
households break out of a vicious cycle whereby poverty is transmitted 
from one generation to another; promoting child health, nutrition, and 
schooling; and helping countries meet the Millennium Development 
Goals. Do those and other claims make sense? Are they supported by 
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the available empirical evidence? What does all of this imply for the 
way in which countries that have CCTs should structure or reform 
the programs? What about countries that do not have CCTs but are 
considering implementing them, often in circumstances very different 
from those in which the programs were fi rst introduced?
This report seeks to answer those and other related questions. 
Specifi cally, it lays out a conceptual framework that considers the eco-
nomic and political rationale for CCTs; it reviews the very rich evidence 
that has accumulated on CCTs, especially arising from impact evalua-
tions; it discusses how the conceptual framework and the evidence on 
impacts should inform the design of CCT programs in practice; and it 
considers where CCTs fi t in the context of broader social policies.
The report shows that there is good evidence that CCTs have 
improved the lives of poor people. Transfers generally have been well 
targeted to poor households, have raised consumption levels, and have 
reduced poverty—by a substantial amount in some countries. Offsetting 
adjustments that could have blunted the impact of transfers—such as 
reductions in the labor market participation of benefi ciaries—have 
been relatively modest. Moreover, CCT programs often have provided 
an entry point to reforming badly targeted subsidies and upgrading the 
quality of safety nets. The report thus argues that CCTs have been an 
effective way to redistribute income to the poor, while recognizing that 
even the best-designed and best-managed program cannot fulfi ll all of 
the needs of a comprehensive social protection system. CCTs therefore 
need to be complemented with other interventions, such as workfare or 
employment programs and social pensions.
The report also considers the rationale for conditioning the transfers 
on the use of specifi c health and education services by program benefi -
ciaries. Conditions can be justifi ed if households are underinvesting in 
the human capital of their children—for example, if they hold incorrect 
beliefs about the returns to these investments; if there is “incomplete 
altruism” between parents and their children; or if there are large 
externalities to investments in health and education. Political economy 
considerations also may favor conditional over unconditional transfers: 
taxpayers may be more likely to support transfers to the poor if they 
are linked to efforts to overcome poverty in the long term, particularly 
when the efforts involve actions to improve the welfare of children.
CCTs have led poor households to make more use of health and 
education services, a key objective for which they were designed. 
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Nevertheless, the evidence on improvements in fi nal outcomes in health 
and education is more mixed. Thus CCTs have increased the likelihood 
that households will take their children for preventive health checkups, 
but that has not always led to better child nutritional status; school 
enrollment rates have increased substantially among program benefi cia-
ries, but there is little evidence of improvements in learning outcomes. 
These fi ndings suggest that to maximize their potential effects on the 
accumulation of human capital, CCTs should be combined with other 
programs to improve the quality of the supply of health and education 
services, and should provide other supporting services. They also sug-
gest the need to experiment with conditions that focus on outcomes 
rather than on the use of services alone.
The CCT Wave
Interest in and the scope of CCT programs have grown enormously 
in the last 10 years. The maps shown in fi gure 1 reveal the expansion 
between 1997 and 2008.
Paralleling the rise in the number of countries with CCT pro-
grams has been an increase in the size of some programs. Mexico’s 
PROGRESA started with approximately 300,000 benefi ciary house-
holds in 1997, but now covers 5 million households. (This program 
was renamed Oportunidades in 2001. In this report we will refer to 
the program as Oportunidades.) Brazil started with municipal Bolsa 
Escola programs in Brasilia and the municipality of Campinas. Those 
programs led to replication by local governments, followed by formula-
tion of sector-specifi c federal programs, and then their unifi cation and 
reform. Today the federal Bolsa Família program serves 11 million 
families (46 million people). In other countries, the increase in size 
has been less explosive but still notable. In Colombia, for instance, the 
program’s initial goal was 400,000 households, but it had expanded to 
cover 1.5 million benefi ciary households by 2007.
CCTs vary a great deal in scope. Some programs are nationwide, 
others are niche programs that serve a regional or narrow target 
population, and yet others are small-scale pilot efforts. Some programs 
require that households receiving transfers comply only with school-
ing conditions; others, especially programs in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, require that households comply with both schooling and 
C O N D I T I O N A L  C A S H  T R A N S F E R S :  R E D U C I N G  P R E S E N T  A N D  F U T U R E  P O V E R T Y
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health conditions. Table 1 presents a partial list of the CCT programs 
considered in this report. The list is not exhaustive in that it does not 
cover all existing programs. There are additional programs in operation 
for which little information was available, and some programs fi t the 
CCT label less well than do others.
Figure 1 CCTs in the World, 1997 and 2008
Source: World Bank.
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The role of CCT programs in social policy varies from place to place 
as a consequence of differences in both program design and the context 
in which they operate. Most obviously, CCT programs vary with respect 
to pertinent measures of size. In terms of absolute coverage, they range 
from 11 million families (Brazil) to 215,000 households (Chile) to pilot 
programs with a few thousand families (Kenya, Nicaragua). In terms 
of relative coverage, they range from approximately 40 percent of the 
population (Ecuador) to about 20 percent (Brazil, Mexico) to 1 percent 
(Cambodia). In terms of budget, the costs range from about 0.50 percent 
of gross domestic product (GDP) in such countries as Brazil, Ecuador, 
and Mexico to 0.08 percent of GDP (Chile). The generosity of benefi ts 
ranges from 20 percent of mean household consumption in Mexico, to 
4 percent in Honduras, and to even less for programs in Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, and Pakistan.
Many of the CCT programs in middle-income countries have pur-
sued an integrated approach to poverty reduction, balancing goals of 
Table 1 Matrix of Program Size and Extent of Conditions
Program size/Target
Conditions
Education and health Education only
Nationwide Bolsa Família (Brazil)
Oportunidades (Mexico)
Bono de Desarrollo Humano (Ecuador)
Familias en Acción (Colombia)
Program of Advancement through Health and 
Education (Jamaica)
Bolsa Escola (Brazil)
Jaring Pengamanan Sosial (Indonesia)
Niche (regional 
or narrow target 
population)
Chile Solidario
Social Risk Mitigation Project (Turkey)
Female Secondary School Assistance Program 
(Bangladesh)
Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (Cambodia)
Education Sector Support Project (Cambodia)
Basic Education Development Project (Yemen)
Small scale/pilot Programa de Asignación Familiar (Honduras)
Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable 
Children (Kenya) 
Atención a Crisis (Nicaragua)
Red de Protección Social (Nicaragua)
Subsidio Condicionado a la Asistencia Escolar–
Bogotá (Colombia)
Punjab Education Sector Reform Program 
(Pakistan)
Source: Authors’ compilation.
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social assistance and human capital formation. They cover children 
from birth (or before) through the mid-teens, with conditions on health 
care use for children from birth to age 5 or 6 and with conditions on 
school enrollment thereafter. Programs usually are administered by 
ministries of social welfare or freestanding agencies under the presi-
dency. Examples of that type of CCT include the programs in Brazil, 
Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, and Turkey. 
Mexico’s Oportunidades is one of the iconic cases. The program 
started early, its evolution has been carried out thoughtfully, and it has 
been successful. What really makes Mexico’s program iconic are the 
successive waves of data collected to evaluate its impact, the placement 
of those data in the public domain, and the resulting hundreds of papers 
and thousands of references that such dissemination has generated. 
Brazil also is exemplary in its use of CCTs. It started early, its 
programs have evolved enormously, and the current program (Bolsa 
Família) is similar to Mexico’s program in coverage and importance. 
In various respects, Brazil’s Bolsa Família program provides something 
of an interesting contrast to the Mexican case—the issue of federalism 
is more in the forefront; it takes a softer, more gradual tack on condi-
tions; and puts a shade more emphasis on redistribution than on human 
capital formation. Also, unlike Oportunidades, the Brazilian programs 
did not explicitly incorporate impact evaluations in their design; as a 
result, much less is known about the effect they have had on consump-
tion, poverty, health, nutrition, and education.
Chile Solidario works in a very different way to fi ll a different niche. 
The program is targeted only to extremely poor people, about 5 percent 
of Chile’s population. It differs notably from the classic CCT design by 
customizing conditions. Families initially work intensely with social 
workers to understand actions that could help them get out of extreme 
poverty. They then commit to action plans that become the household-
specifi c conditions for receiving the benefi t. The cash transfer itself 
really is intended only to motivate clients to make use of social workers’ 
services. Thus far, Chile Solidario is a model unto itself, although other 
programs are moving to emulate it to a degree.
Another branch of the CCT program family focuses on education 
in low-income countries. The programs usually cover a more narrow 
segment of education—some only secondary (Bangladesh’s Female 
Secondary School Assistance Program [FSSAP], Cambodia’s Japan Fund 
for Poverty Reduction [JFPR], and Cambodia Education Sector Support 
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Project [CESSP]), some only primary (programs in Bolivia and Kenya and 
proposals in Nigeria and Tanzania), and occasionally both (Indonesia’s 
Jaring Pengamanan Sosial [JPS] program). The genesis of these programs 
is rather varied. In Bangladesh, the FSSAP was part of a strategy to close 
a then-signifi cant gender gap in education. In Indonesia, the JPS program 
was instituted following the East Asian fi nancial crisis to prevent students 
from dropping out. In Kenya and Tanzania, the programs are geared 
especially to coping with the crisis of orphans and vulnerable children, a 
crisis that has burgeoned in the wake of HIV/AIDS.
CCT programs require the same systems as other transfer programs: 
at minimum, (1) a means to establish the eligibility of clients and enroll 
them in the program, and (2) a mechanism to pay their benefi ts. Strong 
monitoring and evaluation systems also are desirable. CCTs further 
require a means to monitor compliance with conditions and to coordinate 
among the several institutions involved in operating the program. In gen-
eral, CCT programs have handled these systems rather well and, in some 
cases, they have been leaders in modernizing social assistance practice.
Almost all CCTs have tried to target their benefi ts rather narrowly 
to the poor through a combination of geographic and household target-
ing (mostly via proxy means testing). Moreover, many programs use 
community-based targeting or community vetting of eligibility lists to 
increase transparency. In many cases, CCTs have been the drivers for 
developing poverty maps or household targeting systems in their coun-
tries, or for upgrades to them. Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration 
to say that CCTs have moved forward the state of the art and standards 
for targeted programs generally.
A number of CCT programs have had unusually proactive manage-
ment based on cutting-edge technical systems, especially with respect 
to monitoring and evaluation. Two features inherent to CCTs—the 
number of actors involved and the need for extensive information 
management to verify compliance with conditions—may have inter-
acted in ways that have spurred creative development in monitoring 
and management. This excellence in systems, and the high degree of 
transparency in documentation and information that characterizes 
most programs, has contributed to the attraction of CCTs, although 
they are not inherent to them. The evaluation culture around CCTs 
is quite strong, well beyond traditional practice in social policy. Many 
programs have conducted impact evaluations with credible counter-
factuals. Of those programs, a large share used experimental methods, 
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at least initially. This culture of evaluation is spreading not only from 
one CCT program to another, but also from CCTs to other programs 
within the same countries.
The role and design of CCT programs is evolving. Early successes 
with the basic model are prompting countries to address second and third 
rounds of challenges, including the following: Should the emphasis on 
expanding the supply of services be complemented with efforts to improve 
the quality of those services? Should the range or defi nition of conditions 
be changed, for example, to reward performance instead of, or in addi-
tion to, mere service use? What can be done to ensure that youth who are 
aging out of the school support provided by the program can get jobs or 
further training? What should be the balance between targeting younger 
and older children? In some countries, CCT programs themselves are 
addressing these challenges through adjustments to their basic design; in 
other cases, they are catalyzing changes in other programs.
The Arguments for CCTs
Although market-driven economic growth is likely to be the main 
driver of poverty reduction in most countries, markets cannot do it 
alone. Public policy plays a central role in providing the institutional 
foundations within which markets operate, in providing public goods, 
and in correcting market failures. In addition to laying the foundations 
for economic growth, policy can supplement the effects of growth on 
poverty reduction, and one of the instruments that governments can 
use to that end is direct redistribution of resources to poor households. 
Direct cash transfers have opportunity costs (in terms of forgone alter-
native public investments) and may have some perverse incentive effects 
on recipients, but there is a growing body of evidence that in some cases 
transfers may be both equitable and effi cient.
Conditional cash transfers make payments to poor households on 
the condition that those households invest in the human capital of their 
children in certain prespecifi ed ways. Because attaching a constraint on 
the behavior of people one is trying to help is an unorthodox approach 
for economists, this report reviews the conceptual arguments for mak-
ing cash transfers conditionally.
There are two broad sets of arguments for attaching conditions to 
cash transfers. The fi rst set applies if private investment in children’s 
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human capital is thought to be too low. The second set applies if politi-
cal economy conditions show little support for redistribution unless it is 
seen to be conditioned on “good behavior” by the “deserving poor.”
Under the fi rst group of arguments, private investment in human 
capital can be “too low” in two different senses. First, it can be below 
even the private optimal level for the individual children in question if 
household decision makers hold persistently misguided beliefs about 
either the nature of the process of investments in child education and 
health or the subsequent returns to these investments. For instance, par-
ents may believe that earnings respond to education less elastically than 
they actually do. In practice, there is some evidence of this from devel-
oping countries. Among 15- to 25-year-olds in Mexico, the expected 
returns to schooling (calculated from questions asked of respondents) 
are substantially lower than the realized returns (the Mincerian returns 
calculated from a household survey), especially among children of 
fathers with low education levels (Attanasio and Kaufmann 2008). In 
the Dominican Republic, eighth-grade students estimate the rate of 
return to secondary school to be only one quarter to one third of the 
rate derived from an income survey (Jensen 2006).
Parents also may discount the future more heavily than they should, 
perhaps especially with regard to the returns on investments in their 
children—a case of “incomplete altruism.” A slightly different but 
equally plausible version of this problem is a confl ict of interest between 
the parents themselves as opposed to, or in addition to, one between 
parents and children. Mothers’ objectives may be more closely aligned 
with those of all her children or, perhaps, especially with those of her 
daughters.1 That alignment often is given as a justifi cation for giving 
the cash transfer to the mother rather than to the father, as is common 
practice in most CCT programs. In many countries in South Asia, 
girls’ schooling lags well behind that of boys, even though the returns 
to female education—both in wages, and in terms of child health—are 
at least as large as those for males. Low levels of investment in girls’ 
schooling may be rational from the viewpoint of parents who are think-
ing of their own welfare (either because girls are more costly in terms 
of dowries or because boys are more likely to take care of their parents 
than are girls who move to their husbands’ homes upon marriage), but 
they are prima facie evidence of a socially ineffi cient outcome. CCTs 
that compel parents to send their daughters to school are one way to 
address ineffi cient and inequitable gender disparities.
C O N D I T I O N A L  C A S H  T R A N S F E R S :  R E D U C I N G  P R E S E N T  A N D  F U T U R E  P O V E R T Y
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In general, these informational, principal-agent, or behavioral argu-
ments can be seen as providing microfoundations for much older pater-
nalistic arguments for redistribution in-kind or with strings attached.
The second sense in which private investments in children’s health and 
education can be “too low” is that the private optimal level may be below 
the social optimal level. That situation could occur if there are positive 
externalities from education and health across households. Empirically, 
many health investments have important external benefi ts.2 In the case 
of education, externalities might arise if there are increasing returns to 
skilled labor in production, at the aggregate level, or if education lowers 
crime.
How large these externalities are and whether (conditioned) cash 
transfers are the most effective instruments to correct for them, how-
ever, remains to be determined. In most countries, education and health 
services are already heavily subsidized. In many cases, they are publicly 
provided free of charge. To argue for an additional subsidy that com-
pensates households for some of the indirect or opportunity costs of 
using these services, on the basis of the externality alone, would require 
showing that those externalities are quite large.
The political economy family of arguments centers around the 
notion that targeting tends to weaken the support for redistribution 
because it reduces the number of benefi ciaries relative to the number 
of those who are taxed to fi nance the program. Whereas the response 
most commonly considered in the literature is to establish broad-based 
redistribution that includes the middle class, an alternative is to appeal 
to the altruistic motive of voters: the same people who object to targeted 
transfers as “pure handouts” might support them if they are part of a 
“social contract” that requires recipients to take a number of concrete 
steps to improve their lives or those of their children.
The notion that CCT programs constitute a new form of social con-
tract between the state and benefi ciaries is apparent in the use of the 
term co-responsibilities (instead of conditions) in a majority of programs, 
at least in Latin America. When conditions are seen as co-responsibili-
ties, they appear to treat the recipient more as an adult capable of agency 
to resolve his or her own problems. The state is seen as a partner in the 
process, not a nanny. This latter interpretation is particularly plausible 
when the counterfactual to a CCT is not an automatic, transparent, 
unconditional cash grant seen as a citizen’s entitlement (which is close 
to the textbook concept of an unconditional transfer), but is instead a 
myriad of ad hoc and mostly in-kind transfers intermediated through 
11
O V E R V I E W
various service providers, nongovernmental organizations, and local 
governments. Under those circumstances, conditioning the transfers 
on “good behavior” may be perceived as less paternalistic than the 
alternative of conditioning transfers on say, voting for a certain party 
or belonging to a given social organization.
Moreover, the fact that the conditions are focused on building the 
human capital of children (rather than simply supporting parents) adds 
to CCTs’ political acceptability as an instrument to promote opportuni-
ties; after all, it is hard to blame children for being poor. In that sense, 
using public resources to support the human capital development of 
poor children makes a CCT a poverty reduction program rather than a 
social assistance one. Making payments to mothers also resonates with 
well-accepted beliefs (mostly supported by evidence, as shown above) 
that women will tend to put funds to better use than will men.
The conclusion is that even in situations where a narrow techni-
cal assessment might suggest that an unconditional transfer is more 
appropriate than a CCT (say, because there is no evidence of imperfect 
information or incomplete altruism in poor families), conditions might 
be justifi ed because they lead to a preferable political economy equi-
librium. The political process may make signifi cant cash transfers to 
the poor close to impossible unless those transfers are tied somehow to 
clear evidence of benefi ciaries’ “positive behaviors.” The Latin American 
experience suggests that in the absence of dramatic political shifts, the 
increasing trend toward cash-based redistribution schemes has been 
associated with the use of some form of conditioned grants.
In sum, when there is a strong rationale to redistribute, a CCT can be 
justifi ed under two broad sets of conditions: fi rst, when private invest-
ment in human capital among the poor is suboptimal from a social 
point of view and, second, when conditions are necessary for political 
economy reasons (that is, redistribution is politically feasible only when 
conditioned on good behavior). This framework can be extended by 
identifying critical questions that can guide the decision whether to 
have a CCT program, as depicted in fi gure 2.
The Impacts of CCT Programs
Beginning with the Mexican program Oportunidades, an important 
feature of CCT programs has been strong emphasis on credible evalu-
ations of their impact on various outcomes. This report draws heavily 
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on those evaluations. Indeed, it would not have been possible to write 
the report without the efforts of the program administrators themselves, 
international donors, and academics around the world to ensure the 
high quality of many of the evaluations. The accumulating evidence 
of positive impacts has been instrumental both in sustaining existing 
programs and in encouraging the establishment of similar programs in 
other developing countries.
Most CCTs seek both to reduce consumption poverty and to encour-
age investments in the education and health of children. The report 
carefully considers the evidence of programs’ impacts on those two 
dimensions of well-being.
The Impact on Consumption, Poverty, and Labor Market Participation
By and large, CCTs have had positive effects on household consumption 
and on poverty (as measured by the headcount index, the poverty gap, 
or the squared poverty gap). Tables 2 and 3 summarize the evidence. 
 
 
 
Conditional 
Cash Transfer
Unconditional 
Cash Transfer 
Consider trade-offs
Redistribute or not?
Underinvestment in 
human capital?
YES
YES
NO
YES
NO
FACTORS TO CONSIDER
• Poverty and
inequality levels
• Availability of 
resources
• Efficiency costs 
and benefits of 
redistribution   
 
 
 
FACTORS TO CONSIDER
• Misinformation (e.g., differences 
between expected and realized 
rates of return)
• Agency problems (e.g., large 
gender differences in human capital)
• Externalities (e.g., high incidence 
of crime in poor neighborhoods) 
 
 
 
Political economy 
“antipoor”?
FACTORS TO CONSIDER
• Existence of cash 
transfers targeting 
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• Transparency in 
eligibility criteria for 
social assistance
• Views on distributive 
justice
Figure 2 Decision Tree Approach to Identifying CCT Programs as the Right Policy Instrument
Source: Authors’ illustration.
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Table 2 Impact of CCTs on per Capita Consumption, Various Years
Consumption
Brazil 
2002
Cambodia 
2007
Colombia Ecuador Honduras Mexico Nicaragua
2002 2006 2003 2005 2000 2002 1998 Jun. 1999 Oct. 1999 2000 2001 2002
Median daily 
per capita 
consumption 
of control 
households 
(current US$)
0.83 0.89 0.85 1.19 1.12 1.13 0.79 0.68 0.59 0.58 0.59 0.63 0.53 0.52
Daily per 
capita transfer 
(current US$)
0.06 0.02 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.15
Ratio of 
transfer to 
consumption 
(%)a
8 2–3 17 13 8 7 9 11 21 20 19 29 31 30
Impact on 
per capita 
consumption 
for the 
median 
household 
(%)
7.0** B A 10.0** A B A 7.0* B 7.8** 8.3** A 29.3** 20.6**
Source: Authors’ calculations for all countries in the table except Colombia. For Colombia, see Institute for Fiscal Studies, Econometría, and Sistemas Especializados 
de Información (2006). 
Note: The estimated impacts presented here are not always equal to the unconditional double difference estimates because some regressions control for other cor-
relates. The impact for Honduras was obtained from 2002 regression only. The impacts for Mexico are all for single equation cross-sectional regressions for each year. 
The lack of impact in 1998 is likely the result of the fact that this survey was carried out just a few months after the start of the program. Figures are in US$ obtained 
through the offi cial exchange rates observed at the time of the surveys. In the case of Oportunidades in Mexico, the 1998 fi gures are for a few months after the start of 
the program. In the case of Bolsa Alimentação in Brazil, per capita consumption fi gures are for more than a year after the start of the program.
a. The transfer amounts as a proportion of per capita expenditures (or consumption) are not the same across all tables in the report because of differences in the 
surveys used, including their coverage and year.
A. Baseline, before households in CCT treatment group received transfers.
B. No signifi cant impact on consumption.
* Signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
** Signifi cant at the 5 percent level.
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Table 3 Impact of CCTs on Poverty Measures, Various Years
Poverty 
measure
Colombia Honduras Mexico Nicaragua
2002 2006 2000 2002 1998 Jun. 1999 Oct. 1999 2000 2001 2002
Headcount 
index
Control
Impact
0.95
A
 0.90
–0.03*
0.88
A
0.91
B
0.89
0.02**
 0.93
–0.01**
0.94
0.00
0.84
A
 0.91
–0.07**
 0.90
–0.05**
Poverty gap Control
Impact
0.58
A
 0.54
–0.07**
0.49
A
0.54
–0.02*
0.47
0.01*
 0.55
–0.03**
0.56
–0.02**
0.43
A
 0.50
–0.13**
 0.50
–0.09**
Squared 
poverty gap
Control
Impact
0.53
A
 0.43
–0.02**
0.30
A
0.36
–0.02*
0.28
B
 0.35
–0.03**
0.36
–0.03**
0.26
A
 0.32
–0.12**
 0.32
–0.09**
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: We exclude Cambodia and Ecuador from this table because the CCT did not have an effect on median consumption in those countries and so it is not sur-
prising that it did not reduce poverty. We also exclude the Brazilian Bolsa Alimentação program because the evaluation sample is not representative of the program’s 
target population, which makes the analysis of the impact on poverty less informative. For Honduras, Mexico, and Nicaragua, calculations were done via regression 
of household level Foster-Greer-Thorbecke indicator on treatment dummy and other explanatory variables. Using the evaluation sample of each program, we compute 
P(i,t,a) = (z – y(i,t) / z)a * Poor(i,t), for alpha = 0, 1, and 2; and for each household, where y(i,t) is household i ’s level of consumption per capita at year t, z is the 
country-specifi c poverty line, and Poor(i,t) is an indicator function that equals 1 if the household is poor and equals 0 otherwise. For Honduras, the poverty line used 
was Lps 24.6 per capita per day in 2000 lempiras. Expenditure values for 2002 were defl ated to 2000 lempiras. For Nicaragua, we used C$13.87 per capita per day 
in 2000 córdobas. Expenditure values for 2001 and 2002 were defl ated to 2000 córdobas. For Mexico, we used the value of the Canasta Básica of 1997, which was 
M$320 per capita per month. We infl ated this value of the Canasta Básica for 1998 and 1999 using the Canasta Básica Price Index found at: http://www.banxico
.org.mx/polmoneinfl acion/estadisticas/indicesPrecios/indicesPreciosConsumidor.html. Therefore, for October 1998, we used M$320 × 1.134. For June 1999, we used 
M$320 × 1.280. For October 1999, we used M$320 × 1.314. For Colombia (see Institute for Fiscal Studies, Econometría, and Sistemas Especializados de Información 
2006), the estimated impacts presented here are not equal to the unconditional double difference estimates because regressions control for other correlates. The impact 
for Honduras was obtained from 2002 regression only. The impacts for Mexico are all for single equation cross-sectional regressions for each year. 
A. Baseline, before households in CCT treatment group received transfers.
B. No signifi cant impact on poverty measure.
* Signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
** Signifi cant at the 5 percent level.
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Table 2 shows that the largest consumption impacts are found when the 
transfer amount is generous (as with the Red de Protección Social [RPS] 
program in Nicaragua). Moreover, because transfers generally are well 
targeted to the poor, the effects on consumption have translated into 
impacts on poverty, as is shown in table 3. Some of the reductions in 
poverty are quite large. In Nicaragua, for example, poverty fell by 5–9 
points (using the 2002 data).
Another way of measuring the impact of CCTs on welfare is to com-
pare the cumulative distribution of consumption per capita between those 
who receive the transfer and those who do not. The advantage of this 
method is that it does not rely on the selection of a poverty line, which 
can be somewhat arbitrary. If the cumulative distribution for recipient 
households lies completely to the right of the distribution for control 
households—so-called fi rst-order stochastic dominance—current welfare 
is unambiguously improved by CCTs. That is clearly the case for RPS 
benefi ciaries in Nicaragua, as shown in panel A of fi gure 3. Panel B shows 
an improvement that is much smaller for Honduras—a fi nding that is not 
surprising given the smaller magnitude of the transfer.
Moreover, CCTs have affected not only the overall level of consump-
tion, but also the composition of consumption. There is a good deal of 
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0 1 2 3 4
Log per capita expenditure (córdobas)
A. Nicaragua
ControlTreatment
CD
F
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0 1 2 3 4 5
Log per capita expenditure (lempiras)
B. Honduras
CD
F
Figure 3 Impact of CCTs on the Distribution of Consumption, Nicaragua and Honduras, 2002
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: CDF = cumulative distribution function.
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evidence that households that receive CCTs spend more on food and, 
within the food basket, on higher-quality sources of nutrients than do 
households that do not receive the transfer but have comparable overall 
income or consumption levels.3
An important concern when CCTs fi rst were launched was that 
they would result in large reductions in the labor market participation 
of adults—either because benefi ciaries would choose to consume more 
leisure at higher income levels or because they would cut back on work 
in order to continue to appear to be “poor enough” to be eligible for 
transfers. In practice, CCTs appear to have had at most modest disin-
centive effects on adult work. Research on Cambodia, Ecuador, and 
Mexico shows that adults in households that received transfers did not 
reduce their work effort. 
Although CCTs generally have not resulted in reductions in the labor 
market participation of adults, they have led to substantial decreases 
in child labor—as was intended by many of the programs. Reduced 
child work by CCT benefi ciaries has been found in Brazil, Cambodia, 
Ecuador, Mexico, and Nicaragua. In some cases, the reductions are 
quite large. In Cambodia, for example, the average child receiving the 
transfer was 10 percentage points less likely to work for pay.4
In addition to possible reductions in labor market participation, a 
number of behavioral changes by households could have blunted the 
impact of CCTs on consumption and on poverty. In practice, all of 
these offsetting adjustments to transfers appear to have been small. 
Thus CCTs generally have not crowded out remittances and other 
transfers; they have had only small impacts on fertility, at least in the 
short run; and they have not had substantial local general equilibrium 
effects, such as increases in prices or wages. Finally, there is some 
evidence that CCT program benefi ciaries invest part of the transfer, 
that the returns to these investments can result in higher consumption 
levels in the medium term (in Mexico, but not in Nicaragua), and that 
transfers made by CCT programs help households smooth consump-
tion during adverse shocks. 5
The Impact of CCTs on Education and Health Outcomes
In country after country, CCTs have led to signifi cant and, in some 
cases, substantial increases in the use of services (tables 4 and 5). School 
enrollment rates have increased among program benefi ciaries, especially 
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Table 4 Impact of CCTs on School Enrollment and Attendance, Various Years
Country Program
Age/Gender/
Grade
Baseline 
enrollment 
(%) Impacta
Transfer 
(% of PCE)b
Evaluation 
method Reference
Latin American and Caribbean countries
Chile Chile Solidario Ages 6–15 60.7 7.5***
(3.0)
 7 RDD Galasso 
(2006)
Colombia Familias en Acción Ages 8–13 91.7 2.1**
(1.0)
17 PSM, DD Attanasio, 
Fitzsimmons, 
and Gómez 
(2005)
Ages 14–17 63.2 5.6***
(1.8)
Ecuador Bono de Desarrollo 
Humano
Ages 6–17 75.2 10.3**
(4.8)
10 IV, 
randomized
Schady and 
Araujo (2008)
Honduras Programa de 
Asignación 
Familiar
Ages 6–13 66.4 3.3***
(0.3)
 9 Randomized Glewwe and 
Olinto (2004)
Jamaica Program of 
Advancement 
through Health 
and Education
Ages 7–17 18 daysc 0.5**
(0.2)
10 RDD Levy and 
Ohls (2007)
Mexico Oportunidades Grades 0–5 94.0 1.9
(25.0)
20 Randomized Schultz 
(2004)
Grade 6 45.0 8.7***
(0.4)
Grades 7–9 42.5 0.6
(56.4)
Nicaragua Atención a Crisis Ages 7–15 90.5 6.6***
(0.9)
18 Randomized Macours and 
Vakis (2008)
Nicaragua Red de Protección 
Social
Ages 7–13 72.0 12.8***
(4.3)
27 Randomized Maluccio and 
Flores (2005)
continued
among those who had low enrollment rates at the beginning. These 
impacts are found in the middle-income countries where CCT pro-
grams were fi rst implemented (for example, Mexico); in lower-income 
countries in Latin America (for example, Honduras and Nicaragua); 
and in low-income countries in other regions (for example, Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, and Pakistan). CCT programs also have had a positive 
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Country Program
Age/Gender/
Grade
Baseline 
enrollment 
(%) Impacta
Transfer 
(% of PCE)b
Evaluation 
method Reference
Non–Latin American and Caribbean countries
Bangladesh Female Secondary 
School Assistance 
Program
Ages 11–18 
(girls)
44.1 12.0**
(5.1)
0.6 FE Khandker, 
Pitt, and 
Fuwa (2003)
Cambodia Japan Fund for 
Poverty Reduction
Grades 7–9 
(girls)
65.0 31.3***
(2.3)
2–3 DD Filmer and 
Schady (2008)
Cambodia Cambodia 
Education Sector 
Support Project
Grades 7–9 65.0 21.4***
(4.0)
2–3 RDD Filmer and 
Schady 
(2009c)
Pakistan Punjab Education 
Sector Reform 
Program
Ages 10–14 
(girls)
29.0 11.1***
(3.8)
3 DDD Chaudhury 
and Parajuli 
(2008)
Turkey Social Risk 
Mitigation Project
Primary 
school
87.9 –3.0* 
n.a.
6 RDD Ahmed et al. 
(2007)
Secondary 
school
39.2 5.2
n.a.
Source: Authors’ compilation.
Note: DD = difference-in-differences; DDD = difference-in-difference-in-differences; FE = fi xed effects; IV = instrumental variables; 
n.a. = not available; PCE = per capita expenditure; PSM = propensity score matching; RDD = regression discontinuity design. This table 
contains unweighted means for the coeffi cients for Colombia ages 8–13 and 14–17, Chile ages 4–5 and 6–15, and Mexico grades 0–5 
and 7–9. The standard errors in each case are the square roots of the averaged variances of these estimates. 
a. The column for “impact” reports the coeffi cient and standard error (in parentheses); the unit is percentage points, with the excep-
tion of the Jamaican PATH program, where the unit is days.
b. The transfer amounts as a proportion of per capita expenditures (or consumption) are not the same across all tables in the report 
because of differences in the surveys used, including their coverage and year.
c. Impacts were measured in Jamaica only for student attendance over a 20-day reference period. The baseline enrollment rate prior 
to PATH was 96 percent.
* Signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
** Signifi cant at the 5 percent level.
*** Signifi cant at the 1 percent level.
Table 4 continued
effect on the use of preventive health services, although the evidence is 
less clear-cut than with school enrollment.
Moreover, because CCT program effects on utilization are con-
centrated among households who were least likely to use services in 
the absence of the intervention, CCTs have contributed to substantial 
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reductions in preexisting disparities in access to education and health. 
In Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Turkey, where school enrollment rates 
among girls were lower than among boys, CCTs have helped reduce 
this gender gap. In Cambodia, the JFPR program eliminated sharp 
socioeconomic gradients in enrollment among eligible households—
although the coverage of the program was quite small. And in 
Nicaragua, the CCT impact on both school enrollment and growth 
monitoring was largest among extremely poor households, as shown 
Table 5 Impact of CCTs on Health Center Visits by Children, Various Years
Country Program Outcome
Age 
range 
(years)
Baseline 
level (%)a Impactb
Transfer 
(% of 
PCE)c
Evaluation 
method Reference
Chile Chile Solidario Regular checkups 0–6 17.6 2.4
(2.7)
 7 RDD Galasso (2006)
Colombia Familias en 
Acción
Child taken 
to growth and 
development 
monitoring
0–1 n.a. 22.8***
(6.7)
17
 
PSM, 
DD
Attanasio et al. 
(2005)
2–4 n.a. 33.2***
(11.5)
4+ n.a. 1.5*
(0.8)
Ecuador Bono de 
Desarrollo 
Humano
Child had growth 
control in last 6 
months
3–7 n.a. 2.7
(3.8) 
10 R Paxson and 
Schady (2008)
Honduras Programa de 
Asignación 
Familiar
Child taken to 
health center at 
least once in past 
month
0–3 44.0 20.2***
(4.7)
 9 R Morris, Flores, 
et al. (2004)
Jamaica Program of 
Advancement 
through Health 
and Education
Number of visits 
to health center 
for preventive 
reasons in past 6 
months
0–6 0.205 0.278***
(0.085)
10 RDD Levy and Ohls 
(2007)
Mexico Oportunidades Number of visits 
to all health 
facilities in past 
month
0–2 0.219 –0.032 
(0.037)
20 R Gertler (2000)
3–5 0.221 0.027
(0.019)
continued
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Country Program Outcome
Age 
range 
(years)
Baseline 
level (%)a Impactb
Transfer 
(% of 
PCE)c
Evaluation 
method Reference
Nicaragua Atención a 
Crisis
Child weighed in 
last 6 months
0–6 70.5 6.3***
(2.0)
18 R Macours, 
Schady, and 
Vakis (2008)
Nicaragua Red de 
Protección 
Social
Child taken to 
health center at 
least once in past 
6 months
0–3 69.8 8.4
(5.9)
27 R Maluccio and 
Flores (2005)
Child taken to 
health center and 
weighed in past 6 
months
0–3 55.4 13.1*
(7.5)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: DD = difference-in-differences; n.a. = not available; PCE = per capita expenditure; PSM = propensity score matching; R = 
randomized; RDD = regression discontinuity design. This table contains weighted means for the coeffi cients for Chile, combining rural 
and urban estimates. The standard error in this case is the square root of the averaged variances of these estimates. 
a. The unit for baseline level corresponds to the proportion of children who have been taken to the health center, with the exception 
of Jamaica and Mexico, where the unit corresponds to the number of visits.
b. The column for “impact” reports the coeffi cient and standard error (in parentheses); the units are percentage points, with the 
exception of Jamaica, where the unit is the number of visits to the health center in the past six months, and Mexico, where the unit is 
the number of visits to the health center in the past month.
c. The transfer amounts as a proportion of per capita expenditures (or consumption) are not the same across all tables in the report 
because of differences in the surveys used, including their coverage and year.
* Signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
*** Signifi cant at the 1 percent level.
Table 5 continued
in fi gure 4. As Amartya Sen (1985) and others have noted, poverty 
takes many forms—including an inability to develop basic “capabili-
ties” in education and health. Providing all citizens in a country with 
an equality of opportunities is an important policy goal, and CCTs 
have helped level the playing fi eld between rich and poor, more and 
less favored.
Although there is clear evidence that CCTs have increased the use of 
education and health services, evidence on the impact of CCTs on “fi nal” 
outcomes in education and health is more mixed. Some (but by no means 
all) evaluations have found that CCTs contributed to improvements in 
child height among some population groups; there is also some evidence 
that program benefi ciaries have better health status.6
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Turning to education outcomes, adults with more exposure to 
the Oportunidades program in Mexico have completed more years 
of schooling than have those with less exposure; however, the likely 
increase in wages that can be expected to occur because of this added 
schooling is small. Also, a number of evaluations have concluded 
that the higher enrollment levels have not resulted in better perfor-
mance on achievement tests, even after accounting for selection into 
school.7 This pattern of program effects—increases in enrollment, 
without more learning—is not particular to CCTs. Nevertheless, the 
results are sobering because they suggest that the potential for CCTs 
to improve learning on their own may be limited. The evidence is 
somewhat more encouraging regarding the impact of CCT programs 
on cognitive development in early childhood (Macours, Schady, and 
Vakis 2008; Paxson and Schady 2008). This suggests that very early 
intervention might produce larger payoffs than one would expect, for 
example, by looking at the pattern of program effects on school enroll-
ment by age or school grade.
There are various reasons why CCTs may have had only modest 
effects on “fi nal” outcomes in education and health. One possibility is 
that some important constraints at the household level are not addressed 
by CCTs as currently designed; these constraints could include poor 
parenting practices, inadequate information, or other inputs into the 
production of education and health. Another possibility is that the qual-
ity of services is so low, perhaps especially for the poor, that increased 
use alone does not yield large benefi ts.
Nonpoor
Poor
0 5 10
Impact (percentage points)
School enrollment (children ages 7–13)
15 20 25
Extreme poor
Nonpoor
Poor
0 10
Impact (percentage points)
Children weighed in past 6 months (ages 0–3)
20 30
Extreme poor
Figure 4 Heterogeneity of Impacts by Socioeconomic Status, Nicaragua, 2000
Source: Maluccio and Flores 2005.
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Policy and Design Options
Earlier in this overview, we discussed the circumstances under which a 
CCT is desirable. Given that a CCT is put in place, how should it be 
designed? We now turn to questions of CCT program design, including 
the selection of benefi ciaries, the monitoring of conditions, the size of 
the transfer, and the complementary interventions that are needed.
Defi ning the Target Population
Selecting eligible benefi ciaries is the fi rst question any policy maker 
considering a CCT must address. A CCT should be designed to target 
poor households (for whom there is a stronger rationale to redistribute) 
that underinvest in the human capital of their children.
In practice, selecting the target population for a CCT fi rst implies 
defi ning the criteria for eligibility based on poverty. The challenges of 
selecting the “right” targeting method and setting cut-off points for 
eligibility (that is, who qualifi es as poor) are similar to those faced in 
the design of any social assistance program.
Defi ning the second criterion for targeting (that is, households that 
underinvest in the human capital of their children) is more complicated. 
In general, when households have qualifi ed based on poverty criteria, 
CCT programs continue to make transfers as long as those households 
have children of the “right” ages and send them to school and/or take 
them to a health center. In some cases, it may be worthwhile to use a 
more narrow demographic target to direct transfers to population sub-
groups that appear to have the largest human capital gaps. This more 
narrow approach could imply targeting poor households with children 
transitioning from primary to secondary school in some countries, 
and poor households with young children in regions with high rates of 
malnutrition in others.
There may be trade-offs between redistributive and human capital 
goals resulting from alternative targeting approaches. In a setting in 
which a large share of the poor population experiences signifi cant and 
similar human capital gaps, trade-offs are likely to be small. On the 
other hand, when human capital gaps are highly concentrated on a 
relatively small proportion of the poor, designing a CCT to maximize 
impact on human capital accumulation may limit its ability to act as a 
redistributive mechanism.
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Selecting the Appropriate Conditions and the Size 
of the Transfer
Is the increase in the use of education and health services that results 
from CCTs purely a result of the income effects inherent in the trans-
fer? Answering this question has important implications for the extent 
to which conditions are implemented and monitored, and the degree 
to which noncomplying households are penalized. As it turns out, evi-
dence from a variety of sources (including comparisons across programs 
or countries, accidental glitches in program implementation, intentional 
features of program design, and structural models of household behav-
ior) suggests that the impact of CCT programs on service use cannot 
be explained by the cash component of the program alone. 8 The condi-
tions are thus important, at least in terms of increasing levels of school 
enrollment and the use of preventive health care.
However, service use is generally a means to an end. Thus the fi rst 
step in selecting the “right” conditions is a review of the evidence on 
links between service use and the desired outcomes. Is getting children 
into health facilities the most effective way to improve their nutrition 
and health more broadly? Or is giving mothers nutrition and parenting 
information and training more effective?
Conditioning the cash transfer on the achievement of outcomes 
themselves is another possibility, particularly when links between 
such behaviors as service use and outcomes are unknown or complex, 
but outcomes are judged to be mostly within benefi ciaries’ control. 
In the future, experimentation with alternative incentive schemes 
(through small-scale pilot programs, for example) should become 
increasingly important. This could be done by adding performance 
bonuses to the basic benefi ts households receive for satisfying atten-
dance conditions.
A second question is how to set the appropriate transfer amount. 
As discussed above, larger transfers generally have produced bigger 
improvements in consumption (or income) poverty—a result that 
seems reasonable. In terms of education and health outcomes, the 
critical questions are (1) how income-elastic are the outcomes? and 
(2) do larger transfers result in bigger behavioral changes by recipi-
ent households? In terms of enrollment in Cambodia, the marginal 
return to transfers appears to diminish very quickly—even though the 
“baseline” transfer is quite small (Filmer and Schady 2009a). More 
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generally, however, the appropriate transfer amount for a CCT is likely 
to depend on the relative weight given to the program’s redistribution 
and human capital goals, and is likely to vary across outcomes and 
settings. Structural modeling and small-scale experimentation can 
help policy makers identify and quantify the trade-offs (Bourguignon, 
Ferreira, and Leite 2003; Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago 2005; Todd 
and Wolpin 2006a).
Entry and Exit Rules
The design of an effective program also requires careful consideration of 
rules for entry and exit. This is necessary to avoid confusion among pro-
spective benefi ciaries and to minimize the potential for manipulation and 
abuse. Entry and exit rules also are important because they can have unin-
tended incentive effects, particularly related to labor force participation. 
To date, CCTs have used a proxy means rather than an income threshold 
to target benefi ts, and so the correspondence between program eligibility 
and labor supply is weaker than in many welfare programs in developed 
countries. However, the better a proxy means is at distinguishing “poor” 
from “nonpoor” households, the more highly it will be correlated with 
income and consumption—and the more likely it is to provide disincen-
tives for adult labor market participation. Potential solutions include the 
use of time limits on benefi ts (as in Chile or in the United States under 
the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families [TANF] program), and the 
adoption of graduated benefi ts (whereby there is only a partial reduction 
of benefi ts after recertifi cation shows households have ceased to be eligible 
under original criteria) in order to avoid “cliffs” and the associated nega-
tive incentive effects on labor supply.
Complementary Interventions
In many developing countries, the delivery of education and health 
services is dysfunctional. Poor infrastructure, absenteeism, and lack of 
adequate supplies are not unusual problems in schools and health cen-
ters. Achieving the human capital goals of CCT programs will require 
adaptation of the supply of services. In some countries, this adaptation 
may require governments or other actors to provide services where none 
existed before. Improving quality is perhaps an even greater challenge, and 
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some governments have attempted to address this by offering monetary 
incentives to providers of health and education services for good perfor-
mance. Reforms to increase access and the coverage of services frequently 
have been undertaken in parallel with or as an integral part of the CCT 
program.
In addition to the poor quality of services, other constraints at the 
household level may make it diffi cult for CCTs to improve fi nal out-
comes in health and education. Figure 5 makes this point for Ecuador. 
The fi gure shows the scores of children on a test of cognitive develop-
ment in early childhood. At age 3, most children in the Ecuador sample 
are only modestly behind the reference population. By age 6, the age 
when they enter fi rst grade, children in the two poorest deciles of the 
national distribution of wealth are almost three standard deviations 
behind where they should be. The implication is clear: a CCT by itself 
or even in combination with high-quality schools is unlikely to remedy 
such disadvantages. This is particularly important because recent theo-
retical and empirical research suggests that the returns to investments 
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later in the life cycle will be limited if children do not have adequate 
levels of cognitive, social, and emotional development in early child-
hood (Cunha et al. 2006; Knudsen et al. 2006).
Under these circumstances, interventions that seek to improve par-
enting practices and the quality of the home environment are likely to be 
particularly important. Oportunidades and some other CCTs attempt 
to expose parents to new information and practices by conditioning 
transfers on participation in talks (known as pláticas). The conditioned 
cash helps ensure that parents attend and participate in the pláticas. 
However, the cash-condition package offered by CCT programs may 
not be enough, and a comprehensive program that relies on more active 
participation by social workers and others may be needed.
CCTs in the Context of Social Protection Policies
CCT programs are just one option within the arsenal of social protec-
tion programs that can be used to redistribute income to poor house-
holds. They cannot be the right instrument for all poor households—for 
example, they cannot serve the elderly poor, childless households, or 
households whose children are outside the age range covered by the 
CCT. Redistribution to those groups is better handled through other 
means. In the case of the elderly poor, the potential labor supply dis-
incentives from cash transfers are likely to be low, and the justifi cation 
for further investments in human capital is questionable. As a result, 
social (or noncontributive) pensions often are the preferred instrument 
used by both developed and developing countries to provide assistance 
to elderly poor people.
Also, a CCT is unlikely to be the best instrument for social risk man-
agement. CCTs have been used to help cushion the negative impact of 
various types of crises on the poor. But their focus on long-term invest-
ments in human capital and their reliance on administrative targeting 
mean that CCT programs generally are not the best instrument to deal 
with transient poverty. Transfer programs that do not involve long-
term commitments (such as those implicit in CCT conditions), that 
are self-targeted (and thus do not involve complex administrative deci-
sions for entry or exit into the program), and that involve benefi ciaries 
in activities that can help address the source of the shock (for example, 
job-related activities) appear to be better suited than are CCTs as instru-
ments for managing risk.
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Thus in most country contexts, CCT and other cash transfer pro-
grams are likely to coexist and should be seen as complements, rather 
than substitutes, addressing different household characteristics and the 
nature of the poverty those households experience. It is not surprising 
that policy makers and program managers for CCTs in Latin America, 
the region where such programs have the longest tradition and the most 
established status, increasingly are casting CCTs as part of a broader 
system of social protection. Doing so requires making the basic design 
features of programs compatible—for example, the transfer size in a 
CCT must be set in relation to that of other cash transfers to limit 
distortions, ensure horizontal equity, and make programs politically 
acceptable.
Finally, the potential administrative synergies across cash transfer 
programs are large. Perhaps the most obvious examples are common 
systems for administrative targeting and common systems to make 
payments to benefi ciaries (such as with electronic cards). Numerous 
countries also are considering or experimenting with a common out-
reach and service platform—one-stop shops that benefi ciaries of all 
social protection programs can use to access benefi ts and interact with 
program administrators.
Conclusion
CCT programs often are described in both extremely positive and nega-
tive terms. Our review of the CCT experience so far confi rms that the 
programs have been effective in the sense that there is solid evidence 
of their positive impacts in reducing short-term poverty and increasing 
the use of education and health services. Those achievements should 
not be minimized because they are powerful proof that well-designed 
public programs can have signifi cant effects on critical social indicators. 
CCTs also have had positive institutional externalities—most notably, 
through their emphasis on monitoring and evaluation, whereby they 
have helped strengthen a results culture within the public sector, at 
least within social policies. That strengthening is clearly a legacy worth 
sustaining. At the same time, our review provides ample reasons to be 
cautious and avoid transforming the obvious virtues of CCTs into a 
blind advocacy campaign in support of them.
Fifty years ago, Albert Hirschman (1958) argued that development 
is a “chain of disequilibria” whereby the expansion of one sector creates 
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backward or forward pressures that can provide the necessary stimu-
lus for the expansion of another sector, which is still underdeveloped. 
Those links operate not only through the standard motivation for profi t, 
but also by building political pressure for government action. CCT 
programs have increased poor people’s demand for services and have 
the potential to unleash a broader process to transform health, educa-
tion, and social protection services. It is still too early to tell whether 
the current wave of CCT programs will produce those results, but the 
experience so far provides room for hope.
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Introduction
COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN ADOPTING OR CONSIDERING ADOPTING 
conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs at a prodigious rate. In some 
countries, including Brazil, Ecuador, and Mexico, CCTs have become 
the largest social assistance program, covering millions of households. 
They have been hailed as a way of reducing inequality, especially in the 
very unequal countries in Latin America; of helping households break 
out of a vicious cycle whereby poverty is transmitted from one genera-
tion to another; of promoting child health, nutrition, and schooling; 
and of helping countries meet the Millennium Development Goals. 
Nancy Birdsall, of the Center for Global Development, calls CCTs 
“as close as you can come to a magic bullet in development” (Dugger 
2004). Conversely, an article in the Institute of Development Studies 
Bulletin refers to CCTs as “superf luous, pernicious, atrocious and 
abominable” (Freeland 2007, p. 75), arguing that they represent an 
impractical way to improve the use of social services (particularly in 
low-income countries) and are immoral because they may deprive the 
neediest people of the assistance they deserve.
Do these and other claims make sense? Are they supported by the 
available empirical evidence? What does all of this imply for the way 
in which countries that have CCTs should structure or reform those 
programs? What about countries that do not have CCTs but are con-
sidering implementing them, often in circumstances very different from 
those in which they were fi rst introduced?
This report seeks to answer these and other related questions. 
Specifi cally, it lays out a conceptual framework for thinking about the 
economic rationale for CCTs; it reviews the very rich evidence that has 
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accumulated on CCTs, especially that arising from impact evaluations; 
it discusses how the conceptual framework and the evidence on impacts 
should inform the design of CCT programs in practice; and it discusses 
how CCTs fi t in the context of broader social policies. 
The report shows there is considerable evidence that CCTs have 
improved the lives of poor people. Transfers generally have been well 
targeted to poor households, have raised consumption levels, and 
have reduced poverty—in some countries by a substantial amount. 
Offsetting adjustments that could have blunted the impact of transfers, 
such as reductions in benefi ciaries’ participation in the labor market, 
appear to have been relatively modest. Moreover, CCT programs often 
have provided an entry point to reforming badly targeted subsidies 
and upgrading the quality of safety nets. The report thus argues that 
CCTs have been an effective way of redistributing income to the poor, 
although it recognizes that even the best-designed and best-managed 
CCTs cannot fulfi ll all of the needs of a comprehensive social protection 
system. They need to be complemented with other interventions, such 
as social pensions and workfare or employment programs.
The report also considers the rationale for conditioning transfers on 
the use of specifi c health and education services by program benefi cia-
ries. Using such conditions (as opposed to making unconditional cash 
transfers) can be justifi ed as a means to reinforce incentives for house-
holds to invest more in the human capital of their children—for exam-
ple, when there is inadequate information about the returns to these 
investments, myopia, “incomplete altruism” between parents and their 
children, or externalities that are not taken into account by households. 
More generally, political economy considerations sometimes may favor 
conditional over unconditional transfers. For example, both taxpayers 
and benefi ciaries may be more likely to support transfers to the poor 
if those transfers are linked to efforts to overcome poverty in the long 
term, particularly actions to improve the welfare of their children.
CCTs also have led poor households to make more use of health and 
education services, a key objective that CCTs were intended to accom-
plish. Nevertheless, the evidence on improvements in fi nal outcomes in 
health and education is more mixed. Thus, CCTs have increased the 
likelihood that households take their children for preventive health check-
ups, but doing so has not always led to better child nutritional status; 
and school enrollment rates have increased substantially among program 
benefi ciaries, but there is little evidence of improvements in learning 
outcomes. These fi ndings suggest that to maximize their potential effects 
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on poor households’ accumulation of human capital, CCTs should be 
combined with programs to improve the quality of the supply of health 
and education services and provide other supporting services. The evi-
dence also suggests the need to experiment with conditions that focus on 
outcomes rather than on use of services alone.
The CCT Wave
The common definition of a conditional cash transfer program is 
one that transfers cash to poor households if they make prespecifi ed 
investments in the human capital of their children.1 In general, this 
has involved attaching “conditions” to transfers. Health and nutrition 
conditions often require periodic checkups or growth monitoring and 
vaccinations for children less than 5 years of age, perinatal care for 
mothers, and attendance by mothers at periodic health information 
talks. Education conditions usually include school enrollment and 
attendance at 80 or 85 percent of school days, and occasionally some 
measure of performance. Most CCT programs transfer the money to 
the mother of the household, or occasionally to the student.
CCT programs have two clear objectives. First, they seek to provide 
poor households with a minimum consumption fl oor. Second, in mak-
ing transfers conditional, they seek to encourage the accumulation of 
human capital and to break a vicious cycle whereby poverty is transmit-
ted across generations.
Interest in and the scope of CCT programs has grown enormously 
in the last 10 years. The maps shown in fi gure 1.1 give a feel for this 
expansion—although they understate the expansion because the whole 
of Brazil and Mexico are shown as active in 1997, when the Brazilian 
Bolsa Escola programs were run only by a handful of municipalities and 
Mexico’s Oportunidades program was confi ned to very poor rural areas. 
Those programs did not become national for several years. Ten years 
later, 29 developing countries had some type of CCT program in place 
(in some cases, more than one) and many other countries were planning 
one. The range of polities interested covers all continents, although the 
longest established and most evaluated programs are found predomi-
nantly in middle-income countries in Latin America.
Paralleling the rise in the number of countries with programs has 
been an increase in the size of some programs. Mexico’s program 
started with about 300,000 benefi ciary households in 1997, but now 
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covers 5 million households. Brazil started with municipal Bolsa Escola 
programs in Brasilia and the municipality of Campinas. These led 
to replication by local governments, followed by the formulation of 
sector-specifi c federal programs, and then their unifi cation and reform. 
Today, the federal Bolsa Família program serves 11 million families or 
46 million people. In other countries, the increase in size has been less 
explosive, but still notable. In Colombia, for instance, the program’s 
Figure 1.1 CCTs in the World, 1997 and 2008
Source: World Bank.
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initial goal was 400,000 households, but it had expanded to cover 1.5 
million households by 2007.
Many social policy analysts also see a parallel in the move to CCTs 
in developing countries and the welfare-to-work agenda in the United 
States and Europe, as embodied by reforms that led to the Revenu 
Minimum d’Insertion in France, the Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF) reforms in the United States, and the New Deal in 
the United Kingdom. Like CCTs in the developing world, all of these 
programs require “desired behavior” in exchange for income support. 
In settings with highly informal labor markets, the conditions on chil-
dren’s health and schooling are easier to monitor than job search and 
work requirements and thus are sensible adaptations of the basic notion 
of linking social assistance to positive behavioral change.
Table 1.1 presents a partial list of CCT programs that are considered 
in this report. The list is not exhaustive: there are additional CCT 
Table 1.1 Matrix of Program Size and Extent of Conditions
Program size/Target
Conditions
Education and health Education only
Nationwide Bolsa Família (Brazil)
Oportunidades (Mexico)
Bono de Desarrollo Humano (Ecuador)
Familias en Acción (Colombia)
Program of Advancement through Health and 
Education (Jamaica)
Bolsa Escola (Brazil)
Jaring Pengamanan Sosial (Indonesia)
Niche (regional 
or narrow target 
population)
Chile Solidario
Social Risk Mitigation Project (Turkey)
Female Secondary School Assistance Program 
(Bangladesh)
Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (Cambodia)
Education Sector Support Project (Cambodia)
Basic Education Development Project (Yemen)
Small scale/pilot Programa de Asignación Familiar (Honduras)
Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable 
Children (Kenya) 
Atención a Crisis (Nicaragua)
Red de Protección Social (Nicaragua)
Subsidio Condicionado a la Asistencia Escolar–
Bogotá (Colombia)
Punjab Education Sector Reform Program 
(Pakistan)
Source: Authors’ compilation.
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programs in operation for which little information was available and 
there are some programs that fi t the CCT label less well than others—
for example, the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) program in 
Ecuador never actually has monitored compliance with the educa-
tion and health conditions, even though a social marketing campaign 
stressed that beneficiaries were responsible for ensuring that their 
children were enrolled in school and were taken to health centers for 
preventive checkups. More information on the programs in table 1.1, as 
well as on other CCT programs in the developing world, is provided in 
program-by-program “at-a-glance” tables in appendix A.
Even without including every program, table 1.1 shows that CCTs 
vary a great deal in scope. Some programs are nationwide, others are 
niche programs, and yet others are small-scale pilot programs. Table 1.1 
also shows that some programs have required that households receiv-
ing transfers comply only with schooling conditions; others, especially 
programs in Latin America and the Caribbean, have required that 
households comply both with schooling and with health conditions.
Theme and Variations
The role of CCT programs in social policy is different from place to place, 
as a consequence of differences in both their design and the context in 
which they operate. Most obviously, CCT programs vary with respect to 
the pertinent measures of size. In terms of absolute coverage, they range 
from 11 million families (Brazil), to 215,000 (Chile), to pilot programs with 
a few thousand families (Kenya, Nicaragua). In terms of relative coverage, 
programs cover a range from about 40 percent of the population (Ecuador), 
to approximately 20 percent (Brazil, Mexico), to 1 percent (Cambodia). In 
terms of budget, programs cost from about 0.50 percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP) in countries such as Brazil, Ecuador, and Mexico to 0.08 
percent of GDP in Chile. The generosity of benefi ts ranges from 20 per-
cent of mean household consumption in Mexico, to 4 percent of mean 
household consumption in Honduras, and to even less for the programs in 
Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Pakistan.
CCT programs are expected to fi ll different niches in social policy. 
In some countries (Brazil, Jamaica, Mexico), the CCT program offers 
large-scale social assistance and grew out of a reform and expansion of 
other social assistance programs. 
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In Mexico, Oportunidades was established to replace consumption 
subsidies that were badly targeted and had limited impact on poverty. 
By the mid-1990s, the Mexican government had 15 food subsidy 
programs. Of those programs, 11 were targeted at urban and rural 
populations and 4 had no explicit targeting mechanism (see Levy and 
Rodríguez [2004]; Levy [2006]). More than half of social funding was 
allocated to bread and tortilla subsidies in urban areas—a great deal of 
which was absorbed by nonpoor urban households. Food subsidies were 
an ineffi cient way to redistribute welfare to the rural poor, who often 
lived in small, hard-to-access communities. Approximately 60 percent 
of poor rural families received no support from the federal government 
(Rodríguez 2003). There was little coordination across programs, 
administrative tasks were duplicated, there was a noticeable imbalance 
in spending that favored urban areas, and there was no systematic evalu-
ation to analyze the effectiveness of such programs. 
Oportunidades was an innovation in Mexican social policy. In place 
of ineffi cient subsidies and poorly targeted cash transfers, the program 
made explicit a commitment to give benefi ciaries the freedom to choose 
how they used the transfers as long as they committed to certain behav-
iors, namely education, health, and nutrition behaviors that were viewed 
as investments in human capital.
In Brazil, several states began to experiment with new forms of social 
assistance in the mid-1990s. In 1995, two programs (Bolsa Escola and 
the Guaranteed Minimum Family Income Program) were initiated in 
the Distrito Federal (Brasilia) and Campinas, respectively. The federal 
government started the Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil 
(PETI) in 1996. Two years later, the government began to provide 
transfers to municipalities that were running CCTs. 
By 2001, CCTs with education conditions expanded to more than 
100 municipalities and provided support to approximately 200,000 
families (Lindert et al. 2007). In that same year, the federal government 
decided to create a national version of the Bolsa Escola program. It also 
initiated the Bolsa Alimentação (2001), a conditional cash transfer for 
pregnant women and lactating women with children; the Auxílio Gás 
(2002), an unconditional cash transfer intended to dampen the effects 
on poor families as cooking gas subsidies were phased out; and the 
Cartão Alimentação (2003), a general cash transfer to the extremely 
poor population to promote food consumption and prevent hunger. 
Bolsa Família was created in 2003 by merging Bolsa Escola, Bolsa 
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Alimentação, Cartão Alimentação, and Auxílio Gás. That consolida-
tion of programs signaled an effort to improve the effi ciency of the 
social safety net and to broaden federal support for poverty-targeted 
programs. 
In other countries, such as Chile, programs are smaller and are meant 
to fi ll the cracks between and tie together a large number of existing 
social services. In some countries, CCT programs stand independently 
(Honduras, Jamaica), in others they provide links to a large and some-
times increasing array of other services (Chile, Colombia, Mexico). In 
several countries, CCT programs are still small pilot efforts (Kenya, 
Nicaragua). In still other countries, the programs’ roots are in the 
education sector (Cambodia) or are a hybrid of social assistance and 
education (Bangladesh, Kenya). Some of the nascent programs will 
focus more on the nutrition of young children.
Many of the programs in middle-income countries have pursued 
an integrated approach to poverty reduction, balancing goals of social 
assistance and human capital formation. They cover children from birth 
(or prenatally) through their mid-teens, with conditions on health care 
use for children from birth to ages 5 or 6 and with conditions on school 
enrollment thereafter. Targeting usually is done with a proxy means test, 
sometimes combined with geographic targeting. In most cases, programs 
are administered by ministries of social welfare or freestanding agencies 
under the presidency. Examples of that type of CCT include Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, and Turkey. 
Mexico has one of the iconic programs in this class. The program started 
early, its evolution has been carried out thoughtfully, and it has been 
successful. What really makes Mexico’s program iconic is the successive 
waves of data collected to evaluate its impact, the placement of these data 
in the public domain, and the hundreds of papers and thousands of refer-
ences to them that this easy access has generated.
Brazil’s efforts also have been exemplary. The program started early, 
has evolved enormously, and is equally large in coverage and impor-
tance. Brazil’s CCT provides something of an interesting contrast to the 
Mexican case in various respects—the issue of federalism is more to the 
fore in the program; it takes a softer, more gradual tack on conditions; 
and it puts a shade more emphasis on redistribution than on human 
capital formation. Also, unlike the Mexican program, the Brazilian 
programs did not explicitly incorporate impact evaluations in their 
design; as a result, much less is known about the impact they have had 
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on consumption, poverty, health, nutrition, and education than is true 
of Mexico’s program. Table 1.2 shows some of the more salient similari-
ties and differences between the Oportunidades program in Mexico and 
the Bolsa Família program in Brazil.
There is another branch of the CCT program family that focuses 
on education in low-income countries. The programs usually cover a 
Table 1.2 Implementation of “Similar” Programs: Contrast between Mexico and Brazil
Program feature Mexico Brazil
More-similar features
Program size 5 million families 
25% of the population
11 million families
25% of the population
Defi nition of conditions Education:
•  School enrollment and minimum 
attendance rate of 85%, both monthly 
and annually
•  Completion of high school (for savings 
account)
Health: 
•  Compliance by all household members 
with the required number of health 
center visits and mother’s attendance at 
health and nutrition lectures
Education:
•  At least 85% school attendance in a 
3-month period for children aged 6–15 
Health:
•  Children 0–7: vaccination and follow-up 
of nutritional development
•  Pregnant women: pre- and postnatal 
visits, health and nutrition seminars
Less-similar features
Targeting system Geographic targeting used to determine 
which rural areas participated initially
Proxy means test used for household 
targeting within localities and in urban areas
Program itself does targeting and program 
registration 
Geographic targeting used to assign ration 
of slots in registry of poor households
Means test used as household targeting 
system 
Municipalities do program targeting and 
program registration
Evaluation Explicitly taken into account in program 
design
No systematic attempt to integrate 
evaluation of program impact into design
Benefi t structure Differentiated by age, grade, gender Differentiated by poverty level
Payment mechanism In cash at program-specifi c payment points Via debit card usable at banks, ATM 
machines, and lottery points
Enforcement of conditions Rigorous, reduction in benefi ts at fi rst 
round of noncompliance
Warning system, noncomplying households 
seen as in need of additional “care” and 
problem solving
Source: Authors’ compilation.
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narrower segment of education—some only secondary (Bangladesh’s 
Female Secondary School Assistance Program [FSSAP]; Cambodia’s 
Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction [JFPR] and Education Sector 
Support Project [CESSP]), some only primary (Bolivia, Kenya, and 
proposals in Nigeria and Tanzania), and occasionally both (Indonesia’s 
Jaring Pengamanan Sosial [JPS] program). The genesis of these pro-
grams is rather varied. In Bangladesh, the FSSAP was part of a strategy 
to close the then signifi cant gender gap in education. Doing so was 
seen as an important policy objective: in 1981, the female literacy rate 
(approximately 13 percent) was about half the literacy rate among men 
(26 percent). As a result, a series of stipend and tuition waiver programs 
was made available to girls as long as they attended school regularly, 
made passing grades, and remained unmarried. In addition, the Food 
for Education (FFE) program was initiated in 1995 to provide in-kind 
food transfers to poor households as long as they sent their children to 
primary school (Ravallion and Wodon 2000). The FFE in-kind trans-
fer was converted to a cash transfer in 2002, and was renamed as the 
Primary Education Stipend Program.
In Indonesia, the JPS program was instituted following the East 
Asian fi nancial crisis in order to prevent children from dropping out. 
In Kenya and Tanzania, the programs are geared especially to coping 
with the crisis of orphans and vulnerable children that has burgeoned 
in the wake of HIV/AIDS. In many cases, the administrative structure 
behind these programs is less sophisticated than it is for the big Latin 
American programs. This is a result of several things. First, because 
these are primarily education programs and often are run through the 
education ministry, there are fewer actors to coordinate. Second, daily 
attendance is not always a condition of receipt of the transfer, and that 
simplifi es administration. Third, the programs are newer and situated 
in lower-capacity countries so simpler systems are to be expected. To 
compensate for the lack of a complex administrative structure, the role 
of the community in implementing the programs is often greater than 
it is in the Latin American programs.
Chile Solidario works in a very different way to fi ll a different niche. 
The program is targeted to only the extremely poor, about 5 percent 
of Chile’s population. It differs notably from classic CCT programs 
by customizing its conditions. Families initially work intensely with 
social workers to understand actions that could help them get out of 
extreme poverty, and then they commit to action plans that become 
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the household-specifi c conditions of the benefi t. The diagnosis covers a 
total of 53 different so-called minimum conditions grouped along seven 
dimensions (identifi cation and legal documentation, family dynamics, 
education, health, housing, employment, and income). Households 
receive a comparatively small cash transfer, with the amount declining 
periodically during the two years of active participation, and then a 
still lower amount for an additional three years following the program. 
However, they receive preferential access to the full range of Chilean 
social assistance programs from the time they join Chile Solidario 
through the end of the three-year follow-up period. Additional, though 
small, transfers come from those other social programs; the transfer 
from Chile Solidario itself is really intended only to motivate clients 
to avail themselves of the services of the social worker. Chile Solidario 
is thus far a model unto itself, although other programs are moving to 
emulate it to a degree.2 
The different goals and contexts of the programs suggest that some-
what different benchmarks may be pertinent to judge them, and dif-
ferent weights should be given to results in different dimensions—for 
example, reduction in consumption poverty versus improvements in 
human development outcomes. Primary school enrollment in Colombia 
and Mexico already exceeded 90 percent before the CCT programs. 
Enrollment increased slightly due to the CCTs, but dramatic gains were 
not possible because the base was already so high. Those programs, 
however, emphasized their role in social assistance and, with large 
transfers and well-targeted and extensive coverage, they are successful 
at it. The Bangladesh stipend for girls in secondary school was designed 
as a gender-targeted education program. It makes small cash payments, 
however; and given its focus on increasing girls’ enrollments, it did not 
contemplate poverty targeting. Thus, without an understanding of the 
program and its original goals, one could consider it a failure by the 
standards of social assistance.
Variation can occur not only among countries, but even within a 
single program over time. For example, in the 10 years of its existence, 
Mexico’s Oportunidades has undergone continuous evolution of 
implementation systems in order to respond to changing needs as the 
program expanded and as administrative systems were built. The role 
of geographic targeting was reduced as the program achieved national 
coverage, the role of community targeting was eliminated, and the role 
of the proxy means test increased accordingly. Carrying out the proxy 
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means test and eligibility procedures moved from contracted agencies to 
in-house staff. Both eligibility and compliance monitoring were moved 
from a paper-based system to computerized systems, and most of the 
data now fl ows via the Internet. The timeline for bringing people into 
the program has been reduced from 6–8 months to 4–8 days, and a set 
of benefi ts held in a savings account was added to the cash payment.
The role and design of CCT programs is evolving in many countries. 
Early successes with the basic model are bringing countries to address a 
second and third round of challenges, including these: 
• Should the emphasis on expanding the supply of services be com-
plemented with efforts to improve the quality of those services, in 
tandem with the demand-increasing action of the CCT? 
• Should the range or defi nition of conditions be changed, for 
example, to reward performance instead of, or in addition to, 
service use? 
• What can be done to ensure that youth who are aging out of 
the school support provided by the program can attain jobs or 
receive further training?
• What should be the balance between targeting younger and 
older children? 
In some countries, CCT programs themselves are addressing those 
challenges through adjustment to their basic design; in other cases, they 
are catalyzing changes in other programs.
Outline of the Report and Issues Covered
This report seeks to bring together existing knowledge about CCTs. 
Starting with the Mexican program Oportunidades, an important fea-
ture of CCT programs has been the strong emphasis they have placed 
on credible evaluations of their impact on various outcomes. The report 
draws heavily on those evaluations, and expands on earlier efforts to 
assess the performance of CCT programs using evidence from impact 
evaluations (see Das, Do, and Özler 2005; Rawlings and Rubio 2004). 
Indeed, it would not have been possible to write this report without the 
efforts of the programs themselves, international donors, and academics 
around the world to ensure the high quality of many of the evaluations. 
(See appendix B for further discussion of CCT impact evaluations.)
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The accumulating evidence of positive impacts has been instru-
mental both in sustaining existing programs and in encouraging the 
establishment of similar programs in other developing countries.3 
Nevertheless, although the initial group of evaluations provided solid 
evidence of impact along several key dimensions, important policy 
and operational questions remain. First, much of what is known about 
CCTs is based on evaluations of programs in Latin America, especially 
Mexico. It is not clear, therefore, whether CCTs could be expected to 
have similar impacts in other settings, especially in countries that are 
signifi cantly poorer and that tend to have weaker institutions. Although 
much of the evidence discussed in this report is based on studies of 
Latin American programs, we have made a special effort to discuss 
the evidence from countries in other regions, especially programs in 
Bangladesh and Cambodia. 
Second, as CCT programs have become larger—in several countries 
they represent a substantial share of public budgets dedicated to poverty 
reduction—demand for evidence on their results has grown beyond the 
initial emphasis on a small number of outcomes. For example, policy 
makers and academics increasingly are focusing on possible long-term 
effects of the transfers, as well as on changes in “fi nal” outcomes (say, 
learning rather than school enrollment, or nutritional status rather than 
frequency of growth monitoring checkups). This report pays particular 
attention to these outcomes, which have been discussed less extensively 
in the literature on CCTs.
Third, the fact that CCT programs are being implemented in very 
diverse country settings raises many questions regarding their design: 
the role of conditions, the appropriate means of targeting, the right size 
of the transfer, and the best way to coordinate CCT programs with the 
supply of services are just a few of the important questions being asked. 
Again, we make special efforts to analyze the possible importance of 
these features of program design in explaining changes in outcomes, 
and to consider carefully the appropriate role of a CCT within a coun-
try’s social assistance system (although that is a complex agenda that 
goes beyond the goals of this report).
The rest of the report proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 provides a 
conceptual framework in which to think about CCTs. The chapter 
focuses particularly on when it makes sense to condition transfers on 
household investments in child human capital. It discusses three broad 
sets of circumstances under which CCTs are likely to be particularly 
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attractive. The fi rst set of circumstances is a case in which parents invest 
less in the human capital of their children than is warranted by the pri-
vate returns to those investments. That situation might happen because 
parents value their own welfare more than that of their children; are 
poorly informed about the returns to investments in education, health, 
and nutrition; or are myopic and discount the future very heavily. In 
the second set of circumstances, there are externalities to human capital 
investments, as might be true if there are spillovers from having a better-
educated or more healthy population that are not taken into account by 
rational individuals when they make decisions about investments. The 
third set of circumstances is one in which there are political economy 
considerations that justify imposing conditions on transfers, as might be 
the case, for example, when it is easier to sustain a budget for a program 
if transfers are perceived not as a handout but as a quid pro quo whereby 
a government gives households cash if—and only if—these households 
act “responsibly” and invest in their children.
Following that conceptual discussion, chapter 3 describes in detail 
how CCT programs work. Virtually all CCT programs have attempted 
to direct their benefi ts to the poor so the chapter begins with a discus-
sion of the targeting instruments used in different programs. It then 
describes the benefi t systems, including who receives the payment, how 
payment takes place, and what payment levels are in practice. The chap-
ter continues by describing how programs have monitored conditions 
and the extent to which households are penalized for noncompliance. 
The fi nal two sections of the chapter discuss the importance of monitor-
ing and evaluation and how CCTs have coordinated with other actors 
in the social sectors.
Redistribution of resources to the poor is one of the two funda-
mental goals of most CCT programs, and chapter 4 presents the evi-
dence of CCT impact on consumption poverty. The chapter discusses 
the impacts in the short term and, for two countries (Mexico and 
Nicaragua), in the medium term. Many policy makers originally had 
concerns that the effects of CCTs on household consumption would 
be relatively small as households made offsetting adjustments. As the 
chapter discusses, however, those adjustments—in terms of reductions 
in adult labor supply, in remittances, or in household access to other 
social programs—have been modest. As a result, the impact of CCTs 
on consumption poverty is largely determined (at least in the short run) 
by the size of the transfer and the extent to which programs effectively 
can ensure that the cash reaches poor households.
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The second fundamental goal of CCTs is to encourage households 
to invest in the human capital of their children. Chapter 5 turns to the 
evidence on the impact that CCTs have had on outcomes in education, 
health, and nutrition. The chapter begins by showing that CCTs have 
had signifi cant effects on the use of education and health services, and 
that those effects often have been substantial in magnitude. It then dis-
cusses the evidence of CCT effects on “fi nal” outcomes in education and 
health. The chapter shows that the evidence on the impact of CCTs on 
these outcomes is somewhat mixed. Thus, CCTs appear to have had a 
modest impact on years of schooling completed by adults; they reduced 
the incidence of low child height for age in some countries and among 
some populations but not others; and they had little effect on learning 
outcomes among either school-age children or adults. Addressing those 
shortcomings is likely to require a combination of efforts: redefi ning 
conditions, perhaps including incentives for performance, not only 
service use; improving the quality of the supply of services; and comple-
menting CCTs with interventions that help households overcome other 
barriers to adequate child nutrition, development, and learning. The 
chapter closes by discussing whether CCT program impacts that are 
observed are the result of the “income” effect associated with the trans-
fer or the “price” effect that results from the conditions.
Chapter 6, the fi nal chapter of the report, returns to the conceptual 
framework presented in chapter 2. In particular, with the evidence 
from chapters 4 and 5 in hand, it discusses when CCT programs are 
likely to be the right policy instrument. It then turns to a discussion 
of how CCT programs should be designed—for example, in terms of 
the population covered, the conditions that are monitored, and the 
magnitude of the transfer. The chapter closes by considering where 
CCTs fi t in the context of social policies. An important message of the 
chapter is that CCTs have shown themselves to be effective and versatile 
programs. However, they are most likely to be effective in stimulating 
investments in child human capital and in providing a social safety net 
when they work closely with other programs. The chapter reviews some 
of the ongoing efforts by developing countries in this area. It also argues 
that there are other interventions—workfare or employment programs, 
pensions—that need to complement even the best-designed and best-
managed CCT.
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The Economic Rationale for 
Conditional Cash Transfers
CCTS ARE CASH TRANSFERS THAT ARE (1) TARGETED TO THE POOR 
and (2) made conditional on certain behaviors of recipient households. 
More specifi cally, these cash transfers are conditioned on minimum 
levels of use of health and education services, generally by (or for the 
benefi t of) the children in the household. Typical requirements include 
enrollment and actual attendance at schools (for example, minimum 
attendance rates of 85 percent are required in Brazil’s Bolsa Família and 
a similar restriction applies in Mexico’s Oportunidades). Programs that 
have a health component also may require that children make regular 
visits to a health center and receive immunizations, and that pregnant 
women and lactating mothers keep a predetermined number of appoint-
ments at local clinics or attend informational sessions (pláticas) on 
hygiene and nutrition. 
This chapter provides a conceptual understanding of how CCTs 
work. Governments have scarce resources and CCTs—whether they 
increase service use or not—compete for funds with other worthwhile 
projects, such as buying school equipment or upgrading rural roads. 
Why is giving people money to keep their children in (possibly very 
bad) schools a good use of public funds? Wouldn’t it be better to buy 
more books and supplies or to improve teacher training so as to raise 
the quality of the education provided in those schools?
Even if there are good arguments for spending part of the govern-
ment’s budget on direct cash transfers to households, does it really 
make sense to attach conditions to the cash? After all, if attending those 
schools (or walking 5 miles to the local clinic to have the baby weighed) 
contributed more to expected future well-being than an alternative 
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use of the child’s time, wouldn’t households already be sending their 
children there? A condition is a constraint on behavior. What good can 
come of adding a constraint to the household’s optimization problem? 
Why not just make the transfer unconditionally? 
Economists might think of at least two kinds of disadvantage asso-
ciated with attaching conditions to cash transfers. First, some of the 
neediest households might fi nd the conditions too costly to comply 
with (because the clinics are too far away or because their need for 
child help in harvesting a living from the land is too pressing), and 
may thus be deterred from taking up the benefi t. Conditions thereby 
might exclude some of the people the program aims to reach. Second, 
those households that do opt for the benefi t may incur a costly dis-
tortion to their own behavior for the sake of a little extra cash in the 
short run. Perhaps they know how bad the local school (or clinic) is. 
Perhaps it is wasteful for the children to spend time there, rather than 
learning how to tend the fi elds or how to weave a basket with their 
parents. By pushing poor households to do something that they would 
otherwise not be doing, CCTs might be imposing costly distractions 
on people who are trying to do the best thing for their families under 
conditions of severe scarcity.
Proponents of CCT programs should have good answers to questions 
and arguments such as those posed above. There are, in fact, a number 
of good reasons for attaching conditions to targeted cash transfers. This 
chapter reviews the case for conditioning, and briefl y discusses some of 
the empirical evidence on how likely it is that circumstances that justify 
conditions are found in practice.
Cash Transfers: Arguments in Support and Against
The fi rst question one might ask when considering whether a CCT 
makes sense is this: are cash transfers in general a good instrument in 
a particular country? That question is by no means rhetorical. Even if 
everyone accepts poverty reduction as a central policy objective, it does 
not follow immediately that the government should spend its scarce 
resources by transferring cash directly to poor people. 
Broadly, one hears two arguments against such transfers: First, 
poverty is best reduced by economic growth, particularly in the poor-
est countries. In those same countries, fi scal efforts and administrative 
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capacity both tend to be low, and governments should focus on provid-
ing basic infrastructure (which could include roads and ports as well as 
schools and clinics). In this view, cash transfers to a vast poor major-
ity are seen as having a lower future payoff than investment in public 
capital, and as being harder to target and deliver. The second argument 
against cash transfers is that they provide the wrong incentives to recipi-
ents. For example, they may discourage labor supply or investment in 
a person’s own human capital for future gainful employment. If the 
government provides the basic necessities of life, the thinking goes, why 
would people in low-productivity settings bother with very hard work 
that pays so little? 
When combined, those arguments are not to be dismissed immedi-
ately. Direct investment in public infrastructure is likely to be a serious 
alternative use of public funds in very poor countries, and handouts of 
public cash can discourage self-reliance. But there also are many argu-
ments for direct redistribution. First, in most developing countries, 
public expenditure on infrastructure and public services—of the kind 
just advocated—often fails to reach the very poor. In Nicaragua, only 
10 percent of households in the bottom quintile of the expenditure 
distribution had access to electricity in 1998, compared with more than 
90 percent of households in the top quintile (de Ferranti et al. 2004, p. 
209). The sizable electricity subsidies that were in place in Mexico in 
2000 also had a regressive incidence, as documented by Scott (2002). 
In fact, the proponents of the pioneering Oportunidades CCT program 
explicitly couched the initiative as an alternative to the electricity and 
tortilla subsidies, in a way that would be both more equitable (by reach-
ing the poor) and more effi cient (by eliminating the price distortions 
generated by the subsidies). In this context, if cash transfers can be 
shown to be targeted to the poor more effectively than other forms of 
public expenditure, they may contribute to poverty reduction in ways 
that direct public investment does not. 
Second, markets seldom work perfectly in practice, and sometimes 
they fail in ways that prevent poor people from being as productive as 
they might otherwise be. If the root causes of some of these failures are 
too costly to correct, simple redistribution of current resources may be 
able to reduce the effi ciency costs.1 The classic example is that of credit-
constrained families (in an economy with imperfect capital markets) 
that cannot make profi table investments in their children’s education 
or in some other business project. A direct transfer of cash to these 
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families might enable them to undertake an effi cient project that would 
otherwise not have taken place. Once again, the transfer would be both 
equitable (by making a poor person better off) and effi cient (by better 
allocating capital within the economy). 
Similarly, insurance markets often are beyond the reach of many 
poor families. When incomes are volatile, refl ecting a risky economic 
environment, cash transfers can smooth (some of) the fl uctuations, 
raising household welfare. Fields et al. (2007) review evidence of sub-
stantial short-term income volatility in a number of countries in Latin 
America. If these fl uctuations are suffi ciently severe, they may affect 
demand for schooling or health investments, potentially with long-term 
consequences.2 Once again, if fi xing the insurance markets themselves 
is too costly or complicated, volatility can provide an additional argu-
ment for targeted cash transfer programs. 
Finally, the fact that many of the inequalities one observes in the 
developing world are inherited from one’s parents may make them 
ethically objectionable. Differences associated with circumstances 
over which individuals have no control (such as race, gender, or family 
background) often are regarded as “inequality of opportunity,” which 
the state has a moral obligation to redress (see Roemer [1998] and 
Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Walton [2007]). Cash transfers might be 
suitable instruments for compensating families who suffer from inher-
ited disadvantage.
In the face of arguments both for and against, it cannot be stated 
categorically that every country in the world should have a cash trans-
fer program in place to help reduce poverty. But the case often can be 
made that some effi cient redistribution of the kind just described can be 
achieved, as discussed in box 2.1. Chapter 5 of the World Development 
Report 2006 (World Bank 2005) discusses other examples from across 
the developing world, both of market failures and of the resulting 
underinvestment. 
CCT programs still may be justifi ed in the absence of redistribu-
tive goals, as a means to improve incentives for households to invest in 
human capital. In the remainder of this report, however, it is assumed 
that policy makers have weighed the arguments for and against cash-
based redistribution, and have reached a considered decision that there 
is some room for cash transfers in their policy arsenal against poverty.
This chapter next turns to the question of whether it makes sense 
to attach conditions to these cash transfers. The “theoretical default” 
49
T H E  E C O N O M I C  R A T I O N A L E  F O R  C O N D I T I O N A L  C A S H  T R A N S F E R S
position—with informed rational agents, benevolent governments, and 
functioning markets—should be to favor unconditional cash transfers. 
Standard revealed preference arguments establish that choice sets are 
larger for an unconditional cash transfer than if the same transfer is 
given in kind with a no-resale condition. Similar arguments also show 
that a consumer is at least as well-off under a cash transfer as when the 
same budget is used to subsidize a particular good. A transfer that is 
conditional on the purchase of a specifi c good (or the use of a particular 
service) is, of course, analogous to such a subsidy (even if the posttrans-
fer price is negative).
THERE ARE MANY SITUATIONS IN WHICH A 
market failure opens up the possibility of effi cient 
redistribution. Under certain types of credit market 
imperfection, and if there are economies of scale, 
the poor may be unable to take advantage of profi t-
able opportunities because they do not have access 
to the required scale. They thus may be trapped 
in a low-productivity sector of the economy, even 
as more productive opportunities go unexploited, 
because of an inability to commit to repayment in 
credit markets. Some amount of redistribution in 
cash from the rich to the poor may raise the ability 
of the latter to take advantage of these more profi t-
able investments, thereby reducing both inequality 
and ineffi ciency.
This possibility was first modeled by Loury 
(1981), who introduced credit constraints into a 
model of intergenerational mobility. Galor and Zeira 
(1993) further noted the link between aggregate effi -
ciency and reduced inequality under nonconvex pro-
duction sets. Banerjee and Newman (1993) exploited 
long-term implications of the same basic type of 
mechanism by noting the effect of initial levels of 
inequality on patterns of occupational choice and 
subsequent inequality trajectories. All those papers 
demonstrate the theoretical plausibility that some 
redistribution may increase effi ciency.
Empirical examples of aggregate underinvest-
ment arising from the inability of the poor to access 
credit and insurance markets on equal terms now 
abound. In one striking case from Africa, Goldstein 
and Udry (1999) document the failure of many farm-
ers to switch from a low-return maize and cassava 
intercrop to a much more profi table pineapple cul-
ture in southern Ghana. Despite an expected return 
of 1,200 percent, only 190 out of 1,070 plots in the 
study sample made the switch. When asked why, the 
modal answer was “I don’t have the money.” In Sri 
Lanka, de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2008) use 
a randomized experimental design to estimate the 
return on capital for microenterprises that generally 
are thought to be credit constrained. They fi nd aver-
age monthly real rates of return of 5.7 percent—much 
higher than the market interest rate. The existence 
of investment projects (in preexisting fi rms) that are 
profi table at the prevailing market rate, but that do 
not take place (before the intervention) is prima facie 
evidence that the credit market is imperfect. 
Until the underlying causes of failures in credit 
and insurance markets can be corrected, this kind of 
evidence suggests that targeted cash transfers can be 
useful not only in reducing inequality and current 
poverty, but also in reducing ineffi ciencies in the 
economywide allocation of resources.
Box 2.1 Effi cient Redistribution in the Presence of Market Failure
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There are three main conceptual arguments for conditioning a cash 
transfer. First, agents do not always behave exactly as one would expect 
fully informed, rational agents to behave. Private information about the 
nature of certain investments, or about their expected returns, may be 
imperfect and persistent. There is also a body of evidence from recent 
research in behavioral economics that suggests that people often suffer 
from self-control problems and excessive procrastination, in the sense 
that their day-to-day behavior is inconsistent with their own long-term 
attitude toward the future (for example, see O’Donoghue and Rabin 
[1999]). There also may be confl icts of interest within the household, 
either between the parents (who “pay” for education or health services 
today) and their children (who benefi t tomorrow), or between the father 
and the mother. These confl icts of interest may result in “incomplete 
altruism”: parental decisions that are not fully consistent with what the 
child would have chosen herself, if fully rational.
What imperfect information, myopia, and incomplete altruism have 
in common, for our purposes, is that they may cause a family’s privately 
chosen level of investment in human capital to be too low, compared 
with its own “true” private optimal.3 If they are pervasive, then these 
distortions in private decision making provide some contemporary sup-
port to the time-honored notion that governments may “know better” 
what is privately good for poor people than do the poor themselves, at 
least in some realms. The following section of this chapter therefore 
reviews these arguments under the general heading “Microfoundations 
of Paternalism.” 
The second main conceptual argument for conditioning a cash trans-
fer is that governments typically do not behave like textbook benevo-
lent dictators. Policy decisions generally result from decision-making 
processes that involve voting, lobbying, bureaucratic and interagency 
bargaining, and a variety of other forms of what one broadly might call 
political economy. Under some circumstances, conditioning cash trans-
fers on “good behavior” may increase public support for them, making 
the program either feasible or better-endowed. The third section below 
briefl y reviews this political economy argument. 
A third set of justifi cations for making cash transfers conditional is 
that, even if the levels of human capital investment by the poor were 
privately optimal, they might not be socially optimal because of the pres-
ence of market failures, particularly, externalities. These justifi cations 
are considered in the fourth section, “Social Effi ciency Arguments.”
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The Microfoundations of Paternalism
The idea that poor people need the push (or nudge) of government 
“incentives” to behave in ways that are “good for them” is a very old 
notion. It seems to imply that if left to their own devices, these agents 
somehow are not capable of choosing what is in their best interests. 
Although it is not a very fashionable notion among most mainstream 
economists today, paternalism (under different guises) has long been 
used to promote conditional forms of redistribution. 
Consider, for instance, the idea that there are some specifi c goods 
that society sees as essential, as in Richard Musgrave’s (1959) descrip-
tion of merit goods or merit wants. These might be goods that enter the 
social welfare function directly, implying that “society” derives utility 
from everyone being educated or from everyone having access to decent 
housing or health care—in addition to the benefi ts accruing to each 
individual from his or her own consumption of those goods. Another 
way to think about merit goods is that a “social planner” places greater 
welfare weight on consumption levels of certain specifi c goods than 
the individual himself would place on them (for example, see Besley 
[1988]). However it is modeled formally, this old idea of merit goods 
could be used as an argument in support of today’s CCT programs: if 
society somehow places a value on every child being schooled or having 
access to health services that is greater than the value that individuals 
themselves place, then a CCT will provide an incentive toward that 
additional consumption of the merit good, as desired.4,5
Paternalism well may be justified if the individuals in question 
hold persistently erroneous beliefs; if they are not unitary agents, but 
households within which there may be confl icts of interest; or if they 
behave myopically. Recent developments in economic theory and recent 
empirical evidence both suggest that all three of those phenomena may 
be at work.6
The basic economics of these sources of private decision-making 
failure can be illustrated using a simple dynamic model of educational 
choice, outlined more formally in Ferreira (2008). The essence of 
the model is that individual welfare depends on consumption in two 
periods—childhood and adulthood. The link between the two periods 
is that children can contribute to household resources during childhood 
by working (some of the time) in the fi rst period. But any time spent 
working comes at the expense of time spent studying (or otherwise 
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investing in the child’s human capital), and thus at the expense of 
earnings and consumption during adulthood. This trade-off between 
present and future welfare is at the heart of educational decisions made 
for or by children in developing countries, where child earnings (or 
contributions to family enterprises) often are not negligible.7
This simple framework sheds light on the consequences of each of 
the three kinds of distortion listed above for educational choice and for 
child welfare (under different assumptions about how the credit market 
works). In each case, the model tells us what we might expect from 
two kinds of policy response: unconditional cash transfers (UCTs) and 
conditional cash transfers.8 When credit markets are missing, many of 
those insights can be illustrated by fi gure 2.1, where the household’s 
choice of child time spent in school is plotted against the market wage 
rate for child labor. 
The schooling investment function yields the household’s demand 
for schooling, given the prevailing child wage rate (wm) and a set of 
additional parameters, such as expected returns to schooling, the dis-
count rate, the quality of the education expected from the school, and 
other incomes available to the family. When plotted against the wage 
rate, it slopes downward: the higher the opportunity cost of attending 
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Figure 2.1 Choice of Investment in Children with Missing Credit Markets
Source: Authors’ illustration.
Note: wm = child wage rate.
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school, the lower the desired investment in education. Changes in the 
remaining arguments shift the function up or down in this space. For 
instance, a decline in the expected returns to (or quality of) education, 
a rise in the discount rate, or a reduction in the levels of other income 
sources available to the household would shift the investment function 
in fi gure 2.1 from a position such as that denoted “original” to one 
such as that denoted “shifted.” This simple framework can be used to 
investigate the effects of the distortions mentioned above. 
Misinformation or Persistently Misguided Beliefs
Suppose that, for some reason, potential beneficiaries are poorly 
informed about the future returns to education. Of course, if this is a 
simple information asymmetry with no mechanism causing the incor-
rect belief to persist, then the optimal policy intervention is to address 
the information problem—say through a publicity campaign. But pro-
cessing information may be costly: Being convinced about the health 
benefi ts of greater schooling, for instance, may require time and effort to 
process the evidence. In addition, certain beliefs may be self-reinforcing 
so that when agents act on the basis of the beliefs, the outcomes confi rm 
them, even if alternative beliefs would have led to superior outcomes.9 
It is possible that large groups of people may then believe that returns 
to education are lower than they really are. A possible example is that 
of poorer families believing that effort (perhaps in education) is less 
important than connections in generating upward mobility, whereas 
those who are better-off believe the opposite. These beliefs can lead to 
different actions and thus to different outcomes that appear to confi rm 
the initial beliefs—even though the poor also would have benefi ted if 
they had put in greater effort. 
It also is possible that people hold incorrect beliefs about how human 
capital itself accumulates (rather than about returns). They may believe 
that formal schooling requires very high levels of natural talent that 
are not to be found in their families. They may ignore the existence 
of links between formal schooling and parenting skills or health and 
hygiene outcomes. These inaccurate beliefs may result from the insuf-
fi cient availability of information or from diffi culties in processing the 
information that is available. If parents are poorly educated, it may limit 
their ability to process the information on education complementarities 
or on rates of return.10
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In fact, there is some evidence that incorrect beliefs about educa-
tion returns can persist in real populations. A practical way to test for 
such information problems is to compare expected returns to school-
ing (for example, by asking students or parents what they think) with 
the observed Mincerian returns from a household survey (“realized 
returns”).11 For example, Attanasio and Kaufmann (2008) compare 
expected and realized returns among 15–25-year-olds in Mexico and 
fi nd that expected returns from additional schooling were lower than 
the realized returns, especially among children of fathers who have low 
education levels. 
Similarly, Jensen (2006) fi nds that, in the Dominican Republic, 
eighth-grade students estimated the rate of return to secondary school 
to be only one quarter to one third of the rate derived from an income 
survey. When students were told of the real rate, those who underesti-
mated it in the fi rst place increased their secondary school graduation 
rate by 6 percentage points. Both studies provide evidence consistent 
with information failures resulting in ineffi ciently low investments in 
education. But the evidence is not conclusive, and testing for infor-
mation failures in other types of investments in human capital is less 
straightforward.12
Also, investments in education may have positive impacts on 
health, and vice versa—another good reason why individuals may 
have a hard time adequately estimating returns. For instance, Jalan 
and Ravallion (2003a) show that piped water only improved health 
status when mothers were educated. Along similar lines, de Walque 
(2007) shows that an HIV/AIDS campaign in Uganda was most 
effective among educated households. Miguel and Kremer (2004) 
provide an example of how health investments (deworming) improve 
education outcomes.
As previously indicated, if the problem is only missing information, 
providing the information directly would seem to be the first-best 
intervention (rather than having a CCT). For example, Dupas (2007) 
shows how informing girls that HIV prevalence was higher among adult 
males and their partners than among teenage boys led girls to avoid the 
cross-generational partnerships that are riskier in terms of HIV infec-
tion rates.
However, there are at least two situations under which simply pro-
viding information may not do much. First, incorrect beliefs may be 
self-reinforcing, in which case merely providing the information will 
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not help. Second, passively providing information may not be enough 
because, at least initially, people may not think they need the informa-
tion and so may not respond to it. A transfer conditioned on attending 
relevant information sessions or activities thus may be a better option. 
One example is parenting interventions. There is a great deal of evidence 
that poor outcomes in early childhood can be a result of poor home 
environments, including inadequate parenting practices (some of this 
evidence for the United States is discussed in box 2.2). However, most 
people believe that they are not bad parents and, therefore, are unlikely 
to respond either to an information campaign or to home-visiting 
programs in which social workers teach them how to be better parents. 
Oportunidades and some other CCTs attempt to expose parents to new 
information and practices by conditioning transfers on participation in 
NOBEL-WINNING ECONOMIST JAMES HECKMAN 
and many others have argued recently for the impor-
tance of investments in early childhood (Heckman 
and Masterov 2007; Heckman 2008). This research 
makes a number of important points: (1) poor out-
comes in early childhood have long-lasting implica-
tions for functioning in adulthood, including low 
earnings, increases in the likelihood of criminal 
activity, and poor parenting practices; (2) poor 
outcomes in early childhood are often a result of 
adverse home environments, including the absence 
of a stable family structure and nurturing relation-
ships for children; (3) interventions in early child-
hood increase the productivity of interventions later 
in the life cycle (“learning begets learning”); (4) 
defi cits in early childhood are much more costly to 
remedy later; and (5) investments in different dimen-
sions of child well-being, such as those that lead to 
improvements in cognitive skills, behavioral out-
comes, and child health, are interlinked in important 
ways. Improving outcomes in one dimension makes 
it more likely that children will be able to make up 
defi cits in other dimensions.
Whereas the research by Heckman and his coau-
thors has focused on the United States, some of the 
conceptual underpinnings are relevant for the design 
of CCTs in developing countries. Unlike most other 
programs, CCTs seek to improve outcomes in vari-
ous dimensions of child well-being, including edu-
cation, health, and, through the pláticas, parenting 
practices (although pláticas are required in some but 
not all CCTs). Arguably, CCTs therefore implic-
itly attempt to exploit the synergies that Heckman 
and others have identifi ed. In addition, CCTs seek 
to build the human capital of children throughout 
the life cycle, including at the earliest ages. Finally, 
CCTs transfer cash, and this can help alleviate the 
resource constraints that partly explain the adverse 
home environments and inadequate investments 
by parents in their children. That being said, CCT 
programs would benefi t from more experimenta-
tion to see what combination of cash, conditions, 
social marketing, and information provision is 
most effective at ensuring that children do not fall 
behind at early ages—one of the main messages of 
this report.
Box 2.2 Investing Early in the Life Cycle
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pláticas; cumulative exposure of this sort may help do the trick, and the 
conditioned cash helps ensure that parents attend and participate in the 
talks (Schady 2006).
What might be the consequences of persistent misinformation? 
An underestimation of returns to schooling, for instance, could lead 
to an ineffi ciently low level of investment in education (or health), 
even under perfect credit markets. With lower expected returns, the 
demand for education depicted in fi gure 2.1 shifts downward and 
schooling investment falls from a high level in point A, to a low level 
in a point such as B. Since actual returns to schooling are higher than 
the household’s expectation, point B is a (privately) ineffi ciently low 
level of schooling. Some form of intervention may be warranted—but 
what kind? 
Because credit allows for a separation between investment and 
consumption decisions, a UCT would have no effect on investment 
under perfect credit markets. A UCT merely raises the overall level of 
permanent income. And when capital markets are perfect, investment 
in one’s children, just like any other investment decision, is independent 
of one’s income levels and depends only on expected returns and the 
interest rate.13 A CCT, on the other hand, can help shift the investment 
level toward the optimal by reducing the opportunity cost of studying. 
It alters the expected returns to investment by affecting the price associ-
ated with the investment good, in addition to raising income levels. A 
CCT would move the agent along the shifted investment function, from 
point B upward and to the left.
On the other hand, if credit markets are imperfect, the effect of 
misguided beliefs is likely to be even greater, particularly for the poor. 
When credit is not available, those who are poor today may fi nd it 
optimal to use child labor as a (very costly) consumption-smoothing 
mechanism: children may be sent out to increase the availability of 
consumption goods today, even at the expense of higher remunera-
tion in the future. In this case, even a UCT would have some effect 
on present levels of investment in health and education. These effects 
correspond to the income effect of the transfer and reduce the effects 
of missing credit markets on educational investment. Nevertheless, a 
CCT generally will have a larger positive effect on investment than 
will an unconditional transfer of the same amount. This outcome sim-
ply follows from the fact that a CCT adds a substitution effect to the 
income effect of the UCT. If an underestimation of expected returns 
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to education had shifted the household from point A to point B in 
fi gure 2.1, then a small UCT could shift it back upward to point C. 
A CCT of the same amount will move the household’s choice to point 
D, entailing a higher level of investment in schooling. By remunerating 
school attendance, the CCT effectively lowers the opportunity cost of 
studying, relative to working. 
Note that for the household’s welfare (rather than simply its invest-
ment in schooling) at point D to be higher than at point C, it is critical 
that the household be operating under incorrect beliefs. That is why, 
as previously discussed, another imperfection (in addition to the credit 
market failure) is required to justify the condition. Credit constraints 
are relaxed by cash, not by conditions. If there were no additional 
imperfection and the only problem were a credit constraint, a UCT 
should be preferred. A CCT that provided the same income transfer 
would only ineffi ciently distort behavior (toward excessive schooling) 
through the condition. 
The existence of the substitution effect discussed above has 
another important implication for program design: it is possible 
to set a CCT level too high, thus encouraging children to a rate of 
service use that is greater than optimal. This situation (which cor-
responds to points northwest of point E in fi gure 2.1) is evocative of 
anecdotes about children wasting valuable time in classrooms where 
they learn nothing instead of helping their parents in the fi eld, or 
of children taken to unsanitary health facilities that act as disease 
contamination foci because parents have been bribed to take the 
risk. The upshot seems to be this: because CCTs impose a condi-
tion, they are more powerful instruments for inducing behavioral 
change than are UCTs. They are “higher-risk/higher-return” policy 
instruments. When private behavior is suboptimal, they correct it 
at a lower cost. When private behavior was fi ne to begin with, their 
misuse is likely to be costlier. 
Principal–Agent Problems within the Household, 
or “Incomplete Parental Altruism”
Even if parents have a correct expectation of future returns to education, 
they may discount the future more heavily than is optimal from the point 
of view of the child. Basic models of schooling choice usually are written 
under the simplifying assumption of a unitary household. When that 
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assumption is relaxed and the objectives of different household members 
are allowed to differ (say, by having different discount rates), then the 
ensuing confl ict of interest within the household may provide another 
justifi cation for CCTs: parents make the education decision for their chil-
dren, but discount the future at a higher rate and, therefore, demand less 
schooling than the child’s optimal. If policy makers take the view that the 
child is the principal in the matter of her own education, and that parents 
act as her agents, then a principal–agent problem is characterized.
A slightly different but equally plausible version of this problem is 
a confl ict of interest between the parents themselves, as opposed or 
in addition to one between parents and children. One possibility is 
that mothers’ objectives are more closely aligned with those of all her 
children. This closer alignment is mentioned often as a justifi cation for 
handing the transfer to the mother (when there is one), as is common 
practice in most CCT programs, rather than to the father. 
It turns out that differences in the discount rate do not affect the 
investment decision under perfect credit markets. Changing the dis-
count rate will affect consumption choices—how much is consumed 
now versus how much is consumed in the future. Any adjustment will 
take place through borrowing or lending, with no effect on schooling 
or any other investment. As noted previously, investment and consump-
tion decisions are separate.14 But if credit markets are missing, then a 
higher parental discount rate affects the education decision in a way 
that is exactly analogous to a lower expected rate of return to education. 
The results described when discussing the effects of misguided beliefs 
do hold, with both a UCT and a CCT resulting in higher investments 
and welfare (for the child), but the conditional transfer does so at lower 
cost because of the induced substitution effect. 
What is the empirical evidence on intrahousehold principal–agency 
problems? It is hard to test conclusively for the presence of “incomplete 
altruism”.15 Perhaps the most compelling evidence in that regard is the 
presence of gender differences in child human capital. The clearest case 
is in countries where girls’ education lags signifi cantly behind that of 
boys, even when the Mincerian rate of return to women’s education is 
at least as high as that of men.16 This kind of differential is prima facie 
evidence of ineffi cient underinvestment in girls’ schooling and is most 
apparent in South Asia. Such differentials may be rational from the 
viewpoint of parents who are thinking of their own welfare (because 
girls are more costly in terms of dowries or boys are more likely to take 
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care of their parents than are girls who move to their husbands’ homes 
upon marrying), but they are most likely socially ineffi cient.
Somewhat more indirect evidence from countries outside South 
Asia has suggested that differential bargaining power between men 
and women affects the level of human capital investment in children. 
Indeed, there is a lengthy body of empirical literature showing that when 
mothers have greater control over resources, more resources are allocated 
to food and children’s health and education (Thomas 1990; Hoddinott 
and Haddad 1995; Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales 1997; Quisumbing 
and Maluccio 2000; Attanasio and Lechene 2002; Rubalcava, Teruel, 
and Thomas 2004; Doss 2006; and Schady and Rosero 2008). That 
evidence provides a strong justifi cation for making payments to moth-
ers, as CCT programs do. At the same time, in circumstances in which 
women’s power within the household is limited, attaching strings to 
the transfers by mandating specifi c human capital investments could 
strengthen the mother’s bargaining position and reinforce her ability to 
shift household spending and time allocation decisions.17
Although the extent to which incomplete altruism can provide a 
blanket justifi cation for the use of conditions is unclear, there is now a 
substantial body of evidence suggesting that parents (especially fathers) 
value their own utility more than that of their children. Girls, in partic-
ular, often are at a disadvantage. The implication is that schooling and 
health levels chosen on a child’s behalf are likely to be too low relative to 
the child’s optimal level, and that conditions attached to cash transfers 
can help drive the actual household choices toward that optimal.
A Political Economy Argument
The second class of arguments that may provide a justifi cation for con-
ditioning a cash transfer has to do with the political economy of funding 
redistribution. Transfers, whether conditional or unconditional, need to 
be fi nanced, and budget allocation decisions are never really the choice 
of a benign social planner. Rather, they are the outcome of a (gener-
ally complex) political economy process. Most standard theories of the 
political determination of redistribution do not distinguish CCTs from 
UCTs. Voters are assumed to care only about their fi nal welfare level, 
so they look at how much they receive in transfers and at how much 
they pay in taxes. If voters are not recipients of a targeted transfer, then, 
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conditional on their tax bills, they should be indifferent to whether 
there are specifi c conditions attached to the transfers. 
One implication of that kind of analysis is that transfer schemes nar-
rowly targeted to the poor would tend to have limited support because 
a small share of the population benefi t, whereas the costs are dispersed 
across all taxpayers. Gelbach and Pritchett (2002) have a model in 
which an increase in the degree of targeting actually can result in a 
reduction of both the equilibrium level of the transfer and the welfare of 
the poor. The implied vulnerability of targeted redistribution schemes 
to political change enjoys a measure of empirical support (see Subbarao 
et al. [1997] for examples from Colombia and Sri Lanka).
It is conceivable, however, that voters (or other decision makers) are 
not entirely self-regarding. It is possible, for instance, that taxpayers are 
more prepared to pay for transfers to those who are seen to be helping 
themselves than to other equally poor people who are seen to be lazy or 
careless. Some voters who object to unconditional “handouts” may be 
less averse to “rewards” to “deserving” poor people who are investing 
in the education or health of their children. (Box 2.3 contains a brief 
summary of evidence from the recent behavioral literature on fairness, 
which suggests that many people are routinely prepared to incur real 
fi nancial losses to reward others whom they think are deserving or to 
punish those they feel have behaved unfairly.) If this view is commonly 
held, the introduction of conditions may result in an increase in the 
overall budget available for redistribution in the political equilibrium. 
If none of the private ineffi ciencies discussed in the second section of 
this chapter existed, then attaching a condition to a cash transfer would 
be, of itself, suboptimal to benefi ciaries (because it adds an additional 
constraint). But that cost may be offset by an increase in the overall 
size of the transfers that are funded, in which case the conditions will 
be justifi ed for political economy reasons. The condition is justifi ed by 
making redistribution more acceptable to taxpayers and voters—and 
possibly to many benefi ciaries. Another way of seeing this is that, unlike 
a UCT, a CCT can be seen not as plain social assistance, but rather as 
part of a social contract whereby society (through the state) supports 
those poor households that are ready to make the effort to “improve 
their lives”—the deserving poor. 
The notion that CCT programs constitute a new form of social 
contract between the state and benefi ciaries has been manifested in the 
use of the term co-responsibilities (instead of conditions) in a majority of 
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programs, at least in Latin America. This use is illustrated clearly in the 
words of the architects of the CCT program in Mexico: 
Poor families need help, but this should not suppress or under-
mine their role as protagonists in transforming their living 
conditions. Shared responsibility and respect are not only 
prerequisites for effectively combating poverty but are essential 
elements of a democratic society. Shared responsibility and 
respect inevitably imply a reciprocal effort by the poor families 
to link the benefi ts they receive to concrete actions on their 
part. Thus independently of technical considerations, in 1996 
PEOPLE OFTEN BEHAVE IN WAYS THAT AR E 
inconsistent with pure self-regarding preferences. 
In particular, there is now a substantial body of 
experimental evidence suggesting that large num-
bers of people are altruistic rewarders or altruistic 
punishers in the sense that they are prepared to 
incur personal losses to reward behavior they regard 
as socially fair or to punish behavior they regard as 
unfair (see Fehr and Schmidt [1999] for the basic 
theory; Fehr and Gächter [2000] for a review of 
the early evidence).
Some of the main results come from experiments 
in which subjects were asked to play what is known 
as an ultimatum game under experimental condi-
tions. In the game, a fi rst-mover proposes a split 
(of an exogenously given sum) between himself and 
the second player. If the second player accepts the 
proposal, the split is implemented. If he rejects it, 
both players earn zero. If people behaved as standard 
economic theories used to predict (that is, if prefer-
ences were purely self-regarding), then the outcome 
of this game—the so-called Nash equilibrium—
would be “as little as possible for you, all the rest 
for me.” Empirically, however, such an outcome is 
seldom observed. The modal offer is in the 30–60 
percent range, depending on the cultural context. 
And a sizable fraction of offers below that range is 
rejected outright even when the sums in play are 
nontrivial: people appear to be prepared to “pay” 
for the opportunity to punish a player whom they 
see as having behaved unfairly.
More interesting from the point of view of CCT 
programs, Hoffman et al. (1994) fi nd that players in 
anonymous ultimatum games tend to be more toler-
ant of other players in positions of power when those 
positions are allocated on the basis of “merit” (that 
is, to those who score higher in a general knowl-
edge quiz) than when they are allocated randomly. 
The accumulated evidence from the large body of 
literature on fairness suggests that people take con-
siderations of “justice” into account when making 
decisions. The evidence from this particular study 
suggests that people’s perceptions of what is a fair 
distribution may be affected by the perceived “mer-
its” of the recipient. 
Would a similar line of reasoning imply that tax-
payers (or public offi cials) might be more willing to 
fund transfers to people who invest in the future of 
their children than to others who do not? Although 
some tentative suggestions in support of this conjec-
ture are reported in the main text, more research is 
needed to address the question rigorously.
Box 2.3 Fairness, Merit, and the “Deserving Poor”
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it was considered vital that PROGRESA benefi ts go directly to 
poor families and be conditioned on direct action by them to 
improve their own nutrition, health and education, and that 
such support complement but not substitute for their day-to-
day efforts (Levy and Rodríguez 2004, p. 48).
A recent analysis of the treatment of the Bolsa Família program in 
the Brazilian media (Lindert and Vincensini 2008) provides additional 
support to the idea that conditions make transfer programs more politi-
cally palatable. There is little question that Bolsa Família is a popular 
program in Brazil. An Ipsos opinion poll taken in September 2007 
found that the program tops the list of items mentioned in response to 
a question on what President Luiz Lula da Silva had done well in offi ce. 
The authors of the study fi nd that most media criticism of the program 
centered on the possibility that it would “generate dependency” and 
fi nd that this criticism usually was coupled with reports that the con-
ditions were not being monitored and enforced properly. Conversely, 
most of those people arguing the program was not assistencialista listed 
the existence of conditions as one of the top two reasons. Lindert and 
Vincensini (2008) conclude that the acceptance of conditions across 
the political spectrum—where the Left sees the conditions as merely 
restating citizen’s rights, and the Right tends to see them as enforceable 
contracts—played an important role in generating broad-based support 
for the program in Brazil. 
This perception of the condition as a mutually agreeable contract leads 
to an interesting apparent paradox: CCTs often are seen as less, not more, 
paternalistic than UCTs. Indeed, several authors have argued that CCT 
programs provide the basis for a less paternalistic (and possibly less clien-
telistic) form of social assistance (Cohen and Franco 2006; de la Brière 
and Rawlings 2006). Reconciling this view with the “paternalistic” argu-
ments described in the second section of this chapter requires distinguish-
ing between two very different justifi cations for conditioning. The fi rst 
justifi cation, which was discussed in the second section above, relies on 
imperfections in private decision making by the poor households them-
selves. They might be poorly informed, parents may not fully internalize 
the best interests of their children, and so on. Conditions then help, by 
inducing agents to do what is best for their children, individually. 
The second view, which is being proposed here, is that when condi-
tions are seen as co-responsibilities, they treat the recipient more as a 
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“grown-up,” capable of agency to resolve his or her own problems. The 
state is a partner in the process, not a nanny. This latter interpretation 
is particularly plausible when the counterfactual to a CCT is not an 
automatic, transparent, unconditional cash grant seen as a citizen’s 
entitlement (which is close to the textbook concept of a UCT), but 
instead a myriad of ad hoc and mostly in-kind transfers, intermediated 
through various service providers, nongovernmental organizations, 
and local governments. Under those circumstances, conditioning the 
transfers on “good behavior” may be perceived as less paternalistic than 
the alternative of conditioning transfers on voting for a certain party or 
belonging to a given social organization. 
Moreover, the fact that the conditions are focused on building the 
human capital of children (rather than simply supporting parents) adds 
to their political acceptability as an instrument to promote opportuni-
ties. After all, it is hard to “blame” children for being poor. In that sense, 
using public resources to support the human capital development of 
poor children makes CCT a “poverty reduction” rather than a “social 
assistance” program. Making payments to mothers also resonates with 
well-accepted beliefs (mostly supported by evidence, as shown above) 
that mothers tend to put funds to better use than men do.
This view of CCTs as an enabling instrument, which creates politi-
cal viability for targeted redistribution that effectively reaches the poor, 
resonates in many of the Latin American countries that introduced 
CCT programs over the last decade. Social protection systems in the 
region have been characterized by “truncated welfare states” (de Ferranti 
et al. 2004) that channel signifi cant public resources to subsidize social 
insurance schemes for the formal labor force and provide little, if any, 
redistribution (particularly in the form of cash) to the lower segments of 
the income distribution. As in other spheres (for example, service deliv-
ery [Fiszbein 2005]), political capture of state institutions and policies 
by elites meant an historical pattern of low social assistance. From that 
perspective, the introduction of CCT programs since the late 1990s can 
be seen as a break with history. 
Take the case of Brazil, a country with extremely high inequality that 
long has subsidized social insurance programs (with limited reach to the 
poor). Public subsidies for (generally regressive) pension schemes alone 
represent more than 5 percent of GDP (Lindert, Skoufi as, and Shapiro 
2006). It was only in the late 1990s, with the introduction of a series 
of CCT-like programs such as the PETI, Bolsa Alimentação, and Bolsa 
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Escola, that cash-based social assistance programs became a signifi cant 
federal public spending item, reaching approximately 0.5 percent of 
GDP in 2000.18 And it is through the expanded and enhanced Bolsa 
Família program in more recent years that federal spending on social 
assistance reached the 1 percent of GDP mark (Lindert, Skoufias, 
and Shapiro 2006). The story is very similar for the case of Mexico: 
Oportunidades represented a major shift from broad price subsidies 
that benefi ted the poor only marginally to a cash-based redistribution 
to more than 5 million poor households. And, as discussed in chap-
ter 1, Mexico’s success appears to have infl uenced other countries in the 
region to follow a similar path. 
The conclusion is that even in situations where a narrow technical 
assessment might suggest that a UCT is more appropriate than a CCT 
(say, because there is no evidence of imperfect information or incomplete 
altruism in poor families), CCTs might be justifi ed because they lead to 
a “superior” political economy equilibrium. The political process may 
make signifi cant cash transfers to the poor close to impossible unless 
those transfers are tied somehow to clear evidence of commitment and 
“positive behaviors” on the part of benefi ciaries. Once again, the Latin 
American experience suggests that in the absence of dramatic political 
shifts, the increasing trend toward cash-based redistribution schemes 
has been associated with the use of some form of conditioned grants.
Social Effi ciency Arguments
Attaching conditions to cash grants might make sense for political 
economy reasons or because distortions in individual behavior cause 
decision making in the household to be privately ineffi cient. We now 
turn to a third set of reasons for conditioning, namely, human capital 
externalities.
If investments in human capital generate positive externalities that 
parents do not take into account when making decisions, then the 
aggregate (market equilibrium) level of human capital in society will 
be ineffi ciently low. This is a standard argument for subsidizing provi-
sion of education or health care. Empirically, health investments have 
important external benefi ts. Although those benefi ts are well established 
in some cases (for example, immunization), the supporting evidence 
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is rather new in other cases (such as deworming [Miguel and Kremer 
2004] or insecticide-treated nets [Gimnig et al. 2003]). 
In the case of education, externalities might arise if there are increas-
ing returns to skilled labor in production, at the aggregate level. There 
is empirical support for the idea that more education can have spillover 
effects to other workers in the same plant (Moretti 2004b), in the same 
village (Foster and Rosenzweig 1995), or in the same city (Moretti 2004a). 
Possible spillovers also may be present if crime, violence, and related social 
ills decline with average schooling levels. There is solid evidence for the 
United States that education lowers crime—with perhaps the best evi-
dence coming from the Perry Preschool program evaluation, which shows 
that children randomly assigned to the intervention have much lower 
incarceration rates as adults (Currie 2001; Schweinhart 2004). 
How large these externalities are and whether (conditioned) cash 
transfers are the most effective instrument to correct for them, however, 
remains to be determined. In most countries, education and health 
services already are heavily subsidized. In many cases, they are publicly 
provided free of charge. To argue for an additional subsidy that com-
pensates households for some of the indirect or opportunity costs of 
using these services, on the basis of the externality alone, would require 
showing that those externalities are quite large. If that were found to 
be true, then a CCT can be justifi ed on that basis alone: it is effectively 
an additional component to a Pigouvian subsidy, which often already is 
implicit in the service fees. 
Conclusion
Although market-driven economic growth is likely to be the main 
driver of poverty reduction in most countries, markets cannot do it 
alone. Public policy plays a central role in providing the institutional 
foundations within which markets operate, in providing public goods, 
and in correcting market failures. In addition to laying the groundwork 
for economic growth, policy also can supplement the effects of growth 
on poverty reduction, and one of the instruments that governments can 
use to that end is direct redistribution of resources to poor households. 
Although direct cash transfers have opportunity costs (in terms of for-
gone alternative public investments) and may have some perverse incen-
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tive effects on recipients, there is a growing body of evidence to suggest 
that some such transfers may be both equitable and effi cient. 
The cash transfer programs that have been growing most rapidly 
across the developing world over the last decade or so are CCTs, by 
which cash is paid to poor households on condition that they invest 
(in certain prespecifi ed ways) in the human capital of their children. 
Because attaching a constraint on the behavior of those you are trying 
to help is an unorthodox idea for economists, this chapter has reviewed 
the conceptual arguments for making cash transfers conditionally.
Essentially, there are two broad sets of arguments for attaching 
conditions to cash transfers. The fi rst argument applies if private invest-
ment in children’s human capital is thought to be too low. The second 
argument applies if political economy reasons mean that there is little 
support for redistribution, unless it is seen to be conditioned on “good 
behavior” by the “deserving poor.”
CCTs are not a panacea. If there is little evidence to suggest that 
private levels of investment in human capital are too low (in any of the 
senses previously discussed), and if the political economy can accom-
modate the desired levels of redistribution without appealing to co-
responsibilities, then UCTs (or some completely different kind of public 
expenditure) may be preferable. 
There also may be good arguments against conditioning if the same 
result can be achieved at a lower cost through the social policy equiva-
lent of “moral suasion.” Recent research has found evidence of “fl ypa-
per” or “labeling” effects, whereby the household expenditure shares of 
certain goods are higher out of transfers that are notionally earmarked 
for (but not conditional on) those goods, than out of other incomes.19 
Flypaper effects constitute a fairly fundamental violation of rationality 
in that they suggest households do not treat all their income sources 
as fully fungible. Like other departures from full rationality, fl ypaper 
effects certainly are plausible and, if ubiquitous, could have serious 
implications for the design of social protection, tipping the balance in 
favor of UCTs (which then would appear to have some of the benefi ts of 
conditions, without the costs). But much more research is needed before 
the evidence on these effects reaches critical mass.
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C H A P T E R  T H R E E
Design and Implementation 
Features of CCT Programs
BEFORE DELVING DEEPLY INTO THE IMPACTS OF CCT PROGRAMS, IT 
is worth understanding some of the details of how the programs work. 
CCT programs require the same systems as other transfer programs: at 
minimum, a means to establish the eligibility of clients and enroll them 
in the program, a mechanism to pay their benefi ts, and preferably strong 
monitoring and evaluation systems. CCT programs further require a 
means to monitor compliance with co-responsibilities and to coordinate 
among the several institutions involved in operating the program.
In general, CCT programs have handled these systems rather well; in 
some cases, they have been leaders in modernizing social assistance prac-
tices. Of course, technical soundness is neither inherent to nor the exclusive 
domain of CCT programs. That fact should be understood fully by policy 
makers across the gamut of social policy so that those working on CCT 
programs make the deliberate choices required to continue the tradition 
of excellence, and those working on other sorts of programs adopt some 
of the practices that have led to success in the best of the CCT programs.
This chapter describes the nuts and bolts of the operation of CCT 
programs.1 The chapter is divided into fi ve sections, corresponding to 
targeting practices, benefi t systems, conditions (including their defi nition, 
monitoring, and enforcement), monitoring and evaluation, and issues 
concerned with intersectoral and interinstitutional coordination. 
Targeting in Practice 
Almost all CCT programs established to date have tried to target their 
benefi ts rather narrowly to the poor.2 Table 3.1 shows the targeting mecha-
nisms used for a large number of programs, both established and nascent. 
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Table 3.1 Targeting Methods Used in CCT Programs, by Region
Region/Country/Program
Categorical Household identifi cation
Geographic Other
Proxy 
means test
Means 
test
Community 
assessment
Africa
Burkina Faso: Orphans and Vulnerable 
Childrena
x x
Kenya: CT-OVCa x Orphan and vulnerable 
children incidence
x
Nigeria: COPE x x
East Asia and Pacifi c
Cambodia: CESSP x x
Cambodia: JFPR x Gender and ethnic minority x x
Indonesia: JPS xb Genderc x
Indonesia: PKH x x
Philippines: 4Ps x x
Europe and Central Asia
Turkey: SRMP x
Latin America and the Caribbean
Argentina: Programa Familias x Benefi ciaries of Jefes y Jefas 
program, with two or more 
children; head has not 
completed secondary schoold
Bolivia: Juancito Pinto xe
Brazil: Bolsa Alimentação x x
Brazil: Bolsa Escola x x
Brazil: Bolsa Família x x
Brazil: PETI x x
Chile: Chile Solidario x
Chile: SUF Not part of social security 
system
x
Colombia: Familias en Acción x x
Colombia: SCAE-Bogotá x
Dominican Republic: Solidaridad x x
Dominican Republic: TAE/ILAE x x
Ecuador: BDH x
El Salvador: Red Solidaria x xf
Guatemala: Mi Familia Progresa x x
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Region/Country/Program
Categorical Household identifi cation
Geographic Other
Proxy 
means test
Means 
test
Community 
assessment
Honduras: PRAF x xg
Jamaica: PATH x
Mexico: Oportunidades x x
Nicaragua: Atención a Crisisa x x
Nicaragua: RPS x x
Panama: Red de Oportunidades x x
Paraguay: Tekoporã/PROPAIS IIh x x
Peru: Juntos x x
Middle East and North Africa
Yemen: BEDPa x Gender
South Asia
Bangladesh: FSSAP x Gender
Bangladesh: PESP xi x
Bangladesh: ROSC x x
India (Haryana): Apni Beti Apna Dhan x Gender x
Pakistan: CSPa Benefi ciary of food support 
program 
x
Pakistan: Participation in Education 
through Innovative Scheme for the 
Excluded Vulnerable
x x
Pakistan: PESRP/Punjab Female 
School Stipend Program
x Gender
Source: Program profi les.
Note: BDH = Bono de Desarrollo Humano; BEDP = Basic Education Development Project; CESSP = Cambodia Education Sector 
Support Project; COPE = Care of the Poor; CSP = Child Support Program; CT-OVC = Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable 
Children; 4Ps = Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program; FSSAP = Female Secondary School Assistance Program; JFPR = Japan Fund 
for Poverty Reduction; JPS = Jaring Pengamanan Sosial; PATH = Program of Advancement through Health and Education; PESP = 
Primary Education Stipend Program; PESRP = Punjab Education Sector Reform Program; PETI = Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho 
Infantil; PKH = Program Keluarga Harapan; PRAF = Programa de Asignación Familiar; ROSC = Reaching Out-of-School Children; 
RPS = Red de Protección Social; SCAE = Subsidio Condicionado a la Asistencia Escolar; SRMP = Social Risk Mitigation Project; SUF 
= Subsidio Unitario Familiar; TAE/ILAE = Tarjeta de Asistencia Escolar/Incentivo a la Asistencia Escolar.
a. Program at the pilot stage.
b. At both the national level (to identify the poorer districts) and the district level (to identify the poorer subdistricts/schools).
c. At least half of the scholarships at the school level were to be allocated to girls. 
d. The Jefes y Jefas program started as a workfare program for unemployed heads of household. 
e. Covers all children in public schools up to fourth grade. 
f. Household targeting is only in the 68 less-poor municipalities. Targeting in the poorest 32 municipalities is geographic only. 
g. Only households in the area covered by the Inter-American Development Bank project may participate. 
h. PROPAIS II is a project, fi nanced by the Inter-American Development Bank, that builds on the Tekoporã program and fi nances 
additional benefi ciaries using similar procedures. 
i. Only certain types of schools in rural areas may participate.
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About two thirds of countries use geographic targeting; about two thirds 
use household targeting, mostly via proxy means testing; and many coun-
tries use both. Moreover, many programs use community-based targeting 
or community vetting of eligibility lists to increase transparency.
The methods of proxy means testing vary in their details. For example, 
in all cases, the formula for the proxy means test was derived from statisti-
cal analysis of a household survey data set; but, of course, there are differ-
ences in the quality and detail of that original data set, and differences in 
the statistical methods used and in the sophistication and rigor thereof. 
Signifi cant variations also exist in how the implementation is done—
whether households are visited; whether some variables are verifi ed as part 
of the application process for all or for a sample of applicants; whether the 
staff members who help complete applications are permanent or contract 
workers and to which agency they report; and other such differences. 
Usually the proxy means testing system is led by a central agency (whether 
in the CCT program itself, independent, or in the ministry of planning), 
but the day-to-day staffi ng for it is delegated, often to municipalities, with 
considerable variability in independence and quality control.
In many cases, CCT programs have been the drivers for developing 
poverty maps or household targeting systems in their countries or for 
prompting upgrades to them. Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration 
to say that CCT programs have moved forward the state of the art and 
standards for targeted programs generally. Many countries fi rst estab-
lished proxy means tests when designing the CCT program (Cambodia, 
Jamaica, Kenya, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Turkey). Some countries 
with older proxy means tests have made signifi cant reforms and improve-
ments in their systems over time—if not because of, then certainly to 
the advantage of, their CCT programs (Chile, Colombia). Some of these 
are relatively low-income countries with limited administrative capacity, 
and they have made adaptations to accommodate that situation. Box 3.1 
illustrates this for the case of Cambodia’s scholarship program.
The household targeting systems used in some of the best-known 
CCT programs constitute major “institutional capital” for the country. 
The same system often is used to target many programs, sometimes 
with different thresholds or ancillary criteria. For example, in Chile (the 
fi rst country to use proxy means tests extensively), the system is used 
not just for the recent Chile Solidario program, but also for much older 
child allowance and social pensions, for water price subsidies, for hous-
ing subsidies, and for other uses. Similarly, in Colombia, the same proxy 
means test (the SISBEN) used to determine eligibility for subsidized 
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health insurance, hospital fee waivers, the public workfare program, a 
youth training program, and a social pension has been used to target 
the CCT program. Even in countries with a more recently established 
proxy means test, those tests can be used in multiple programs. Jamaica 
established its proxy means test expressly for the CCT program, but 
now uses it to grant fee waivers in the health system and for secondary 
education textbook rentals and school lunches. Such an investment will 
pay off sooner for programs that are generous in coverage or benefi t lev-
els and for countries that, at least eventually, will use the proxy means 
tests for multiple programs.
What have these procedures accomplished? It is diffi cult to measure 
targeting outcomes properly (see box 3.2), but we can approximate 
BE C AUSE C A M B ODI A H A S R AT H E R L E S S 
administrative capacity than the middle-income 
Latin American countries where proxy means test-
ing originated, it has adapted the general practice 
of proxy means testing in a way that makes rigor-
ous but simplifi ed testing viable. The schools that 
participate in its scholarship program are subject to 
a prior round of geographic targeting, and appli-
cants complete a proxy means test that is used to 
allocate scholarships among each selected school’s 
students.
Cambodia’s CESSP program dispenses with 
the cadre of fi eld worker/social workers who often 
administer the instrument. Instead, students fi ll out 
the program application/proxy means test form in 
school. Then the teacher reads the information aloud 
and the classmates help verify/certify that it is cor-
rect. A local committee of school and community 
leaders score the forms by hand.a To assist in manual 
scoring, the formula uses only integers.
The ranking is done only within schools, rather 
than against a national standard as in most proxy 
means tests. In each school, the scored forms are 
arranged by score and the poorest children, up to 
the quota for that school, are selected for the scholar-
ship. This process implies that recipients in poorer 
schools will be poorer, on average, than recipients 
in less-poor schools. It is thus less accurate than a 
ranking against a national standard, but eliminates 
the need for a national database and the informa-
tion technology and communications networks that 
would be required to support it.
In a previous scholarship program, the formula 
was not very sound, so the committees were given 
leeway to deviate when they thought it appropriate; 
and when they did so, the students selected were, in 
fact, poor (as judged later by an evaluation survey). 
Subsequently the formula was based on statistical 
analysis of the same type used elsewhere, and the 
discretion of the local committees was reduced.
Source: CESSP Scholarship Team 2005.
a. In the fi rst year of the CESSP program, an independent 
fi rm scored the forms centrally.
Box 3.1 Proxy Means Testing Where Administrative Capacity Is Low: 
Cambodia’s Scholarship Programs
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TO KNOW HOW WELL A PROGRAM TARGETS, WE 
need to measure the welfare that a household would 
have if it did not receive the transfer and then to 
rank households according to that measure. Doing 
so would allow for any behavioral responses associ-
ated with the receipt (or removal) of the transfer, 
such as changes in the household’s labor supply, sav-
ings, or receipt of remittances. These estimations 
are undertaken in chapter 4 for those programs for 
which consumption data are available for benefi ciary 
(treatment) and nonbenefi ciary (control) households 
before and after the start of the CCT program.
There are two possible “naïve” ways of determin-
ing where transfer recipients fall in the pre-interven-
tion welfare distribution—measured consumption 
including the transfer and measured consumption 
minus the transfer. Using consumption including the 
transfer biases welfare upward, thus making house-
holds seem better-off than they would be without 
the program. This will give the most conservative 
estimate of narrow targeting because a benefi ciary 
who is poor even after receiving the transfer surely 
was poor beforehand. On the other hand, using con-
sumption net of the full transfer value biases the 
estimate of initial welfare downward if behavioral 
responses offset the transfer in part. As will be dis-
cussed in chapter 4, there is little evidence of signifi -
cant offsetting behavioral responses through private 
transfers and labor supply, at least in the early stages 
of such CCT programs as Mexico’s Oportunidades 
and Nicaragua’s Red de Protección Social. 
To investigate how sensitive the targeting assess-
ment is to the welfare measure used, we conducted 
comparative analysis using both naïve indicators, 
which will bracket the “true” but imprecisely 
known counterfactual. Figure 3B.1 shows the 
results for Jamaica and Mexico. As expected, the 
estimates net of transfer show the programs to be 
Box 3.2 Who Benefi ts from CCT Programs?
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Figure 3B.1 Coverage Using per Capita Expenditure Deciles Gross and Net of the CCT Transfer, 2004 
Source: Authors’ calculations, using the 2004 Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions and the 2004 Mexico household survey 
(Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso-Gasto de los Hogares).
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outcomes for a number of programs, as shown in fi gure 3.1. Those 
estimates rank households on their observed per capita household 
consumption (or income, if a measure of consumption is not available) 
less the value of the transfer received. This is a naïve estimator that will 
exaggerate the accuracy of targeting if households change their behav-
ior in ways that lower their autonomous, nontransfer income, perhaps 
through working less or receiving fewer private transfers. As we shall 
see in chapter 4, these behavioral responses to CCT programs appear 
to be modest. Moreover, the sensitivity analysis illustrated in box 3.2 
gives some comfort that biases are not too large and do not affect greatly 
the conclusion that CCT programs largely have realized their intent to 
concentrate the benefi ts on the poorest households.
As fi gure 3.1 reveals, there is signifi cant variation in coverage of the 
poor, depending on the size and budget of the programs—from about 
1 percent of the poorest decile in Cambodia to more than 60 percent 
in Brazil, Ecuador, and Mexico.3 The coverage rates in the larger CCT 
programs seem to compare well with international experience. In the 
Lindert, Skoufi as, and Shapiro (2006) study of 40 targeted programs 
(including several CCT programs),4 the mean coverage rate of the 
poorest quintile is 19 percent. In a study of Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia cash transfers, child allowances, and social pensions (Tesliuc et al. 
2006), the mean coverage rate of the fi rst quintile is 42 percent. A study 
reviewing experience in a small number of Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development countries was able to model take-up 
more closely among eligible individuals, and concluded that take-up 
rates typically are between 40 and 80 percent for social assistance and 
housing programs (Hernanz, Malherbet, and Pellizzari 2004).
more progressive than do the estimates gross of 
transfer. The important thing is the magnitude of 
difference. For Jamaica’s Program of Advancement 
through Health and Education (PATH), where the 
transfer is a small share of households’ base con-
sumption, the two curves are rather close together. 
In the case of Mexico’s Oportunidades program, 
where the transfer is among the largest of any CCT 
program and, therefore, the sensitivity of results to 
method is the greatest, the curves diverge more; the 
estimated participation rate for the poorest decile 
drops from more than 60 percent (using consump-
tion minus the transfer as the ranking variable) to 
less than 50 percent (using consumption including 
the transfer). However, the policy conclusion that 
the program concentrates resources at the bottom 
end of the distribution holds for both naïve estima-
tors of the counterfactual.
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In thinking about coverage rates, it is important to distinguish the 
various reasons for low coverage. Some of these are likely to be benign, 
others problematic. The fi rst and most obvious factor in low coverage is 
the size of the budget and the role a program is meant to play in broader 
social policy. Chile Solidario is meant to fi ll a defi ned and small niche 
in social policy, with other transfer and subsidy programs providing 
greater coverage and higher benefi ts. In Ecuador, by contrast, the BDH 
is meant to be the mainstay of social assistance for families. Its signifi -
cant size contributes to this goal, as does the wide age range of children 
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Brazil BF 2006
Chile Solidario 2003
Chile SUF 2003
Ecuador BDH 2006
Honduras PRAF 2004/5
Mexico Oportunidades 2004
Jamaica PATH 2004
Nicaragua RPS 2000
Cambodia JFPR 2003
Bangladesh FSSAP 2000
Turkey SRMP Education 2005/6
Turkey SRMP Health 2005/6
Figure 3.1 Coverage of CCT Programs, by Decile, Various Years
Sources: Authors’ calculations, based on the following surveys: Ecuador’s Encuesta de 
Condiciones de Vida 2006; Mexico’s Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso-Gasto de los Hogares 2004; 
Brazil’s Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios 2006; Jamaica’s Survey of Living Conditions 
2004; Chile’s Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional 2003; Honduras’ Encuesta 
de Hogares de Propósitos Multiples 2004; Bangladesh’s Household Income and Expenditure 
Survey 2000; and the Cambodia Japanese Fund for Poverty Reduction application form 2003. 
The numbers for Turkey are from Ahmed et al. (2007); for Nicaragua, the numbers are from 
the 2002 Mesoamerica Nutrition Program Targeting Study Group.
Note: BDH = Bono de Desarrollo Humano; BF = Bolsa Família; FSSAP = Female Secondary School 
Assistance Program; JFPR = Japanese Fund for Poverty Reduction; PATH = Program of Advancement 
through Health and Education; PRAF = Programa de Asignación Familiar; RPS = Red de Protección 
Social; SRMP = Social Risk Mitigation Project; SUF = Subsidio Unitario Familiar. For Brazil and 
Chile, the deciles are based on per capita income minus transfer per capita. For the remaining countries, 
the measure of welfare used is per capita expenditure net of the transfer per capita.
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covered. Naturally, differences in the role of these programs lead to 
wide variations in the extent to which they cover the poor. Several of 
the smaller programs, however, clearly are constrained by budget and 
design. Cambodia and Honduras are targeted geographically, operat-
ing only in defi ned areas of the country, with the Cambodian program 
being only a very small pilot at the time of these results.
The second obvious factor involved in determining the share of the 
poorest people that a program can reach has to do with the range of 
ages and grades that the program covers. A program that covers all 
families with children aged 0–16 will help more of the poorest quintile 
than will one that covers families with girls in secondary school grades. 
(This theme is taken up in more detail in chapter 6.) Box 3.3 provides 
an in-depth analysis of the extent to which the proxy mean tests and the 
demographic composition of the households results in errors of exclu-
sion in Brazil and Ecuador.
A third factor has to do with the requirements for service delivery 
(Nichols and Zeckhauser 1982; Das, Do, and Özler 2005). The essence 
of a CCT program is that families must make sure their children use 
health and education services. If those services are not available, then 
the families will be excluded from the program. Some programs, at 
least in their early years, aimed to cover poor areas as indicated by a 
poverty map, but they set up operations only in areas where services 
were deemed accessible and intentionally excluded all those poor people 
who lived in areas without minimum service capacity. For example, 
one of the preconditions for rural localities to be covered by Mexico’s 
Oportunidades program was that they have a population between 50 
and 2,500 individuals as well as a primary school situated within the 
locality and access to a paved road and a health center within a radius 
of 5 kilometers. Those conditions, by necessity, excluded a small share 
of very needy villages, although the requirement was relaxed in sub-
sequent years. Similarly, for Colombia the program was targeted fi rst 
by municipality—but only municipalities that offered the necessary 
services were allowed to join. Initially, 15 percent of municipalities 
containing 8 percent of the targeted benefi ciaries thus were excluded 
(Lafaurie and Leiva 2004). More geographically dispersed versions of 
this problem will occur when households are allowed to participate, but 
some are more remote from services than others. For example, de Janvry 
and Sadoulet (2005) suggest that Oportunidades has little impact on 
children who live more than 4 kilometers from a secondary school; in 
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TO GET A PICTURE OF THE RELATIVE MAGNITUDE 
of some of the factors that lead to errors of exclusion, 
we look in detail at the Ecuadoran and Brazilian 
cases, focusing on those two countries because, for 
them, we are able to infer from the survey more accu-
rately than usual which households are eligible for 
the programs. In Ecuador, the score from the proxy 
means test used to determine eligibility is available 
in the data set. In Brazil, the survey captures income, 
as does the means test. To make the analysis reason-
ably comparable between countries and pertinent to 
other countries, we defi ne the target population as 
the poorest 20 percent of households. For those in 
the poorest quintile according to our survey-based 
measure of welfare (consumption net of transfer in 
Ecuador, income net of transfer in Brazil), we parse 
as best we can the reasons for errors of exclusion. 
These results are presented in table 3B.1.
In Ecuador, the proxy means test correctly pre-
dicts that 95 percent of households in the poorest 
quintile are eligible for the benefi ts, but it errone-
ously excludes 5 percent of them. Among those 
people in the poorest quintile who are eligible, we 
fi nd that only 70 percent actually receive program 
benefi ts—a fi nding that implies only 67 percent of 
the poor end up receiving benefi ts. In the Ecuadoran 
case, the budget covers about 40 percent of house-
holds (many more than this exercise considers), so 
there is no explicit rationing of slots other than the 
proxy means test. Thus one can infer that the less-
than-full coverage of the lowest quintile stems not 
from a lack of offer by the program but from a lack of 
take-up by poor households. To understand the fac-
tors affecting exclusion from or nonparticipation in 
the program, we ran a probit analysis on the sample 
of poor households, looking for predictors of par-
ticipation. The results show that the BDH has been 
successful in overcoming some problems endemic in 
transfer programs—indigenous, less-educated, and 
female-headed households are less likely than oth-
ers to be excluded from the program, all else being 
equal. Thus, outreach has been suffi cient to include 
groups who often face barriers to information and 
access. The role of self-selection would appear to be 
fairly strong because poorer households participate 
more often than do the less-poor; the same is true 
for those in rural areas where the effective value 
of the transfer is a little higher. There is a caveat: 
being located in the Oriente (the Amazonian part of 
Ecuador) does raise the probability of nonparticipa-
tion among poor and eligible people, probably a sign 
that transaction costs deter some of the residents 
because parts of this region are accessible only by 
air. That area may be an exception to the conclusion 
that nonparticipation generally is not too grave an 
issue in Ecuador.
In a parallel analysis for Brazil’s Bolsa Família, 
we see that all households in the poorest quin-
tile have incomes under the eligibility thresh-
old of R$100,a so errors of exclusion from the 
means test should be zero. That is a simplifi ca-
tion because the implementation of the means 
test may be imperfect. But we would expect that 
self-declared income on the application would be 
underreported—if anything, the applicant would 
Box 3.3 Analyzing Errors of Exclusion of CCT Programs, Brazil and Ecuador
Table 3B.1 Coverage of Poor Households, Brazil 
and Ecuador
Reason
Share of bottom quintile (%)
Brazil Ecuador
Classifi ed as eligible 
because of means or 
proxy means test
100 95
Eligible, receiving 
program benefi ts
 55 67
Eligible, receiving 
program benefi ts with 
children ages 0–17
 54 64
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Turkey, the qualitative evaluation suggests that the transfer is not suf-
fi cient for some households to pay for transportation or to compensate 
households for concerns over students having to travel outside the vil-
lage (Adato et al. 2007). However, the fact that coverage is highest for 
the poorest decile indicates that the problems are not so widespread that 
they generally preclude coverage of the poorest people.
Another possible cause of errors of exclusion is that proxy means 
tests contain an element of statistical error in making their predictions 
of household welfare. In Panama, the ex ante assessment of the proxy 
means test is that with the eligibility threshold selected, a quarter of 
the extreme poor could be excluded from the program (World Bank 
2006d). In Ecuador, such errors are lower, as we shall see below. 
Errors of exclusion also may occur if outreach to potential benefi cia-
ries to inform them of the benefi ts of the program and its application 
have an incentive not to reveal more than she or 
he had to reveal and the form itself may not fully 
elicit all income for those with irregular or in-kind 
income. Among those who are eligible by income, 
enrollment is shown at just 55 percent. In this 
case, a lack of offer from the program is probably 
a good deal of the cause. These fi gures are from 
2006, when the program covered about 11 million 
families. But, of course, there may be other causes 
for exclusion and an element of self-selection. To 
understand that possibility, we again ran a probit 
model to predict the probability of participation 
based on the sample of poor and eligible house-
holds. Here, too, there is some good news relative 
to program outreach: For example, Afro-Brazilians 
were signifi cantly less likely to be excluded, all 
else being equal. There seems to be an element of 
self-selection—those with more income and more 
education and those in urban areas were less likely 
to participate than were others. (The cost of living 
differentials are very large in Brazil, so the value 
of the benefi t is implicitly lower in urban areas.) 
Therefore, outreach appeared to be quite good as 
early as 2006. The government has since expanded 
the program and that expansion should reduce any 
issue of undercoverage substantially.
We return to table 3.2 to look at the potential 
impacts of the demographic restriction on the 
exclusion of poor households from the program. 
In Ecuador, 95 percent of the eligible participants 
have children aged 0–17. Thus, if the program were 
restricted to families with children, as is the case 
with most CCT programs, only a few percent more 
poor households would be excluded (a reduction of 
the eligible poor receiving benefi ts from 67 percent 
to 64 percent). In Brazil, the poorest families receive 
a transfer even if they have no children. If the age 
requirement of having children aged 0–17 were to 
be enforced, it would exclude only 1 percent of those 
who were in the program. This fi nding suggests that 
demographic restrictions are not an important fac-
tor for the exclusion of poor and eligible households 
from CCT programs with similar designs.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Brazil’s Pesquisa 
Nacional por Amóstra de Domicílios 2006 and Ecuador’s Encuesta 
de Condiciones de Vida 2006.
a. When this was written, in 2008, the eligibility threshold was 
R$120, but it was R$100 at the time of the survey in 2006.
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procedures is lacking and they never apply (see Atkinson 1996; Grosh 
et al. 2008, ch. 3). We do not have clear quantitative data on the extent 
of outreach in all CCT programs, but do have some indications that 
it has been good in a number of them. Castañeda and Lindert (2005) 
show that in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico as early as 2002–04, the 
proxy means testing systems already had registered more than the num-
ber of poor families in the countries. Of course, this fi nding does not 
mean that all of the poor necessarily were registered, but it does seem 
that the magnitude of outreach and the administrative mechanism to 
handle registration were of the right order of magnitude. Moreover, 
we know of a number of innovative or extensive examples of outreach. 
Several countries fi elded teams to go door-to-door in poor areas to 
register households. All countries had information campaigns of one 
sort or another. In Ecuador, the mass media were used. In Cambodia, 
program rules carefully specify that information posters will be placed 
in all pertinent schools; on the commune council notice board; and 
in the health center, market, and pagoda. Furthermore, to ensure that 
out-of-school students hear of the program, school offi cials are directed 
to contact children who fi nished sixth grade in the last 2 years but did 
not go on to lower secondary school.
Even after outreach, some households will decide not to participate 
because of stigma or because the benefi ts do not seem worth the trans-
action costs implied. There is not much systematic evidence on stigma 
and CCT programs. Adato (2004) concludes from qualitative studies 
in Mexico and Nicaragua that the issue was not one of stigma for ben-
efi ciaries but one of envy of them by nonbenefi ciaries. In Nicaragua, 
some communities even went so far as to provide school supplies to 
nonbenefi ciary children because they felt stigmatized for not having 
what the programs provided. The general impression among many 
people in the CCT community is that stigma is not much of an issue, or 
at least is a lesser issue than it is for social assistance in, say, the United 
States or some European countries. It would seem that the notion of co- 
responsibilities helps households and the general public feel that the pro-
gram benefi ciaries are behaving in desirable ways and merit support.
As is true for other social programs, transaction costs are a concern—
and more so where benefi ts are relatively small. Indeed, it is largely to 
minimize transaction costs to both participants and program budgets 
that many programs pay benefi ts only every two months when the logic 
of the program would imply that regular small fl ows of cash each month 
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would be most helpful in supporting food expenditures, defraying the 
small regular costs of school attendance, and substituting for reduced 
child earnings. Despite that, we know that transaction costs can be high 
relative to the transfer for at least a subset of participants. In Ecuador, 
for example, residents of some isolated communities in Amazonia, 
páramo, or remote coastal areas can face very high costs for transpor-
tation (as high as $50–$480 by airplane, $10–$50 by motorboat or 
panga; or they require a walk of one or more days’ duration). However, 
because benefi ciaries allow transfers to accumulate before collecting 
them, and combine trips to program payment points with other activi-
ties they carry out in urban areas, the costs of collecting the transfer are 
generally much lower—perhaps as low as $0.25–$0.50 per month, on 
average, including in the Amazonia region (Carrillo and Ponce 2008).5 
In Bangladesh, the benefi t level is very low, so many people fail to par-
ticipate in the program.6
A comparison of the coverage of CCT-like programs in two coun-
tries, Bangladesh and Cambodia, helps illustrate the role that targeting 
practice can have in determining who is reached by a program. Both 
programs have several elements in common: They are in poor coun-
tries where administrative capacity is low, probably lower in Cambodia 
than in Bangladesh. Both programs have only education conditions 
and are limited to girls in secondary school. As such, both start with 
a challenge because base enrollment rates in upper primary grades are 
low among the poor. Nevertheless, because of careful geographic and 
proxy means targeting, Cambodia was able to concentrate transfers 
among the poor. Simple calculations suggest that approximately 70 
percent of benefi ts reached households in the poorest quintile of per 
capita consumption (minus transfers), and less than 5 percent reached 
households in the richest quintile. In Bangladesh, the program oper-
ates nationally, except in the four largest cities, and is targeted only by 
gender. In practice, however, the incidence of the program has been 
regressive largely because the base enrollment is higher among the less 
poor. Simple calculations suggest that less than 10 percent of benefi ts 
reached households in the poorest quintile of per capita consumption 
(minus transfers), and approximately 35 percent reached households in 
the richest quintile. 
It is important to recognize that targeting results seen to date are not 
inherent to the design of CCTs, but refl ect the political will and techni-
cal effort made in the programs we examined. Although it is impossible 
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to say whether that will continue over time, we note that a number of 
countries continue to refi ne and improve the implementation and use of 
their proxy means tests and poverty maps, the technical tools that drive 
the results. Several countries have carried out recertifi cation processes 
to remove from the list of benefi ciaries those who have prospered in the 
interim. We cannot quantify the effect of these changes because mea-
sures of comparable targeting outcomes over time are scarce. In many 
countries, the programs have been rolling out from year to year, cover-
ing areas of different inherent poverty characteristics, so measures across 
time would not be fully comparable. Even in countries with nationwide 
programs over several years, we would need information that straddles 
recertifi cation periods. Deterioration of targeting outcomes could be 
expected within a single certifi cation period, such as is observed but not 
statistically signifi cant for Jamaica.
The Latin American CCT programs (which are the majority of the 
programs with known targeting results) have a fairly similar experience 
in using a combination of geographic targeting and proxy means test-
ing and in devoting considerable effort to implementing these targeting 
systems well. Many of the countries with well-established programs 
have had time to improve and refi ne their targeting systems. In some 
of the countries with newer programs, improvements are likely to be 
needed. As the range of countries running CCT programs diversifi es, 
we would expect their targeting mechanisms, and possibly the outcomes 
from them, to diversify as well. Some countries may choose universal-
ism over targeting, as Bolivia has done in the Juancito Pinto program 
for all fi rst-grade students. Eastern European countries that already 
have established means testing systems may use those; community-
based targeting may play a larger role in Africa and Asia than in Latin 
America. Moreover, the results that reasonably can be achieved will 
vary, depending on such context and design features as the range of ages 
covered by the program.
Benefi t Systems 
Benefi t systems have a number of aspects that can infl uence outcomes. 
Here we describe some of the main features of CCT programs, espe-
cially the structure and level of payments, the payee, and the payment 
mechanism.
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Benefi t Structures
CCT programs often differentiate payments by the number of children 
in the eligible age range, but otherwise have rather simple benefi t struc-
tures—only two differentiate by poverty level, none by cost of living,7 
and few by age/grade or gender of the student. Those simple payment 
structures streamline administrative systems and greatly facilitate com-
munication and community understanding of the programs. But they 
represent something of a missed opportunity in terms of fi ne-tuning the 
impact on poverty for a given budget and possibly on best leveraging 
changes in human capital (a theme taken up in chapter 6).
In most of the CCT programs, benefi ts depend directly on the num-
ber of children in the household. That is consistent with an underlying 
logic of the program that recognizes that each child needs to receive 
health and education services and that there are costs (explicit and 
implicit) in getting those services. However, a number of programs have 
capped the number of children who can be covered. Bolsa Família caps 
the benefi t at R$45, equivalent to having three children in the program. 
Mexico caps the benefi t at about $153, an amount that roughly corre-
sponds with two children in primary school and one in high school. In 
the Dominican Republic, the maximum benefi t amount is $19 for four 
or more children ($9 for one or two, $14 for three children). 
A few programs, such as the ones in Ecuador, El Salvador, Panama, 
and Peru, pay a fl at benefi t per household, irrespective of the number of 
children. Paying such a fl at benefi t can be done as a way to ration ben-
efi ts among families when the program budget cannot cover all who are 
poor, to counter any incentive to increased fertility,8 or if the program 
logic is that households need an incentive to learn a new behavior but 
do not need one to practice it with each successive child.
Benefi ts also can be differentiated by grade or by gender. Opor-
tunidades in Mexico, Familias en Acción in Colombia, the Social Risk 
Mitigation Project (SRMP) in Turkey, and recently Jamaica’s Program 
of Advancement through Health and Education (PATH) pay higher 
amounts for children in secondary school than for children in primary 
school as a way of recognizing that the opportunity cost of the time 
of older students is higher than of younger students; often, explicit 
costs of secondary schooling are higher as well because schools are 
more distant and textbooks more expensive. Oportunidades and the 
SRMP pay higher benefi ts for girls in recognition that they have been 
disadvantaged in enrollment. The Bangladesh and Cambodia girls’ 
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scholarship programs originally were designed to benefi t girls only, 
although Bangladesh is designing a reform to include poor boys and 
Cambodia now covers both sexes. Jamaica recently decided to make 
higher payments for boys in secondary school because boys have lower 
enrollment and schooling outcomes.
Many programs pay bimonthly or less often to economize on transac-
tion costs for the program and for the benefi ciary. Sometimes there are 
no payments for the months when school is not in session; in other cases, 
payments continue throughout the year; and in yet other instances, a 
payment is timed before the school year to enable households to pay for 
uniforms, shoes, textbooks, and any fees. Though lately there is much 
talk of moving to rewarding performance rather than attendance only, 
Bogotá’s Subsidio Condicionado a la Asistencia Escolar (SCAE) pro-
gram alone gives bonuses at the end of the school year.
Payee
In most of the programs, the payee is the parent rather than the student; 
exceptions are mostly in secondary scholarship programs, especially 
those in Asia and in the SCAE program in Bogotá. In nearly all pro-
grams where the adult is the payee, payments are made to the mother 
of the children, a feature that may be important, as we shall see in 
subsequent chapters.
Payment Systems
The range of payment systems used in CCT programs covers the full 
gamut of possibilities. In Brazil, payments are made on debit cards 
and cash can be withdrawn at banks, ATM machines, or lottery sales 
points. In Turkey, payments are made through the state bank, in cash, 
with clients going to tellers to withdraw funds. In Mexico, a fairly 
low-tech “Brinks truck” model is still the main payment modality, 
though payments through banks are being introduced in urban areas. 
Households are paid in cash at temporary pay points that use available 
infrastructure (such as community centers), with transportation and 
payment of the money contracted to the Mexican post and telegraph 
offi ce. In Kenya, payments are made through the post offi ce, but a 
pilot program being set up is considering paying via cell phone sys-
tems. And at the opposite end of the scale, a pilot program in Tanzania 
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will disburse funds to community representatives who will make the 
payments. 
There is diversity in how countries ensure that payments are made in 
full and understood by the client. Most of the Latin American programs 
work through the banking system, with the full panoply of audits that 
implies. Mexico gives each household pay statements that show details 
of payments for each different member/set of conditions and for whom 
any payments were suspended. Cambodia pays in cash, with payments 
made every quarter at ceremonies that celebrate and encourage the stu-
dents’ enrollment and academic status and bring an element of transpar-
ency and community monitoring to the payment system.
Payment Levels
One of the most important features of the payment structure is, of 
course, its level. Capturing this succinctly is complicated because of the 
differentiation of payments by number of children and other pertinent 
factors, differences in context, and the targeting of the programs. Data 
from household surveys enable us to summarize into a single number 
or two each program’s level of generosity. Table 3.2 presents the share 
of recipient welfare that the transfers represent for the population of 
recipients. For a subset of the programs we also present the share of 
the transfer and for the poorer among them (defi ned in this exercise 
as those whose pre-transfer per capita expenditure is less than the 25 
percentile of national distribution of the pre-transfer per capita expen-
diture or income). As table 3.2 reveals, there is signifi cant variation in 
the generosity of CCT programs, from about 1 percent of pretransfer 
household expenditures in Bangladesh to 29 percent in Nicaragua. It is 
also encouraging that the generosity of the programs is slightly higher 
for the poorer benefi ciaries—especially in the case of Mexico where the 
share of program transfer is estimated to be 33 percent of the pretrans-
fer level of household consumption among households in the bottom 
quartile. As is documented in the next chapter, the combination of the 
generosity of the Oportunidades transfers and the program’s high cover-
age of the poor resulted in a signifi cant impact on poverty measures at 
the national level. 
As a means of summarizing the extent to which CCT programs con-
centrate their benefi ts on the poorer segments of the population, fi gure 3.2 
presents the proportion of various programs’ transfer budgets received by 
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each decile of the welfare distribution. Except for Bangladesh, the CCT 
programs for which we have targeting outcomes have sharply progres-
sive incidence, with much higher shares of benefi ts going to the poorest 
households than to the upper end of the distribution. Among the big, 
well-known programs, Mexico delivers more than 45 percent of benefi ts 
to the poorest decile. Next in line are Chile and Jamaica with approxi-
mately 35–40 percent of benefi ts to their poorest deciles. 
Table 3.2 Generosity of CCT Programs, Various Years
Country/Program/Year
Transfer as share of pretransfer consumption among 
all benefi ciaries (%)a
Bangladesh: FSSAP, 2000b  0.6
Brazil: BF, 2006b  6.1
Colombia: Familias en Acción, 2002c 17.0
Ecuador: BDH, 2006b  6.0
Honduras: PRAF, 2000c  7.0
Jamaica: PATH, 2004b  8.2
Mexico: Oportunidades, 2004b 21.8
Nicaragua: RPS, 2000c 29.3
Country/Program/Year
Transfer as share of pretransfer consumption among 
poord benefi ciaries (%)
Bangladesh: FSSAP, 2000b  0.8
Brazil: BF, 2006b 11.7
Ecuador: BDH, 2006b  8.3
Jamaica: PATH, 2004b 10.7
Mexico: Oportunidades, 2004b 33.4
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: BDH = Bono de Desarrollo Humano; BF = Bolsa Familia; FSSAP = Female Secondary School Assistance Program; PATH 
= Program of Advancement through Health and Education; PRAF = Programa de Asignacion Familiar; RPS = Red de Protección 
Social.
a. The transfer amounts as a proportion of per capita expenditures (or consumption) are not the same across all tables in the report 
because of differences in the surveys used, including their coverage and year.
b. The measure of welfare used for Brazil is pretransfer per capita income (PCI). For the remaining countries, the measure of welfare 
is pretransfer per capita expenditure (PCE). Pretransfer PCI or PCE is constructed by subtracting the value of the transfer per capita 
received from either PCE or PCI. The numbers reported are the median shares derived by fi rst removing extreme outliers at both ends 
of the national distribution of PCE or PCI (that is, dropping households with PCE or PCI below the 1st percentile and above the 99th 
percentile of the national distribution). 
c. The number reported is the share of consumption for the median control household. 
d. A poor benefi ciary is one whose pretransfer PCE is less than the 25th percentile of national distribution of the pretransfer PCE. 
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Therefore, it is not surprising that CCT programs have been rec-
ognized for their success in both reaching the poor and concentrating 
benefi ts among them. Although there are serious diffi culties in properly 
measuring the incidence of transfers (see box 3.2), naïve comparisons 
of the Latin American CCT programs with other transfer programs 
suggest that CCT programs do a better job of concentrating benefi ts 
among the poorest (see Lindert, Skoufi as, and Shapiro [2006], fi gure 
11, p. 71).9
Looking forward, the agenda with respect to benefi t systems will be 
more focused on benefi t level and structure issues than on the payment 
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Figure 3.2 Benefi t Incidence of CCT Programs, Various Years
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the following surveys: Ecuador’s Encuesta de 
Condiciones de Vida 2006; Mexico’s Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso-Gasto de los Hogares 2004; 
Brazil’s Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios 2006; Jamaica’s Survey of Living Conditions 
2004; Chile’s Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional 2003; Honduras’s Encuesta 
de Hogares de Propósitos Multiples 2004; Bangladesh’s Household Income and Expenditure 
Survey 2000; and the Cambodia Japanese Fund for Poverty Reduction application form 2003. 
Note: BDH = Bono de Desarrollo Humano; BF = Bolsa Família; FSSAP = Female Secondary 
School Assistance Program; JFPR = Japanese Fund for Poverty Reduction; PATH = Program of 
Advancement through Health and Education; PRAF = Programa de Asignación Familiar; SUF = 
Subsidio Unitario Familiar. For Brazil and Chile, the deciles are based on per capita income minus 
transfer per capita. For the remaining countries, the measure of welfare used is per capita expenditure 
net of the transfer per capita.
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mechanisms. Establishing payment mechanisms is a key effort, but one 
that countries generally have found easier to accomplish than develop-
ing sound targeting systems or monitoring benefi ciaries’ compliance 
with co-responsibilities. Refi nements in payment mechanisms to reduce 
costs, increase convenience, or better ensure accountability will con-
tinue, but the basic issues already have been resolved in most countries. 
Where policy attention is focused is on the issues of how much to pay; 
whether to customize payments further by age, grade, household com-
position, poverty, and cost of living; and whether and how to pay for 
performance as well as attendance.
Conditions: Their Defi nition, Compliance Monitoring, 
and Enforcement
CCT programs vary somewhat with respect to the design of their condi-
tions, and more so with respect to their enforcement of those conditions. 
Monitoring compliance with conditions is a complex task. It involves 
a variety of actors inside and outside the CCT program, requires the 
collection and processing of large amounts of information, and needs 
to happen in a timely manner for the conditions to have any meaning-
ful link with the transfer payment the benefi ciaries receive. Just as the 
role of the CCT program in social policy and its basic characteristics 
(such as targeting method, benefi t amount, and payment system) dif-
fer from program to program, so do the mechanisms used to monitor 
benefi ciaries’ compliance with the conditions and the degree to which 
those conditions are enforced. 
Defi nition of Conditions
Many programs condition the transfer both on enrollment and regular 
attendance of the households’ children in school and on regular health 
center visits for the younger children and often the pregnant women. 
The conditions in programs that promote education can be defi ned 
for certain age brackets (Dominican Republic, Jamaica) or grades 
(Cambodia, El Salvador). Almost all CCTs require enrollment and 
attendance on 80 or 85 percent of school days; Bangladesh’s FSSAP is 
the exception, requiring only 75 percent attendance. A few programs 
condition on some aspect of performance: Cambodia, for example, 
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requires passing grades; Turkey allows a grade to be repeated only once; 
and Nicaragua required grade promotion at year’s end. 
In programs defi ning conditions by the use of health services, condi-
tions tend to apply to children aged 0 to 5 or 6 years, with the age set 
to allow continuous eligibility from birth to schooling, assuming “on-
time” enrollment. In about half the cases with child health conditions, 
there also are conditions for pregnant women and/or lactating mothers. 
Less often are there conditions for adult health care more generally, 
although such conditions are present and well enforced in Mexico and 
are present albeit less enforced in Jamaica. Child health conditions are 
formulated in various ways, requiring children to have complete immu-
nizations (Brazil) or to adhere to a schedule of regular health center 
visits for health checkups. In some countries, the kind of health services 
that mothers and children should receive are defi ned in great detail 
(Jamaica), but other countries mandate only that they regularly go to 
the health center (Honduras). Growth monitoring is required two to 
six times a year in most programs with child health conditions. Health 
and nutrition education sessions are a feature of many, but not all, Latin 
American programs and rarely are used elsewhere (for details, see the 
country at-a-glance tables in appendix A). Indeed, all Latin American 
programs have health conditions of some kind, whereas such conditions 
are much less common in active and planned programs in Africa and 
South Asia. Though malnutrition and immunization coverage are more 
problematic in those regions, services are more limited, so the programs 
have not focused on health conditions.
Some programs allow exceptions or exemptions to the conditions 
they impose. Most common is justifi cation for absence during a speci-
fi ed reporting period on grounds of illness. Jamaica waives attendance 
requirements for children who are disabled and deemed unlikely to 
benefi t from attending school (Mont 2006). Kenya waives attendance 
requirements for children who do not have access to schools or clinics 
(Government of Kenya 2006b).
Timing of Compliance Verifi cation
The frequency of verifying compliance with conditions varies widely 
(see table 3.3). Frequency ranges from monthly (Turkey) to every four 
months (Honduras) or even once a year (Chile SUF). Verifi cation fre-
quency depends, in part, on the type of conditions a program imposes: 
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if benefi ciaries are required to attend one training session a year, com-
pliance verifi cation can be determined only annually. Consequently, 
conditions related to health or awareness raising tend to be verifi ed at 
longer intervals than do those for school attendance. 
Another factor in determining the frequency of verif ication is 
capacity constraints. Given the amount of information and number 
of transactions involved, smaller-scale programs or programs in low-
capacity settings may opt for longer intervals. Scholarship programs 
in Bangladesh and Cambodia have done so. But even if compliance 
verifi cation is designed to be done more frequently, capacity con-
straints may yield delays in sanctioning noncompliance. Even in a 
high-capacity environment such as Mexico, the benefi t amount paid 
in the period January/February refl ects the benefi ciary household’s 
compliance or noncompliance in the period September/October of 
the preceding year. Such long lag times between the noncompliance 
Table 3.3 Country and Program Variations in Monitoring and Penalties for Noncompliance with Conditions
Degree of monitoring No penalties Light penalties Full penalties
No monitoring Ecuador None None
Light monitoring 
(annually)
Pakistan: PESRP
Chile: SUF
Bangladesh: FSSAP
Cambodia: CESSP and JFPR
None
Full monitoring 
(monthly, bimonthly, 
or quarterly)
None Brazil: Bolsa Alimentação, Bolsa 
Escola, Bolsa Família, and PETI
Chile: Chile Solidario
Honduras: PRAF
Kenya: CT-OVC
Pakistan: CSP
Colombia: Familias en Acción and 
SCAE-Bogotá
El Salvador: Red Solidaria
Jamaica: PATH
Mexico: Oportunidades
Nicaragua: Atención a Crisis and 
RPS
Turkey: SRMP
Source: Authors’ compilation.
Note: CESSP = Cambodia Education Sector Support Project; CSP = Child Support Program; CT-OVC = Cash Transfer for Orphans 
and Vulnerable Children; FSSAP = Female Secondary School Assistance Program; JFPR = Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction; PATH 
= Program of Advancement through Health and Education; PESRP = Punjab Education Sector Reform Program; PETI = Programa 
de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil; PRAF = Programa de Asignación Familiar; RPS = Red de Protección Social; SCAE = Subsidio 
Condicionado a la Asistencia Escolar; SRMP = Social Risk Mitigation Project; SUF = Subsidio Unitario Familiar. Light penalties 
= warnings prior to penalties and/or delay or minor reduction in individual benefi t and/or irregular application of reductions; full 
penalties = complete withdrawal of period’s benefi t for noncompliant person in payment period immediately following detection of 
noncompliance.
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and the reduction of benefi t may weaken the positive quid pro quo 
effect of the program. 
Sanctions and Enforcement
Although all CCT programs specify a schedule of sanctions in the case 
of noncompliance with the stated conditions, both the type of sanc-
tions and the degree of enforcement vary quite substantially from one 
program to another. Most common is a temporary reduction of all or 
part of the benefi t for the fi rst instances of noncompliance, followed 
by an eventual termination of the benefi t for repeated noncompliance. 
Such is the case, for example, in Colombia, Jamaica, and Mexico, where 
the benefi t is reduced immediately for the period for which there was 
noncompliance and the reduction is refl ected in the next payment. 
Programs do not always take a hard line on compliance with the 
conditions they impose because CCT programs generally are targeted 
to the poorest and most vulnerable groups of the population—those 
people most in need of assistance. By design, some programs involve a 
social worker who, in the case of noncompliance, will reach out to the 
benefi ciaries (El Salvador, Jamaica). Brazil even goes a step farther: the 
conditions fundamentally are viewed as encouraging beneficiaries to 
take up and exercise their right to free education and free health care, so 
noncompliance is taken to be a manifestation of some kind of obstacle 
that the family cannot overcome to access the service rather than an 
unwillingness to comply. A benefi ciary who is noncompliant will receive 
a warning (written notice) of noncompliance for the fi rst period and may 
be visited by a social worker to see if there is a noncash-related problem to 
be solved. Only on a third consecutive occasion of noncompliance will the 
benefi t be “blocked” for 30 days, after which the full amount, including 
the amount accumulated during the blockage, will be paid out. Perhaps 
the ultimate “soft conditions” are those in Ecuador, where the program 
was announced as conditional, but effective systems of monitoring com-
pliance and enforcing sanctions have yet to be developed. 
In Brazil, El Salvador, and Mexico, compliance with education con-
ditions has tended to be 90 percent or better among enrolled students; 
in Jamaica, compliance has improved over the years from 70 percent 
to 85 percent.10 Compliance with health conditions (among those for 
whom compliance information is available) is in the same range or bet-
ter for these countries. 
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Compliance Verifi cation Mechanisms
The process of verifying benefi ciaries’ compliance with the conditions 
generally involves, at the very least, the providers of the services whose 
use is mandated, the program, the payment agency, and the benefi ciaries 
themselves. Depending on the country context, not only one but vari-
ous levels of government may be involved, as may be nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) or other community organizations helping with 
either the delivery of the services or the program itself. 
Information is collected and processed by these various actors in many 
different ways. In most programs, the education or health service provider 
collects data on school enrollment and attendance or on health center vis-
its. The provider gives the data either directly to the program or to a cen-
tral unit in the provider’s line ministry, which then compiles the data and 
passes them on to the program. In some programs, such as in Colombia, 
the benefi ciaries are involved more heavily by having to get forms fi lled 
out and certifi ed by each service provider and then to submit the forms to 
the program. Practices span anything from paper-and-pencil attendance 
lists kept by teachers and handed over to the program offi cials on a regular 
basis (Bangladesh, Cambodia) to optical-scan forms (Mexico) to experi-
ments with different types of smart cards (Brazil). 
Enforcement of sanctions for noncompliance demands the timely 
availability of reliable information, which may be especially problematic 
in the beginning phases of a program. Although about 93 percent of 
schools in Brazil reported information in 2006, only 55 percent did so 
in 2004; by 2006, information on compliance with health conditions 
was only available for about 33 percent of families. Jamaica was able to 
reduce the number of schools that did not return the benefi ciary lists 
in time from about 10 percent of schools in 2003 to zero by the end of 
2005. Mexico’s Oportunidades, like some mature programs, now has 
timely information on compliance with all conditions for 96 percent 
of its benefi ciaries (Castañeda 2006), but initially had problems with 
delays (IFPRI 2000). 
Lack of information clearly precludes establishing a meaningful link 
between conditions and payments through the enforcement of sanc-
tions. There are few studies that soundly address issues of the accuracy 
of compliance information. Although a qualitative study of Turkey 
suggested that education offi cials were hesitant to report absences, the 
bigger issue was getting them to fi ll in the forms at all (Kudat 2006). 
A series of operational audits of Jamaica’s compliance monitoring has 
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turned up no big discrepancies between attendance records kept in 
schools and clinics and the information submitted to the PATH pro-
gram (Government of Jamaica 2006). 
Unfortunately, little information is available on the costs of moni-
toring compliance with conditions, partly because some of the costs 
are borne by health or education sector employees or subsumed in 
other administrative costs and so are not easily accounted for. The 
only piece of comparative analysis of cost structures we are aware of is 
the study of Nicaragua (RPS pilot), Honduras (PRAF), and Mexico 
(Oportunidades) (Caldés, Coady, and Maluccio 2006). This study 
fi nds that the cost of verifi cation can range from 2 percent to 24 per-
cent of total program administrative costs (excluding transfers) in any 
given year. Those estimates have to be viewed with caution, however, 
because they very much depend on a program’s stage of implementa-
tion (newly introduced versus mature) and on the associated shift in 
the relative shares of different project activities in the overall costs of 
the program. 
Another way to estimate the costs of verifying compliance is to work 
backward. Grosh et al. (2008) compile administrative costs for 10 CCT 
programs, showing a range from 4 percent to 12 percent of total pro-
gram costs. Those costs include running the systems for targeting and 
payments as well as monitoring compliance, plus all the support services 
of management, monitoring, and evaluation. If those functions each 
took the same share of administrative resources, monitoring compli-
ance would be on the order of 1–3 percent of total program resources. 
It is interesting to note that the median administrative cost for CCT 
programs in the study is 8 percent; for other types of cash transfers it 
is 9 percent; and over the whole range of 54 social assistance programs, 
the median administrative cost is 10 percent (Grosh et al. 2008). 
Apparently the scale and generosity of the (mature) CCT programs has 
been suffi cient to temper the extra administrative requirement imposed 
by monitoring compliance with conditions. 
Monitoring and Evaluation
A number of CCT programs have had unusually proactive manage-
ment based on cutting-edge technical systems, especially monitoring 
and evaluation systems. Two features inherent to CCTs programs—the 
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number of actors involved and the need for extensive information man-
agement to verify compliance with conditions—may have interacted 
in ways that have spurred creative development of monitoring and 
management. This excellence in systems, the extensive documentation 
that has resulted from the amount of information available, and the 
degree of transparency about the information have contributed to the 
attractiveness of CCT programs, although such features are not inher-
ent to them. 
All CCT programs need to know how implementation is being car-
ried out across diverse actors and processes, and they have developed 
various ways to elicit that information, some of which also add incen-
tives for good performance. Colombia’s Familias en Acción has used 
a system of sample-based site monitoring or “spot checks” as internal 
process evaluation. Interviews are conducted every six months in a 
sample of 20 municipalities; for participants, program offi cials, and 
local governments, interviewers use defi ned questionnaires that cover 
400 indicators of various program aspects (including inscription pro-
cesses, verifi cation of compliance with conditions, payment systems, 
appeals, and quality of the health education component) (box 3.4). 
The results show which aspects of the program are working well; how 
much variability there is in program management across locations; 
and where changes in procedures, training, staffi ng, or other inputs 
are needed. The program has been good not only at collecting such 
information, but also in acting on it. Program managers detected 
problems with long queues for payments (including people waiting 
outdoors in the rain) and worked with banks to fi nd various ways to 
reduce the queues. They found that some children were not being 
served continuously between the preschool and school portions of the 
program because of when their birthdays fell relative to enrollment, so 
they changed the specifi cations. And when they identifi ed a number 
of areas where staff needed more training to carry out the program 
effi ciently, they provided that training.
In Brazil, the Bolsa Família program depends to a great extent 
on work done by the municipalities. After an initial problem with 
the quality and timeliness of such work, the Bolsa implemented its 
“index of decentralized management,” which captures the quality of 
functions performed by municipalities on the household registry, the 
monitoring of conditions, and all municipalities’ social controls for 
the program. Municipalities receive support for their administrative 
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costs, with the payments adjusted to their performance on the 
index. 
From the early stages of program development, Oportunidades 
has put in place three structures to monitor program operations and 
results. The fi rst structure, operating since 1998, generates a set of 
64 monitoring and management indicators every two months (the 
Sistemas de Datos Personales de Oportunidades). A second structure, 
a survey of benefi ciaries and program providers called sentinel points, 
was implemented in 2000 and produces information on perception 
of service quality twice a year. Third, external experts use monitor-
ing and management data to make regular assessments of program 
Knowledge
•  Mother’s knowledge of specifi c themes
•  Clinic and school staffs’ familiarity with their program guide
Use of materials
•  Do mother leaders use materials?
•  Do school and clinic staff consult their guides?
Compliance with operational procedures
•  Do mother leaders report complaints?
•  How many days do the banks allow for payments; what is the 
waiting time?
Infrastructure
•  Do regional offi ces have necessary equipment?
•  Do mothers stand in line at the bank, inside or outside?
Organization
•  Percent of schools that require a written excuse for absence
Procedures
•  Percent of complaints resolved at the Regional Coordination 
Unit
•  Percent of municipalities that have lists of schools, clinics, and 
completed stickers
Source: Velásquez 2007.
Box 3.4 Colombia’s Familias en Acción 
Sample-Based Site Monitoring, Selected Indicators
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operations. All the information and assessments are available to the 
public on the program Web site. In Mexico, compliance with condi-
tions is certifi ed on schedule in 96 percent of cases, payments are 
made on time in 98 percent of cases (Castañeda 2006), and overall 
administrative costs exclusive of payment transactions are 3 percent 
of total program costs (Gomez-Hermosillo 2006).
Of course, not all experiences are so positive. There are real logistic 
and institutional challenges in running CCT programs: Turkey’s quali-
tative evaluation pointed to problems with the management informa-
tion system in the fi rst couple of years of operation (Ahmed et al. 2007), 
and Honduras sometimes is cited as a case where poor implementation 
has affected the expected impacts. Compliance monitoring has been a 
challenge in many countries. But the positive cases get more press and 
are setting new expectations for the administration of social assistance 
programs.
The evaluation culture around CCT programs is quite strong. It 
is present in a larger share of programs than is excellent monitoring, 
and it goes well beyond traditional practice in social policy. Many 
programs either have conducted or have plans to conduct impact eval-
uations with credible counterfactuals. Among those programs, a large 
share of countries have used experimental methods, at least initially. 
In several countries, the evaluations are neither simple nor one-off. 
There have been dozens of studies for Mexico’s program, and there is 
a fairly diverse body of evaluation for Colombia and Nicaragua. Most 
evaluations have been conducted by agencies external to the program 
and often external to the government and international partners 
as well, a practice that enhances the credibility of the evaluation. 
In the great majority of cases, evaluations have been made public, 
often posted on program Web sites and/or published in respected 
academic journals. A number of those evaluations have had a real 
impact on policy. Evaluations showed, for example, that anemia was 
not declining as expected among Oportunidades benefi ciaries. That 
fi nding led to a series of investigations of causes and the discovery 
that the bioavailability of iron in the original food supplement was 
low. Moreover, the supplement was shared among family members 
and thus the target child got less than the intended amount. The 
supplement was reformulated and the nutrition education component 
was strengthened (Neufeld 2006). In Jamaica, the increase in second-
ary enrollment was disappointing, so the government has decided to 
95
D E S I G N  A N D  I M P L E M E N T A T I O N  F E A T U R E S  O F  C C T  P R O G R A M S
increase the benefi ts at the secondary level and to differentiate them 
by grade and gender.
This culture of evaluation is spreading not only from one CCT 
program to another, but also from CCT programs to other programs 
within the same countries. Mexico’s decision to evaluate the early phases 
of Oportunidades in 1997 was, at the time, an unusually dramatic 
example of evaluation: it was motivated and paid for wholly by the 
program designers without external pressure, it used an experimental 
design, it was contracted to an independent third party, and the data 
collected were made publicly available so that scholars could replicate 
and extend the work. Since then, the notion of good evaluation has 
spread. Appendix B of this report provides a detailed discussion of the 
technical aspects of CCT impact evaluations. 
In Mexico, a social development law, passed in 2004, requires that 
all new programs be evaluated, and established a National Council for 
the Evaluation of Social Development Policy. A separate transparency 
law mandates that evaluation results be made public. External evalua-
tions are done and the summaries are passed to program managers, who 
annually must describe to Congress what they are doing in response to 
the evaluations (Hernández 2006). The Mexican Ministry of Social 
Development, which is responsible for Oportunidades and many other 
programs, has adopted a system of results-based monitoring. It plans 
to conduct evaluations of fi ve national programs a year in each of three 
years and to have installed such a system in half its subnational agencies 
within six years (Rubio 2007). Chile and Colombia also have developed 
signifi cant evaluation cultures, cited as “good practice” in global reviews 
(for example, Mackay 2007).
Meanwhile, the evaluation agenda remains vital among CCT pro-
grams. The large majority of new programs are planning credible evalu-
ations, and several of those have included interesting dimensions not 
previously assessed (see box 3.5). For countries with programs that have 
reached their full intended coverage, a range of issues remains, although 
experimental design is no longer an option for many aspects of evalua-
tion and so there are additional methodological challenges.
A noteworthy aspect of the experience of CCT programs has been 
the fact that lessons learned in one country often have been shared 
internationally. That sharing has happened to such an extent that an 
international community of practice has developed as a result (see 
box 3.6). 
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DESPITE THE UNUSUAL QUANTITY AND QUALITY 
of impact evaluations of CCT programs to date, the 
agenda remains vital and there are quite a number of 
evaluations ongoing or planned. Those evaluations 
can be grouped into three types:
1. Relatively basic evaluations of new programs: 
Many of these will use experimental design. 
A signifi cant subset is in new contexts, espe-
cially low-income countries (Bolivia, Kenya, 
Pakistan, Yemen), or has new twists on 
service delivery (community-driven develop-
ment approaches being developed in Sierra 
Leone and Tanzania).
2. Evaluations that will help disentangle the 
role of different parts of the “classic” pro-
gram in delivering impacts:
 •  Pilot programs in Burkina Faso and 
Morocco have comparative treatment 
arms for conditional and unconditional 
transfers. The transfer will be discounted 
fully in the payment round that immedi-
ately follows noncompliance. Experiments 
already under way in Kenya and Pakistan 
test much softer versions of penalties: 
initial warnings to households rather than 
penalties, and fi nal penalties amounting 
to only a small reduction in the trans-
fer and occurring several months after 
noncompliance.
 •  So far, virtually all CCT programs have 
paid the woman of the household. Doing 
so imposes no additional direct opera-
tional burden because a single person must 
represent the household in any case. 
However, the uniform payment to women 
has made it diffi cult to understand to what 
extent impacts have come from the release 
of the budget constraint via the transfer, 
changes in behavior due to conditions, or 
changes in use of household resources due 
to the payment to women. Pilot programs 
in Burkina Faso, Morocco, and Yemen test 
treatment arms for delivering cash to men/
fathers versus women/mothers. 
 •  The role of the health/nutrition education 
component in CCT programs has not 
been studied specifi cally. In Panama, the 
impact of adding community-based nutri-
tion education (the Atención Integral de 
la Niñez en la Comunidad model) will be 
tested. In Indonesia, a less intense variant 
on providing health education to leaders of 
benefi ciary groups will be tested.
3. Evaluations that propose to go beyond the 
use of services to look at fi nal outcomes: 
Burkina Faso, Indonesia, Morocco, and 
Tanzania look at examination results or 
cognitive outcomes for school children. 
Nutritional status is measured in Burkina 
Faso, El Salvador, Indonesia, Panama, and 
Tanzania. Anemia is measured in Burkina 
Faso, El Salvador, and Panama.
There is still a large evaluation agenda on second-
round and long-run impacts. Very little is known 
about how programs impact savings or investment, 
long-run autonomous incomes of benefi ciary house-
holds, or spillover effects at the community level in 
any setting. Evidence on labor supply, on migration, 
and on remittances beyond the few settings in which 
these have been measured also would be useful, as 
would knowing what happens to families or children 
after they leave the program. Evaluations on those 
issues are under way for Chile and Mexico; are being 
considered in Colombia; and are pertinent in many 
other countries, especially those with programs that 
have operated for several years. 
Box 3.5 Evaluation Remains Important in CCTs
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Intersectoral and Interinstitutional Challenges
Poverty has been recognized as multidimensional for a long time, but 
most service provision is organized along unidimensional lines. CCT 
programs, especially in Latin America, often are at the heart of a move 
toward integrating policy and service delivery to achieve greater syner-
gies among policies. The CCT programs sometimes are catalysts of 
such a move, and sometimes are forerunners in a larger explicit strategy 
to improve integration. That move toward coordination or integration 
has two facets—the increased coordination of actors and the integra-
tion of benefi ts.
CCTs inherently involve coordination among actors across several 
sectors (social assistance, health, education, planning, fi nance, auditing) 
and levels (federal, state, local, community). Many countries with a CCT 
program have at least national coordinating structures, and countries 
CCT PROGRAMS HAVE ENGAGED INTENSIVELY 
in learning from each other—often directly, some-
times facilitated by international agencies—and 
using a full range of modalities:
• A series of three global conferences spon-
sored by international agencies and hosted 
by local governments have drawn together 
almost all countries that have had CCT 
programs active at the time of a conference: 
2002 in Puebla, Mexico; 2004 in São Paulo, 
Brazil; and 2006 in Istanbul, Turkey. A 
series of smaller regional events has rein-
forced ties among program managers.
• There has been a series of study trips, 
often to the established Latin American 
programs.
• A video conference “learning circle,” facili-
tated by the World Bank, has been formed 
by fi ve of the established Latin American 
programs. Participants also have organized 
face-to-face sessions: January 2008 in 
Cuernavaca, Mexico; September 2008 in 
Cartagena, Colombia.
• Extensive publication of evaluation results in 
academic journals has enabled a wider range 
of people to join in the learning.
• Several programs have very detailed pub-
lic Web sites that publicize not only basic 
program information, but also operational 
manuals, monitoring statistics, evaluation 
results, program news, and the like.
Not only is the learning South-South, but it 
also has taken on South-North dimensions, with 
offi cials in London, New York City, and Sydney 
familiarizing themselves with the international 
CCT experience. The contacts have gone farther 
with Opportunity NYC: offi cials from the mayor’s 
offi ce and program management traveled to Mexico 
to visit Oportunidades, joined in some of the activi-
ties of the Latin American learning circle, and freely 
cited international experience as a justifi cation for 
their pilot program.
Box 3.6 The International CCT Community of Practice
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where service provision is local usually have some sort of local coordi-
nating structures as well. For example, Mexico’s national coordinating 
council, composed of senior policy makers, meets twice a year; the tech-
nical coordinating committee, comprising senior program managers, 
meets bimonthly, as do the state coordinating committees with local 
coordination around the 11,000 service centers (known as the mesas de 
atención). Those structures are concerned principally with operational 
details of ensuring that program benefi ciaries meet conditions, that the 
information to monitor compliance fl ows appropriately, and that pay-
ments are made on time and correctly. But in handling those concerns, 
larger issues of the provision of at least health and education services 
arise. Because most countries with CCT programs also have taken 
simultaneous action to increase the quantity or quality of education and/
or health services, the points of contact on CCT operations can add a 
dimension of concrete management interface to such initiatives. (That 
will be discussed more fully in chapter 6.) Some CCT program manag-
ers feel that regularly presenting information about service availability 
(and the shortcomings thereof in specifi c locations) to local line staff and 
senior ministerial representatives exercises pressure for improved services, 
whether or not there is a comprehensive plan to do so.
In a number of cases, the CCT program has given the national gov-
ernment a new tool to affect the delivery of decentralized services. In 
Brazil, for example, the Ministry of Social Development signed a “joint 
management agreement” with each municipality that specifi es who is 
responsible for what part of the Bolsa Família’s administration. It also 
requires that states and municipalities give Bolsa participants priority in 
the wide range of locally run and funded programs. It thereby induces 
all these programs to share, at least partly, a targeting system and eligi-
bility threshold. In Colombia, participating municipalities are required 
to appoint liaison offi cers who oversee all the functions the municipal-
ity is responsible for in the program and who communicate with the 
national and regional program offi ces. De facto, however, a good deal of 
what those municipal liaison offi cers do is coordinate among different 
social services supplied by the municipality. Moreover, the Familias en 
Acción program only works in municipalities that meet defi ned service 
standards for health and education. Initially, some target municipalities 
did not meet those standards but, over time, all did. Thus the national 
program has resulted in better coordination within municipal govern-
ments and has improved service delivery in some.
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Financing is a potent tool. In El Salvador, the Red Solidaria has a 
budget to increase health services through contracting with NGOs. The 
national education budget goes to local schools on a capitated basis, so 
as local enrollments increase in response to the demand-side transfer, the 
supply-side budget will increase in step. Chile Solidario has an even stron-
ger tool than most programs: the portion of the budget needed to provide 
priority services to its clients passes through the Ministry of Planning, 
which releases it only to the ministries in exchange for services. 
Though hard to quantify or document, there is a sense in the CCT 
community that in at least a number of countries, the avenues of coordi-
nation established for the programs not only led to addressing the issues 
directly involved with the CCT program, but also have facilitated col-
laborative identifi cation and solution of problems beyond that. Among 
the challenges currently felt in countries with mature and successful CCT 
programs are the needs to establish more clarity about the role of the CCT 
program versus other instruments and to pursue greater integration of 
social policy. In the countries with the most explicit instruments for meet-
ing those challenges (Chile, Colombia, El Salvador), the leadership has 
come from a central agency under the presidency or ministry of planning 
rather than from within the CCT program itself. 
One way of integrating benefi ts is geographic. In Panama, when the 
government developed the Red de Oportunidades, it also strengthened 
the Social Cabinet in the Ministry of Economy and Finance and created 
a multisector committee of the Red de Oportunidades to ensure that 
the supply of education and health prioritizes the areas where the Red 
will work. Similar approaches to giving priority in health and educa-
tion improvements to areas in which CCT programs concentrate is not 
unusual. In some cases, the coordination has gone beyond the minimum 
level inherent in a CCT program. In El Salvador, for example, the Red 
Solidaria is focused on the poorest 100 municipalities. It includes the 
CCT program itself, a program to improve basic infrastructure services 
in the same municipalities, and a program to provide small-scale pro-
ductive projects and microcredit. The Red then involves coordination 
on a greater range of subjects and from a wider range of actors, including 
those in agriculture, electricity, water, and sanitation.
Another place to integrate benefi ts is directly at the household level. 
As mentioned earlier, the household targeting systems used to select 
CCT benefi ciaries often are used to target the benefi ts of other pro-
grams as well. This means that separate programs may reach the same 
C O N D I T I O N A L  C A S H  T R A N S F E R S :  R E D U C I N G  P R E S E N T  A N D  F U T U R E  P O V E R T Y
100
households. In Jamaica, the benefi ciaries of PATH are eligible not only 
for the cash transfer but also for fee waivers for hospital services and 
pharmaceuticals, for secondary school tuition, and for textbook rentals. 
In Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador, the scope of programs that use the 
same household targeting system as the CCT program is much wider, 
encompassing other cash transfers, housing, school-to-work transition 
for youth, adult education, and so forth. In some countries, the integra-
tion goes beyond a common eligibility threshold in separately admin-
istered programs to specifi cally providing links or referrals. Several 
countries (Chile, Dominican Republic, and El Salvador, among them) 
help households get their birth, adoption, marriage, or identifi cation 
papers in order—and that has spillover benefi ts in improving access 
to many other government programs, to voting rights, and sometimes 
to private banking services. In a decentralized context, Brazil’s Bolsa 
Família has encouraged municipalities to use social workers to bring 
additional support and diagnostics to households where children fail 
to meet their co-responsibilities. Jamaica is beginning to set up a refer-
ral system (including a pilot program with one-stop shops) between 
PATH benefi ciaries and a range of other programs, including skills 
and job-readiness training, job matching, business development, and 
caregiving support. The Chile Solidario program is focused on linking 
poor households into all pertinent branches of social policy. Colombia 
is rolling out a similar program, Juntos, that will link benefi ciaries of 
Familias en Acción into a similarly large range of services.
One of the basic attractions of CCT programs is the potential 
synergy of getting health, education, and social assistance to the same 
families. Realizing such synergy at the operational level has been a basic 
challenge in all countries. The kernels of success often have motivated 
further waves of ambition toward more fully coordinating the actors in 
social policy and the benefi ts they can deliver to households. Thus, for 
the foreseeable future, coordination will remain a core issue of CCT 
work in the full range of countries, from those whose programs are 
nascent to those whose programs are mature.
Conclusion
CCT programs have been at the forefront of the modernization of 
social assistance. Many of the CCT programs have been ambitious 
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and in some cases innovative in their mechanics. Most have chosen 
to focus narrowly on the poorest and have used (sometimes creating 
or refi ning) geographic and household targeting methods effectively 
to make possible a good record with respect to incidence. The larger 
programs also have a good record on coverage. Payment systems have 
been developed, and in most cases the systems function extremely well 
in getting payments reliably to the right people in the right amount at 
the right time. Also, there has been attention to keeping transaction 
costs reasonably low for participants. The banking sector or other pay-
ment agencies have been used to quite good effect in many countries. 
The monitoring of compliance with conditionalities has required the 
development of extensive and rapid information fl ows among numer-
ous actors. Although monitoring compliance is still the least developed 
aspect of the programs in several countries, the mere fact (even the 
expectation) of routine exchange of large volumes of data is remarkable 
and a departure from common practice 10 years ago or in many other 
kinds of social programs today. CCT programs require the coordinating 
actions of many parties—the program itself, the providers of health and 
education services, the payment agency, and often subnational govern-
ments at one or more levels. This has reinforced the need for informa-
tion sharing and led to wider discussions and actions on integrating 
different parts of social policy.
CCT programs have been very self-critical and open to learning. 
As a whole, they have a remarkable record for the extent and rigor of 
impact evaluation and public dissemination of fi ndings. In most cases 
this is matched by extensive continuous monitoring systems that enable 
program managers to ensure that implementation is going as planned 
and to make adjustments as needed. There has been a great deal of 
exchange among programs as they seek to learn from each other how 
best to handle design issues and operational challenges.
The success of CCT programs documented in subsequent chapters 
could not have been achieved without the reliable implementation that 
their systems of targeting, payment, and monitoring and evaluation 
have delivered. However, none of these are inherent in, or limited to, 
CCT programs. Programs of other genres may learn from the imple-
mentation experience of CCTs. And CCT programs, both new and 
established, must be cognizant that success, or continued success, is not 
automatic, but dependent on excellence in their basic systems.
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The Impact of CCTs 
on Consumption Poverty 
and Employment
WE SAW IN CHAPTER 3 THAT CCT PROGRAMS GENERALLY HAVE DONE 
well in targeting their transfers to the poor. That does not mean, how-
ever, that they necessarily have a large impact on poverty. A number 
of factors, including behavioral and political economy responses to 
targeted programs, intervene in determining the ultimate impacts on 
poverty. For example, a study of China’s Di Bao program—the largest 
cash transfer program in the developing world, though not a conven-
tional CCT—found that the cities of China where the program was 
better targeted to the poor generally were not the ones where the scheme 
had the highest impact on poverty or where the program was the most 
cost effective in reducing poverty (Ravallion 2008). 
This chapter directly assesses the performance of existing CCT pro-
grams in reducing consumption poverty. The chapter is divided into 
three sections and a conclusion. In the fi rst section, we consider the 
impact of CCTs on short-term consumption and consumption poverty. 
This is done both for the target populations of CCT programs and, for 
a few countries, for the country population as a whole. We also discuss 
evidence showing that transfer income is used differently from other 
sources of income. 
In principle, the impact of CCTs on poverty could be smaller than 
would be suggested by simple back-of-the-envelope calculations based 
on the size of the transfer because of both intended and unintended 
effects of the program. The second section of the chapter discusses 
the evidence on behavioral changes that could offset the impact of 
transfers. As will be shown in chapter 5, there is solid evidence that 
CCTs have increased school enrollment levels. If schooling and child 
work are substitutes, at least in part, then we would expect that CCTs 
might reduce child labor—and therefore reduce the contribution that 
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children make to household income. We thus begin that section of the 
chapter with a discussion of CCT impacts on child labor. CCTs also 
could reduce adult labor supply for a variety of reasons: leisure is likely 
to be a normal good so households will tend to consume more of it as 
their incomes rise, and households could adjust their labor supply in an 
attempt to stay “poor enough” to continue being eligible for transfers. 
For that reason we next review the evidence on program effects on work 
by adults. Finally, we discuss whether CCTs appear to have crowded 
out transfers from other sources, had unintended impacts on fertility, 
or have had (local-level) general equilibrium effects. 
If part of the transfer is invested, or if the transfer enables households to 
better smooth consumption, then CCT programs also can have impacts 
on consumption in the long run, above and beyond the changes aris-
ing from human capital accumulation. The third section of the chapter 
provides some evidence that this indeed has been the case. (Impacts on 
human capital accumulation will be discussed in chapter 5.)
Impact of CCTs on Household Consumption 
and Poverty
Impacts on Consumption among Program Benefi ciaries
The impact of CCTs on immediate consumption is an important 
determinant of poverty alleviation in the short run, especially because 
most benefi ciaries belong to the poorest part of the population. In this 
section we assess the impact of CCTs on short-term consumption or 
income for seven programs in which such data were collected as part 
of their evaluations and in which robust methods can be applied in the 
estimation of impact, namely, Bolsa Alimentação in Brazil,1 Familias en 
Acción in Colombia, PRAF in Honduras, Oportunidades in Mexico, 
the RPS in Nicaragua, the BDH in Ecuador, and the CESSP scholar-
ship program in Cambodia.2 In all programs, consumption or income 
data were obtained through fi eld surveys that interviewed both benefi -
ciary and control households. Except for Brazil’s Bolsa Alimentação, 
Mexico’s Oportunidades, and the CESSP, all evaluations had baseline 
surveys that can be used to measure averages before the programs were 
implemented.3
Table 4.1 shows that preprogram median per capita consumption 
levels for the target population were low in all programs. This fi nding 
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Table 4.1 Impact of CCTs on per Capita Consumption, Various Years
Consumption
Brazil 
2002
Cambodia 
2007
Colombia Ecuador Honduras Mexico Nicaragua
2002 2006 2003 2005 2000 2002 1998 Jun. 1999 Oct. 1999 2000 2001 2002
Median daily 
per capita 
consumption 
of control 
households 
(current US$)
0.83 0.89 0.85 1.19 1.12 1.13 0.79 0.68 0.59 0.58 0.59 0.63 0.53 0.52
Daily per 
capita transfer 
(current US$)
0.06 0.02 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.15
Ratio of 
transfer to 
consumption 
(%)a
8 2–3 17 13 8 7 9 11 21 20 19 29 31 30
Impact on 
per capita 
consumption 
for the 
median 
household 
(%)
7.0** B A 10.0** A B A 7.0* B 7.8** 8.3** A 29.3** 20.6**
Source: Authors’ calculations for all countries in the table except Colombia. For Colombia, see Institute for Fiscal Studies, Econometría, and Sistemas Especializados 
de Información (2006). 
Note: The estimated impacts presented here are not always equal to the unconditional double difference estimates because some regressions control for other cor-
relates. The impact for Honduras was obtained from 2002 regression only. The impacts for Mexico are all for single equation cross-sectional regressions for each year. 
The lack of impact in 1998 is likely the result of the fact that this survey was carried out just a few months after the start of the program. Figures are in US$ obtained 
through the offi cial exchange rates observed at the time of the surveys. In the case of Oportunidades in Mexico, the 1998 fi gures are for a few months after the start of 
the program. In the case of Bolsa Alimentação in Brazil, per capita consumption fi gures are for more than a year after the start of the program.
a. The transfer amounts as a proportion of per capita expenditures (or consumption) are not the same across all tables in the report because of differences in the 
surveys used, including their coverage and year.
A. Baseline, before households in CCT treatment group received transfers.
B. No signifi cant impact on consumption.
* Signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
** Signifi cant at the 5 percent level.
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corroborates the fi ndings of chapter 3 that CCTs were well targeted. 
Per capita consumption varied between $0.52 per day in Nicaragua and 
$1.19 per day in Colombia. 
Per capita transfers for the median household varied more widely 
across countries. They were as low as $0.02 per day in Cambodia, and 
as high as $0.16 per day in Nicaragua. This heterogeneity refl ects the 
different weights that each program assigned to reducing short-term 
versus long-term poverty. Reducing current consumption poverty 
was a central objective of Oportunidades and the RPS. By contrast, 
the CESSP program had no redistributive or poverty alleviation 
goals.
Because the size of the transfer varies a great deal across countries, 
so does the ratio of the transfer to median consumption. This dif-
ference can be seen in the third row of the table: for households in 
Nicaragua, the transfer represented about 30 percent of consumption, 
whereas in Cambodia that number is only about 2 percent. Other 
programs fall somewhere in between, with Familias en Acción and 
Oportunidades making relatively large transfers, compared with 
the smaller transfers for the BDH program in Ecuador, PRAF in 
Honduras, Bolsa Alimentação in Brazil, and especially the CESSP 
program in Cambodia.
The fourth row of the table summarizes program effects on con-
sumption. The largest impacts are found for the RPS, the program that 
made the largest transfers.
Other programs included in the table (including Familias en Acción 
in Colombia, Oportunidades in Mexico, PRAF in Honduras, and Bolsa 
Alimentação in Brazil) also had signifi cant impacts on per capita con-
sumption, ranging from 7 to 10 percent.4 By contrast, neither the BDH 
program in Ecuador nor the CESSP program in Cambodia appears to 
have increased consumption levels. The results for the CESSP program 
are not unexpected, given the small size of the transfer and the fact that 
short-term poverty alleviation was not a program goal. The results for 
Ecuador are more surprising, and they appear to be related to the large 
reduction in child labor among BDH program benefi ciaries (a point 
that we discuss in more detail below). 
The estimated impact on consumption for the median households 
tells us very little about the potential distributional effects of CCTs. 
Therefore we next consider impacts on various poverty measures, 
including those that are distributionally sensitive. 
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The Impact of CCTs on Poverty at the Program Level
We estimate program impacts on three poverty measures of the Foster-
Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) family: the headcount index, which is the num-
ber of people below the poverty line; the poverty gap, which measures the 
average distance between the consumption of poor people and the poverty 
line; and the squared poverty gap, which takes into account the distribu-
tion of resources among the poor. The analysis in this section focuses on 
Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, and Nicaragua. We exclude Cambodia 
and Ecuador; in those countries, the CCT did not have an effect on 
median consumption and, as would be expected, did not reduce poverty. 
We also exclude the Brazilian Bolsa Alimentação program because the 
evaluation sample is not representative of the program’s target population, 
which makes the analysis of the impact on poverty less informative. 
The results from these calculations are summarized in table 4.2. 
Consistent with table 4.1, programs that had large effects on consump-
tion also had large effects on poverty. In Nicaragua, the RPS reduced 
the headcount index among benefi ciaries by 5–7 percentage points, 
the poverty gap by 9–13 points, and the squared poverty gap by 9–12 
points. In Colombia, Familias en Acción also had sizable effects on 
poverty, especially on the poverty gap, which was reduced by almost 7 
percentage points. PRAF in Honduras and Oportunidades in Mexico 
had more modest impacts on poverty.5 
Another way to measure the impact of CCTs on welfare is to com-
pare the cumulative distribution of consumption per capita between the 
treatment and control populations. This method has the advantage of 
not relying on the selection of a poverty line, which can be somewhat 
arbitrary. If the cumulative distribution for treated households lies 
completely to the right of the distribution for control households—so-
called fi rst-order stochastic dominance—current welfare is improved 
unambiguously by CCTs. This is clearly the case for RPS benefi ciaries 
in Nicaragua, as shown in panel A of fi gure 4.1. Panel B shows an 
improvement that is much smaller for Honduras, a result that is not 
surprising given the smaller magnitude of the transfer.
The Impact of CCTs on Poverty at the National Level
The welfare effects of CCT programs discussed so far are based on 
the sample of households in the impact evaluation surveys. That is, 
we have assessed impacts on those households and individuals directly 
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Table 4.2 Impact of CCTs on Poverty Measures, Various Years
Poverty 
measure
Colombia Honduras Mexico Nicaragua
2002 2006 2000 2002 1998 Jun. 1999 Oct. 1999 2000 2001 2002
Headcount 
index
Control
Impact
0.95
A
 0.90
–0.03*
0.88
A
0.91
B
0.89
0.02**
 0.93
–0.01**
0.94
0.00
0.84
A
 0.91
–0.07**
 0.90
–0.05**
Poverty gap Control
Impact
0.58
A
 0.54
–0.07**
0.49
A
0.54
–0.02*
0.47
0.01*
 0.55
–0.03**
0.56
–0.02**
0.43
A
 0.50
–0.13**
 0.50
–0.09**
Squared 
poverty gap
Control
Impact
0.53
A
 0.43
–0.02**
0.30
A
0.36
–0.02*
0.28
B
 0.35
–0.03**
0.36
–0.03**
0.26
A
 0.32
–0.12**
 0.32
–0.09**
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: We exclude Cambodia and Ecuador from this table because the CCT did not have an effect on median consumption in those countries and so it is not sur-
prising that it did not reduce poverty. We also exclude the Brazilian Bolsa Alimentação program because the evaluation sample is not representative of the program’s 
target population, which makes the analysis of the impact on poverty less informative. For Honduras, Mexico, and Nicaragua, calculations were done via regression 
of household level Foster-Greer-Thorbecke indicator on treatment dummy and other explanatory variables. Using the evaluation sample of each program, we compute 
P(i,t,a) = (z – y(i,t) / z)a * Poor(i,t), for alpha = 0, 1, and 2; and for each household, where y(i,t) is household i ’s level of consumption per capita at year t, z is the 
country-specifi c poverty line, and Poor(i,t) is an indicator function that equals 1 if the household is poor and equals 0 otherwise. For Honduras, the poverty line used 
was Lps 24.6 per capita per day in 2000 lempiras. Expenditure values for 2002 were defl ated to 2000 lempiras. For Nicaragua, we used C$13.87 per capita per day 
in 2000 córdobas. Expenditure values for 2001 and 2002 were defl ated to 2000 córdobas. For Mexico, we used the value of the Canasta Básica of 1997, which was 
M$320 per capita per month. We infl ated this value of the Canasta Básica for 1998 and 1999 using the Canasta Básica Price Index found at: http://www.banxico
.org.mx/polmoneinfl acion/estadisticas/indicesPrecios/indicesPreciosConsumidor.html. Therefore, for October 1998, we used M$320 × 1.134. For June 1999, we used 
M$320 × 1.280. For October 1999, we used M$320 × 1.314. For Colombia (see Institute for Fiscal Studies, Econometría, and Sistemas Especializados de Información 
2006), the estimated impacts presented here are not equal to the unconditional double difference estimates because regressions control for other correlates. The impact 
for Honduras was obtained from 2002 regression only. The impacts for Mexico are all for single equation cross-sectional regressions for each year. 
A. Baseline, before households in CCT treatment group received transfers.
B. No signifi cant impact on poverty measure.
* Signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
** Signifi cant at the 5 percent level.
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affected by the programs at a given stage of each program’s implemen-
tation. Given that the evaluation samples were derived either from the 
pilot stages of a program (as in Honduras and Nicaragua) or from the 
early phases of expansion of the program (as in the Bolsa Alimentação 
program in Brazil and the Oportunidades program in Mexico), these 
estimates may not be representative of the impacts of CCTs on the 
population of benefi ciaries after coverage has been expanded to the 
national level. In this section, we investigate the poverty impacts of 
some relatively large CCT programs, using nationally representative 
household surveys in four countries: Brazil, Ecuador, Jamaica, and 
Mexico.6 The welfare measure used is household consumption per 
capita (except for Brazil, where we use household income per capita 
because consumption data were not available). The poverty line is set 
in each country at the 25th percentile of the pretransfer distribution of 
consumption or income.
To approximate pretransfer income or consumption for CCT ben-
efi ciaries, we simply subtract the full value of the transfer from income 
or consumption reported in the survey. This approach has important 
shortcomings: it amounts to ruling out behavioral changes, such as 
reductions in labor supply or remittances arising from the receipt of 
transfers, by assumption. Furthermore, and unlike the evaluations 
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Figure 4.1 Impact of CCTs on the Distribution of Consumption, Nicaragua and Honduras, 2002
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: CDF = cumulative distribution function.
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discussed in the previous section, these calculations may be biased by 
purposeful program placement or self-selection.7 Nevertheless, and 
keeping these important caveats in mind, the results are useful because 
they enable us to approximate the impact of large-scale CCT programs 
on measures of poverty at the national level.
Table 4.3 suggests that CCTs generally helped reduce national 
poverty. In Mexico there are large effects on poverty, especially for the 
poverty gap and squared poverty gap measures. For example, the esti-
mates in table 4.3 suggest that Oportunidades decreased the squared 
poverty gap by approximately 29 percent. In Jamaica, PATH reduced 
the squared poverty gap index by 13 percent from its pretransfer value. 
In Brazil, the impacts of the Bolsa Família program on the headcount 
index and the poverty gap are modest; however, the program reduces 
the squared poverty gap by a substantial amount, 15 percent. This fi nd-
ing is consistent with the fi ndings of Paes de Barros, Foguel, and Ulyssea 
(2006), who suggest there is a strong link between the introduction of 
CCTs and the fall in inequality in Brazil.
The most puzzling fi ndings correspond to the BDH program in 
Ecuador because the results in tables 4.2 and 4.3 are very different. It is 
likely that this difference arises, at least in part, because the estimates in 
Table 4.3 Impact of CCT Programs on Poverty Indexes at the National Level, Various Years
Country
Headcount Poverty gap Squared poverty gap Size of the transfer 
(% of PCE)aPre-transfer Post-transfer Pre-transfer Post-transfer Pre-transfer Post-transfer
Brazil 0.2421 0.2369 0.0980 0.0901 0.0553 0.0471 11.7
Ecuador 0.2439 0.2242 0.0703 0.0607 0.0289 0.0235  8.3
Jamaica 0.2439 0.2329 0.0659 0.0602 0.0258 0.0224 10.7
Mexico 0.2406 0.2222 0.0847 0.0683 0.0422 0.0298 33.4
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: PCE = per capita expenditure. The poverty line used in each country is the 25th percentile of the pretransfer national distribu-
tion (prior to the symmetrical trimming of the distribution for extreme outliers; that is, values of less than the 1st percentile and above 
the 99th percentile of the distribution). For Brazil, the measure of welfare used is per capita income (PCI). In the other three countries, 
the measure of welfare is PCE. Pretransfer welfare is derived by subtracting the full value of the per capita cash transfer reported by a 
benefi ciary household in each country from its welfare measure, inclusive of the transfer (PCE or PCI in Brazil). For Brazil, we use the 
Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios 2006. For Ecuador, we use the Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida 2006. For Jamaica, we 
use the Survey of Living Conditions 2004. For Mexico, we use the Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares 2004.
a. The transfer amounts as a proportion of per capita expenditures (or consumption) are not the same across all tables in the report 
because of differences in the surveys used, including their coverage and year.
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table 4.3 disregard the very large reduction in child labor, which offsets 
the impact of the transfer (Edmonds and Schady 2008). In addition, 
differences in the coverages of the surveys may be important: the survey 
used for table 4.3 is nationally representative, whereas the data collected 
for the impact evaluation of the BDH was limited to four provinces and 
to poor households within those provinces.8 
Impacts on the Composition of Consumption
In addition to impacts on aggregate consumption, CCTs may affect dis-
proportionately the consumption of particular items, such as food. This 
is of interest for a variety of reasons, including the link between food 
consumption and such measures of nutritional status as height-for-age 
and weight-for-height in children and body mass index for adults.9 Also, 
in analyzing consumption patterns among CCT recipients, it is possible 
to test whether households use transfer income differently from other 
sources of income. This could happen for a variety of reasons. Transfers 
are made to women, and there is a large body of evidence suggesting 
that women have different preferences over consumption than do men 
(Thomas 1990; Hoddinott and Haddad 1995; Lundberg, Pollak, 
and Wales 1997; Doss 2006; Ward-Batts 2008); that the conditions 
attached to transfers or the social marketing of programs may affect how 
transfer income is used;10 and that transfer income may be perceived as 
temporary, in which case households may save rather than consume the 
bulk of it (as suggested by the permanent income hypothesis). 
A number of authors have analyzed CCT effects on the food Engel 
curve—the share of consumption that is devoted to food at various levels 
of total consumption. The intuition behind this is as follows: CCTs trans-
fer cash, which increases total consumption, as shown above. If house-
holds perceive CCTs as any other source of income, we would expect that 
transfers move them along the food Engel curve. On the other hand, if 
transfer income is treated differently from other sources of income, CCTs 
may result in shifts of the food (and other) Engel curves. 
To see whether that is the case, fi gure 4.2 graphs food Engel curves 
for treated and control households in Ecuador and Nicaragua. The 
fi gure shows that Engel curves in both countries have the familiar 
downward-sloping shape, with the share of food decreasing as total 
expenditures rise. This phenomenon is known as “Engel’s law.” 
However, both panels of the fi gure show that, at the time of follow-up, 
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Figure 4.2 Impact of CCTs on Food Shares in Ecuador and Nicaragua
Sources: For Ecuador, Schady and Rosero (2008); for Nicaragua, Macours, Schady, and Vakis (2008). 
the food Engel curves of CCT benefi ciaries are everywhere above those 
for control households—clear evidence that transfer income was used 
differently from other sources of income. 
Similar results are reported elsewhere. Using nonexperimental 
data for the Familias en Acción program in Colombia and the urban 
Oportunidades program in Mexico, Attanasio, Battistin, and Mesnard 
(2008) and Angelucci and Attanasio (2008) report upward shifts of 
the food Engel curves among program benefi ciaries. The regression 
results presented in table 4.4 also corroborate these fi ndings. Food 
share regression results indicate that for a given level of total household 
expenditure, treated households tend to consume a larger proportion of 
food. For example, the food share is about 4 percentage points higher 
among program benefi ciaries in Colombia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua 
than among non-benefi ciaries. Moreover, insofar as CCT programs 
affect total consumption, the effect on the level of food expenditures (as 
opposed to the share, measured by the Engel curve) can be considerable. 
In Mexico, for example, the median value of food consumption was 11 
percent higher for benefi ciary households than for comparable control 
households, and the median caloric consumption had increased by 8 
percent (Hoddinott, Skoufi as, and Washburn 2000). 
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The increase in expenditures on food generally is directed toward 
increasing quality. Households that benefi ted from Familias en Acción 
in Colombia signifi cantly increased items rich in protein, such as milk, 
meat, and eggs (Attanasio and Mesnard 2006); and the increases in food 
expenditures in Mexico and Nicaragua were driven largely by increased 
consumption of meat, fruits, and vegetables (Hoddinott, Skoufias, 
and Washburn 2000; Maluccio and Flores 2005). Oportunidades also 
increased caloric diversity as measured by the number of different food-
stuffs consumed. At similar overall food expenditure levels in Nicaragua, 
Macours, Schady, and Vakis (2008) show that households that receive 
transfers from the Atención a Crisis program spend signifi cantly less on 
staples (primarily rice, beans, and tortillas) and signifi cantly more on ani-
mal protein (chicken, meat, milk, and eggs), as well as on fruits and veg-
etables. Angelucci and Attanasio (2008) report similar results using data 
for urban Oportunidades in Mexico. Not only did households diversify 
their diets; they also shifted toward higher-quality sources of calories.
What causes these Engel curve shifts? Schady and Rosero (2007, 
2008) hypothesize that CCTs increase the bargaining power of 
women within the household, and that this results in increased food 
expenditures. They use data on the BDH program in Ecuador to test 
Table 4.4 Impact of CCTs on Food Shares
Brazil Colombia Ecuador Honduras Nicaragua
 2002 2002 2006 2005 2000 2002 2000 2001 2002
Daily per 
capita food 
consumption
Control 0.45 0.6 0.65 0.73 0.53 0.47 0.44 0.35 0.35
Impact (%) 12** A 6** B A B 38** 31**
Food shares Control (%) 60 74 56 54 71 72 73 69 68
Impact 
(percentage 
points)
0.02** A 0.04** 0.04** A B 0.04** 0.04**
Sources: For Brazil, Ecuador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, authors’ calculations. For Colombia, see Institute for Fiscal Studies, Econometría, 
and Sistemas Especializados de Información (2006).
Note: Daily per capita food consumption is presented in US$ converted by the offi cial current exchange rates at the time of the surveys. 
Food share is the percentage of total per capita consumption dedicated to food. The estimated impacts presented here are not always 
equal to the unconditional double-difference estimates because some regressions control for other correlates. In the case of Honduras, 
impacts were estimated with 2002 data only (via cross-sectional regression).
A. Baseline, before households in CCT treatment group received transfers.
B. No signifi cant impact on poverty measure.
** Signifi cant at the 5 percent level.
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that hypothesis. Specifi cally, they argue that if changes in bargaining 
power are important, one would expect to see program effects on the 
food Engel curve among households that included prime-age men and 
prime-age women at baseline (where bargaining between males and 
females is an issue), but not among households with only prime-age 
women (where there is no bargaining of this sort). The results of their 
analysis are consistent with this prediction. 
Analyzing Offsetting Behavioral Responses 
to CCTs
The size of the transfer and the fraction of poor households that receive 
it are major determinants of CCT impacts on consumption poverty. 
However, table 4.1 shows that, for most countries, the impact of the 
transfer is generally somewhat smaller than the magnitude of the trans-
fer (when both are normalized as a fraction of the consumption or 
income of households in the control group).11 The difference between 
these two values may be a result of behavioral changes by CCT ben-
efi ciaries, which partly offset the value of the transfer itself. We now 
turn to a discussion of the evidence on these possible offsetting effects, 
focusing on impacts on child labor, adult labor, remittances, fertility, 
and spillovers and other general equilibrium effects. 
Child Labor
Whether CCT programs help reduce the prevalence and amount of 
child work is of interest not only because of the resulting difference 
between the amount of the transfer and the change in household con-
sumption. Rather, a reduction in child work is often seen as a good in its 
own right: working under poor conditions can adversely affect both the 
physical and mental health of children, and income-generating activi-
ties for children often take place at the cost of reductions in educational 
attainment and future earnings.
There are two main channels through which CCTs could reduce the 
prevalence and amount of work among school-age children. The fi rst 
channel works though the conditional nature of the programs. Given 
the requirement of school enrollment and regular attendance, children 
have less time available for participation in income-generating activities. 
115
T H E  I M P A C T  O F  C C T S  O N  C O N S U M P T I O N  P O V E R T Y  A N D  E M P L O Y M E N T
Conditions also may increase parents’ awareness of the importance of 
schooling and thereby decrease child work. The second channel is a pure 
income effect: households that receive the transfer are less likely to be 
dependent on the income of their children, and therefore may reduce 
child work, as suggested by a number of theoretical models (Basu and 
Van 1998; Baland and Robinson 2000). 
Several CCTs have been successful in reducing child work. Frequently, 
these impacts have been concentrated among older children. Table 4.5 
shows that Oportunidades reduced child work among older children, 
aged 12–17, especially among boys (for whom baseline levels of child 
work also were substantially higher). Skoufi as and Parker (2001) also 
show that domestic work decreased substantially, especially for girls. 
In Ecuador, Edmonds and Schady (2008) show that the Bono de 
Desarrollo Humano program had very large effects on child work 
among those children most vulnerable to transitioning from school-
ing to work. Those effects are concentrated in work for pay away from 
the child’s home. On the other hand, BDH transfers had small effects 
on child time allocation at peak school attendance ages and among 
children already out of school at baseline. In Cambodia, the CESSP 
program, which gives transfers to children in transition from primary 
to lower-secondary school, reduced work for pay by 11 percentage points 
(Filmer and Schady 2009c). 
Table 4.5 Impact of Oportunidades on the Probability 
of Children Working
Age group Pre-program level
November 1999
Coeffi cient t-statistic
Boys
8–11 years 0.0620 –0.011 –1.3
12–17 years 0.3775 –0.047 –2.1
Girls
8–11 years 0.0353  0.000 –0.5
12–17 years 0.1317 –0.023 –1.8
Source: Skoufi as and Parker 2001, table 5.
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Other CCT programs also appear to have reduced child work. In 
Nicaragua, the RPS reduced child work by 3–5 percentage points 
among children aged 7–13 (Maluccio and Flores 2005). Furthermore, 
the fraction of children who only studied (as opposed to worked and 
studied, only worked, or neither worked nor studied) increased signifi -
cantly (from 59 percent to 84 percent) as a result of the RPS (Maluccio 
2005). Yap, Sedlacek, and Orazem (2008) estimate the effects of the 
Brazilian PETI, another precursor of the Bolsa Família program. PETI 
gave out conditional transfers to secondary school-age children enrolled 
in school. Stipends were given directly to students, not to the families, 
conditional on school attendance and participation in special training 
workshops. PETI benefi ciaries reduced substantially their probability of 
working. Attanasio et al. (2006), however, fi nd no effect of the Familias 
en Acción program on child work in Colombia (although the program 
does appear to have reduced the amount of time dedicated to domestic 
chores); and Glewwe and Olinto (2004) fi nd no effects of the PRAF 
program on child work in Honduras.
Two recent papers consider the impact of CCTs on child work when 
the transfer is conditional on school attendance for only one child in 
the household, and that child has siblings. Potentially, programs of this 
nature could have positive or negative spillovers for other siblings—pos-
itive if the income effect reduces child work for all children, if transfers 
increase the bargaining capacity of women within the household, or if 
the social marketing by the program leads parents to reduce child work 
even for children whose school attendance is not monitored; negative if 
parents compensate for the reduction in work of one child by increas-
ing the work of other siblings. Barrera-Osorio et al. (2008) analyze 
Subsidio Condicionado a la Asistencia Escolar, a pilot CCT program in 
Bogotá, Colombia. This program randomized assignment to individual 
children rather than households, and made transfers directly to students 
rather than to their parents.12 Barrera-Osorio et al. show that, within 
the same household, a student selected into the program is 2 percentage 
points more likely to attend school and works about 1 hour less than 
a sibling who has not been selected. However, the benefi ciary’s sibling 
(particularly if this sibling is a girl) is less likely to attend school than 
are children in households that received no cash transfer at all. On the 
other hand, Filmer and Schady (2009c) fi nd that the CESSP program 
in Cambodia had no effect on the school enrollment of a benefi ciary’s 
ineligible siblings. More research is needed to understand this difference 
117
T H E  I M P A C T  O F  C C T S  O N  C O N S U M P T I O N  P O V E R T Y  A N D  E M P L O Y M E N T
between the two programs, especially if the number of CCTs that 
attempt to target individual children increases. (For a discussion of time 
spent in school as a substitute for child labor, see box 4.1.)
Adult Labor Supply
Of greater concern than changes in the amount of child labor are any 
possible reductions in adult work that result from CCTs. Such reduc-
tions could happen for a variety of reasons. If leisure is a normal good, 
then the income effect associated with the transfer might result in more 
leisure and less work. There also may be a price effect: benefi ciaries of 
CCTs may believe (correctly or incorrectly) that they need to supply 
less labor to become or continue to be “poor” and eligible for a means-
tested program. Adults also may have to take time away from work—for 
instance, to take children to school or health clinics. All of these could 
result in a reduction in adult work effort. Indeed, concern with pos-
sible work disincentives was one of the main reasons for the reform of 
transfer and other welfare programs in the United States in the 1990s 
(see box 4.2).
In practice, CCTs appear to have had, at most, modest disincentives 
for adult work. Two studies (Parker and Skoufi as 2000; Skoufi as and 
AN IMPORTANT QUESTION IS WHETHER TIME 
spent in school and time spent at work are fully 
substitutable. The answer seems to be rarely so. In 
Colombia, Attanasio et al. (2006) provide evidence 
of partial substitution between school and work, 
with at most 25 percent of each extra hour spent on 
schooling coming from time otherwise spent at work. 
Because most of the substitution arises from a decrease 
in hours of domestic work activities, time spent on 
income-generating activities largely is unaffected and 
leisure is somewhat reduced. The substitution effects 
are largest among the children ages 10 to 13 in rural 
areas and ages 14 to 17 in urban areas. 
In their analysis of the FFE program in 
Bangladesh, Ravallion and Wodon (2000) show 
that the decrease in the prevalence of child work 
for boys was only about a quarter of the increase 
in the percentage of boys enrolled in school. For 
girls, it was only about one eighth of the increase 
in enrollment. 
On the other hand, using data from Oportunidades 
and a broad defi nition of work (including market, 
farm, and domestic work), Skoufias and Parker 
(2001) show that the reduction in time spent at work 
largely equals the increase in schooling for boys, but 
not for girls. Rather, leisure time is reduced signifi -
cantly for girls. The pattern also varied by gender 
in other ways, with boys reducing both market and 
domestic work and girls reducing mainly domestic 
work.
Box 4.1 Is Time Spent in School a Perfect Substitute for Time Working?
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di Maro 2006) examine the effects of Oportunidades on adult labor 
supply; neither fi nds evidence of disincentive effects. The data used 
by Edmonds and Schady (2008) suggest that the BDH program in 
Ecuador had no effects on adult labor supply; in a similar vein, Filmer 
and Schady (2009c) report that adult labor supply was largely unaf-
fected by the CESSP program in Cambodia. Only in Nicaragua is there 
some evidence of signifi cant negative effects on adult work: Maluccio 
and Flores (2005) show that the RPS resulted in a signifi cant reduction 
THE LITER ATUR E ON WORK DISINCENTIVE 
effects of social assistance programs in developed 
countries is vast (for surveys, see Atkinson 1987; 
Krueger and Meyer 2002; Moffi tt 2002). Moffi tt, 
for instance, fi nds that because of its implicit tax on 
income, the U.S. federal assistance program, Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), 
reduced labor force participation of benefi ciaries 
by 10 to 50 percent, when compared with similar 
nonbenefi ciary households.a
To address the issue of a strong built-in disincen-
tive to work, in 1996 the U.S. government replaced 
AFDC with a new program, Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TANF). TANF is different from 
AFDC in many ways. First, there is no entitlement. 
The fact that a household’s income is below a cer-
tain level does not entitle it to a transfer. Second, 
TANF introduced time limits. Individuals cannot 
receive cash benefi ts for more than fi ve years (with 
few exceptions); and after two years in the program, 
recipients must work at least 30 hours per week to 
continue to be eligible for the transfers. Third, at 
least 50 percent of single-mother recipients and 90 
percent of two-parent families must be working or in 
a job training program offered by the state. Finally, 
states now may decide on their program’s benefi t 
reduction rates (or implicit tax on income). That is, 
instead of being required to reduce the benefi ts by 
one dollar for each dollar earned, states can decide 
whether this implicit tax rate will be zero to one, one 
to one, or any other rate in between.
A study by Grogger (2003) indicates that up to 
12 percent of the welfare caseload decline observed 
between 1993 and 1999 (from 33 percent to 15 per-
cent), and up to 7 percent of the observed increase in 
employment rates of families headed by single moth-
ers (from 69 percent to 83 percent) during the same 
period were the result of time limits introduced by 
TANF. The study fi nds no effects of time limits on 
hours worked by recipient single mothers. Bloom and 
Michalopoulos (2001) show results from randomized 
experiments that indicate time limits seem to increase 
employment of welfare recipients by 4–11 percentage 
points (from a base that varied from 40 percent to 55 
percent employment rates).
According to the research surveyed by Blank 
(2002) and Moffi tt (2002), however, the marginal 
tax rate changes embodied in TANF do not seem to 
have had any effect on work effort. It seems that most 
of the changes in labor supply induced by TANF 
came from its time limits and work requirement. 
a. Between 1935 and 1996, the main government cash trans-
fer program in the United States was AFDC. Federal law required 
that the AFDC grant to an individual be reduced by one dollar 
for each dollar earned as income. This requirement represented 
a 100 percent implicit tax on income, and many policy makers 
and academics alike worried that such design features created 
strong work disincentives.
Box 4.2 Work Disincentive Effects of Social Assistance Programs 
in Developed Countries
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in hours worked by adult men in the preceding week (by about 6 hours), 
with no effect among adult women.
Why did CCT programs not lead to larger reductions in adult labor 
supply, as had been a concern of many policy makers and academics? 
There are various possible explanations. First, the benefi ciaries of CCT 
programs generally are very poor, and the income elasticity of leisure may 
be quite low for households that are this poor. Moreover, for some house-
holds the reduction in income from child work and the increase in school 
expenditures associated with the additional school enrollment offset the 
amount of the transfer. Obviously, that is particularly true for programs 
that made small transfers but had large effects on school enrollment and 
child work, as with the CESSP program in Cambodia; but Edmonds 
and Schady (2008) show that it was also the case for benefi ciaries of the 
BDH program in Ecuador. Under these circumstances, increasing adult 
labor supply (or at least not reducing it) is one way to keep income and 
consumption at a level comparable with what it would have been had a 
household not taken up the program. Not coincidentally, perhaps, disin-
centive effects on adult labor supply are found only for the program that 
made the most generous transfers, the RPS in Nicaragua.
There are other reasons that might help explain why there have not 
been large disincentives to adult labor associated with CCTs. First, there 
are issues of timing. If households perceive transfers to be “temporary” 
rather than a permanent new “entitlement,” they would treat them as 
a windfall, and generally would not change the labor supply of adults. 
Moreover, the data used to estimate the CCT impacts on labor supply 
generally refl ect household responses shortly after they have become eli-
gible for the program for the fi rst time. In the longer run, as households 
have more time to adjust their behavior, disincentive effects on adult labor 
may become more of an issue. Nevertheless, recent research on the South 
African old-age pension (OAP) scheme, which makes transfers that dwarf 
those of even the most generous CCTs and which is likely to be seen as 
“permanent” by benefi ciaries, is encouraging. As box 4.3 shows, the OAP 
does not appear to have reduced work effort by prime-age adults. 
Crowding-Out of Remittances and Transfers
The impact of CCTs on consumption poverty also could be offset if 
they crowd out transfers from other sources, such as remittances. That 
could happen if senders of remittances or other private transfers target 
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a fi xed level of income for recipient households or seek to equate mar-
ginal utility across donors and recipients. When part of the transfer is 
crowded out, this fraction will accrue to households outside the target 
group, and program recipients will benefi t less than intended. However, 
the implied mistargeting of program resources also means that there is 
a positive effect of the program beyond that measured by evaluation 
surveys in the treatment areas. 
Empirical evidence on the crowding-out effects of CCTs shows 
mixed results. For Mexico, Albarran and Attanasio (2003) show some 
indication of crowding out for Oportunidades, using one round of 
ex post evaluation data. However, Teruel and Davis (2000) reject the 
crowding-out impact of Oportunidades on private transfers, using more 
rounds of evaluation data. Their result holds for both monetary and 
in-kind transfers.
More recently, Nielsen and Olinto (2008) provide evidence on 
crowding-out effects of the Honduran and Nicaraguan CCT programs. 
They fi nd that both the prevalence and the amount of remittances in 
the two countries were unaffected by the programs. That fi nding is 
comforting because remittances constitute a major source of foreign 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN OAP SCHEME PROVIDES A 
generous benefi t to retirees in that country. The 
value of the transfer is more than twice median 
per capita income for African (black) households. 
In principle, the program is means tested. In prac-
tice, however, all households that do not have a 
private pension are eligible. The program was 
made available to black families after the end of 
apartheid in 1994. By now, it is likely that the 
program is seen as an “entitlement” by most ben-
efi ciary households.
Early research on the OAP suggested that it had 
substantial negative effects on adult labor supply 
(Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Miller 2003). More 
recent research (Ardington, Case, and Hosegood 
2008) disputes those fi ndings. These new results are 
based on better data—specifi cally, panel data rather 
than a single cross-section, which allows the authors 
to control for time-invariant differences between 
pension recipients and nonrecipients; and data on 
nonresident (migrant) household members, which 
are important because migrant status is correlated 
with pension receipt. The preferred specifi cation in 
Ardington, Case, and Hosegood (2008) suggests 
that the OAP had a positive effect on adult labor 
supply—the probability that prime-age adults are 
employed is approximately 3 percentage points 
higher in households with at least one pension 
recipient. Those authors argue that the OAP relieves 
fi nancial and child care constraints, which can be 
short-run impediments to migrating, even when the 
medium-run returns to migrating are positive. 
Box 4.3 Do Transfers Reduce the Supply of Adult Labor? 
Evidence from the South African Pension Scheme
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currency for many countries in Central America. However, the evi-
dence in Nielsen and Olinto (2008) points toward some crowding out 
of private food transfers and money and food transfers from NGOs 
in Nicaragua, which could be a concern if it represents a change in 
informal insurance schemes. The PRAF in Honduras does not seem 
to crowd out any of these private transfers, most likely because of the 
modest size of CCT payments in that program. 
Fertility and Family Composition
Transfers made by CCT programs are often a function, in part, of the 
number of children, sometimes with a cap on the total amount of trans-
fers for which a household can be eligible (see the discussion in chapter 
3). One concern is that CCTs could provide incentives for increased 
fertility, which could result in eventual reductions in household (and 
national) welfare. 
In practice, any effects on fertility appear to have been modest. A 
recent paper (Stecklov et al. 2006) fi nds no effects on the total fertility 
rate among benefi ciaries of Oportunidades in Mexico or the RPS in 
Nicaragua; however, it appears that PRAF increased fertility among 
eligible households in Honduras by 2–4 percentage points. The authors 
argue that these differences can be explained by differences in program 
design: In Mexico, the transfer to households with preschool children 
was a lump sum, regardless of the number of children; and (in the 
fi rst three years of the program) poor, childless households could not 
become eligible for transfers if they had children after the fi rst wave of 
inscriptions. In Nicaragua, the transfer was also a lump sum, although 
some households became eligible for transfers once they had children. 
In Honduras, fi nally, new households could be registered if they gave 
birth to children, and the amount of the transfer depended on the 
number of young children. If borne out by results from other countries, 
the evidence in Stecklov et al. (2006) would suggest that the details of 
program design are important because they can provide incentives that 
result in unintended outcomes.13 
Spillovers and General Equilibrium Effects
CCT programs often are targeted geographically to poor and 
remote rural areas. In some cases, transfers are substantial and a 
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large proportion of the population in a community receives them. 
Potentially, this could result in general equilibrium and spillover 
effects in the local economy. For instance, CCTs could increase 
the prices of consumption goods through higher demand, or could 
increase prevailing local wages because of the reduction in the labor 
supply of children. 
To assess whether such spillover effects occurred in Mexico, 
Angelucci and de Giorgi (2008) analyze the evaluation data of 
Oportunidades for both benefi ciaries and ineligible households liv-
ing in treatment communities. They fi nd that there was no indirect 
negative effect on labor earnings, prices, and the receipt of other 
welfare payments. In fact, they observe that the real incomes of 
ineligible households living in treatment communities seem to have 
been affected positively by the program. They show that ineligible 
households in treatment villages consumed more by receiving more 
private transfers, by borrowing more (almost exclusively from family, 
friends, or informal moneylenders), and by reducing their stocks of 
grains and animals. In addition, they show that the indirect program 
effects on consumption and loans are larger for households hit by a 
negative shock.
The lack of impact on wages and prices of consumer goods is not 
surprising. In most countries in which CCTs have been evaluated, 
labor and goods markets are suffi ciently developed so that both labor 
and goods are largely tradable. CCTs may induce larger local demand 
for goods and lower local supply of labor, and, in the short run, prices 
may change to refl ect these imbalances; in the long run, however, prices 
should return to their initial equilibrium.
Another kind of spillover effect is related to changes in access to 
and use of the formal banking sector. A number of CCT programs, 
including Bolsa Família in Brazil and the BDH in Ecuador, directly 
deposit benefi ts in bank accounts created for benefi ciaries, who then 
can withdraw cash using an automated teller machine (ATM) card. 
That payment system appears to have reduced transaction costs (such 
as standing in line to receive transfers), and is likely to have reduced any 
stigma attached to the program. In addition, creating a bank account for 
CCT benefi ciaries and giving them ATM cards may make it more likely 
that they use the formal banking sector in other capacities—potentially, 
a very important benefi t of CCT programs and one that has not been 
evaluated to date.
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Long-Term Impacts of CCTs on Consumption
As we have shown, many CCT programs have had substantial effects 
on consumption and poverty in the short run. A natural question is 
whether those positive impacts are likely to remain, at least in part, once 
households are no longer eligible for the CCT or the program ceases 
to exist altogether. Positive effects could be maintained, for example, 
if part of the transfer is saved and invested in productive assets, or if 
the stable income stream of the transfer allowed households to gain 
access to credit and overcome liquidity constraints. It also is possible 
that the transfer enables households to smooth consumption when they 
face negative shocks. If CCT programs do have a long-term impact 
on household consumption, then the estimates of program impact on 
short-term consumption and poverty reported above will underestimate 
the true (medium- and long-run) impact of CCTs on poverty. 
Looking fi rst at the investment of transfers, Gertler, Martínez, and 
Rubio-Codina (2006) provide extensive evidence on the Mexican expe-
rience. They fi nd that the program had a substantial positive impact on 
investment in productive activities such as microenterprises and agricul-
ture (animals and land). On average, 12 percent of transfers were invested, 
and households that received more transfers from Oportunidades also 
invested more. It seems that the CCT helped alleviate two market fail-
ures. First, the increased income allowed households to overcome credit 
constraints. Second, the stable stream of income may have made house-
holds willing to undertake more risky (and profi table) investments. 
Another study (Maluccio 2008) assesses the impact of the RPS pro-
gram in Nicaragua on various types of investments. The author fi nds 
only limited evidence that the program led to an increase in investment 
for agricultural equipment. His fi ndings do not imply that the program 
had no long-term effects—it almost certainly did in terms of investment 
in child health and education, which should continue to lead to benefi ts 
for many years to come. In contrast to Mexico, however, there was only 
weak (albeit positive) evidence that RPS improved investment activi-
ties, possibly because of an economic downturn during the period, the 
strong program orientation toward increased food expenditures, and 
the limited opportunities in the impoverished rural areas where the 
program operated.
CCTs also may help households smooth their consumption and pro-
tect them from adverse shocks. If that is true, treated households may 
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be relatively more willing to undertake risky investments and less likely 
to sell assets or discontinue their children’s school enrollment during an 
economic downturn.
The ability of the RPS to function as a social safety net during the 
so-called coffee crisis provides empirical evidence that CCTs can pro-
tect households from adverse shocks. For Nicaragua during 2000 and 
2001, the crisis consisted of a drop in coffee prices to a 30-year low (or 
a 100-year low, adjusting for infl ation) due to a worldwide oversupply 
of coffee (Varangis et al. 2003). The fall in prices hurt farmers and 
laborers socially and fi nancially. By comparing coffee-growing and 
non-coffee–growing areas and treatment and control households, 
one can measure how well the RPS performed as a social safety net. 
Maluccio (2005) fi nds that the RPS enabled benefi ciary households to 
maintain per capita expenditures during the crisis and helped reduce 
labor supply increases in coffee-growing areas. The effect was larger for 
those who were most affected by the fall in coffee prices. 
It is important to make clear that the protection of income during a 
shock was achieved even if the RPS in no way was designed to respond 
to shocks. A similar result holds for Mexico, where Oportunidades 
helped beneficiary households smooth their consumption in the 
face of income fl uctuations (Skoufi as 2002). Skoufi as also fi nds that 
Oportunidades provided that protection without replacing existing 
informal insurance schemes. 
Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the impacts of CCTs on household consump-
tion, poverty, the composition of consumption, behavioral responses 
that might offset the effect of transfers, and long-term welfare. We focus 
on CCT programs for which there are robust evaluation data. 
Policy makers and academics alike long have been concerned with 
the disincentive and general equilibrium effects of government cash 
transfers to the poor. That fear stems from hypothesized disincentives 
to work, crowding out of private transfers, effects on fertility and fam-
ily composition, and effects on local wages and prices. The evidence 
reviewed in this chapter, however, suggests that these offsetting effects 
generally have been modest.
125
T H E  I M P A C T  O F  C C T S  O N  C O N S U M P T I O N  P O V E R T Y  A N D  E M P L O Y M E N T
First, by and large, programs have had positive impacts on consump-
tion, especially when the transfer amount is generous (as with the RPS 
program in Nicaragua). In and of itself, those positive impacts on con-
sumption are indirect evidence that the offsetting behavioral responses 
are unlikely to be large, and that the marginal propensity to consume 
out of transfer income is high. Moreover, because transfers generally are 
well targeted to the poor, the effects on consumption have translated 
into impacts on poverty. 
Second, the evidence suggests that CCTs generally do not have 
large disincentive effects on the labor supply of adults. More research 
is needed to see whether those patterns are maintained as programs 
mature and beneficiaries have more time to adjust their behavior. 
However, the results to date indicate that the popular view that cash 
transfers encourage indolence is not supported by the evidence.
Third, unlike most social assistance programs in the developed 
world, CCTs do not seem to crowd out private transfers. Although there 
is some evidence that CCTs crowd out intracommunity transfers of in-
kind goods, these usually are transfers among the poor and therefore 
have very little redistributional impact. Also, CCTs do not appear to 
have had large effects on fertility. 
Fourth, CCTs seem to have no signifi cant negative effects on local 
wages, local prices, and the receipt of other welfare payments. In fact, 
contrary to expectations, there is some evidence that the real incomes of 
ineligible households living in program communities have been affected 
positively by CCTs. In Mexico, nonpoor households in treatment vil-
lages received more private transfers, borrowed more, and reduced their 
stocks of grains and animals; they also consumed more.
Finally, although the evidence suggests that, as intended, CCTs do 
have signifi cant impacts in reducing child labor, the resulting income 
losses generally are not large enough to offset the impact of transfers on 
per capita consumption. (Cambodia and especially Ecuador appear to 
be exceptions to this general pattern.)
In sum, the main conclusion of this chapter is that redistribution 
via direct cash transfers seems to have worked well. Most programs, 
especially those making sizable transfers, have had substantial impacts 
on consumption and on poverty. The offsetting effects that were a 
source of concern when CCT programs were created do not appear to 
have occurred on a scale large enough to offset the bulk of the transfer. 
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CCTs do not seem to reduce the labor supply of adults or to crowd out 
private transfers. They do reduce the supply of child labor, but this 
reduction seems to have only a modest impact on household income 
and consumption. Moreover, some CCTs seem to increase productive 
investment, which boosts the impact on poverty even farther.
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C H A P T E R  F I V E
The Impact of CCT Programs 
on the Accumulation 
of Human Capital
IN ADDITION TO THE OBJECTIVE OF REDUCING CURRENT POVERTY, 
as discussed in the previous chapter, CCT programs try to encourage 
households to invest in the human capital of their children. This chap-
ter turns to the evidence of program impacts on education, health, and 
nutrition. As in chapter 4, the evidence provided in this chapter relies on 
rigorous impact evaluations (described in appendix B) and on calcula-
tions done for the purpose of this report.
The first section presents evidence of CCT program effects on 
the use of education and health services. We show that, by and large, 
CCTs have had signifi cant and, in some cases, large effects on school 
enrollment and attendance. There is also some evidence of increases in 
the use of preventive health services, although that is not as clear. The 
second section of the chapter presents evidence of CCT program effects 
on “fi nal” outcomes in education and health—for example, years of 
schooling completed, test scores, child height for age, and infant mortal-
ity. We show that there are many fewer evaluations to draw on, with a 
disproportionate amount of the evidence coming from a single country 
(Mexico). Importantly, the evidence on the impact of CCTs on these 
“fi nal” outcomes is somewhat mixed. Thus CCTs appear to have had a 
modest impact on years of schooling completed by adults; they reduced 
the incidence of low child height for age only in some countries and only 
among some populations; and they resulted in modest improvements in 
cognitive development among very young children, but had no discern-
ible effect on learning outcomes for children who benefi ted from CCT 
programs while they were of school age. The third section of the chapter 
then considers the extent to which CCT program effects on human 
capital appear to be a result of the “income” effect associated with the 
transfer, the “price” effect that results from the condition, or both.
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CCT Program Effects on the Use of Education 
and Health Services
CCTs transfer cash and require that households make regular use of 
education and health services. In this section, we review evidence of the 
impact of CCT programs on the use of those services, focusing fi rst on 
education and then on health.
Table 5.1 Impact of CCTs on School Enrollment and Attendance, Various Years
Country Program
Age/Gender/
Grade
Baseline 
enrollment 
(%) Impacta
Transfer 
(% of PCE)b
Evaluation 
method Reference
Latin American and Caribbean countries
Chile Chile Solidario Ages 6–15 60.7 7.5***
(3.0)
 7 RDD Galasso 
(2006)
Colombia Familias en Acción Ages 8–13 91.7 2.1**
(1.0)
17 PSM, DD Attanasio, 
Fitzsimmons, 
and Gómez 
(2005)
Ages 14–17 63.2 5.6***
(1.8)
Ecuador Bono de Desarrollo 
Humano
Ages 6–17 75.2 10.3**
(4.8)
10 IV, 
randomized
Schady and 
Araujo (2008)
Honduras Programa de 
Asignación 
Familiar
Ages 6–13 66.4 3.3***
(0.3)
 9 Randomized Glewwe and 
Olinto (2004)
Jamaica Program of 
Advancement 
through Health 
and Education
Ages 7–17 18 daysc 0.5**
(0.2)
10 RDD Levy and 
Ohls (2007)
Mexico Oportunidades Grades 0–5 94.0 1.9
(25.0)
20 Randomized Schultz 
(2004)
Grade 6 45.0 8.7***
(0.4)
Grades 7–9 42.5 0.6
(56.4)
Nicaragua Atención a Crisis Ages 7–15 90.5 6.6***
(0.9)
18 Randomized Macours and 
Vakis (2008)
Nicaragua Red de Protección 
Social
Ages 7–13 72.0 12.8***
(4.3)
27 Randomized Maluccio and 
Flores (2005)
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Country Program
Age/Gender/
Grade
Baseline 
enrollment 
(%) Impacta
Transfer 
(% of PCE)b
Evaluation 
method Reference
Non–Latin American and Caribbean countries
Bangladesh Female Secondary 
School Assistance 
Program
Ages 11–18 
(girls)
44.1 12.0**
(5.1)
0.6 FE Khandker, 
Pitt, and 
Fuwa (2003)
Cambodia Japan Fund for 
Poverty Reduction
Grades 7–9 
(girls)
65.0 31.3***
(2.3)
2–3 DD Filmer and 
Schady (2008)
Cambodia Cambodia 
Education Sector 
Support Project
Grades 7–9 65.0 21.4***
(4.0)
2–3 RDD Filmer and 
Schady 
(2009c)
Pakistan Punjab Education 
Sector Reform 
Program
Ages 10–14 
(girls)
29.0 11.1***
(3.8)
3 DDD Chaudhury 
and Parajuli 
(2008)
Turkey Social Risk 
Mitigation Project
Primary 
school
87.9 –3.0* 
n.a.
6 RDD Ahmed et al. 
(2007)
Secondary 
school
39.2 5.2
n.a.
Source: Authors’ compilation.
Note: DD = difference-in-differences; DDD = difference-in-difference-in-differences; FE = fi xed effects; IV = instrumental variables; 
n.a. = not available; PCE = per capita expenditure; PSM = propensity score matching; RDD = regression discontinuity design. This table 
contains unweighted means for the coeffi cients for Colombia ages 8–13 and 14–17, Chile ages 4–5 and 6–15, and Mexico grades 0–5 
and 7–9. The standard errors in each case are the square roots of the averaged variances of these estimates. 
a. The column for “impact” reports the coeffi cient and standard error (in parentheses); the unit is percentage points, with the excep-
tion of the Jamaican PATH program, where the unit is days.
b. The transfer amounts as a proportion of per capita expenditures (or consumption) are not the same across all tables in the report 
because of differences in the surveys used, including their coverage and year.
c. Impacts were measured in Jamaica only for student attendance over a 20-day reference period. The baseline enrollment rate prior 
to PATH was 96 percent.
* Signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
** Signifi cant at the 5 percent level.
*** Signifi cant at the 1 percent level.
Table 5.1 continued
Effects on School Enrollment and Attendance
Overall Program Effects A large number of evaluations estimate the 
effect of CCTs on school enrollment and attendance. Table 5.1 shows 
that virtually every program that has had a credible evaluation has 
found a positive effect on school enrollment, although those effects 
sometimes are found among some age groups and not others.
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In Latin America and the Caribbean, there are evaluations for pro-
grams in Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, and 
Nicaragua. Five of those evaluations identify program effects on the 
basis of random assignment. In Mexico, the impact of Oportunidades 
in rural areas is signifi cant for children making the transition from pri-
mary to secondary school, a point to which we return below (Schultz 
2004; Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd 2005; de Janvry and Sadoulet 
2006). Oportunidades also appears to have had positive spillover 
effects—school enrollment increased even among children above the 
cut-off point of the proxy means who were ineligible for transfers. 
Bobonis and Finan (2008) argue that the increase was a result of peer 
effects—barely ineligible children in Oportunidades communities 
were more likely to enroll because their eligible peers were in school. 
In Nicaragua, the RPS program was targeted at children aged 7–13 
who had not yet completed the fourth grade of primary school. The 
evaluation results show that the RPS had large effects on school enroll-
ment—13 percentage points (Maluccio and Flores 2005). In Honduras, 
the PRAF also had a positive effect on school enrollment, although 
the impact was much smaller—on the order of 3 percentage points 
(Glewwe and Olinto 2004). 
Other evaluations have used quasi-experimental methods. Schady 
and Araujo (2008) use instrumental variables to estimate an impact of 
approximately 10 percentage points on enrollment for the BDH program 
in Ecuador. Galasso (2006) analyzes the impact of the Chile Solidario pro-
gram on a variety of outcomes, including preschool and school enrollment. 
Using regression discontinuity techniques, she estimates program effects 
of 4–5 percentage points on preschool enrollment and of approximately 7 
percentage points on the probability that all children aged 6–14 are enrolled 
in school. In Colombia, Fitzsimmons and Gomez (2005) use differences-
in-differences to compare changes in villages where the Familias en Acción 
program was operational with a comparison group of villages. Their results 
suggest that the program had impacts of 2 percentage points for children 
aged 8–13 at baseline and 6 percentage points for those aged 14–17 at base-
line. Finally, an evaluation of PATH in Jamaica indicates that the program 
increased school attendance by approximately 0.5 days per month (Levy 
and Ohls 2007).
As we showed in chapter 1, CCTs have been most popular in Latin 
America, but they have gradually spread to a number of countries in 
other regions. In those countries, programs often are referred to as 
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“scholarship” or “stipend” programs. In practice, however, they work 
much like CCTs. Two programs in South Asia target girls. Khandker, 
Pitt, and Fuwa (2003) assess the impact of the FSSAP program on 
enrollment in Bangladesh. They use data from a panel of households to 
show that the probability that a girl enrolls in school increased more in 
villages that participated in the FSSAP program earlier than in villages 
that participated later. On the basis of those comparisons, they estimate 
that every year of program exposure increased the female enrollment 
rate by 12 percentage points.1 Chaudhury and Parajuli (2008) con-
sider the impact of the Punjab Education Sector Reform Program in 
Pakistan. They use regression discontinuity and triple-differencing 
techniques, and conclude that the program increased enrollment by 
approximately 11 percentage points.
In Cambodia, Filmer and Schady (2008) evaluate the impact of the 
JFPR program, which is targeted at girls making the transition from 
elementary to lower-secondary school. Their differences-in-differences 
estimates suggest a very large program impact—approximately 31 
percentage points. A follow-on program, the CESSP scholarship, was 
made available to boys as well as girls. An evaluation of that program 
using regression discontinuity techniques fi nds a program effect of 
21 percentage points (Filmer and Schady 2009c). In Turkey, fi nally, 
the CCT program had an impact on secondary school enrollment, 
but not on the enrollment of children in primary school (Ahmed et 
al. 2007).
Heterogeneity by Baseline Enrollment Whereas table 5.1 shows that 
virtually all of the programs that have been evaluated have had positive 
effects on school enrollment, those effects appear to vary considerably 
across countries and across population groups within countries. One 
dimension of heterogeneity is by baseline enrollment, with generally 
higher impacts found in settings where school enrollments prior to 
the CCT program were low. This pattern is apparent when making 
comparisons across countries—for example, the impact among chil-
dren of primary school–age is substantially larger in Nicaragua than 
in Mexico or Colombia. It is also apparent when making comparisons 
within countries—for example, the results reported in Ahmed et al. 
(2007) suggest that the CCT in Turkey had no effect on enrollment in 
primary school and among boys in secondary school; however, among 
girls of secondary school–age, for whom baseline enrollment rates were 
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very low (38.2 percent), the impact of the program on enrollment was 
approximately 11 percentage points. 
To some extent, the fact that CCT impacts are larger when enroll-
ment is lower is purely mechanical because net enrollment rates can-
not exceed 100 percent. However, this pattern also may be driven at 
least partly by differences in the expected rate of return to schooling. 
A number of authors have argued that there may be heterogeneity in 
these returns (Card 1999; Heckman and Carneiro 2003). If children or 
their parents select into school at least in part on the basis of expected 
returns (so-called Roy selection), the children who can expect to benefi t 
the most from schooling generally will enroll fi rst. In this case, the rate 
of return for the marginal unenrolled child may be higher when overall 
schooling levels are low. Also, in countries where overall school enroll-
ment rates are low, educated workers will be relatively scarce and gener-
ally able to command a higher premium in the labor market. Higher 
rates of return to education should make households more responsive to 
a transfer that is conditional on schooling.
Heterogeneity by Transfer Size and Timing of Payments All else being 
equal, we would expect programs that make larger transfers to have 
larger effects on school enrollment (among other outcomes). However, 
the evidence presented in table 5.1 suggests that, at current transfer 
sizes, larger transfers are not consistently associated with larger program 
effects on school enrollment. Within Latin America, the program that 
makes the largest transfers, RPS, had the largest effects on enroll-
ment. However, other programs that made large transfers, including 
Oportunidades in Mexico and Familias en Acción in Colombia, had 
much smaller impacts on enrollment. Meanwhile, some programs that 
made more modest transfers, including the BDH in Ecuador and Chile 
Solidario, produced substantial impacts on enrollment. Furthermore, 
by far the biggest program effects on enrollment are found among pro-
grams in Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Pakistan, all of which make very 
modest transfers (between 1 and 3 percent of the expenditures of the 
median recipient household). 
The issue of how transfer size affects enrollment is addressed explic-
itly in a recent paper by Filmer and Schady (2009a), who exploit the 
fact that the CESSP scholarship program in Cambodia made payments 
of different magnitudes: within any school, the poorest 25 students 
were offered scholarships of $60, and the next-poorest 25 students were 
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offered scholarships of $45. Figure 5.1 shows a clear jump in the prob-
ability that a child who was offered a $45 scholarship was attending 
school on the day of an unannounced visit, relative to those who were 
offered no scholarship at all. By contrast, the effect of the additional 
$15 was small—on average, students who were offered a $60 scholar-
ship were only 4 percentage points more likely to be attending school 
than those who were offered a $45 scholarship. In per dollar terms, 
every dollar of the fi rst $45 had more than twice as large an impact on 
attendance as every dollar of the additional $15.
What can we learn from these results? Ultimately, the effect of 
transfer size on enrollment outcomes is likely to be highly context 
specifi c and will depend on a variety of other factors. However, one 
would expect there to be diminishing marginal returns to transfer size. 
Figure 5.1 and the differences across countries in impacts summarized 
in table 5.1 suggest that, at current transfer levels, the marginal effect 
of larger transfers on school enrollment may be modest.
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Figure 5.1 Impact of Transfers of Different Magnitude on School Attendance in Cambodia, 2005–06
Source: Filmer and Schady 2009a. 
Note: Intent-to-treat effects. The left-hand panel compares the enrollment effect of receiving a $45 scholarship versus no scholarship, whereas 
the right-hand panel compares the effect of receiving a $60 scholarship versus a $45 scholarship.
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Timing of payments is another potentially important design feature. 
CCT programs have adopted different schemes. For example, Brazil’s 
Bolsa Família pays on a monthly basis, Colombia’s Familias en Acción 
pays bimonthly, and Cambodia’s JFPR and CESSP pay quarterly. 
The driving force behind these design choices has been operational 
in nature, balancing convenience for benefi ciaries with costs for the 
program. Even so, the timing (and frequency) of payments may affect 
program impacts. That possibility is illustrated in the case of Bogotá’s 
Subsidio Condicionado a la Asistencia Escolar, in which benefi ciaries 
were assigned randomly to different payment structures: a regular 
bimonthly payment, a smaller bimonthly payment supplemented by an 
end-of-year bonus, and the same smaller bimonthly payment supple-
mented by a larger bonus at school graduation. Barrera-Osorio et al. 
(2008) fi nd that reducing the monthly payment and adding an end-of-
year bonus does not reduce impacts (a fi nding the authors interpret as 
indicative that “short-term” liquidity constrains are low), whereas the 
lump-sum payment upon graduation has positive effects on attendance. 
The latter result, in particular, suggests that some payment schedules 
may augment incentives for behavioral change. To date, however, few 
programs have experimented in that direction.
Heterogeneity by School Grade or Child Age We next turn to a discus-
sion of differences in enrollment effects by school grade. Figure 5.2 
shows the enrollment trajectories of Oportunidades recipients and 
nonrecipients in Mexico. Each line corresponds to the probability of 
being enrolled in a school grade, conditional on having completed the 
grade before (the “continuation rate”). The fi gure shows that in Mexico 
this probability is highly nonlinear—the bulk of dropouts occur in the 
transitions from primary school to lower-secondary school (6th to 7th 
grade) and from lower-secondary to upper-secondary school (9th to 
10th grade). The impact of Oportunidades transfers on school enroll-
ment is given by the vertical distance between the two lines. That dis-
tance is clearly largest for children entering the fi rst grade of secondary 
school—indeed, the results in Schultz (2004) show that Oportunidades 
effects on enrollment are signifi cant only  for children enrolled in grade 
6 at baseline. Schady and Araujo (2008) fi nd that the BDH program in 
Ecuador also had the largest program effects among children in transi-
tion grades. Note also that table 5.1 shows that the largest impacts on 
enrollment observed for any CCT program are those found among 
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recipients of the JFPR and CESSP programs in Cambodia. Both of 
those programs focus on children making the transition from primary 
to lower-secondary school.
Heterogeneity by Socioeconomic Status A fi nal dimension of hetero-
geneity concerns differences in program effects by the socioeconomic 
status of households at baseline. A priori, there are several reasons why one 
might expect that the impact of a CCT program would be larger for the 
poorest households. Those households have worse education outcomes 
at baseline, so there is more margin for improvement; they may be more 
credit constrained in ways that affect their schooling choices; the cost of 
forgoing transfers if children do not comply with the program conditions 
may be higher for the poor, either because the transfer is a higher fraction 
of household income or because of the diminishing marginal utility of 
income; and fi nally, if there is heterogeneity in the returns to schooling, 
as discussed above, the expected returns to schooling for the marginal 
unenrolled child may be higher among the poorest children because their 
baseline enrollment rates are lower. 
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Figure 5.2 Oportunidades Impacts on School Enrollment, by Grade, 1998
Source: de Janvry and Sadoulet 2006.
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In practice, numerous studies have shown larger CCT program 
effects among households that are poorer at baseline. That point is 
made in fi gure 5.3, which presents the results of an impact evaluation 
of the RPS in Nicaragua. The left-hand panel of the fi gure focuses 
on school enrollment among children aged 7–13, and the right-hand 
panel focuses on the fraction of children aged newborn to 3 years who 
have been weighed at least once in the previous 6 months. The fi gure 
clearly shows that program effects on both outcomes were largest among 
extremely poor households. 
Similar results are reported elsewhere. In Cambodia, Filmer and 
Schady (2008) show that the impact of the JFPR program on enroll-
ment is approximately 50 percentage points for girls in the poorest 
two deciles of a composite measure of socioeconomic status, compared 
with 15 percentage points for girls in the richest two deciles. As a result 
of the larger program impacts among the poorest households, the 
JFPR eliminated the “gradient” between poverty and school enroll-
ment among benefi ciaries. In Honduras, Glewwe and Olinto (2004) 
also fi nd signifi cantly larger program effects on enrollment among 
households with lower per capita expenditures. In Mexico, Behrman, 
Sengupta, and Todd (2005) argue that Oportunidades program effects 
are largest for children with the lowest propensities to enroll in school 
at baseline. Finally, Oosterbeek, Ponce, and Schady (2008) show that 
the BDH program in Ecuador had a signifi cant effect on enrollment 
for children around the 20th percentile of the proxy means, but no 
effect among children around the 40th percentile.2,3
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Figure 5.3 Heterogeneity of Impacts by Socioeconomic Status, Nicaragua, 2000
Source: Maluccio and Flores 2005.
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Effects on the Utilization of Preventive Health Services 
Regular use of preventive health care services is a requirement of many 
CCT programs, and we next turn to a discussion of program effects 
on utilization rates. As with education, there is a reasonably large 
number of evaluations that assess the impact of CCT programs on the 
use of preventive health services. With one exception (an evaluation 
of the CCT program in Turkey), however, all evaluations are of Latin 
American programs. Some evaluations have found that program ben-
efi ciaries make more use of health services than they would have made 
in the absence of the intervention, but that is apparent only for some 
outcomes (such as growth monitoring for children) and generally not 
for others (such as immunization rates). 
Table 5.2 summarizes results from various evaluations that esti-
mate the effects of CCT programs on preventive health checkups for 
children. Most of these evaluations suggest there were positive pro-
gram effects on growth and development monitoring visits to health 
centers by children. For Nicaragua’s RPS, for example, Maluccio and 
Flores (2005) report a borderline-signifi cant impact of 13 percentage 
points on the probability that a child aged 0–3 had been taken to a 
health center and weighed in the last 6 months. Macours, Schady, and 
Table 5.2 Impact of CCTs on Health Center Visits by Children, Various Years
Country Program Outcome
Age 
range 
(years)
Baseline 
level (%)a Impactb
Transfer 
(% of 
PCE)c
Evaluation 
method Reference
Chile Chile Solidario Regular checkups 0–6 17.6 2.4
(2.7)
 7 RDD Galasso (2006)
Colombia Familias en 
Acción
Child taken 
to growth and 
development 
monitoring
0–1 n.a. 22.8***
(6.7)
17
 
PSM, 
DD
Attanasio et al. 
(2005)
2–4 n.a. 33.2***
(11.5)
4+ n.a. 1.5*
(0.8)
Ecuador Bono de 
Desarrollo 
Humano
Child had growth 
control in last 6 
months
3–7 n.a. 2.7
(3.8) 
10 R Paxson and 
Schady (2008)
continued
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Country Program Outcome
Age 
range 
(years)
Baseline 
level (%)a Impactb
Transfer 
(% of 
PCE)c
Evaluation 
method Reference
Honduras Programa de 
Asignación 
Familiar
Child taken to 
health center at 
least once in past 
month
0–3 44.0 20.2***
(4.7)
 9 R Morris, Flores, 
et al. (2004)
Jamaica Program of 
Advancement 
through Health 
and Education
Number of visits 
to health center 
for preventive 
reasons in past 6 
months
0–6 0.205 0.278***
(0.085)
10 RDD Levy and Ohls 
(2007)
Mexico Oportunidades Number of visits 
to all health 
facilities in past 
month
0–2 0.219 –0.032 
(0.037)
20 R Gertler (2000)
3–5 0.221 0.027
(0.019)
Nicaragua Atención a 
Crisis
Child weighed in 
last 6 months
0–6 70.5 6.3***
(2.0)
18 R Macours, 
Schady, and 
Vakis (2008)
Nicaragua Red de 
Protección 
Social
Child taken to 
health center at 
least once in past 
6 months
0–3 69.8 8.4
(5.9)
27 R Maluccio and 
Flores (2005)
Child taken to 
health center and 
weighed in past 6 
months
0–3 55.4 13.1*
(7.5)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: DD = difference-in-differences; n.a. = not available; PCE = per capita expenditure; PSM = propensity score matching; R = 
randomized; RDD = regression discontinuity design. This table contains weighted means for the coeffi cients for Chile, combining rural 
and urban estimates. The standard error in this case is the square root of the averaged variances of these estimates.  
a. The unit for baseline level corresponds to the proportion of children who have been taken to the health center, with the exception 
of Jamaica and Mexico, where the unit corresponds to the number of visits.
b. The column for “impact” reports the coeffi cient and standard error (in parentheses); the units are percentage points, with the 
exception of Jamaica, where the unit is the number of visits to the health center in the past six months, and Mexico, where the unit is 
the number of visits to the health center in the past month.
c. The transfer amounts as a proportion of per capita expenditures (or consumption) are not the same across all tables in the report 
because of differences in the surveys used, including their coverage and year.
* Signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
*** Signifi cant at the 1 percent level.
Table 5.2 continued
139
T H E  I M P A C T  O F  C C T  P R O G R A M S  O N  T H E  A C C U M U L A T I O N  O F  H U M A N  C A P I T A L
Vakis (2008) report a signifi cant increase of 6 percentage points in 
the probability that a child aged 0–6 had been weighed in the last 6 
months (among benefi ciaries of the Atención a Crisis program). Even 
larger effects are reported by Attanasio et al. (2005) for the Familias 
en Acción program in Colombia, and by Morris, Flores et al. (2004) 
for PRAF in Honduras. In Jamaica, Levy and Ohls (2007) also report 
signifi cant effects of PATH on the number of preventive health care 
visits by children under the age of 6. On the other hand, there do 
not appear to be signifi cant effects on preventive health care visits 
by children for the Chile Solidario program (Galasso 2006), for the 
Ecuador BDH program (Paxson and Schady 2008), or for benefi ciaries 
of Oportunidades (Gertler 2000).
Table 5.3 presents comparable evidence on the effects of CCT 
programs on immunization coverage. The effects are mixed. Barham 
(2005b) uses the randomized design in Oportunidades to estimate 
program effects on the coverage of tuberculosis and measles immu-
nization rates. The program effects she estimates are small and not 
signifi cant—something she attributes to the high immunization rates 
(around 90 percent) at baseline. In Colombia, Attanasio et al. (2005) 
fi nd positive program effects for Familias en Acción on immunization 
rates, although the effects generally are not signifi cant. In Honduras, 
PRAF appears to have increased coverage of immunization for diph-
theria/pertussis/tetanus, but not for measles. Barham and Maluccio 
(2008) fi nd large impacts of the RPS on full vaccination coverage in 
Nicaragua. In Turkey, too, the CCT program increased vaccination 
coverage signifi cantly: the fraction of children under the age of 6 who 
have all required immunizations is 14 percentage points higher among 
those who participated in the CCT program. 
To conclude this section, we briefl y discuss the evidence on changes 
in the use of preventive health care services by adults. In Honduras, 
Morris, Flores et al. (2004) use a differences-in-differences strategy to 
show that the fraction of women who reported fi ve or more antenatal 
visits increased by 19 percentage points more in the randomly assigned 
PRAF treatment group than in the control group.4 On the other hand, 
PATH in Jamaica appears to have had no effect on the use of preventive 
health care services by the elderly. The Oportunidades program effects 
in Mexico are small and not signifi cant at conventional levels, whereas 
the impact of the Chile Solidario program on checkups by the elderly 
is not consistent with a positive program impact.
C O N D I T I O N A L  C A S H  T R A N S F E R S :  R E D U C I N G  P R E S E N T  A N D  F U T U R E  P O V E R T Y
140
Table 5.3 Impact of CCTs on Vaccination and Immunization Rates, Various Years
Country Program Outcome
Age 
range
Baseline 
levela Impactb
Transfer
(% of 
PCE)c
Evaluation 
method Reference
Colombia Familias en 
Acción
Compliance with 
DPT vaccination
<24 
months
n.a. 8.9*
(4.7)
17 PSM, DD Attanasio et 
al. (2005)
24–48 
months
n.a. 3.5 
(2.6)
>48 
months
n.a. 3.2 
(3.9)
Honduras Programa de 
Asignación 
Familiar
Child vaccinated 
with DPT
<3 years 73.2 6.9***
(3.0)
 9 R Morris, 
Flores et al. 
(2004)Child vaccinated for 
tetanus
<3 years 59.6 4.2
(7.1)
Child vaccinated for 
measles
<3 years 82.2 –0.2
(4.7)
Mexico Oportunidades Child vaccinated for 
tuberculosis 
<12 
months
88.0 1.6 
(2.4)
20 R Barham 
(2005b)
Child vaccinated for 
measles
12–23 
months
92.0 2.8 
(2.8)
Nicaragua Red de 
Protección 
Social
Full vaccination 
coverage (household 
data)
<3 years 54.0 13.0
(9.0)
27 R Barham and 
Maluccio 
(2008)
Full vaccination 
coverage 
(administrative data)
60.0 18.0***
(5.0)
Turkey Social Risk 
Mitigation 
Project 
Full immunization <6 years 43.8 13.6***
(4.2)
6 RDD Ahmed et 
al. (2007)
Source: Authors’ compilation.
Note: DD = differences-in-differences; DPT = diphtheria/pertussis/tetanus; n.a. = not available; PCE = per capita expenditure; PSM 
= propensity score matching; R = randomized; RDD = regression discontinuity design. Figures for Mexico and Nicaragua are after 2 
years of their respective programs. 
a. The unit for the baseline level corresponds to the proportion of children who have received a given vaccination.
b. The column for “impact” reports the coeffi cient and standard error (in parentheses). The unit is percentage points.
c. The transfer amounts as a proportion of per capita expenditures (or consumption) are not the same across all tables in the report 
because of differences in the surveys used, including their coverage and year.
* Signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
*** Signifi cant at the 1 percent level.
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Impact of CCTs on “Final” Outcomes in Education 
and Health
As we have shown above, CCTs generally have increased the use of 
education and (some) health services. However, service utilization is 
arguably only an “intermediate” outcome. School enrollment is of inter-
est primarily insofar as the children who are enrolled as a result of the 
CCT ultimately complete more years of schooling, learn more, and earn 
higher wages as adults. Similarly, increases in the use of health services 
are of interest primarily insofar as they help improve the health status 
of children and adults and reduce mortality. For those reasons, we now 
turn to a discussion of the evidence of CCT program effects on arguably 
fi nal measures of education and health status.
Effects on Learning Outcomes and Completed Schooling
We begin by discussing CCT impacts on learning outcomes. It is useful 
to start by considering carefully the problem of selection—particularly 
in evaluations that give tests to children in school. Many CCT pro-
grams have resulted in increases in school enrollment. The children who 
are brought into school by the transfer tend to be poorer, on average, 
than children who already are enrolled in school. Furthermore, even 
among the poor, there may be heterogeneity in the expected returns to 
schooling, as discussed above. If there is selection on expected returns, 
then poor children who already are enrolled in school will have higher 
average returns to schooling than will other poor children. For those 
reasons, a simple comparison of test scores among children in school in 
the CCT “treatment” and “control” groups is not appropriate, even if 
the comparison is limited to similarly poor children. Indeed, that com-
parison might misleadingly suggest that CCT programs have a negative 
effect on achievement, even if that were not the case. Note also that a 
convincing identifi cation strategy to evaluate the CCT effects on enroll-
ment will not take care of this problem.
Two evaluations use in-classroom tests to assess the impact of CCT 
programs on test scores in language and mathematics. Behrman, 
Sengupta, and Todd (2000) use the random assignment in the rollout of 
Oportunidades. They correct for differences in age and gender between 
Oportunidades-treated and control children, but diffi culties merging 
data that make it impossible for them to control for other observable 
C O N D I T I O N A L  C A S H  T R A N S F E R S :  R E D U C I N G  P R E S E N T  A N D  F U T U R E  P O V E R T Y
142
characteristics somewhat limit the appeal of their evaluation. Ponce 
and Bedi (2008) use a regression discontinuity approach to evaluate the 
impact of the BDH in Ecuador on test performance among second-grade 
students around the 40th percentile of the proxy means that is meant 
to determine eligibility for transfers They argue that sample selection is 
unlikely to be a problem for their estimates, given the absence of a pro-
gram effect on enrollment for children in that sample (see the study by 
Oosterbeek, Ponce, and Schady [2008] discussed above). 
Methodological considerations aside, the results of the evaluations 
for Ecuador and Mexico are similar: In neither case is there a signifi cant 
effect of the CCT program on test scores. How should one interpret 
these fi ndings? One interpretation would be that this is grounds for 
guarded optimism: The marginal (additional) children brought into 
school by a CCT appear to learn no less than other children learn. 
However, one also could take a more negative view: Despite a transfer 
of (in some cases) considerable magnitude, which could have resulted in 
increases in spending on various inputs to learning such as food, books, 
or school supplies, CCT-treated children learn no more than other chil-
dren who go to school without the transfer.
A more convincing approach to assessing the impact of CCTs on 
learning is not to condition on school enrollment because that avoids 
the problem of nonrandom selection. This approach generally involves 
applying tests at home rather than in school, and there are two evalu-
ations that do that. In Mexico, Behrman, Parker, and Todd (2005) 
analyze the impact of two additional years of Oportunidades exposure 
on performance on the language and mathematics batteries of the 
Woodcock-Johnson tests. They fi nd that young adults who benefi ted 
from the program for two more years when they were children do no 
better on these tests than do those who received transfers for a shorter 
period of time—despite the fact that the children who started receiving 
the transfers earlier have more years of schooling, on average. 
In Cambodia, Filmer and Schady (2009b) apply a Khmer translation 
of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test to test language attainment, 
and a 20-item problem-solving test that focuses on basic competen-
cies in mathematics. By construction, all children in their sample were 
enrolled in sixth grade at baseline because that was a prerequisite for 
program eligibility. Two years later, approximately one in fi ve children 
offered the CESSP scholarship had completed one more year of school-
ing (seventh grade) than they would have completed in the absence of 
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the program. Nevertheless, despite those large changes in enrollment 
and school attainment, Filmer and Schady (2009b) show that CESSP 
benefi ciaries do no better on either the mathematics or the language 
tests than do children in the control group. 
There are various possible explanations for these disappointing results. 
It could be that the tests used in both studies are inappropriate or are very 
noisy measures of skills or knowledge. That explanation is unlikely to be 
fully satisfying, however, because scores on those tests are correlated with 
other variables in the expected ways. For example, Filmer and Schady 
(2009b) show that among students in the control group, years of school-
ing for both children and their parents are signifi cant predictors of test 
performance. An alternative explanation is that schools particularly fail 
the disadvantaged children who are induced to enroll by a CCT, perhaps 
because the curricula and pedagogical methods used are geared toward 
relatively more advanced students (as suggested by Banerjee et al. [2007] 
for a different set of school-based interventions in India). It also may be 
that there are other household constraints—nutrition, parenting qual-
ity, the value placed on education—that particularly affect the poorest 
households, are not resolved by a cash transfer, and limit the amount of 
learning that takes place in school by CCT benefi ciaries.
These fi ndings suggest that policy experimentation and innovation 
is important to increase the impact of CCTs on learning outcomes. 
Experimentation would be valuable on a number of fronts, such as 
different bundles of interventions—for example, CCT plus reforms to 
improve the quality of the supply of services, or CCT plus programs that 
seek to improve the home environment. In addition, serious thought 
should be given to the possibility of paying parents not only for school 
enrollment, but also for their children’s performance on standardized 
tests. As box 5.1 describes, that approach has been the focus of a num-
ber of recent innovations in the United States that seek to incentivize 
student behavior. (We return to this topic in chapter 6.)
Even if the additional enrollment that results from CCTs does not 
translate into more learning, CCTs could result in higher wages—for 
example, if there are “sheepskin” or “diploma” effects in schooling. 
Students could develop important noncognitive skills, like discipline, 
responsibility, and motivation, and those skills may have large payoffs in 
the labor market (Heckman and Carneiro 2003). More years of school-
ing also could have other positive effects, including delayed marriage 
and childbearing and better health practices.
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Ideally, to evaluate the effects of CCTs on these outcomes, one would 
have a measure of program effects on the years of schooling completed 
by adults.5 However, the bulk of program evaluations of CCT effects on 
enrollment and grade attainment has focused on short-run effects. This 
is not surprising—many CCT programs are relatively recent; and even 
for those programs that were created a number of years ago, program 
administrators generally are more interested in evaluating the program “as 
it is now” than in evaluating some earlier incarnation of the program that 
perhaps was run by a previous administration. There also are practical 
diffi culties in revisiting CCT-treated and control households many years 
after collection of the baseline data. In particular, attrition rates may be 
unacceptably high, and the potential for estimation biases is serious.
For all of those reasons, there is only one evaluation that has 
attempted to estimate the impact of a CCT program on completed 
school attainment. Behrman, Parker, and Todd (2005) conclude that 
children in the random sample that received Oportunidades transfers 
for two more years as a result of the staggered program rollout attain an 
average of one fi fth more of a year of schooling. They argue that these 
A NUMBER OF RECENT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED 
States seek to improve the outcomes of students from 
disadvantaged backgrounds by giving monetary 
incentives. These programs include Opportunity 
NYC and Spark programs in New York and the 
Capital Gains program in Washington, DC.
Opportunity NYC and Spark make payments to 
parents and students if they comply with a series of 
conditions, including school attendance by students, 
attendance by parents at parent-teacher association 
meetings, and performance on standardized tests. 
The Spark program also will experiment with group 
incentives, in addition to individual incentives, to 
investigate whether group rewards provide an impe-
tus for collaborative learning and tutoring across dif-
ferent achievement levels. Washington, DC’s Capital 
Gains is innovative because it is being implemented 
in tandem with a series of city-based initiatives to 
improve teacher performance, including perfor-
mance-based pay. All of these pilot projects place 
a heavy emphasis on evaluation, including random 
assignment to treatment and control groups for the 
study period.
Opportunity NYC was modeled explicitly on 
Mexico’s Oportunidades. Staff from the offi ce of 
Mayor Michael Bloomberg and a number of city 
agencies traveled to Mexico to learn about the 
program. Numerous learning meetings also were 
facilitated by the World Bank so that policy makers 
designing Opportunity NYC could learn from the 
experience in developing countries—an example of 
the North learning from the South. Administrators 
of CCT programs in the developing world now could 
benefi t from the experimentation in U.S. programs 
paying students for learning outcomes, including 
performance on standardized tests.
Box 5.1 Monetary Incentives to Students: Evidence from the United States
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comparisons are likely to provide an approximation to the fi nal impact 
on school attainment of the additional exposure to Oportunidades. 
Some crude calculations are helpful to put the magnitude of these 
impacts in perspective. Suppose that the Mincerian return to every year 
of schooling is 10 percent, a reasonable fi gure for developing-country 
settings. The results on school attainment in Behrman, Parker, and 
Todd (2005) then suggest that children exposed to the Oportunidades 
program for two more years will earn wages that are about 2 percent 
higher than the wages earned by other children. More intuitively, per-
haps, because schooling grades are completed in full years (rather than 
in fractions of years), every fi fth child who received program benefi ts 
for two more years would have earnings that are 10 percent higher than 
he or she would have had if randomly assigned to the control group.6 
Of course, that assumes that the return to schooling for this sample of 
benefi ciaries will be reasonably similar to the return found in the popu-
lation at large, despite the fact that the evaluation by Behrman, Parker, 
and Todd (2005) fails to fi nd an impact on learning outcomes.
Should one regard these effects as “large” or “small”? There is no easy 
way to answer that question. An average 1 percent increase in lifetime 
earnings for every year of program exposure is obviously a good thing. 
But these simple back-of-the-envelope calculations also make clear that 
Oportunidades likely will be able to make only a small dent in poverty in 
the next generation, at least through its effects on schooling and wages in 
Mexico. In countries such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, or Pakistan, where 
enrollment rates are low (in some cases, especially among girls), CCTs may 
have larger effects on current schooling levels, and the aggregate effects on 
poverty in the next generation may be of a greater magnitude.7 
Effects on Nutrition, Health Status, and Cognitive Development 
in Early Childhood
In much the same way that school enrollment is an input into learning, 
the use of preventive health services is an input into health status. This 
section now turns to the evidence of CCT program effects on “fi nal” 
outcomes in health and nutrition.
Impacts on Child Height and Anemia Child height for age and weight 
for height are among the two most-used measures of child health. 
In a number of Latin American countries, where CCTs have been 
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implemented most extensively, malnutrition (particularly low height 
for age) remains stubbornly high. CCT programs were designed in part 
with the expectation that they could help improve child nutritional sta-
tus through the combination of income transfers, which should enable 
households to purchase more (and more nutritious) foods, and the 
requirement that children be taken for regular health checkups. 
Table 5.4 summarizes the results from a number of evaluations of 
the impact of CCTs on child height. Where possible, we disaggregate 
the results by the baseline age of the child because there is a reasonable 
consensus in the nutrition literature that height defi cits are hard to make 
up after approximately 2 years of age (Martorell 1995; Shrimpton et 
al. 2001).
Table 5.4 Impact of CCTs on Child Growth Indicators
Country Program Outcome
Age range 
(months)
Baseline 
levela Impactb
Transfer 
(% of 
PCE)c
Evaluation 
method Reference
Brazil Bolsa 
Alimentação
Height-
for-age Z 
score
<24 –0.90 –0.110
(0.130)
9 R Morris, Olinto 
et al. (2004)
24–48 –0.190
(0.110)
49–83 –0.040
(0.090)
Colombia Familias en 
Acción
Height-
for-age Z 
score
<24 n.a. 0.161*
(0.085)
17 PSM, DD Attanasio et al. 
(2005)
24–48 0.011 
(0.055)
>48 0.012 
(0.033)
Ecuador Bono de 
Desarrollo 
Humano
Height-
for-age Z 
score
0–23 –1.07 –0.030
(0.090)
10 R Paxson and 
Schady (2008)
24–47 –1.12 –0.060
(0.090)
48–71 –1.23 0.080 
(0.090)
Honduras Programa de 
Asignación 
Familiar
Height-
for-age Z 
score
0–60 –2.05 –0.02
n.a.
 9 R IFPRI (2003)
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Country Program Outcome
Age range 
(months)
Baseline 
levela Impactb
Transfer 
(% of 
PCE)c
Evaluation 
method Reference
Mexico Oportunidades Height 
(cm)
12–36 n.a. 0.959***
(0.334)
20 R Gertler (2004)
Mexico Oportunidades Change 
in height 
(cm)
4–12 –1.76 0.503 
(0.524)
20 R Behrman and 
Hoddinott 
(2000, 2005)
12–36 1.016**
(0.398)
36–48 –0.349
(0.529)
Mexico Oportunidades Change 
in height 
(cm)
<6 –0.36 1.1**
(0.550)
20 R Rivera et al. 
(2004)d
6–12 –1.04 –0.6
n.a.
Nicaragua Atención a 
Crisis 
Height-
for-age Z 
score
0–23 –0.76 –0.140
(0.130)
15 R Macours, 
Schady, and 
Vakis (2008)24–47 –1.41 –0.120
0.140 
48–71 –1.56 –0.030
(0.140)
Nicaragua Red de 
Protección 
Social
Height-
for-age Z 
score
<60 –1.79 0.17**
(0.080)
27 R Maluccio and 
Flores (2005)
Source: Authors’ compilation.
Note: DD = differences-in-differences; n.a. = not available; PCE = per capita expenditure; PSM = propensity score matching; R = 
randomized. For Atención a Crisis and Bono de Desarrollo Humano, authors’ calculations are based on the data used by Paxson and 
Schady (2008) and Macours, Schady, and Vakis (2008), disaggregated by child age; impact regressions include single-month age dum-
mies and a dummy for child gender. Gertler and Behrman (2000) and Hoddinott (2005) refer to ages at follow-up, whereas the Rivera 
et al. (2004) paper refers to ages at baseline. Authors’ calculation of the standard error from Gertler (2000) and Rivera et al. (2004) are 
done using the p-values reported by the authors.
a. The baseline Z score for Brazil is an average for all children ages 0–83 months; for the Behrman and Hoddinott study (2005) for 
Mexico, the baseline Z score is an average for all children ages 4–48 months.
b. The column for “impact” reports the coeffi cient and standard error (in parentheses); the units are Z-score points for all evaluations 
except the three evaluations of the Mexico Oportunidades program, where the units are centimeters.
c. The transfer amounts as a proportion of per capita expenditures (or consumption) are not the same across all tables in the report 
because of differences in the surveys used, including their coverage and year.
d. The estimates reported from Rivera et al. are based on children below the 50th percentile of the distribution of their measure of 
socioeconomic status. The authors compare children in households that have received Oportunidades for two years with children in 
households that have received transfers for only one year.
* Signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
** Signifi cant at the 5 percent level.
*** Signifi cant at the 1 percent level.
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Three studies focus on the short-term impact of Oportunidades: 
Gertler (2004), Rivera et al. (2004), and Behrman and Hoddinott 
(2005). All three papers have some limitations related to data problems 
(box 5.2), but all report an estimated program impact on child height of 
approximately 1 centimeter for some children. In the case of the papers 
by Gertler (2004) and Behrman and Hoddinott (2005), that impact is 
found among children aged 12–36 months at follow-up, which roughly 
corresponds to children younger than 2 years of age at baseline; Rivera 
et al. (2004), however, fi nd signifi cant effects only for children who 
were younger than 6 months at baseline and who lived in households 
with below-median wealth. 
As with the results on schooling outcomes, it is useful to consider 
the magnitude of these effects. Thomas and Strauss (1997) use data on 
Brazil to estimate that a 1 percent increase in height is associated with 
a 2.4 percent increase in lifetime earnings. Assuming that each year of 
exposure to Oportunidades increases child height by 1 centimeter for 
children under the age of 2, an increase in height of 1 centimeter rep-
resents a change of 0.66 percent for an adult of 150 centimeters. That 
(extremely simple) calculation suggests that, if one can apply the results 
from Brazil to Mexico and if the associations between height and wages 
reported by Thomas and Strauss have a causal interpretation, every year 
of Oportunidades exposure in early childhood results in wages that are 
approximately 1.6 percent higher in adulthood (0.66*2.4).8 
That is likely to be an upper bound on the long-term effects of 
Oportunidades on child height, however, because it is not clear whether 
the estimated program impacts are sustained over time. A paper by 
Neufeld et al. (2005) uses a 2003 survey to compare the heights of chil-
dren in the original Oportunidades treatment and control samples. As a 
result of the randomized assignment, children approximately 5 years of 
age in 2003 would have received transfers in their fi rst year of life if they 
were in the original treatment group but not if they were in the original 
control group. Remember that the program effects estimated by Gertler 
(2004), Rivera et al. (2004), and Behrman and Hoddinott (2005) were 
apparent only among the youngest children in 1999. Therefore, one 
might expect that the height differences between children in the origi-
nal treatment and control groups would persist because children in the 
original control group would have received transfers only after their fi rst 
year of life, when transfers no longer appear to affect height. However, 
Neufeld et al. (2005) show that, in 2003, there are no differences in 
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CHILD HEIGHT AND WEIGHT DATA HAVE BEEN 
collected in some Oportunidades surveys since 1998, 
and data on hemoglobin status has been gathered 
since 1999, although these data generally have been 
collected for a relatively small subsample of chil-
dren from the full evaluation sample. Gertler (2004) 
compares child height among 1,552 Oportunidades-
eligible children in the original treatment and con-
trol villages, using a 1999 survey. His sample is 
limited to children ages 12–36 months at the time 
of the follow-up. Gertler estimates that children 
exposed to the program are 0.96 centimeters taller 
than other children. Those estimates are based on 
comparisons between treatment and control groups 
at follow-up. However, when he matches children 
in the 1999 survey to a 1997 socioeconomic survey, 
which did not collect information on child height, he 
fi nds signifi cant differences between the treatment 
and control households in two of the 11 sociodemo-
graphic characteristics he analyzes. That difference 
is more than one would have expected by chance, 
and it could be a source of concern. 
Behrman and Hoddinott (2005) use the same 1999 
survey as Gertler uses. To construct a pre-intervention 
baseline, the authors attempt to match children from 
that survey to a 1998 survey that collected data on 
child height. But matching children across surveys 
appears to have been a serious problem—the sample 
of children ages 12–36 months in the Behrman and 
Hoddinott paper is only one fi fth the size reported in 
Gertler. Like Gertler, Behrman and Hoddinott fi rst 
focus on comparisons between children who were 
offered the Oportunidades treatment and other chil-
dren—the so-called intent-to-treat effects. The implied 
program effects in those estimates are not signifi cant; 
are just as likely to be positive as negative, depending 
on whether the dependent variable is child height at 
follow-up or changes in child height; and are sensitive 
to the inclusion of controls—all of which suggests that 
random assignment did not equate characteristics of 
the treatment and control groups in this smaller sample. 
Behrman and Hoddinott next turn to regressions that 
compare height outcomes between children who actu-
ally participated in Oportunidades and other children. 
That comparison is much more likely to be biased by 
selection into the program. To address possible endoge-
neity concerns, the authors run regressions in fi rst dif-
ferences. The identifying assumption therefore is that 
children who participated in Oportunidades did not 
have different growth trajectories than did other chil-
dren in the sample. On the basis of those regressions, 
the authors conclude that Oportunidades resulted 
in height gains of 1.02 centimeters for children ages 
12–36 months at follow-up, and insignifi cant effects 
for children ages 4–12 months and 36–48 months.
Rivera et al. (2004) analyze changes in child height 
between 1998 and 2000 for children randomly assigned 
to Oportunidades treatment and control communities. 
They limit their sample to children ages 0–12 months 
in 1998, and focus on program effects by the age of 
the child and by the socioeconomic status of the house-
hold. The authors present results based on regressions 
of changes in height on a main effect in Oportunidades 
treatment eligibility, as well as on interactions between 
eligibility and a dummy variable for children ages 6 
months or younger; eligibility and a dummy variable for 
households with below-median socioeconomic status 
(SES); and a three-way interaction between treatment 
eligibility, age, and SES. The SES composite is based 
on a variety of household characteristics and assets, 
aggregated by principal components; one shortcom-
ing of this composite is that it is based on data from 
1999 and 2000. Given the size of the transfers made 
by the program, the measure of SES is itself likely to be 
endogenous. At the time of the 2000 follow-up survey, 
one group had been eligible for Oportunidades for two 
years whereas the other group had been eligible for one 
year only. Rivera et al. conclude that there are only sig-
nifi cant program effects among children aged less than 
6 months at baseline in households with below-median 
SES; those children grew 1.1 centimeters more if they 
were eligible for two years than if they were eligible for 
only one year. There are no signifi cant program effects 
for older children or for relatively better-off children.
Box 5.2 Impact of Oportunidades Transfers on Child Height in the Short Run
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height whatsoever between the two groups, thus suggesting that what-
ever advantage early incorporation into the program had conferred on 
children in terms of height had vanished over time. 
Turning to CCT programs in other countries, the evidence of 
short-term program effects on child height is somewhat mixed. In 
Nicaragua, Maluccio and Flores (2005) fi nd that the RPS increased by 
about 0.17 points the height-for-age Z score for children younger than 
5 years of age, but Macours, Schady, and Vakis (2008) fi nd no effect of 
the Atención a Crisis program on child height among children of any 
age group. In Honduras, Hoddinott (2008) fi nds PRAF had no effect 
on child height. He argues that the small size of the transfers made 
by PRAF accounts for the lack of a program effect on nutrition.9 In 
Ecuador, the BDH program does not appear to have improved child 
height among children of any age group (Paxson and Schady 2008). 
Attanasio et al. (2005), evaluating the impact of Familias en Acción 
on nutritional outcomes in Colombia, fi nd that the Z scores of treated 
children younger than 2 years of age improved by 0.16 points, imply-
ing a 7–percentage point reduction in the probability of stunting; there 
are no program effects on child height for children aged 3–7 years at 
baseline.10
A fi nal study included in table 5.4 is the evaluation of the effect of the 
Brazilian Bolsa Alimentação CCT program on child height and weight 
(Morris, Olinto et al. 2004). Theirs is an ingenious identifi cation strat-
egy: Because of a series of administrative errors, some potential benefi -
ciaries inadvertently were excluded from program benefi ts. Specifi cally, 
entire batches of benefi ciaries were lost when fi les were transferred 
from participating municipalities to a central data-processing unit in 
Brasilia, and the data-processing software initially rejected applications 
with names having nonstandard characters (such as é, ç, or ô). Morris, 
Olinto et al. (2004) argue that this source of variation is as good as 
random, and therefore is uncorrelated with potential outcomes. They 
show that Bolsa Alimentação appears to have had a signifi cant negative 
impact on weight for age and a borderline-signifi cant negative effect on 
height for age. Those negative program effects occurred despite the fact 
that the program appears to have increased the availability of nutri-
tious foods in the household. The authors discuss a number of possible 
explanations for this puzzling fi nding, and conclude that it may be a 
result of perverse incentives: Because an earlier program (Incentivo para 
o Combate de Carencias Nutricionais) made powdered milk available 
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to mothers if their children were underweight, benefi ciaries of Bolsa 
Alimentação may have believed that their children needed to be under-
weight to qualify for transfers. That explanation is plausible, although 
corroborating evidence (for example, qualitative information gathered 
from children’s mothers) would have made it more convincing. In any 
event, the fi ndings from the evaluation of Bolsa Alimentação show that 
it is important to consider incentive effects seriously when designing the 
conditions in CCT programs.
There also are several papers that estimate CCT impacts on child 
hemoglobin levels and anemia. Gertler (2004) estimates that children 
exposed to the Oportunidades program were 26 percent less likely to 
be anemic after the fi rst year than were children not exposed to it. 
Paxson and Schady (2008) conclude that the BDH program had a 
large effect on the hemoglobin levels of the poorest children in rural 
areas in Ecuador, corresponding to an improvement of approximately 
0.3 standard deviations; however, the BDH program had no effect on 
hemoglobin levels among somewhat-less-poor children. Neither the 
RPS in Nicaragua nor PRAF in Honduras had a signifi cant effect on 
the prevalence of anemia (Maluccio and Flores 2005; Hoddinott 2008). 
The lack of a signifi cant program effect on anemia in Nicaragua is 
particularly surprising because the program included provision of iron 
supplements, and Maluccio and Flores (2005) show that mothers in the 
treatment group were twice as likely to have received iron supplements 
as those in the control group. It is possible that children actually did not 
ingest the tablets, or that defi ciencies in other micronutrients limited the 
effectiveness of iron supplementation in Nicaragua. 
In sum, the evaluations of the impact of CCT programs on child 
height and hemoglobin status present a mixed picture. Some find 
program effects among younger children, but many do not. It is not 
clear whether these differences in results refl ect differences in the data 
and estimation choices, or underlying differences in population char-
acteristics and program design or implementation. Only one study has 
attempted to investigate the somewhat longer-term effects of transfers 
on child height, and it fi nds no evidence that the positive impacts that 
had been observed initially were sustained over time (Neufeld et al. 
2005). Given the very high rates of chronic malnutrition in many of 
the Latin American countries where CCT programs have been imple-
mented, the impact of CCTs on child nutritional status should be an 
important area for future policy experimentation and evaluation. 
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Impacts on Infant Mortality and Child and Adult Health Status In addi-
tion to their presumed effect on nutrition, CCTs were expected to 
reduce mortality and improve child and adult health. Barham (2005a) 
analyzes the impact of Oportunidades on infant mortality. She con-
cludes that a rural municipality that enrolled every household in the 
program could expect to see an infant mortality rate that is 2 deaths 
per 1,000 live births lower than a comparable municipality that enrolled 
no one. That corresponds to a reduction in infant mortality of approxi-
mately 11 percent. Using a different estimation strategy, Hernández et 
al. (2005) also conclude that Oportunidades reduced both infant and 
maternal mortality.
Gertler (2004) uses the randomized Oportunidades design to esti-
mate program effects on child illness. He shows that approximately two 
years after program implementation, newborns in the treatment group 
were 25 percentage points less likely to be reported as having been ill in 
the preceding four weeks; children aged 0–35 months at baseline were 
22 percentage points less likely to have been ill. In Colombia, Attanasio 
et al. (2005) fi nd that Familias en Acción resulted in a lower incidence 
of diarrhea among children aged 48 months or less in rural areas. 
However, the program did not have signifi cant effects on the incidence 
of diarrhea among older children in rural areas or among children of 
any age group in urban areas; nor did it have signifi cant effects on the 
incidence of respiratory infections among children of any age group in 
urban or rural areas. Finally, the evaluation of PATH in Jamaica assesses 
the impact of the program on the health status of children, as reported 
by their mothers (Levy and Ohls 2007). The authors conclude there 
is no evidence of improvements in child health status among PATH 
benefi ciaries. 
Turning to estimates of CCT program effects on adult health sta-
tus, Gertler (2000) uses the original experimental evaluation design 
to analyze Oportunidades program effects on a variety of adult health 
measures. He fi nds signifi cant effects mainly for adults aged 51 and 
older: adults in this age group who received transfers report fewer 
days of diffi culty performing daily tasks, fewer days incapacitated by 
illness, and fewer days bedridden, and they report being able to walk 
longer distances.11 More recently, Fernald, Gertler, and Olaiz (2005) 
analyze the impact of Oportunidades on obesity and chronic illness. 
They suggest that the program reduced the incidence of obesity by 6 
percentage points, hypertension by 7 percentage points, and diabetes 
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by 4 percentage points.12 Gutiérrez et al. (2005) consider the effects 
of Oportunidades on adolescent behavior. Adolescents in households 
in Oportunidades-eligible communities are less likely to smoke (by 
13–15 percentage points), and less likely to consume alcohol (by 11–13 
percentage points) than are those in a sample of comparison communi-
ties. However, those results probably should be seen as only suggestive. 
To identify program effects, both Fernald, Gertler, and Olaiz (2005) 
and Gutiérrez et al. (2005) match communities that benefi ted from 
Oportunidades with a set of comparison communities on the basis of 
“retrospective” baseline data. It is not clear how well such procedures 
work: Chen, Mu, and Ravallion (2006) present evidence from China 
that suggests they can perform very poorly in practice.
Impacts on Child Cognitive Development An extensive body of research 
stresses that there are large payoffs to interventions that improve cogni-
tive development in early childhood (for example, Heckman [2006a, 
2006b]; Knudsen et al. [2006]; Grantham-McGregor et al. [2007]; 
Walker et al. [2007]). In poor countries, early cognitive development is 
a strong predictor of school attainment in Brazil, Guatemala, Jamaica, 
the Philippines, and South Africa, even after controlling for wealth and 
maternal education (Grantham-McGregor et al. 2007). 
We close this section by discussing two recent studies of the effect 
of CCT programs on child cognitive development. Both studies are 
based on random assignment, and both collect unusually rich data on 
a variety of child development measures. The main results on CCT 
program effects on child cognitive development from both papers are 
presented in table 5.5.13
Looking at rural areas of Ecuador, Paxson and Schady (2008) evalu-
ate the impact of the BDH program on child cognitive development for 
children between 3 and 6 years of age. Their data include children in 
approximately the fi rst four deciles of the national PCE distribution. 
The authors fi rst show that the relationship between cognitive outcomes 
and household socioeconomic status tends to be highly nonlinear: in the 
absence of the program, there are large differences in outcomes between 
children in the fi rst (poorest) decile of the PCE distribution and other 
children, but much smaller differences between children in the second, 
third, and fourth deciles. Paxson and Schady (2008) therefore separately 
analyze the BDH program effects for children in the poorest decile and 
those for children in the other three deciles. They show that the BDH 
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transfers improved cognitive outcomes by 0.18 standard deviations for 
the poorest children. However, there are no signifi cant program effects 
on any outcome for children who were somewhat better-off.
Macours, Schady, and Vakis (2008) study the effect of the Atención 
a Crisis program on child cognitive development in Nicaragua. Theirs, 
too, is a very rich data set, including measures of child language devel-
opment, gross and fi ne motor skills, personal-behavioral skills, and 
the incidence of behavior problems. After only nine months, children 
who received the Atención a Crisis transfers had signifi cantly better 
language skills (improvements of 0.19–0.23 standard deviations) and 
Table 5.5 Effect of CCTs on Child Cognitive Development, Ecuador (2004–05) and Nicaragua (2005–06)
Indicator Ecuador (poorest 40%) Ecuador (poorest 10%) Nicaragua
Language (TVIP) 0.005
(0.098)
0.137
(0.129)
0.228***
(0.084)
Language (Denver) n.a. n.a. 0.189***
(0.065)
Short-term memory –0.019
(0.100)
0.079
(0.143)
0.070
(0.058)
Long-term memory 0.141
(0.092)
0.173*
(0.097)
n.a.
Visual integration-executive function 0.054
(0.095)
0.256
(0.160)
n.a.
Behavioral Problems Index 0.066
(0.091)
0.240
(0.147)
0.037
(0.064)
Personal-behavioral skills n.a. n.a. 0.135**
(0.066)
Average effect on cognitive outcomes 0.049
(0.066)
0.177*
(0.094)
0.132***
(0.040)
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on Paxson and Schady (2008) for Ecuador; and on Macours, Schady, and Vakis (2008) for 
Nicaragua.
Note: n.a. = not available; TVIP = Test de Vocabulario en Imágenes Peabody. The table reports coeffi cients on the CCT treatment 
variable, and standard errors (in parentheses). All regressions adjust for clustering at the village level. Average effects are calculated by 
seemingly unrelated regressions. All measures have been standardized so they have mean 0 and a standard deviation of 1. The coeffi cients 
therefore can be interpreted as changes in standard deviation units. All regressions include single month-of-age dummy variables and a 
dummy variable for gender. In both countries, the sample is limited to children aged 36–83 months, for comparability. 
* Signifi cant at the 10 percent level. 
** Signifi cant at the 5 percent level.
*** Signifi cant at the 1 percent level.
155
T H E  I M P A C T  O F  C C T  P R O G R A M S  O N  T H E  A C C U M U L A T I O N  O F  H U M A N  C A P I T A L
signifi cantly better personal-behavioral skills (an improvement of 0.14 
standard deviations). Macours, Schady, and Vakis (2008) also show 
that the CCT impacts are found for the entire sample, not just the poor-
est children—unlike the Ecuador results in Paxson and Schady (2008). 
However, households in the evaluation sample in Nicaragua appear to 
be noticeably poorer than those in the Ecuador sample, which may 
account for some of the differences.14
The results of the evaluations of CCT impacts in Ecuador and 
Nicaragua are reasonably encouraging. It also is worth noting the 
contrast between evaluations that do not fi nd evidence of learning 
outcomes among children who benefi ted from CCT when they were of 
school age (Behrman, Parker, and Todd [2005] on Mexico; Filmer and 
Schady [2009b] on Cambodia) and those evaluations that show signifi -
cant improvements in cognitive and learning outcomes among children 
who benefi ted from similar programs before they entered school (Paxson 
and Schady [2008] on Ecuador; Macours, Schady, and Vakis [2008] 
on Nicaragua). These patterns suggest that, insofar as CCTs seek to 
improve learning outcomes, the payoffs to early investments in a child’s 
life may be substantially larger than those that focus on children who 
already have entered the school cycle. That is an important topic for the 
design of effective programs. (We return to it in chapter 6.) 
Cash, Behavioral Changes, and Outcomes
CCTs provide households with an income transfer that is conditional on 
certain behaviors. In principle, therefore, the impact of CCT programs 
on schooling and health outcomes could be a result of the income effects 
associated with the transfers, the price changes implicit in the condi-
tions, or both. It also could be a result of the fact that transfers are made 
to women, who are generally believed to devote to children a larger share 
of the income they control than do men.15 Finally, even when conditions 
are not strictly monitored, the social marketing surrounding programs 
could affect how transfer resources are used.16 These issues are of more 
than academic interest; they have important implications for program 
design, including the optimal size of the transfer that should be given 
and the extent (if any) to which conditions should be monitored and 
noncompliers penalized.
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Ideally, to disentangle the effect of conditions from the income effect 
inherent in the transfer, an experiment would be designed whereby a fi rst 
group of households or villages receives a UCT, a second group receives 
a CCT, and a third group serves as a control group. That experiment has 
not yet been conducted anywhere. As a result, the evidence that exists 
on this issue generally has drawn on a variety of sources—comparisons 
across programs or countries, accidental glitches in program implemen-
tation, or structural models of household behavior. Individually, none of 
those approaches is a defi nitive test of the relative importance of the cash 
and conditions. Taken together, however, they provide some evidence 
that suggests that CCT impacts on service use are larger than would 
have been the case if the programs had not included explicit conditions, 
or had not made an effort to launch social marketing campaigns that 
stressed the importance of household investments in children. 
We fi rst look at the evidence regarding education outcomes. In two 
countries, Mexico and Ecuador, there were implementation glitches 
whereby some households believed transfers were conditional and others 
did not. In Mexico, when Oportunidades was fi rst launched, a frac-
tion of eligible households that received transfers were never given the 
forms that were required to monitor school conditions. de Brauw and 
Hoddinott (2008) compare the impact on school enrollment between 
households that did and did not receive the forms. Using propensity 
score matching to control for a variety of observable characteristics, they 
estimate that children in households that did not receive the forms were 
5 percentage points less likely to enroll in school than those who received 
them. For children enrolled in sixth grade (who are most likely to drop 
out of school in the absence of an intervention), those who received the 
forms were 17 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in school. 
Moreover, de Brauw and Hoddinott (2008) fi nd that the effect is larger 
in households with illiterate heads—arguably, those households among 
whom one would expect the lack of information about the benefi ts of 
education to be the most serious.17 
In Ecuador, policy makers initially intended to make the BDH con-
ditional. As a result, there was an information campaign that stressed 
the program’s human capital goals.18 In practice, because of administra-
tive constraints, the BDH did not monitor the schooling “condition,” 
and did not penalize households whose children were not attending 
school. Nevertheless, the BDH information campaign had an effect: In 
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various surveys, a fraction (approximately one quarter) of respondents 
state that they believe that sending children to school is a BDH program 
requirement. Schady and Araujo (2008) compare the impact of the 
program among “conditioned” households (those telling enumerators 
that school enrollment was a BDH requirement) and “unconditioned” 
households (those telling enumerators that there was no enrollment 
requirement attached to transfers). They show that program effects 
on enrollment are much larger and are signifi cant only among “con-
ditioned” households. Because exposure to the information campaign 
was not assigned randomly, those comparisons are not experimental. 
However, Schady and Araujo (2008) use various matching, trimming, 
and double-differencing techniques to make conditioned and uncondi-
tioned households more closely comparable. None of these estimation 
choices has an appreciable effect on their results, so they conclude that 
the larger program effect among conditioned households most likely 
has a causal interpretation.
Filmer and Schady (2009c) analyze the effects of the CESSP program 
on school enrollment and employment in Cambodia. To be eligible for 
the CESSP, households had to have at least one child enrolled in sixth 
grade at baseline before the program was implemented. Transfers were 
then made conditional on the enrollment of these children in lower-
secondary school. No requirements were made on the school enrollment 
of children in other grades, even though most recipient households 
had more than one child. As a result, the transfer was conditional for 
children who were in sixth grade at baseline, but unconditional for their 
siblings. Filmer and Schady (2009c) exploit this feature of the program 
to tease out the income and substitution effects of the transfer. They 
show that the CESSP had very large effects on the school enrollment 
of children who were in sixth grade when the program started, but had 
no effect on the enrollment of their siblings. The authors therefore con-
clude that the observed changes in enrollment can be explained by the 
substitution effect (because this affects only children who were in sixth 
grade to begin with) rather than the income effect (because this affects 
all children in the household). 
Simulation methods and structural modeling also have been used to 
estimate the relative importance of income and price effects associated 
with transfers in Brazil (Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite 2003) and 
Mexico (Todd and Wolpin 2006a).19 In such an approach, child wages 
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are used to approximate the opportunity cost of going to school and 
to model the effects of schooling subsidies on the schooling and work 
choices made by children. The analysis for Mexico has an additional 
virtue: the results from the randomized evaluation of Oportunidades 
can be used to check the estimated parameters. The models then can 
be used to estimate the effects of various policy experiments. The 
papers for both Brazil and Mexico suggest that replacing a CCT 
with an unconditional program would reduce the schooling effects 
substantially: in Brazil, the UCT essentially has no impact on school 
enrollment (which is surprising), whereas in Mexico, the impact of the 
unconditional program on schooling attained is only 20 percent as large 
as the impact of the CCT. 
Somewhat less evidence is available on the relative importance of 
the income and price effects in explaining changes in the use of health 
services or in fi nal health outcomes. A number of authors have used 
quasi-experimental methods to argue that unconditional transfers 
have had positive effects on health outcomes in South Africa. Those 
authors include Agüero, Carter, and Woolard (2007), who evaluate 
the impact of the Child Support Grant program; and Dufl o (2003), 
who considers the effects of the old-age pension program. Both stud-
ies report positive program effects; for example, Dufl o shows that girls 
whose grandmothers receive transfers have large improvements (about 
1.2 standard deviations) in weight and height. But transfers made by 
these programs are very large—especially in the case of the OAP, which 
amounts to more than twice the median per capita income for African 
(black) households. 
In Latin America, Paxson and Schady (2008) and Macours, 
Schady, and Vakis (2008) argue that the impact of CCT programs on 
child cognitive outcomes (and, in the case of the Paxson and Schady 
(2008) study on Ecuador, child physical health and fi ne motor con-
trol) is larger than would be expected if transfers were used like other 
sources of income. Ironically, neither of the two programs studied—
the BDH program in Ecuador and the Atención a Crisis program 
in Nicaragua—monitored the condition that required children of 
preschool age to be taken for regular checkups at health centers. 
Nevertheless, both programs involved a social marketing campaign 
that stressed the importance of investments in early childhood. 
Paxson and Schady (2008) show that the improvements they observe 
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among children in the poorest decile cannot be explained fully by 
movements along the curves that relate child cognitive development 
and health to PCE; rather, there are upward shifts in these curves—
outcomes for children randomly assigned to the BDH treatment 
group are above those for children assigned to the control group at 
any given level of expenditures. Macours, Schady, and Vakis (2008) 
fi nd that households that received transfers altered their spending and 
behavior patterns, spending less on food staples and more on animal 
protein, fruits, and vegetables even after accounting for the income 
effect of the transfer. Figure 5.4 shows that at every level of overall 
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Figure 5.4 Impact of Transfers Made by the Atención a Crisis Program on Stimulation 
in Early Childhood, 2005–06
Source: Macours, Schady, and Vakis 2008. 
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expenditures, households receiving the Atención a Crisis transfers 
also were more likely to read, tell stories, and sing to their children, 
and to have books, paper, and pencils for them to use at home. Both 
papers conclude that the observed improvements in child cognitive 
outcomes are inconsistent with a simple explanation whereby “a dol-
lar is always a dollar,” no matter where it comes from and who in the 
household receives it. They also stress, however, that they cannot iden-
tify whether the larger-than-expected program impacts are a result of 
the social marketing of the programs or the fact that transfers were 
made to women.
Conclusion
Although the goals of individual programs vary, most CCTs were cre-
ated with the expectation that they would help reduce consumption 
poverty, increase the utilization of health and education services, and 
result in improvements in fi nal outcomes in schooling, nutrition, and 
health. We conclude this chapter by summarizing its main messages on 
the evidence of CCT effects on the accumulation of human capital in 
its various dimensions.
First, in country after country, CCTs have led to signifi cant and 
sometimes substantial increases in the use of services. School enrollment 
rates have increased among program benefi ciaries, especially among 
those who had low enrollment rates at the outset. These impacts are 
found in both the middle-income countries where CCT programs fi rst 
were implemented (for example, Mexico), in lower-income countries in 
Latin America (Honduras, Nicaragua), and in low-income countries 
in other regions (Bangladesh, Cambodia, Pakistan). CCT programs 
also have had a positive effect on the use of preventive health services, 
although the evidence is less clear than with school enrollment. Finally, 
CCTs may have helped protect human capital investments during eco-
nomic downturns in some countries (box 5.3). 
Second, because CCT program effects on utilization are concen-
trated among households least likely to use services in the absence of the 
intervention, CCTs have contributed to substantial reductions in preex-
isting disparities in access to education and health care. In Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, and Turkey, where school enrollment rates among girls were 
lower than among boys, CCTs have helped reduce this gender gap. In 
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BECAUSE CCTS TRANSFER CASH, THEY MAY HELP 
cushion the impact of systemic or idiosyncratic 
shocks, including any possible effects that these 
may have on the accumulation of human capital by 
children. This is an important question because it 
often is argued that sharp deteriorations in income 
can have potentially irreversible effects on educa-
tion and child nutritional status—and that, in turn, 
may be one of the mechanisms whereby poverty is 
transmitted across generations.
We briefl y discuss the evidence that CCTs pro-
tect human capital investments during economic 
downturns, using results from Nicaragua, Mexico, 
and Indonesia. Maluccio (2005) considers patterns 
of occupational choice, employment, consumption, 
school enrollment, and child nutritional status in the 
2000–02 period in Nicaragua. The data cover com-
munities randomly assigned to the RPS treatment 
and control groups, and households in coffee-grow-
ing and non-coffee–growing areas, which are found 
in both the RPS treatment and control communi-
ties. The 2000–02 period saw a sharp downturn in 
the price of coffee. Maluccio begins by analyzing 
patterns in control communities. He shows that in 
those communities that did not receive RPS trans-
fers over the period, household PCE fell by 18 per-
cent. Nevertheless, school enrollment of children 
aged 7–12 increased—particularly in coffee-growing 
areas. Among boys, for example, school enrollment 
increased by 15 percentage points, which suggests 
that the opportunity cost of going to school fell 
sharply.a Turning next to a comparison of changes 
in enrollment in RPS treatment and control com-
munities, Maluccio shows that increases in school 
enrollment were larger in RPS communities than 
in the control communities, and even larger in RPS 
communities that also were in coffee-growing areas. 
But it would not be accurate to conclude that the 
RPS “protected” school enrollment during a down-
turn because school enrollment increased during the 
period in control communities, especially in coffee-
growing areas. 
Maluccio next analyzes changes in nutritional 
status over the period. He shows that height for age 
deteriorated in control communities between 2000 
and 2002, but did not do so in RPS communities. 
However, the positive impact of the RPS on child 
nutritional status was larger in non-coffee–growing 
areas than in areas where coffee is grown—a fi nding 
that suggests, if anything, that the RPS was better 
able to improve child nutritional status in areas in 
which household incomes were stable than in areas 
affected by the economic downturn. 
de Janvry et al. (2006) combine the randomized 
assignment in Oportunidades with data on systemic 
shocks (drought, natural disaster) and idiosyncratic 
shocks (unemployment or illness of the household 
head, illness of preschool-age children) to compare 
household responses to shocks in treatment and 
control villages.b They show that shocks gener-
ally reduced school enrollment in the sample, but 
that those effects were offset partially or fully by 
Oportunidades (in particular, with systemic shocks 
such as droughts and other natural disasters). 
During the Indonesian crisis of 1997–98, the 
government made children in poor households eli-
gible for a “scholarship” program. It is not surprising, 
given the crisis context, that little attention was paid 
to a possible evaluation of the effect of the program. 
Using regression and matching techniques, Cameron 
(2002) concludes that the program reduced drop-
out levels in lower-secondary school by about 3 
percentage points. Sparrow (2007) runs ordinary 
least squares regressions that suggest a larger effect 
on enrollment for children aged 10–12 (about 7.6 
percentage points).c 
Box 5.3 Do CCTs Help Protect Human Capital Investments 
during Economic Shocks?
continued
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In their study of Oportunidades, de Janvry et al. 
(2006) conclude that “benefi ciaries of conditional 
transfers can be effectively protected from the risk 
of shocks that would induce them to take their chil-
dren out of school” (p. 372). In practice, shocks 
are likely to have very different effects on different 
dimensions of human capital, and the impact will 
depend critically on whether shocks are idiosyn-
cratic or systemic (see Ferreira and Schady [2008]). 
In many developing countries, child health and 
nutritional status deteriorates during crises (see, for 
example, Cutler et al. [2002]; Paxson and Schady 
[2005]; Baird, Friedman, and Schady [2007]). The 
effects on schooling are less uniform. For example, 
Jensen (2000) fi nds that negative weather shocks 
have large negative effects on school enrollment in 
Côte D’Ivoire; and Thomas et al. (2004) fi nd that 
the Indonesian fi nancial crisis of 1998 had a negative 
effect on school enrollment, although the magni-
tude of the effect is very small. On the other hand, 
schooling may increase during downturns if the 
decrease in the opportunity cost of going to school 
is large enough to offset the negative income effect 
for credit-constrained households. This appears to 
have been the case in Nicaragua; it also has been 
observed in Peru during the deep recession of the 
late 1980s (Schady 2004), in Mexico in the 1990s 
(Mckenzie 2003), and in the United States during 
the Great Depression of the 1930s (Goldin 1999). 
In conclusion, CCTs may be one of the pol-
icy instruments that enable households to better 
weather crises, but this effect is likely to vary a great 
deal by country, by the nature of the economic 
shock, and by the outcome that is considered. As 
we discuss in chapter 6, however, CCTs arguably 
are not the best instrument to respond to idiosyn-
cratic or systemic shocks to household income for 
various reasons: they have no provisions whereby 
new households easily can be added to the roster of 
eligible benefi ciaries, and they have no mechanisms 
whereby payment levels increase for households 
that see a temporary downturn in their economic 
circumstances.
a. These numbers are based on changes over the 2000–02 
period. In Maluccio’s words: “It would seem that the downturn 
did not adversely affect enrollment and, if anything, had nega-
tive effects on the incidence of child labor for young children, 
possibly because of reduced labor demand” (p. 25).
b. Information on shocks was collected only in later survey 
rounds, after Oportunidades had been implemented; and the 
specifi cations used by de Janvry et al. (2006) include child fi xed 
effects. As a result, they are able to recover only the parameter 
on differential school enrollment responses by Oportunidades 
benefi ciaries and nonbenefi ciaries during shocks, not the param-
eter on average responses to the program. 
c. Sparrow also uses “mistargeting” that resulted from out-
dated poverty data as an instrument for receipt of the scholarship 
program. On the basis of these calculations, he estimates a larger 
program effect on enrollment (about 10 percentage points) for 
children aged 10–12. However, the identifying assumption—in 
effect, that enrollment decisions respond to current but not 
lagged poverty levels—is not trivial. Despite their limitations, 
the ordinary least squares results reported by both Sparrow 
and Cameron perhaps are less likely to be biased than are these 
instrumental variable regressions.
Box 5.3 continued 
Cambodia, the JFPR scholarship program eliminated sharp socioeco-
nomic gradients in enrollment among eligible households, although the 
coverage of the program was quite small. As Amartya Sen and other 
authors have noted, poverty takes many forms, including an inability to 
develop basic “capabilities” in education and health (Sen 1985; 1999). 
Providing all citizens in a country with an equality of opportunities, if 
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not of outcomes, is an important policy goal; and CCTs have helped 
level the playing fi eld between rich and poor, more favored and less 
favored (World Bank 2005).
Third, although there is limited evidence on exactly which feature of 
CCT programs matters most—the cash, the conditions, the social mar-
keting of the program, the fact that transfers are made to women—it 
does not appear that the cash alone can explain the observed changes 
in outcomes. More research on this topic would have very large payoffs 
because it could inform the design of CCT programs so as to maximize 
their impacts. 
Fourth, the evidence on the impact of CCTs on “fi nal” outcomes 
in education and health is mixed. A number of evaluations (but by no 
means all) have suggested that CCTs contributed to improvements in 
child height among some population groups; there is also some evi-
dence that program benefi ciaries have somewhat better health status. In 
Mexico, the only country in which a study of the long-term effects of 
CCTs has been conducted, adults with more exposure to the program 
have completed more years of schooling; however, the likely increase in 
wages associated with that added schooling is small. More discourag-
ingly, a number of evaluations have failed to fi nd effects of transfers on 
learning, even after accounting for selection into school. This pattern of 
program effects—increases in enrollment without attendant improve-
ments in learning outcomes—is not particular to CCTs (see box 5.4), 
but it is sobering because it suggests that the potential for CCTs on their 
own to improve learning may be limited. The evidence is somewhat 
more encouraging regarding the impact of CCT programs on cognitive 
development in early childhood. It suggests that very early intervention 
might have larger payoffs than one would conclude, for example, by 
looking at the pattern of program effects on school enrollment by age 
or school grade.
There are numerous reasons why CCTs may have had only mod-
est effects on fi nal outcomes in education and health. One possibility 
is that there are important constraints at the household level that are 
not addressed by CCTs as currently designed, perhaps including poor 
parenting practices, inadequate information, or other inputs into the 
production of education and health. Another possibility is that the qual-
ity of services is so low, perhaps especially for the poor, that increased 
use of them does not yield large benefi ts in and of itself. More research 
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clearly is needed to understand these fi ndings. However, these results 
also suggest that it may be important to experiment with different bun-
dles of interventions—CCTs together with other programs to address 
household-level constraints, or CCTs together with interventions to 
improve the quality of service delivery.
A NUMBER OF EDUCATION PROGR AMS HAVE 
been shown to increase school enrollment (in some 
cases dramatically so) without improvements in 
learning outcomes. 
A well-known study by Miguel and Kremer 
(2004) shows that the provision of deworming drugs 
reduced student absenteeism by about one quarter in 
a sample of schools in Kenya. However, despite the 
increase in attendance, students in treated schools 
score no better on tests than do those in control 
schools. In a separate study, Glewwe, Kremer, and 
Moulin (2008) show that a program that distributed 
textbooks in Kenya did not raise average test scores. 
Banerjee et al. (2005) fi nd similarly discouraging 
results from a program that provided additional 
teachers in rural Rajasthan.
Some evaluations have found that interventions 
in education, such as those described above, result 
in better learning outcomes only among relatively 
better-off students or when the quality of the supply is 
adequate. For example, Glewwe, Kremer, and Moulin 
(2008) show that, although textbook distribution 
had no effects on learning for the average student, it 
did impact learning positively for students who had 
the highest test scores at baseline. The authors sug-
gest that a centralized curriculum and a language of 
instruction (English) that is the second or third lan-
guage for most children are particularly detrimental 
for low-performing students. That suggestion has 
led to calls for inputs that are targeted toward low-
performing students, such as tutors or early tracking 
of students—which in theory could help ensure that 
teaching is appropriate for low-performing students. 
Banerjee et al. (2007) fi nd evidence that a tutoring 
program was effective at raising the scores of low-
performing students in India; Dufl o, Dupas, and 
Kremer (2008) fi nd evidence suggesting that tracking 
benefi ts all students, including low-performing ones, 
in Kenya. Other authors have found that it is the qual-
ity of the supply that determines whether programs 
that increase school attendance also improve learn-
ing outcomes. For example, Vermeersch and Kremer 
(2004) conclude that a Kenyan program that provides 
school meals raises test scores—but only in schools 
where the teacher was relatively experienced prior to 
the program.
The results from these evaluations present par-
ticular challenges for CCTs. Conditional cash trans-
fers frequently are targeted geographically. Because 
they work in especially poor areas, the quality of the 
supply of education (and health) services is low. In 
addition, CCTs use proxy means to identify poor 
households. The evaluations discussed above gen-
erally suggest that raising the achievement of these 
disadvantaged students is particularly diffi cult—
even when they have been brought into school. For 
this reason (and as we discuss in chapter 6), carefully 
evaluated pilot tests of interventions that attempt to 
combine CCTs with improvements in the supply of 
services would be particularly valuable.
Box 5.4 Increasing School Enrollment without Improving Learning Outcomes
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C H A P T E R  S I X
CCTs: Policy and Design Options
IN PREVIOUS CHAPTERS WE REVIEWED THE PERFORMANCE OF CCT 
programs in terms of their impacts on poverty (chapter 4) and human 
development outcomes (chapter 5). Overall, the evidence supports the 
view that CCT programs have generated positive results. From the point 
of view of a policy maker, however, knowing that CCT programs have 
performed well is not enough. When is a CCT the right policy instru-
ment? How does one determine the right design features of a CCT 
program needed to generate the desired impact? Are there complemen-
tary policy actions that are needed? Those are the questions addressed 
in this chapter.
The chapter starts with a discussion of the conditions under which 
CCT programs are the right policy instrument. Building on the discus-
sion in chapter 2, a simple decision-making framework is offered, as are 
some illustrations of how the framework can be used. Next, assuming 
that a decision has been made to have a CCT, the second section of 
the chapter considers the key design features that can be used to make 
the program an efficient instrument: the selection of beneficiaries, 
the nature and enforcement of conditions, and the level of benefi ts. 
However, CCT programs cannot be thought of in isolation from other 
social policies. In particular, achieving the human capital accumula-
tion goals sought by these programs typically will require some (often 
major) adaptation of the supply of social services. And CCT programs 
alone seldom will be suffi cient to provide assistance to all categories of 
poor households and individuals. Thus they should be considered as 
components of broader social protection systems. The third and fourth 
sections of the chapter discuss complementary actions required on both 
fronts. The fi nal section concludes the chapter and identifi es research 
challenges for the future.
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When Is a CCT Program the Right Policy Instrument?
CCTs are quite complex programs, given that they seek to affect poverty 
both in the short run (by redistributing income to poor households) 
and in the long run (by building the human capital of poor children). 
Their multidimensionality actually may be a key reason why they have 
become so popular: it is not often that government programs can “kill 
several birds with one stone”—and do it effectively. At the same time, 
using one instrument to address more than one policy goal implies that 
decisions on when or whether to use it also will be complex and will 
need to consider a combination of factors. 
Chapter 2 considered a range of factors and concluded that when 
there is a strong rationale to redistribute income, a CCT can be justi-
fi ed under two broad sets of conditions: fi rst, when private investment 
in human capital (among the poor) is suboptimal from a social point of 
view and, second, when conditions are necessary for political economy 
reasons (that is, redistribution is politically feasible only when condi-
tioned on “good behavior”).1 
Here we extend that discussion by presenting a simple framework 
that identifi es critical questions that can guide the decision to have a 
CCT program and the type of information that can support such deci-
sions. We also seek to provide a sense of the trade-offs or costs involved 
in those decisions. Figure 6.1 graphically presents the overall decision 
framework.
A logical starting point in our framework is the justifi cation for using 
tax revenues to transfer income to the poor. As noted in chapter 2, there 
are both effi ciency and distributional considerations that, in theory, 
provide the justifi cation for redistribution. Such considerations are not 
specifi c to CCT programs and should precede the discussion of whether 
a CCT should be used. Here we briefl y mention two sets of conditions 
that should be considered: First, standard measures of poverty and 
inequality provide a good starting point to assessing the need for redis-
tribution from an equity perspective. In that sense, it is not surprising 
that the CCT wave started (and became so popular) in Latin America, a 
region widely characterized by high levels of both poverty and inequal-
ity (de Ferranti et al. 2004). Second, whether and how income transfers 
will affect effi ciency should be considered before a decision is made 
to redistribute. One key aspect to consider is the potential for income 
transfers to affect labor supply. If the disincentive effects associated with 
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transfers are small (as suggested by the evidence presented in chapter 4), 
then the case for redistribution is much stronger. Moreover, the presence 
of low-productivity traps, particularly in some sectors or regions, may 
indicate that redistribution actually may increase effi ciency (see World 
Bank 2006d, ch. 5). Evidence of such effects typically is diffi cult to 
gather but, when available, could provide a more solid basis for deciding 
whether to go ahead with a cash transfer (and possibly could provide a 
prima facie case for determining benefi ciaries). Ultimately, the decision 
on whether (or how much) redistribution is acceptable is one that each 
polity must make (a point we return to later in the chapter).
The next step in our decision-making framework is to establish 
the presence of distortions that make the human capital investment 
decisions of (poor) households ineffi ciently low from a social point of 
view. Low levels of human capital investments are not, per se, enough 
to justify the use of conditions; household decisions not to accumulate 
 
 
 
Conditional 
Cash Transfer
Unconditional 
Cash Transfer 
Consider trade-offs
Redistribute or not?
Underinvestment in 
human capital?
YES
YES
NO
YES
NO
FACTORS TO CONSIDER
• Poverty and
inequality levels
• Availability of 
resources
• Efficiency costs 
and benefits of 
redistribution   
 
 
 
FACTORS TO CONSIDER
• Misinformation (e.g., differences 
between expected and realized 
rates of return)
• Agency problems (e.g., large 
gender differences in human capital)
• Externalities (e.g., high incidence 
of crime in poor neighborhoods) 
 
 
 
Political economy 
“antipoor”?
FACTORS TO CONSIDER
• Existence of cash 
transfers targeting 
the poor
• Transparency in 
eligibility criteria for 
social assistance
• Views on distributive 
justice
Figure 6.1 Decision Tree Approach to Identifying CCT Programs as the Right Policy Instrument
Source: Authors’ illustration.
C O N D I T I O N A L  C A S H  T R A N S F E R S :  R E D U C I N G  P R E S E N T  A N D  F U T U R E  P O V E R T Y
168
more human capital could be rational and effi cient (even from a social 
point of view). That would be the case, for example, if the expected 
returns to schooling (given the quality of schools available and the 
learning ability of the child) are lower than the returns to alternative 
uses of the child’s time. What is needed is an indication of the pres-
ence of distortions that would yield socially ineffi cient investments in 
human capital by the poor unless household behaviors are modifi ed. 
In other words, the use of a CCT is predicated on the assumption that 
the pure income effect is insuffi cient and thus conditions are required 
to generate a further substitution effect in favor of investments in child 
health or education. 
Chapter 2 identifi ed different types of distortions: misinformation, 
agency problems, and externalities. Under what contexts should we 
expect such distortions to be present? And how could we identify the 
likelihood of socially ineffi cient decisions being the reason for observed 
low levels of human capital investment? While there are no straightfor-
ward means of testing for the presence of such ineffi ciencies, there are a 
number of indicators that can be used for that purpose.
Comparisons of expected and realized rates of returns provide an 
indication of possible information problems. In the case of investments 
in education, this comparison can be done relatively easily by asking 
students or parents how much they think people with more education 
earn in the labor market and comparing the implied returns with the 
Mincerian returns from a household survey (for example, see Jensen 
2006; Attanasio and Kaufmann 2008; Nguyen 2007). Small-scale 
experiments can help establish whether the sole provision of infor-
mation is suffi cient to address such problems, or whether conditions 
attached to the transfer are needed.
The presence of gender differences in child human capital is a 
signal of potential agency problems, particularly when rates of return 
to human capital investments (for example, schooling) are not differ-
ent (see Behrman and Deolalikar 1995; Alderman and King 1998).2 
In-depth, qualitative studies can be helpful in identifying the extent 
to which power relationships within the household generate biases 
against investments in the human capital of all or some specifi c group 
of children.
Identifying the presence of specifi c externalities associated with low 
investments in human capital by poor households is a more complex 
endeavor. In some cases, existing research in-country can provide solid 
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evidence of such externalities (for example, Miguel and Kremer [2004] 
on deworming or Gimnig et al. [2003] on insecticide-treated nets), 
and thus can provide the basis for considering whether the use of a 
CCT is justifi ed.3 More generally, however, policy makers may need to 
rely on more indirect evidence. For example, the observation of a high 
incidence of crime in poor neighborhoods, particularly among out-of-
school youth, can be used as the basis to argue for a CCT program to 
increase school participation, under the expectation that higher levels 
of schooling will reduce crime both in the short term and in the future. 
Naturally, such hypotheses can and should be tested empirically when 
the CCT program is pilot-tested and/or implemented.
In the absence of signifi cant distortions leading to under-investment 
in human capital by poor households, conditions are most likely redun-
dant. Even worse, they could be ineffi cient, to the extent that they 
may lead some households to “over-invest” in human capital. In those 
circumstances, there is a prima facie case for a UCT: its redistributive 
impact most likely would be larger (because take-up rates should be 
larger), and the reliance on just the income effect limits the danger that 
the added human capital accumulation will be ineffi cient.
Whereas a technical assessment may indicate that a UCT is more 
appropriate than a CCT, the political process may make signifi cant 
cash transfers to the poor close to impossible unless those transfers 
are tied somehow to clear evidence of benefi ciaries’ commitment and 
“positive behaviors.” As argued in chapter 2, satisfying the conditions 
in a CCT makes the transfer less of a “handout” and more of a reward 
for effort. That perception might make redistribution more accept-
able to taxpayers and voters—and possibly to many benefi ciaries as 
well. Determining ex ante how important those factors are typically 
will require an analysis of the extent to which the prevailing political 
economy favors redistribution to the poor. The lack (or small size) of 
cash transfers targeting the poor is a strong indication that the political 
process has not been supportive of such redistribution. As was shown in 
chapter 2, political economy considerations were an important motiva-
tion for launching the PROGRESA program in Mexico as a conditional 
rather than unconditional cash transfer. More generally, assessing the 
extent to which political economy factors demand the use of conditions 
even in the absence of distortions in household behaviors vis-à-vis the 
accumulation of human capital requires an understanding of prevailing 
views on distributive justice. Developing such an understanding can 
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be done in various ways, including opinion polls or, more indirectly, 
through media analyses, as illustrated by Lindert and Vincensini (2008) 
in the case of Brazil. 
Ultimately, the decision on whether to adopt a CCT or a UCT 
(assuming that the latter is politically feasible) should be based on 
an assessment of their respective costs and benefi ts. Quite often, the 
factors justifying the use of a CCT will apply to some, but not all, 
poor households with children—the potential target for a CCT. Even 
assuming that it is feasible to identify correctly which poor households 
are ineffi ciently under-investing in the human capital of their children 
and which are not, setting up a CCT for the former and a UCT for the 
latter could involve both administrative and political costs. 
Figure 6.2 presents a simple way of considering the trade-offs associ-
ated with adopting a CCT. It distinguishes among four groups of poor 
households with children:
• Group A comprises households in which children are already 
attending school and receiving proper medical and nutrition 
care; there is no under-investing in the human capital of chil-
dren. For this group, a CCT would be a de facto UCT, given 
that the conditions would be redundant.
• Group B comprises households that are under-investing in the 
human capital of their children.4 This is the group for whom a 
CCT is the right instrument.
• Groups C and D are poor households whose children are expe-
riencing low levels of human capital; these households, however, 
GROUP A
Children in school
without conditions;
CCT = UCT
GROUP B
Low schooling
reflecting inefficient
under-investment in
children’s schooling.
Poor Households with Children
GROUP C
Efficiently low
schooling; take up
program.
GROUP D
Efficiently low
schooling; no take-up
of program.
Figure 6.2 Types of Households with Children
Source: Authors’ illustration.
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are making effi cient decisions, given other factors. For example, 
the quality of schools available and/or the learning ability of 
children may make the returns to further schooling low. These 
are the groups for whom, in principle, a UCT would be a better 
option. Group C comprises those households that would take up 
the CCT if it were offered. As a result, they would be better-
off with a CCT than without a transfer (after all, take-up is 
voluntary so that the added cash must be making them better-
off), but worse off than under a UCT (because the condition is 
making them over-invest in human capital). Group D, on the 
other hand, does not take up the CCT (because the transfer is 
not large enough to compensate for the cost of complying with 
the conditions). For them, the cost of having a CCT instead of a 
UCT is the amount of the (lost) transfer. 
The case for a CCT, rather than a UCT, will depend on the rela-
tive size of the various groups and on the cost of the excess (shortage 
of) investment in human capital by group C (group D). The possible 
combinations are many, but consider the following cases:
• A large share of the poor households with children are inef-
fi ciently under-investing in human capital (group B is large). 
There are large take-up rates among eligible households (group 
D is small). Satisfying conditions is not too costly to a majority 
of participating households. This is a high-impact CCT.
• A large share of poor households with children are not under-
investing in human capital (group A is large). Although small, a 
group of households is heavily and ineffi ciently under-investing 
in human capital with high social costs (the benefi ts of condi-
tioning transfers to group B are large). In this case, conditions 
are unnecessary (but harmless) for a majority, but are needed for 
a minority. A CCT is still the right instrument.
• A large fraction of poor households with children have low levels 
of human capital investment, but that is an effi cient decision 
based on the low quality of schools and health clinics (groups C 
and D are large). Moreover, given the level of benefi t the govern-
ment can afford from a fi scal perspective, a large part of those 
households would not take up such a costly program (group D is 
large). This is a case in which a CCT is an ineffi cient program: 
its opportunity costs may be too high to justify a CCT, even on 
political economy grounds.
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The answer to the question of whether a CCT is the right policy 
instrument will be country specifi c. Assessing the extent and nature 
of human capital under-investment among poor households is of criti-
cal importance. As suggested in fi gure 6.1, such assessment can draw 
on quantitative indicators as well as on more qualitative information 
(including benefi ciary assessments).
The previous discussion highlights the importance of considering 
the initial conditions to determine not only whether a CCT is the right 
instrument but also to identify the right target population, the ensuing 
conditions (and degree of enforcement), and the payment levels. In the 
next section, we discuss these in more detail.
Designing an Effi cient CCT Program
Given that a CCT is to be put in place, how should it be designed? To 
answer this question, we focus on cases where the CCT seeks both to 
redistribute income and build the human capital of poor children. For 
some cases, these objectives may be in confl ict, so we discuss the pos-
sible tradeoffs.
Selecting the Target Population
Defi ning the target population is the fi rst issue any policy maker con-
sidering a CCT must address. It follows from the defi nitions above that, 
in theory, a CCT should be designed to target poor households (for 
whom there is a stronger rationale to redistribute) that under-invest in 
the human capital of their children. Applying such general defi nitions 
in specifi c countries, though, will typically imply setting very different 
targets, depending on the initial conditions in terms of the prevailing 
distribution of both income and human capital.
Selecting the target population for a CCT fi rst implies defi ning 
the criteria for eligibility based on poverty. As discussed in chapter 3, 
CCT programs have been characterized by their use of some type of 
means test to establish eligibility, and this often has contributed to their 
poverty-targeting success. The challenges of selecting the “right” target-
ing method and setting cut-off points for program eligibility (that is, 
deciding who qualifi es as poor) are similar to those faced in designing 
any kind of social assistance program that seeks to maximize its poverty 
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alleviation impact for a given budget (see Grosh et al. [2008]). There 
is, however, one important twist to this general theme. As reviewed 
in chapter 5, there is growing evidence that CCT impacts on human 
capital outcomes are larger among poorer households. The implication 
is that, in addition to any considerations regarding the optimal target-
ing to achieve redistributive goals, tighter poverty targeting also may 
contribute to maximizing the CCT impact on human capital accumu-
lation. In other words, if in the case of Nicaragua’s RPS (see Maluccio 
and Flores [2005]) the average impact of the program on enrollment 
for 7–13-year-old children in fi rst to fourth grades was 25 percentage 
points for the extremely poor and 14 percentage points for the poor, we 
could expect that a program targeting the extremely poor would have a 
larger average effect on enrollment.5
Identifying households that under-invest in their children’s human 
capital is more complicated in practice. From a conceptual point of view, 
this could be done by fi rst identifying poor households based on some 
means test and then proceeding to identify the particular ways in which 
those households are under-investing in the human capital of their 
children. To some extent, that is the approach followed by the Chile 
Solidario program. Eligible households in extreme poverty are identifi ed 
using a standard proxy means test. Benefi ciaries then must agree with a 
government-appointed social worker on a set of minimal critical condi-
tions (including many related to the well-being of their children) that 
constitute the basis of the “contract” for program participation (Galasso 
2006). This approach, however, requires intensive interaction between 
social workers and families not only in the diagnosis phase but also in 
terms of monitoring. Clearly, that interaction is seen as a critical aspect 
of program design in the case of Chile (and probably is feasible because 
of the combination of a relatively small target group and the country’s 
high administrative capacity). Chile Solidario may serve as a model for 
other middle-income countries with persistent pockets of poverty, but 
may not be affordable for many developing countries.
It thus is not surprising that a majority of countries implement-
ing CCT programs have complemented poverty targeting with some 
form of demographic targeting as a proxy for human capital under-
investment. Doing so typically implies defi ning eligibility on the basis 
of the age (and sometimes gender) of the children, and linking it to the 
human capital investments most relevant for their ages (that is, growth 
monitoring and feeding for younger children, school attendance for 
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older ones). In simple terms, when they qualify based on some poverty-
targeting criteria, households will receive the transfer as long as they 
have children of the “right” age and send them to school and/or take 
them to the clinic.
In other words, households and children are typically not targeted 
based on the actual observation of a human capital gap, but on the 
presumption of one. Seen from the perspective of the human capital 
goals of CCT programs, this targeting method is bound to have errors 
of inclusion because some households eligible to receive the payments 
already may be making the desired investments in the absence of the 
program. So, for example, programs that defi ne eligibility on the basis 
of the presence of children of a certain age conditioned on attending 
school will include households that would have sent their children 
to school even without a transfer. Similarly, not all young children 
receiving a transfer based on evidence of visits to health clinics for 
growth monitoring will be malnourished. One way in which such 
errors of inclusion can be minimized is to adopt “narrow demographic 
targeting”—that is, to target those demographic subgroups among the 
poor who experience the largest human capital gaps and to defi ne the 
conditions so that they are relevant (binding) for that group. Doing 
that may imply targeting poor households with children transitioning 
from primary to secondary school in some countries; in other countries 
it may imply targeting poor households with young children in regions 
with high rates of malnutrition.
The importance of considering initial conditions is illustrated in 
fi gure 6.3, which shows grade survival rates among the poor in two 
countries. In the case of Mexico, the almost-universal primary school 
enrollment among the poor implies that the CCT’s impact on school-
ing is bound to be low when targeted to poor households with younger 
children. Such a program still may be justifi ed for its redistributive 
effects if alternative means of providing cash assistance to those families 
are not feasible. But those households are not, in principle, the primary 
target for a CCT. Narrower targeting thus could be justifi ed in two 
ways. First, by targeting households with children transitioning to 
secondary school, the CCT would be helping remove the kink in the 
curve—clearly the most effi cient way to achieve increases in enroll-
ment (see de Janvry and Sadoulet [2006]). Attanasio et al. (2005), for 
example, estimate that eliminating the transfers to children in sixth 
grade and below, and using those resources to increase the size of the 
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transfer to children in seventh grade and beyond, almost would double 
school participation among the older children, with no effect on school 
participation by the younger ones. 
Second, reaching out to the relatively small number of poor house-
holds with children not attending primary schools may require more 
specifi c eligibility criteria developed by using good predictors of non-
attendance. For the case of Mexico, de Janvry and Sadoulet (2006) 
identify factors such as being indigenous or having illiterate parents as 
examples of such predictors. Gender targeting (as in the scholarship 
programs in South Asia) may play a similar role. At the same time, 
when human capital under-investment is concentrated in a small group 
of socially excluded households (see box 6.1), the additional cost of a 
social worker (as in Chile Solidario) who is better able to determine eli-
gibility on the basis of a more detailed assessment of family conditions 
may be justifi ed.
Such retargeting, however, would come at a cost. In the Mexico 
case, the number of poor households not covered by the program would 
increase because those families with children in primary school no lon-
ger would qualify, and that would create a confl ict with the program’s 
redistributive goals. It could be argued that a UCT (like the one those 
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families are receiving de facto) is exactly what is required to redistribute 
income to those households. Under these circumstances, the decision 
on whether to have two separate transfer programs or a single one with 
“broad demographic targeting” is really one about administrative effi -
ciency and political feasibility, as discussed above. 
COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
tend to have high rates of use of education and health 
services and well-established safety nets. However, 
there are sometimes socially excluded groups for 
whom low levels of human capital remain a seri-
ous bottleneck. For example, in many countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe, the educational attain-
ment of the Roma minority lags far behind that of the 
majority population. This point is made apparent in 
fi gure 6B.1, which shows educational attainment of 
poor and nonpoor adults between the ages of 20 and 
28 in Bulgaria, and of ethnic Bulgarians, Turks, and 
Roma in that same age group. The fi gure shows that 
only roughly 60 percent of young Roma adults have 
completed primary school, compared with almost 
100 percent for the majority Bulgarian population. 
Differences become more pronounced at higher edu-
cation levels: Approximately 95 percent of the major-
ity Bulgarian population has completed at least nine 
years of schooling, compared with approximately 10 
percent of the Roma minority. Taken together with 
a variety of other disadvantages, the Roma’s low edu-
cational attainment dramatically increases the prob-
ability that they will have limited options in the labor 
market and low earning potential. CCT programs 
could potentially provide the necessary incentives to 
increase schooling among young Roma. 
Sources: Andrews and Ringold 1999; World Bank 2008c.
Box 6.1 CCTs As an Instrument to Fight Social Exclusion
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In Cambodia, dropping out of school starts much earlier (as early as 
in the transition from second to third grade) and increases gradually 
with every grade. As a result, low school enrollment among children 
from poor households is less sharply concentrated among a specifi c age 
group than it is in Mexico. A CCT targeting seventh graders would 
fl atten out the end-tail of the distribution but leave schooling in the 
earlier grades untouched, at least in the short run; in the long run, 
it is possible that households also will keep young children in school 
longer, knowing that they may have access to transfers when those 
children reach seventh grade. On the other hand, a CCT targeting 
younger children would shift the entire curve up, over time, because 
the increased enrollment rates in the lower grades would push up 
enrollment in higher grades even if dropout rates at that level remain 
unchanged. Cambodia provides a different example of how initial 
conditions matter for the choice of targeting criteria—perhaps one 
in which trade-offs between redistributive and human capital goals 
are less serious and, as a result, retargeting could be seen as a win-win 
solution. Retargeting to cover earlier grades may be good both in 
terms of poverty (because the proportion of poor households covered 
likely would increase) and in terms of impact on total enrollment, 
given that increasing the number of children enrolling in the earlier 
grades is a precondition to expanding coverage at the secondary level. 
Moreover, because the opportunity cost of schooling is probably lower 
for younger children, a smaller benefi t level may be suffi cient to incen-
tivize the desired change in behavior, enabling a further expansion in 
coverage without increasing program costs.
The two cases discussed above illustrate that the trade-offs between 
redistributive and human capital goals resulting from alternative 
targeting approaches are likely to differ across countries. In a setting 
in which a large share of the poor experience signifi cant and similar 
human capital gaps (as in Cambodia), trade-offs are likely to be small. 
However, when the human capital gaps that justify the need for a 
CCT are highly concentrated on a relatively small proportion of the 
poor, designing a CCT to maximize impact on human capital accu-
mulation may limit its ability to act as a redistributive mechanism. 
As indicated before, other safety net instruments may be better suited 
for that purpose. But when, for whatever reasons, other instruments 
are not feasible, a less “effi cient” selection of benefi ciaries in terms of 
the expected impact on human capital accumulation actually may be 
desirable.
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Selecting Conditions and Enforcement Levels
The impact of CCT programs on human capital outcomes is linked 
directly to the programs’ ability to affect the behaviors of benefi ciary 
households. The right conditions would be different in each case and 
would require different means of enforcement. The evidence reviewed 
in chapter 5 suggests that conditions can be important in terms of 
increasing service use—particularly if the income elasticity of demand 
for those services among the target population is low. Thus, when 
increasing service use is a goal in itself (for example, widening the use 
of immunization), defi ning the condition becomes mostly a question of 
detail (how often? where?).
More generally, however, service use is a means to an end. Thus, the 
fi rst step in selecting the “right” condition(s) is a review of the evidence 
on links between “service use” and the desired outcomes. Is getting 
children into health facilities the most effective way to improve their 
nutrition and health more broadly? Or is it more effective to give moth-
ers information and training on nutrition and parenting? In the case 
of Mexico, for example, there is evidence suggesting that the pláticas 
may have contributed to the improved health outcomes by encourag-
ing better diets (Hoddinott and Skoufias 2004) and by improving 
knowledge on a variety of health issues (Duarte Gómez et al. 2004).6 
In that sense, conditioning on “training” may be more effective than 
conditioning on actual health service use. This critical fi rst step can be 
challenging because the right instrument to achieve the desired outcome 
may fall outside the sectoral realm of those involved in the design of 
the program. In some settings, for example, improved child health may 
be better pursued through the elimination of open-air defecation, and 
that would require using a different type of condition (that is, targeting 
communities rather than individuals).
The previous discussion also suggests that a narrower defi nition 
of the behaviors the program is seeking to affect could be helpful in 
designing the specific incentives required. For example, monetary 
incentives have been found to be effi cient in improving abstinence and 
treatment adherence for drug and alcohol abuse (Petry 2002; Petry and 
Bohn 2003). This fi nding has led to the use of so-called contingency 
management approaches that use incentives to reinforce behavioral 
change. In designing such approaches, clinical researchers have focused 
on considerations that apply very closely to CCT programs: the choice 
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of target behavior and target population; and the type, magnitude, fre-
quency, timing, and duration of the incentive (Petry 2000). Payments 
are seen as a mechanism to reinforce the specifi c clinical treatment. In 
other words, when the objective is to change behaviors that are unlikely 
to be income elastic, the use of CCTs ought to be tailored to the specifi c 
behaviors and population to generate effi cient incentives.
Conditioning the transfer on the achievement of outcomes themselves 
is another possibility, particularly when links between specifi c behav-
iors (such as service use) and outcomes are unknown or complex, and 
outcomes are mostly within the control of benefi ciaries. Some health 
outcomes may be amenable to that approach, which would imply, for 
example, conditioning payment to young people on evidence that they are 
free from sexually transmitted diseases. In the case of education, it would 
imply moving away from conditioning on school attendance and moving 
to school completion and perhaps to evidence of actual learning (as mea-
sured through tests), although the latter approach may be problematic 
unless practical ways are found to also control for teacher effort. 
As was shown in box 5.1, in the United States there is some experi-
ence with programs that pay for fi nal outcomes rather than for service 
use. Given the concerns about whether CCT programs in developing 
countries are succeeding in improving fi nal outcomes (for example, 
learning outcomes), experimentation with alternative incentive schemes 
(perhaps through small-scale pilot programs) is justifi ed. A practical 
way to do that is to structure such incentives as additional to the basic 
benefi ts qualifying households receive for satisfying attendance condi-
tions (that is, as performance bonuses).
More generally, though, the choice of conditions ought to be 
informed by the evidence of expected returns from alternative types of 
investment in human capital. Returns, of course, will vary across coun-
tries and social groups. However, the accumulated evidence regarding 
returns to investments in the human capital of young children is con-
sistently strong. Moreover, life-cycle skill formation is believed to be a 
dynamic process in which early inputs affect the productivity of inputs 
later in life; and thus investments in young (particularly disadvantaged) 
children are not only good from an equity point of view but also are 
highly effi cient (Heckman 2006a, 2006b). 
The review in chapter 5 found no evidence of CCT impacts on 
learning outcomes among school-age children, but did fi nd signifi cant 
(albeit modest) improvements among younger children. That evidence 
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suggests that the payoffs of CCT programs may be higher when focused 
on development at early ages in life. Figure 6.4 illustrates that point, 
drawing on information from Ecuador. Paxson and Schady (2007) use 
the Spanish version of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (that is, 
the Test de Vocabulario en Imágenes Peabody) to measure cognitive 
development among young children. They fi nd that between the ages 
of 3 and 6, the poorest children go from scoring 90 on the normalized 
scale (the equivalent of being about two thirds of a standard deviation 
behind where they should be) to scoring below 70. That decline implies 
that the median child in this group (corresponding approximately to 
the poorest quintile of the national wealth distribution) is 2.5–3.0 
standard deviations behind the reference population. By the time they 
start school, these children are severely handicapped in terms of their 
cognitive development. The implication is clear: it is hard to see how 
a CCT by itself, or even in combination with “high-quality” schools, 
can remedy such disadvantages. Using CCT programs to support earlier 
investments in children may be a more effective approach.
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Seen from that perspective, the emphasis of many CCT programs 
on secondary education rather than early childhood development may 
appear paradoxical. In fact, several countries are considering adapt-
ing their CCT programs to focus also on expanding participation in 
early childhood development programs among low-income households 
(for example, Colombia and Mexico). Such changes also may require 
improvements in the availability and quality of nutrition and parenting 
interventions.
In practice, it is not just about which conditions are selected, but also 
about how they are monitored and enforced.7 Do programs that enforce 
conditions strictly get better results than others that are more lenient? 
Unfortunately, very little is known about how important the degree of 
monitoring and enforcement is in explaining results; and no country, so 
far, has experimented with different approaches in that regard. There is, 
however, some evidence suggesting that the sole announcement of the 
intended purpose of a cash transfer may have an effect on how resources 
actually are used. Two well-known examples from developed countries 
are Kooreman (2000) and Fraker, Martini, and Ohls (1995). Kooreman 
analyzes the case of a child benefi t in the Netherlands and fi nds that the 
marginal propensity to spend on child clothing out of the benefi ts is much 
larger than out of other sources of income. He argues that this may be the 
result of a “labeling effect”: parents consider the benefi t a benchmark that 
tells them how much they should spend on their child. Fraker, Martini, 
and Ohls examine estimates of the effect on household food expenditures 
of converting food stamps into a cash transfer in the United States. Their 
estimates imply that households spend more on food out of food stamps 
that have been monetized than out of other sources of income.
There is also some suggestive evidence from CCT programs. As 
discussed in chapter 5, evidence from Ecuador shows that the sole 
announcement that benefi ciaries of the BDH were expected to send 
children to school had that effect without the conditions ever being 
monitored or enforced (Schady and Araujo 2008). In the CCT com-
ponent of the Atención a Crisis program in Nicaragua, the anticipated 
increase in health service supply did not occur because of implemen-
tation problems, and children’s visits to the health centers were not 
monitored during the study period. During program enrollment and 
on paydays, however, the program included repeated information and 
communications about the importance of varied diets, health, and 
education. Macours, Schady, and Vakis (2008) fi nd signifi cant positive 
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effects on early childhood development outcomes and changes in the 
composition of food consumption (toward more nutritious food). 
Moreover, the size of those effects is too large to be the result of the cash 
transfer alone: there appears to be a change in behavior despite the fact 
that the conditions for children of preschool age were not monitored 
or enforced. 
Those cases illustrate the possibility that less than full enforcement 
of conditions may be suffi cient—although our understanding of what 
infl uences the seriousness with which parents take the program’s stated 
goals remains limited. The fact that transfers typically have been paid 
to mothers raises the question of whether the observed results are associ-
ated with mothers’ preferences for investing in children’s nutrition (see 
box 6.2 on whether it matters who receives the payment).
Overall, these are areas on which the existing evidence from evalu-
ations of CCT programs is mostly silent and thus will require further 
research and experimentation in the future.
Selecting Payment Levels
The setting of benefi t levels and structure is a critical design aspect 
in CCT programs. Budget availability obviously is an important fac-
tor infl uencing benefi t levels. And when a CCT replaces preexisting 
programs, there are strong pressures to set benefi t levels to avoid the 
perception of benefi t cuts. In the case of Mexico, for example, the 
amount of monthly assistance under Oportunidades’ food component 
was estimated to be greater than the previous subsidies received in 
90 percent of the cases (Levy and Rodríguez 2004). In Brazil, where 
Bolsa Família replaced a series of existing transfer programs, the pay-
ment level was set to prevent eligible benefi ciaries of the prereform 
programs from losing as a result of the reform. Moreover, an “extraor-
dinary benefi t” was established to compensate losers from the reform 
(Lindert et al. 2007).
In terms of the human capital goals of a program, however, the key 
parameter in setting benefi t levels is the size of the elasticity of the 
relevant outcomes to the benefi t level. In other words, the benefi t level 
ought to be set in relation to the desired impacts. That is what several 
programs have attempted to do (ex ante) in a variety of ways. For exam-
ple, the size of the education grant for Oportunidades was set to cover 
the opportunity costs for students, estimated on the basis of observed 
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children’s incomes (Levy and Rodríguez 2004); and in Honduras it was 
set to cover both the opportunity and direct costs, the latter including 
the costs for books, uniforms, and the like (IFPRI 2000). 
Overall, however, there is little evidence available from impact evalu-
ations to inform decisions about payment levels. An exception is the 
Cambodia evaluation (Filmer and Schady 2009a), which found positive 
but diminishing marginal returns to transfer size. These questions also 
have been analyzed using structural models that explore the effects of 
different program choices on education outcomes (see box 6.3).
Taking into account heterogeneity among beneficiaries further 
complicates the process of setting optimal benefi t levels. For example, 
A MAJORITY OF CCT PROGRAMS HAVE TARGETED 
payments to mothers. The justifi cation for doing 
so has been that mothers have a stronger preference 
for investing in children than do fathers. (Chapters 
4 and 5 discuss the relevant evidence.) At the same 
time, a number of studies suggest that women and 
men may value boys and girls differently. For exam-
ple, Thomas (1994), using data from Brazil, Ghana, 
and the United States, fi nds that fathers and mothers 
invest different amounts of resources in the human 
capital of their children, with mothers allocating 
more to daughters and fathers allocating more to 
sons. In Dufl o’s (2003) study of the South Africa 
OAP, the positive effect on child nutrition associated 
with pension receipt by a female is observed only 
if the child is a girl. Rangel (2006) analyzes the 
extension of alimony rights to couples in consen-
sual unions in Brazil (an act that arguably increased 
the bargaining power of women), and he fi nds an 
increase in attendance rates among oldest daughters. 
The implication is that if mothers really do have a 
preference for girls, targeting payments to mothers 
would result in some form of discrimination against 
boys. Depending on the context, that discrimina-
tion may help or hurt the achievement of human 
development outcomes.
How about targeting payments to children? Very 
few programs do it, and the reasons are understand-
able. In those cases that do (Bangladesh’s Female 
Secondary School Assistance Program, Bogotá’s 
Subsidio Condicionado a la Asistencia Escolar), 
the transfer actually is a deposit in a bank account 
that the student can use at a later time. Although 
evaluations are available for those programs, they 
don’t consider the differential impact of making pay-
ments to the students versus to their parents. The 
Education Maintenance Allowance (EMA) in the 
United Kingdom provides a cash subsidy to young 
people aged 16–19 from poor households to encour-
age them to remain in education after the end of 
compulsory schooling. During that program’s pilot 
phase, different implementation variants were tried. 
In one variant of the program, the payment was made 
to the young people themselves; in another variant, 
parents received the transfer. An impact evaluation 
found that the impact on education participation 
was twice as large where EMA was paid to the young 
person (Ashworth et al. 2002). That fi nding suggests 
that the alternative of paying at least some part of 
the transfer (perhaps as a savings deposit) to young 
people, perhaps those attending secondary school, 
may be worth considering.
Box 6.2 Does It Matter Who Receives the Cash?
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HOW LARGE SHOULD A CCT BE? SHOULD TRANSFER 
amounts differ with the child’s age or grade level? 
Answers to questions such as these might be helpful 
to policy makers charged with designing a new—or 
reforming an existing—CCT program. An ideal 
way to seek those answers would be to launch pilot 
programs of various alternative designs, with ran-
domized assignment and a control group. An ex 
post impact evaluation of the various pilot programs 
would teach us much about how each alternative 
design performs in practice.
Such detailed experimentation takes time, how-
ever, and can be expensive. The number of alterna-
tive designs is a combination of different values for 
various program parameters (the value of the trans-
fer, the level of the means test, plus grade and gender 
variations, for instance), leading to an experiment 
that is demanding and complex. That is why simu-
lating program impacts on the basis of an economic 
model of household behavior can be useful. 
Model-based simulation exercises (also known as 
“ex ante program evaluations”) typically consist of a 
structural model of the aspects of economic behavior 
that are most relevant for the program at hand. For 
CCTs, those aspects tend to focus on the child’s 
occupational choice between staying in school and 
dropping out. More complex models also can con-
sider the effects of the transfer on adult labor sup-
ply, or even on fertility. Models are written to yield 
estimable equations, which then are taken to the 
data. The models are estimated on data that predates 
the program—typically, but not always, a house-
hold survey. When the parameters of the model have 
been estimated, the equations that contain policy 
parameters can be used to simulate (counterfactual) 
outcomes under various scenarios. Comparing those 
outcomes and their simulated costs can be informa-
tive for policy makers—at least in selecting which 
parameter combinations to pilot-test in an actual 
experiment. 
Two examples of structural models applied to 
simulating CCT impacts are Attanasio, Meghir, and 
Santiago (2005) and Todd and Wolpin (2006a). 
Those models are estimated on preprogram (base-
line) Oportunidades survey data. Attanasio, Meghir, 
and Santiago (2005) use a school participation 
model to predict the impact of the program when 
the distribution of transfers is shifted toward later 
grades. Specifi cally, they increase the grant for chil-
dren above grade six and eliminate the transfer for 
children in lower grades.
Todd and Wolpin (2006a) use a detailed inter-
temporal structural model to predict the impact of 
Oportunidades on school enrollment, wages, and 
fertility. The predicted changes in enrollment rates 
derived from the model closely match the actual 
changes measured in the ex post evaluation of the 
program. The authors also simulate the relative 
impact and costs of alternative program designs, 
including various cash transfer levels, cash transfers 
restricted to the sixth grade and beyond, and a bonus 
for completing ninth grade. The results of these sim-
ulations suggest that the original Oportunidades 
subsidy or a cash transfer solely targeted to those 
students in sixth grade and above is the most cost-
effective means of increasing student enrollment, a 
fi nding similar to that in Attanasio, Meghir, and 
Santiago (2005). 
Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite (2003) and 
Todd and Wolpin (2006b) offer simpler models 
of the impact of CCTs on educational attainment, 
which trade some structural complexity for added 
fl exibility. Using preprogram household survey data 
from Brazil, Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite (2003) 
estimate an occupational choice model for children 
that enables the authors to simulate the impacts of 
various alternative designs on school attendance and 
child labor. The policy alternatives they consider 
include changing the size of the transfer, the maxi-
mum transfer per household, and the eligibility cut-
Box 6.3 Using Behavioral Models to Simulate the Effects of CCT Design Changes
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smaller transfers may be needed for children of primary school age than 
for those of secondary school age because the latter may incur a higher 
opportunity cost for attending school. The elasticity of some human 
development outcomes to the transfer level could vary according to 
the child’s gender—either because the child’s opportunity costs differ 
or because of parental preferences. In Mexico, for example, the design 
of the program recognized those factors and, as a result, pays more for 
secondary school–age children and for girls. Achieving similar improve-
ments in outcomes may require different payment levels in rural and 
urban areas because of various factors, including differences in relative 
prices.
In theory, the effi cacy of a CCT program in terms of its expected 
impact on human capital accumulation could be improved by calibrat-
ing the size of the transfer to the relevant characteristics of benefi ciaries. 
In other words, ideally the CCT could be designed to recognize the fact 
that the cost of achieving a given improvement in child health or an 
increase in school attendance may vary signifi cantly, even among the 
eligible population. In practice, of course, doing so not only requires 
off point for households; and making Bolsa Escola 
transfers unconditional. The authors estimate that 
doubling the size of the Bolsa Escola transfer in 
Brazil would have reduced by half the percentage 
of children in poor households not attending school, 
and a further doubling of the transfer would reduce 
nonattendance among the poor to one third. As a 
corollary to the prediction of the impact on school 
enrollment and child labor, the authors examine 
the relative changes in program design as it affects 
per capita income, inequality, and income poverty. 
Although the authors fi nd that school enrollment 
is rather elastic to the size of the transfer, at least 
when it is conditional, they fi nd very little effect 
on income and poverty variables, except when the 
transfer is quadrupled. 
Todd and Wolpin (2006b) use propensity score 
matching based on pre-Oportunidades data to match 
households having a specifi ed income level and child 
wage rate with households who would have that level 
of income and child wage rate after the transfer. The 
central assumption of their matching model is that 
those households that receive the transfer will behave 
in the same manner as those that have the specifi ed 
income level before the program. Todd and Wolpin 
(2006) use this model to test multiple transfer sizes. 
Like Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite (2003), Todd 
and Wolpin (2006b) fi nd that enrollment responds 
sharply to the size of the conditional transfer. 
All of these studies acknowledge that these simu-
lations or “predictions” of alternative scenarios are 
only as good as the models (and data) on which they 
are based. Of course, when a decision on program 
design is made and implemented, the predictions 
of the ex ante simulation should be tested against 
an actual, ex post evaluation of the program. (See 
Bourguignon and Ferreira [2003] for a general 
discussion.)
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a wealth of information on the different effect sizes, but also demands 
that the criteria to be used for such calibration be feasible to implement 
from both administrative and political points of view. Moreover, the 
more complicated the system is, the more likely it is that households will 
try to game it—for example, by manipulating the observable character-
istics (such as ownership of specifi c assets) that infl uence eligibility.
So far, we have considered benefi t levels and structure as means 
of improving the design of CCT programs to achieve human capital 
outcomes, but they are equally relevant to achieve redistributive goals. 
Say, for example, that a small transfer (that is, small as a proportion of 
the poverty gap) is suffi cient to generate improved nutrition or school 
attendance, but insuffi cient to have a signifi cant effect on consumption 
poverty. As long as redistributive goals are an important aspect of the 
program, setting benefi t levels above the minimum necessary for the 
human capital goals will be justifi ed. That could be done by adding a 
fi xed amount per household or by raising the per-child benefi t.
Heterogeneity among benefi ciaries is also an important factor when 
considering the structure of payments from the point of view of the 
program’s redistributive goals. Particularly in large programs that, by 
design, target several deciles of the income distribution (such as Brazil’s 
Bolsa Família or Ecuador’s BDH), the question of whether higher 
benefi t levels should be set for the poorest benefi ciaries is very relevant. 
In the Bolsa Família program, Brazil has adopted a benefi t structure 
whereby the extreme poor (defi ned on the basis of per capita income) get 
a base benefi t that is supplemented by a per-child benefi t (Lindert et al. 
2007). The (less) poor benefi ciaries get only the per-child benefi t. This 
is a practical way to pursue the program’s redistributive goals without 
altering the overall structure of the program as it relates to its human 
capital goals.8
Adapting the Supply of Social Services
CCT programs cannot be thought of in isolation from other social 
policies. In particular, achieving the human capital accumulation goals 
sought by CCT programs typically will require adapting the supply of 
social services, including expanding coverage and improving quality. 
Moreover, in many cases it will require going beyond improvements in 
the provision of traditional health and education services and involving 
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social work activities to affect parenting and other “within-household” 
practices. 
Although it is conceivable that a CCT could be implemented in 
conditions where the supply of education and health services is per-
fectly adequate (and, as a result, no complementary actions would 
be required), in practice that is highly unlikely in most developing 
countries where the delivery of education and health services typically 
is dysfunctional (World Bank 2003). Poor infrastructure, absenteeism, 
and lack of adequate supplies are not unusual problems in schools and 
health centers in most developing countries—including those that have 
ongoing CCT programs. Indeed, there is some evidence that weak-
nesses in the supply of services are a limiting factor to the effectiveness 
of CCT programs. In their comparison of program effects for children 
randomly assigned to two more years of Oportunidades intervention 
in rural areas, Behrman, Parker, and Todd (2005) show that program 
impacts on enrollment were larger when children had access to gen-
eral or technical schools than when they had access only to the long-
distance, satellite-based telesecundaria schools.9 Program impacts also 
are larger for students in areas where, prior to implementation of the 
program, student-teacher ratios were low (fewer than 20 students per 
teacher). Both of those results suggest that in assessing whether to send 
their children to school in response to the CCT, parents took account of 
the quality of local schools, and were more likely to enroll their children 
if quality was higher.
In that sense, actions oriented to improving the adequacy of the 
relevant services typically will be needed to complement a CCT. Of 
course, CCT programs also may be competing with other supply-side 
actions, at least in terms of funding, and decisions on the right size of 
CCT programs ought to be based on their “productivity” relative to 
such supply-side interventions. At the same time, those decisions also 
ought to be based on the marginal social value of both CCT programs 
and health and education services relative to other categories of public 
spending. (See box 6.4 on the cost–benefi t analysis of CCT programs.) 
However, no matter how one answers the question of what is the right 
budget allocation to the CCT, the need for complementary actions to 
improve the supply of services most likely will remain central in most 
countries.
A review of the experience of those countries that have implemented 
CCT programs confi rms the latter point. Governments have often 
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undertaken actions (in parallel, in coordination, or as an integral part 
of the CCT program) to improve the supply of those services that ben-
efi ciaries are expected to use. It is fair to say that the policy dilemma is 
not whether such actions are needed, but how they should be carried out. 
Table 6.1 illustrates the range of complementary actions that countries 
have taken to improve the adequacy of education and health services. 
The table also shows the diversity of cases in terms of the approaches 
being followed, and whether these are schemes specifi cally targeting 
CCT benefi ciaries or part of broader efforts to improve the supply of 
services.
At one extreme across the possible range of cases, all that really 
is required to improve the adequacy of services is ensuring that 
MEASURING THE COST AND BENEFIT OF CCT 
programs can be a daunting task, given the multi-
dimensionality of such programs. A detailed cost–
benefi t analysis of the Colombian program Familias 
en Acción was undertaken jointly by the Institute 
for Fiscal Studies, Econometría, and Sistemas 
Especializados de Información (2006). 
Their analysis values the benefi ts of Familias en 
Acción in terms of the increased future earnings that 
result from (1) lowered incidence of underweight 
infants, (2) lowered incidence of malnutrition and 
child morbidity among children aged 0–6 years, 
and (3) increased years of secondary schooling. The 
effects of Familias en Acción on those outcomes are 
derived from an impact evaluation, and then are 
monetized using evidence from a combination of 
sources (for example, a net additional year of sec-
ondary school education is assumed to increase 
future income by 8 percent, based on estimates 
of Mincerian rates of return; an increase of 0.4 
kilograms in birth weight is assumed to increase 
future income by 5 percent, based on international 
evidence). When those monetized benefi ts are dis-
counted, the total net present value of benefi ts is 
calculated to be $259.4 million.
Costs are summed to $163 million, and they 
consist of (1) program costs for both the nutrition 
and the education components, (2) the private costs 
incurred by the household for additional food and 
education expenditure, (3) private household costs 
of collecting transfers, (4) infrastructure and input 
costs of additional school and health center sup-
ply, and (5) the public cost generated to fi nance the 
CCT. 
Comparing the benefit and cost figures, the 
authors estimate a ratio of benefi ts to costs of 1.59, 
which is high by traditional cost–benefi t ratio stan-
dards and suggests that the CCT is worth its cost. 
The ratio also means that even if the assumptions 
used in this model are imperfect, costs would need 
to increase 59 percent relative to benefi ts to reach a 
point where the benefi ts do not justify the costs. It 
should be noted that this analysis does not consider 
other benefi ts, including the increased household 
consumption (other than through child nutrition 
and birth weight).
Source: Institute for Fiscal Studies, Econometría, and 
Sistemas Especializados de Información 2006.
Box 6.4 Cost–Benefi t Analysis of a CCT: The Case of Familias en Acción
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Table 6.1 Examples of Supply-Side Interventions Complementary to a CCT
Country
Supply-side 
intervention, education
Targeting only CCT 
communities?
Supply-side 
intervention, health and 
nutrition
Targeting only CCT 
communities?
Bangladesh (1) Government 
school and classroom 
construction; (2) 
nonformal and 
religious school 
expansion
Both stipend and 
school expansion 
were national; 
madrassa expansion 
was infl uenced by 
secondary school 
stipend; NGO-
managed schools did 
not participate in early 
years of the primary 
school stipend
No health component 
in CCT
No health component in 
CCT
Cambodia New classroom 
construction for 
lower-secondary 
school
Some overlap, but not 
full coverage
No health component 
in CCT
No health component in 
CCT
El Salvador School-based 
management (Redes 
Escolares Efectivas)
No, covers a wide 
set of communities, 
including those in Red 
Solidaria
NGO contracts and 
mobile brigades for the 
delivery of basic health 
package (including 
community-based 
nutrition component)
No, program covers a 
wide set of communities, 
including those in Red 
Solidaria. 
Honduras (1) School 
construction; (2) 
transfer payments 
to parent-teacher 
associations
(1) No, national 
coverage; (2) yes, 
intervention piloted 
with CCT, but 
discontinued
Construction of health 
centers
Yes, intervention 
piloted with CCT, but 
discontinued
Jamaica Provision of 
textbooks, teaching 
materials, and library 
resources; new school 
construction 
National coverage Established health 
education sessions in 
response to low health 
center attendance
Yes, education sessions 
were designed specifi cally 
for PATH recipients
Mexico Rehabilitation of 
primary schools 
and construction of 
secondary schools; 
incentive grants for 
teacher performance
Yes Mobile health teams National coverage
continued
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Country
Supply-side 
intervention, education
Targeting only CCT 
communities?
Supply-side 
intervention, health and 
nutrition
Targeting only CCT 
communities?
Nicaragua 
(RPS)
Cash transfer for 
teachers
Yes Basic health 
package (including 
nutrition) supplied 
by NGOs and mobile 
institutional brigades
Yes, intervention was 
based on preexisting 
model covering non-
CCT communities, 
but implementation 
was adapted for CCT 
communities
Panama Nonformal preschools 
and home-based early 
childhood education
Yes, Educational 
Development Project 
and the Second Basic 
Education Project were 
adapted to meet the 
supply needs of Red de 
Oportunidades
Basic health package 
plus community-based 
nutrition 
Yes, program existed 
prior to CCT, but 
nutrition component was 
added to the basic health 
package of services for 
indigenous and remote 
rural villages
Source: Authors’ compilation.
Note: NGO = nongovernmental organization; PATH = Program of Advancement through Health and Education; RPS = Red de 
Protección Social.
Table 6.1 continued
benefi ciaries know and understand the services available and that ser-
vice providers have the outreach capabilities to attract them. That is 
most likely to be the case in countries with relatively well-functioning 
services and where CCT programs are targeting a relatively small 
group of benefi ciaries. Chile provides a good example: The Chile 
Solidario program seeks to cover the 225,000 poorest households in 
the country. Because Chile has a broad and rather sophisticated net-
work of education and health service providers, no major investments 
were needed to expand or change the supply of services. Nevertheless, 
Chile Solidario also works on the supply side to ensure coordination 
with providers. The social workers that give psychosocial support to 
the benefi ciaries are trained on how to collaborate with the munici-
palities (which are responsible for schools and primary health centers 
in Chile) to make sure that benefi ciaries are not excluded from exist-
ing services. As a result of that interaction, over time municipalities 
have introduced new social services to meet the needs of the Chile 
Solidario benefi ciaries.
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At the other extreme of the range of cases, supply is so inadequate 
that the proper functioning of the program requires major adjust-
ments, including providing services where none existed before. 
Several countries have implemented initiatives to expand public sector 
capacity to supply services in parallel with the CCT, often relying on 
existing programs rather than establishing new ones. For example, 
in tandem with Oportunidades, the government of Mexico took 
steps to improve the supply of schooling through a combination of 
interventions: rural primary schools and telesecundarias were rehabili-
tated in Oportunidades communities; grants were offered to parent 
associations to pay for minor classroom maintenance and repairs; 
and in some communities, secondary schools were constructed to 
help meet the supply requirements in line with Oportunidades (Levy 
and Rodríguez 2004).10 Efforts also were undertaken through the 
Programa de Ampliación de Cobertura to expand access to basic 
health services in rural areas (González-Pier et al. 2006). Similar 
efforts are found in other countries as well. Just to mention a few: In 
Bangladesh, starting in the 1980s, government spending on education 
almost doubled as a proportion of social sector spending, allowing for a 
signifi cant expansion in the capacity of the schooling system (Hossain 
2004); in Cambodia, the CESSP, which fi nances the scholarships that 
effectively function as a CCT, also fi nances the construction of new 
lower-secondary classrooms in communes with high poverty rates 
(communities also targeted for the scholarships). 
Other countries have decided to use nongovernmental providers 
instead. For example, seeking to keep costs down and avoiding the inef-
fi ciencies experienced by public providers, several countries in Central 
America have contracted out basic health and nutrition services to 
NGOs and community groups.11 Although these programs typically 
were implemented independently of the CCT programs at fi rst,12 in 
most cases they became the instrument used to deliver services to CCT 
benefi ciaries. 
Implementation of such efforts has involved both financial and 
administrative resources and coordination among different institutions 
(for example, between the agencies in charge of the CCT program and 
health and education ministries, and between them and local govern-
ments). Whereas those efforts resulted in important achievements in 
some countries (for example, more than 50,000 Mexican schools were 
rehabilitated), serious implementation diffi culties impaired success in 
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others countries. In the Nicaraguan program Atención a Crisis, the 
anticipated increase in the supply of services by public clinics didn’t 
materialize and, as mentioned earlier, resulted in a lack of monitoring 
of health conditions.13 Similarly in Honduras, PRAF contemplated a 
health service package that involved the transfer of resources to the 
community to finance an annual work plan. The package was not 
implemented in accordance with protocol because no legal means 
could be identifi ed to transfer resources from the central government 
to community-based teams. Thus only 17 percent of one year’s trans-
fers were disbursed (with central procurement), and only introductory 
training in quality assurance methods was given (Morris, Olinto et al. 
2004). The pilot program was later discontinued.
Clearly, expanding the supply of health and education services in 
many countries is an important aspect of the efforts needed to imple-
ment a CCT. But, more generally, many countries face the challenge 
of improving the quality of services, particularly to respond to the 
needs of benefi ciaries from the CCT programs themselves. In part, the 
efforts described above have sought to address issues of quality—for 
example, through more and better inputs or the training of providers. 
In a few cases, however, CCT programs also have introduced explicit 
monetary incentives to providers seeking to improve the quality of 
services. In Nicaragua, benefi ciary households in the RPS were given 
an additional quantity of money, called the bono a la oferta, to be paid 
to the teacher by the child or parents. Oportunidades also included 
incentive grants to teachers (equivalent to a 29 percent increase in 
the average teacher salary) tied to attendance and participation in 
extracurricular activities with students and parents. In Bangladesh, 
the FSSAP II program incorporated incentive awards for school per-
formance and improvement.
Whether or not the CCT programs become a vehicle to introduce 
innovations in service delivery, their success in promoting human capital 
accumulation among poor children is bound to be affected by other 
government efforts to reform service delivery. In some Central American 
countries (El Salvador, formerly in Nicaragua), children benefi ting from 
CCT programs may attend schools that follow school-based management 
practices, or they may receive health services from nongovernmental pro-
viders who operate under “pay-for-performance” contracts. In Colombia, 
the existence of demand-side fi nancing in health enables CCT benefi -
ciaries to use both public and private health providers (see box 6.5). And 
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in countries as diverse as Brazil and Pakistan (Punjab), CCT programs 
operate in the context of decentralized provision of education services. 
Whether and how local governments respond in terms of adapting the 
supply of services is critical in those cases, and this is an important area 
for future research.14 
To date, there is little robust evidence to assess the effectiveness 
of different means of adapting the supply of services to the needs of 
poor households (such as those households benefiting from CCT 
programs).15 One thus should not simply assume that shifting resources 
to provide more or different health or education inputs will generate 
better results (as argued, for example, by Reimers, Da Silva, and Trevino 
2006). Moreover, the evidence base is still thin on the joint effects of 
ALTHOUGH A MAJORITY OF THE EXISTING CCT 
programs have structured conditions around the use 
of government-managed facilities (schools, clinics), 
CCT programs can be (and have been) designed in 
a more pluralistic fashion, combining their demand-
side incentives to change household behavior with 
both public and private provision of health and edu-
cation services. It is assumed sometimes that the 
need to monitor conditions restricts CCT benefi cia-
ries to using public facilities. But that is not the case. 
In Bangladesh, FSSAP recipients are permitted to 
attend their choice of government, secular-private, or 
religious schools. In addition to the regular report-
ing of enrollment and attendance by schools, the 
program is introducing audits as well as random 
checks by an independent third-party survey fi rm. In 
Colombia’s Familias en Acción, mothers are required 
to ask doctors or nurses to verify their and their 
children’s attendance at the health clinic, regardless 
of whether the clinic is public or private. And in 
the Chile Solidario program, education conditions 
are met through enrollment at the school (or pre-
school) that is nearest to the residence of the family. 
CCT recipients thus may enroll their children at 
public schools/preschools or at subsidized private 
schools/preschools that accept government vouchers. 
Monitoring the conditions is the same in all cases: 
school enrollment is verifi ed by the social worker 
assigned to a given family.
If the regulatory environment is fl exible enough, 
the private sector (both for and not for profi t) can 
help by responding, over time, to the increased 
demand enabled by CCT programs. The experience 
of Bangladesh appears to be relevant in this regard: 
A large share of the increase in school enrollments 
that took place starting in the 1990s was enabled by 
the expansion in the private supply of schools. BRAC 
(Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee), the 
largest Bangladeshi NGO, offers a clear example: 
Starting with 22 single-room, one-teacher schools 
in 1985, it had 35,000 schools serving more than 
1.1 million students by 1999 (Nath, Sylva, and 
Grimes 1999; Ahmed and Nath 2003). The gov-
ernment push to modernize schools (including mak-
ing primary school attendance legally compulsory) 
led many madrassas, or religious schools, to open 
their doors to female students and to reformulate 
their curricula. As a result, enrollment in reformed 
madrassas increased by 62 percent between 1990 
and 2003 (Niaz Asadullah and Chaudhury 2007).
Box 6.5 Private Sector Delivery and CCT Programs
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supply and demand actions like the ones discussed above. Maluccio, 
Murphy, and Regalía (2006), for example, fi nd that the effectiveness of 
the Nicaraguan RPS was larger in areas in which schools were autono-
mous than in areas where they were not, suggesting that school-based 
management reforms may be an important complement to a CCT pro-
gram. But it is hard to make more general assessments without evidence 
from other settings.
The trend toward systematic impact evaluation fi rst seen for CCT 
programs now is observed for the case of initiatives seeking to improve the 
delivery of social services, particularly in education (World Bank 2007). 
As results of such evaluations become available, it will be easier to answer 
the many remaining questions regarding how to design much needed 
supply-side complementary actions to CCT programs.
Chapter 5 showed that CCT programs to date have had only modest 
effects on “fi nal” outcomes in education and health. The poor quality of 
services, particularly those to which poor people have access, may mean 
that increased utilization alone does not lead to better outcomes in the 
form of increased learning or reduced mortality. Thus it is important 
when considering complementary actions to improve the quality (and 
not just the quantity) of education and health (including nutrition) 
services. As illustrated in table 6.1, several countries already are seeking 
to do exactly that in various ways.
Another possible explanation for the apparently weak effects on fi nal 
outcomes is the important constraints at the household level that are 
not addressed by the CCT programs, at least as currently designed. 
Those constraints could include poor parenting practices, inadequate 
information, or other inputs into the household production of education 
and health. More research is needed in this area, but two implications 
of this line of thought should be noted: First, as discussed above, simply 
conditioning the transfers on service use (regardless of the quality of the 
service) may not be suffi cient to achieve the desired outcomes. In some 
cases, rethinking the nature of conditions may be needed. Second, a 
more proactive approach to outreach and support to households may be 
necessary. In other words, if household constraints really are a serious 
impediment to improving fi nal outcomes, the cash/condition combina-
tion may not be suffi cient, and social work interventions may be neces-
sary. That is what Chile has been doing through Chile Solidario, and 
what other countries (Colombia, El Salvador, Panama) are pilot-testing 
or starting to implement more generally. 
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CCT Programs As Components of Social 
Protection Systems
As we have discussed at various points throughout this report, CCT 
programs are only one option within the arsenal of social assistance 
programs that can be used to redistribute income to poor households. 
The logical implication is that CCT programs should not be seen in 
isolation, but rather must be considered as part of a broader social pro-
tection system.
Why is that so? First, CCT programs cannot be the right instrument 
for all poor households. Because of their focus on building the human 
capital of poor children, CCT programs are not a feasible option for 
some groups among the poor, such as the elderly poor, poor households 
without children, or households with children outside the age range 
covered by the CCT. Redistribution to those groups is better handled 
through other means. In the case of the elderly poor, the potential labor 
supply disincentives from cash transfers are likely to be low, and the jus-
tifi cation for further investments in human capital is questionable. As a 
result, UCT programs in the form of social or noncontributory pensions 
often are the instrument preferred by both developed and developing 
countries to provide assistance to that group.16 As discussed in chapter 
5, the evaluations of some social pension schemes (most notably in 
South Africa) show that some of the benefi ts of such redistribution 
accrue to other family members, including children.
The potential complementarities between CCTs and social pensions 
have not escaped policy makers. Eligibility rules for participation in a 
CCT program can be expanded to include the elderly simply by exempt-
ing them from the accompanying human capital conditions (and thereby 
effectively making the program into a UCT for that subpopulation). That 
approach was suggested by Camargo and Ferreira (2001) in their policy 
paper proposing the consolidation of Brazil’s disparate social protection 
initiatives into a more coherent program. The proposal was implemented 
as part of Brazil’s Bolsa Família; this approach also has been taken in 
Jamaica’s PATH, Ecuador’s BDH, and Chile Solidario. Although the 
costs of reforming existing programs need to be assessed, the administra-
tive synergies of running the two components from the same agency and 
using the same benefi ciary database may provide an argument for includ-
ing the elderly poor in a CCT (rather than setting up a separate program), 
particularly in countries where no social pension exists.
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Even among those poor households that potentially are eligible for 
a CCT, countries face different options, including UCTs or workfare 
programs. The choice among instruments needs to give serious con-
sideration to their respective costs and benefi ts (as considered in the 
fi rst section of this chapter). Rapid appraisals of the type suggested by 
Ravallion (1999) for workfare programs conceivably can be applied to 
CCT and UCT programs and can serve as inputs for decision making. 
For example, Murgai and Ravallion (2005) conduct such an exercise to 
compare workfare and a universal UCT for the case of India. They fi nd 
that a budget-neutral, untargeted transfer has greater impact on poverty 
than does workfare, unless wages paid are extremely low and there is 
full recovery of nonwage costs.
Because of their emphasis on long-term human capital accumula-
tion and on administrative targeting, CCT programs are better suited 
as instruments for structural poverty than as responses to episodes of 
transient poverty. Whether and how CCT programs can play a role 
as an insurance mechanism in the face of income shocks remain open 
questions—ones that have acquired increased importance in the face of 
the recent global economic slowdown (see box 6.6).
The previous discussion illustrates the overall message that in most 
country contexts, conditional and other cash transfer programs are 
likely to coexist, and should be seen as complementary rather than as 
substitutes—addressing different household characteristics and the 
nature of poverty those households experience. Thus it is not surprising 
that policy makers and program managers for CCT programs in Latin 
IT IS WIDELY BELIEVED THAT THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
of 2008 in the United States and other industrial 
countries, and the ensuing global economic slow-
down, could have dire consequences for the well-
being of people in the developing world. Poverty may 
increase dramatically in countries where a sizable 
share of the population already lives in desperate 
circumstances. If families cut back on investments 
in the education, health, and nutrition of their chil-
dren, this could have serious long-term consequences 
for the opportunities these children have as adults. 
The possibility of sharp reductions in living stan-
dards rightly has focused the minds of policy makers 
and academics on fi nding tools to mitigate the costs 
of the crisis for the world’s poorest households. Can 
CCTs be part of the solution?
Box 6.6 CCT Programs and the Financial Crisis
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CCTs transfer cash and, as we have shown else-
where in this report, that cash can help poor house-
holds weather systemic shocks like an economywide 
crisis, or idiosyncratic shocks like unemployment, 
illness, or the death of the main breadwinner. 
Moreover, the requirements that young children be 
taken to health centers for growth monitoring and 
that older children be enrolled in school and attend 
regularly may ensure that households do not cut 
back on critical investments in childhood.
That being said, CCTs by their nature primarily 
are instruments to address long-term, structural 
poverty rather than sudden income shocks, par-
ticularly if those shocks are expected to be short-
term ones. A number of the properties of CCT 
programs are inconsistent with the type of fl exible 
social insurance instrument required to manage 
social risk. First, CCTs are not countercyclical in 
nature. The administrative targeting methods they 
use are such that it is hard to add new benefi ciaries 
in the short term and hard to remove them from the 
program rosters when a crisis has passed. Second, 
households that already are receiving transfers from 
a CCT program may not be those worst hit by an 
aggregate economic shock. Third, CCTs ask that 
households make “lumpy” investments in child 
education and health—investments that only make 
sense with a longer-term horizon. And fi nally, as 
described in box 5.3, it is not clear that households 
always will disinvest in child human capital during 
systemic shocks, especially in the middle-income 
countries in Latin America where CCTs are most 
widespread.
For all of these reasons, CCTs are not an ideal 
instrument for dealing with transient poverty. 
Transfer programs that do not involve long-term 
commitments (such as those implicit in CCT condi-
tions), that are self-targeted (and thus do not involve 
complex administrative decisions for program entry 
or exit), and that involve the participation of benefi -
ciaries in activities that can help address the source of 
the shock (for example, job-related activities) appear 
to be better suited than are CCTs to act as risk man-
agement instruments. Those characteristics tend to 
make workfare a better instrument in this regard. 
There is also plenty of empirical evidence on how 
workfare programs operate (for example, see Drèze 
and Sen 1991; Ravallion, Datt, and Chaudhuri 
1993; Datt and Ravallion 1994; Ravallion and Datt 
1995; Jalan and Ravallion 2003b).
Nevertheless, having a CCT in place clearly is 
better when there is a crisis than is not having any 
large-scale social assistance program at all. Several 
Latin American countries (including Chile, Ecuador, 
and Mexico) temporarily have increased the level of 
payments to CCT benefi ciaries. These additional 
payments have been presented (or labeled) clearly 
as supplemental payments made on an exceptional 
basis. The intent behind this labeling is to give 
policy makers room to scale back payments to their 
precrisis levels in the future. Numerous programs 
also have accelerated the expansion in coverage they 
originally had planned for a longer period of time 
(World Bank 2008b).
CCT programs have a role to play in the con-
text of a “permanent safety net” (as discussed in 
Ravallion 2009). Some experimentation with design 
features that make them more nimble in responding 
to sudden changes in aggregate economic circum-
stances may be useful. And some features of CCT 
programs—including the high technical quality of 
staff, the transparency in the processing of infor-
mation, the absence of political interference, and 
an emphasis on monitoring and evaluation—could 
(and should) be replicated by other social assistance 
programs, including those whose primary goal is 
helping poor households cope with income volatil-
ity and risk. However, CCTs should continue to be 
policy tools whose main goals are reducing struc-
tural poverty and increasing investments in child 
human capital, especially where these investment 
levels are low. 
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America—the region where such programs have the longest tradition 
and the most established status—increasingly are emphasizing the 
importance of casting CCTs not as isolated poverty reduction programs 
(no matter how effective they may be), but as part of a broader system 
of social protection (World Bank 2008b).
What does it mean, in practice, for a CCT program to be part of a 
social protection system? The answer could vary signifi cantly depend-
ing on the country. In particular, the broader social protection system 
is bound to take very different shapes in advanced, highly urbanized, 
middle-income countries with relatively well-developed institutions and 
in low-income countries with a large share of their population residing 
in rural areas and with relatively weak institutions.
That having been said, there are some common elements. First, as 
explored in some detail earlier in the chapter, the target population for a 
CCT program must be defi ned in a comprehensive way by considering 
the nature of poverty experienced by different groups and the avail-
ability of alternative instruments for income redistribution. Second, the 
specifi c design features of CCT programs must be compatible with the 
design features of other cash transfers (that is, the transfer size cannot 
be set in isolation but must be relative to other cash transfers) both to 
limit distortions and to ensure horizontal equity—if for no other reason 
than political sustainability.17
Third, it implies having clear and transparent eligibility rules and 
procedures for admission into the program in order to avoid confusion 
among potential benefi ciaries and close the door to potential manipu-
lation and abuse on the part of government officials and program 
administrators. 
Entry and exit rules also are important in terms of their incentive 
effects, particularly those related to labor force participation. Until now, 
CCTs have used a proxy means rather than an income threshold to 
target benefi ts, and so the correspondence between program eligibility 
and labor supply is weaker than in many welfare programs in devel-
oped countries. However, the better a proxy means is at distinguishing 
“poor” from “nonpoor” households, the more highly it will be correlated 
with income and consumption—and the more likely it is to provide 
disincentives for adult labor market participation. Also, the roster of 
households eligible for transfers, based on the proxy means, is updated 
only infrequently in most countries, so recipient households have no 
incentive (other than the income effect, which would push them toward 
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consuming more leisure) to reduce labor supply. However, many pro-
grams (including Oportunidades in Mexico, Familias en Acción in 
Colombia, and the BDH in Ecuador) have updated their proxy means 
or are in the process of doing so. Therefore it is possible that as CCT 
programs mature, any disincentive effects will become more apparent. 
Potential solutions to such effects include the use of time limits on ben-
efi ts (as in Chile or under TANF in the United States), or the adoption 
of graduated benefi ts (where benefi ts are reduced only partially after 
recertifi cation shows households have ceased to be eligible under the 
original criteria) to avoid “cliffs” and the associated negative incentives 
on labor supply.
Fourth, the potential administrative synergies across cash transfer 
programs are large. Using common systems for administrative targeting 
as well as systems to make payments to benefi ciaries (for instance, by 
setting up an electronic card system) may be the most obvious example 
of such synergies. But more generally, as illustrated in chapter 3, setting 
up a common outreach and service platform (one-stop shops) through 
which benefi ciaries of all social protection programs can access benefi ts 
and interact with program administrators is an innovation that several 
countries are either considering or experimenting with at present.
Although the challenges of inter-institutional coordination often 
are recognized in terms of the relationship between CCT programs 
and education and health ministries in charge of service delivery, it is 
equally important to recognize the challenges in terms of coordina-
tion among social protection programs. CCT programs are housed 
in and managed by a variety of agencies and ministries, depending 
on the countries in which they operate. It is often the case that other 
cash transfer programs are managed separately—for example, through 
ministries of labor or social security agencies. Making CCT programs 
part of a broader social protection system thus will require some coor-
dination mechanism. Ministries of fi nance or planning can play and 
have played that role.
In many developing countries, however, subnational governments 
increasingly are playing an important part in social protection. Brazil, 
where CCT programs were local before they became national, is per-
haps an extreme example. But in even smaller and nonfederal countries, 
subnational governments are a relevant actor not only in the implemen-
tation of CCT programs, but also by running their own social protec-
tion programs. That adds another complex dimension to the challenges 
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of coordination. Challenges, however, often present opportunities for 
change and reform—a point we come back to below. 
Conclusion
As noted in the introduction to this report, CCT programs have been 
seen in both extremely positive (a “magic bullet in development”) and 
extremely negative (“superfl uous, pernicious, atrocious, and abomi-
nable”) terms. 
Our review of the CCT experience so far confi rms that they have 
been effective in reducing short-term poverty and increasing the use of 
education and health services. These achievements cannot and should 
not be dismissed or minimized because they represent powerful proof 
that well-designed public programs can have signifi cant effects on criti-
cal social indicators.
At the same time, the review provides ample reasons to be cautious 
and to avoid transforming their obvious virtues into a blind advocacy 
campaign for CCT programs. The programs are not the right policy 
instrument for all poor households or in all circumstances. In particu-
lar, whether conditions are needed and what types of conditions are 
appropriate remain critical questions that countries planning to initiate 
a new or reform an existing CCT must consider seriously. The evidence 
on their impact on fi nal outcomes in education and health is mixed. 
And it should be remembered that CCT programs typically will require 
a set of complementary actions, in terms of both other social protection 
programs and the adaptation of the supply of social services. Improving 
their impact on learning and health outcomes may require a combina-
tion of stronger services, a different set of conditions, and more decisive 
actions to target children at the right time in the life cycle. Deciding 
on when (or for whom) to have a CCT program, and how to design 
it, requires careful consideration of local conditions. Moreover, CCT 
programs run the risk of becoming less effective when their mandate is 
expanded to address challenges for which they may be less well suited.
Thanks to the extremely valuable efforts of policy makers and 
managers of CCT programs around the world to invest in data col-
lection and include evaluation modules as a routine aspect of program 
management, we now have more rigorous evidence on CCTs than on 
practically any other development program. As noted throughout the 
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report, however, many important questions regarding the design of 
CCT programs remain unanswered and require further research.
From the point of view of the generation of global public goods, 
the returns to additional evaluations of relatively standard CCTs are 
likely to be small (even if these evaluations help build the evidence 
base for specifi c countries, and perhaps help build political support). 
However, there are three broad areas where additional research would 
be extremely valuable.
The fi rst of those research areas is unpackaging the overall CCT 
impact. How important are the magnitude of the transfer, the gender of 
the recipient, the choice of conditions, and the degree to which condi-
tions are monitored and households penalized for noncompliance? For 
what outcomes do these choices matter most? Answering those ques-
tions is important for program design, and will help governments make 
CCT programs more effi cient in the future. 
The second critical research area involves the interactions between 
CCTs and other programs. Are CCT effects on health and education 
outcomes larger when they come hand-in-hand with efforts to improve 
the quality of the supply? Is the sum of the effects larger than the sum 
of the parts (which would suggest that there are important synergies)? 
Are there particular programs that target households, such as parenting 
interventions, amenable to being combined with CCTs? Under what 
circumstances would those programs work? The answers to all of those 
questions are critical to understanding how best to coordinate CCT 
programs with other investments.
The third area where further research is important relates to the 
impact of CCTs in very different settings or on outcomes that have 
not yet been studied. Although there is some encouraging evidence of 
the impact of CCTs in low-income countries, including Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, and Nicaragua, the bulk of the evidence on CCTs comes 
from the middle-income countries in Latin America. There would be 
high returns to evaluations of CCT-like programs in sub-Saharan Africa 
where institutional capacity may be weaker, poverty is more widespread, 
and human capital defi cits are deeper. It also is important to assess 
whether the CCTs currently in place have impacts on outcomes about 
which we know little or nothing—for example, long-term poverty, 
or interactions with the formal banking sector in the middle-income 
countries of Latin America—and to assess whether CCTs are useful 
tools for improving outcomes in other settings—for example, if they 
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can be used to prevent HIV infection in Africa. All of those questions 
will require experimentation and careful evaluation. Many also involve 
following households for longer time horizons than traditionally has 
been the case in standard CCT and other program evaluations, which 
itself poses important methodological challenges.
In concluding, it is important to recognize that the multidimension-
ality of a CCT program is a source of both strength and complexity. 
CCT programs cannot and should not be seen as only education or 
health interventions. After all, they are cash transfers and should be 
considered and analyzed as social protection interventions. In that 
sense, experience indicates that CCT programs have been very success-
ful in reforming social assistance policies by replacing badly targeted 
and ineffective subsidies and in creating the political conditions for 
expanding income support to the poor. Moreover, where they have 
been implemented, CCT programs have brought an enhanced atten-
tion to the behavioral consequences of social policies. That, by itself, is 
important.
Experience so far suggests that CCT programs also have had posi-
tive institutional externalities. Most notably, through their emphasis on 
monitoring and evaluation they are helping strengthen a results culture 
within the public sector—at least within social policies. The emphasis 
on monitoring and evaluation appears to have transcended international 
borders, and new CCT programs have emulated older, more established 
ones in this important regard—clearly a legacy worth sustaining. 
Equally important are the potential institutional externalities affect-
ing health and education systems. Supporting human capital accumula-
tion among children from poor households cannot be addressed solely 
by a CCT program. Clearly, a supply of health and education services 
of adequate quality must be developed. Thus it is important to consider 
the question of whether these tasks should be tackled sequentially or 
must be solved all at once. Particularly in countries or regions where 
the supply of such services is insuffi cient or of low quality, policy mak-
ers must consider such questions with care. Cash transfers may be the 
right policy instrument to alleviate poverty in the short run, but their 
contribution to longer-term poverty reduction also will depend on what 
happens on the supply side.
That question is closely associated with the debates in development 
economics concerning the tension between balanced and unbalanced 
growth.18 As Albert Hirschman (1958) argued, development is a “chain 
203
C C T S :  P O L I C Y  A N D  D E S I G N  O P T I O N S
of disequilibria” whereby the expansion of one sector creates backward 
or forward pressures and can thus provide the necessary stimulus for 
the expansion of another sector that is yet underdeveloped. Such links 
operate not only through the standard motivation for profi t, but also 
by building political pressure for government action. Seen from that 
perspective, by increasing poor households’ demand for human capital, 
CCT programs have the potential to unleash a broader process of trans-
formation in the development of adequate-quality health and education 
services to which children from poor households have access. Whether 
such a process materializes depends on how permeable the political 
system is to such pressures. Responses on the supply side can take many 
different forms, including through the development of an enabling 
environment for the expansion of service provision by the private sec-
tor. But those responses are likely to be thwarted unless there is some 
political receptivity to the demand-side pressures. As Hirschman (1990) 
argued, “getting stuck” is the risk of a sequential approach, particularly 
when “a one thing at a time” approach operates as an excuse for political 
paralysis on other, equally important fronts. 
We cannot tell at this time whether the current wave of CCT pro-
grams will be successful in unleashing a sustainable transformation in 
both the provision of health and education services and the broader 
design of social protection policies we discussed above. Although it may 
be too early to tell, the experience so far provides room for hope.
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A P P E N D I X  A
Summary Tables
A.1 Targeting Methods Used in CCT Programs
A.2 Targeting Structure in CCT Programs
A.3 Payment Schedules
A.4 CCT Programs at a Glance
Country Programs (by region)
Sub-Saharan Africa
Burkina Faso Orphans and Vulnerable Children
Kenya  Cash Transfer for Orphans and 
Vulnerable Children
Nigeria Care of the Poor
East Asia and Pacifi c
Cambodia  Cambodia Education Sector 
Support Project; Japan Fund for 
Poverty Reduction Girls Scholarship 
Program
Indonesia  Jaring Pengamanan Sosial; Program 
Keluarga Harapan
Philippines   Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino 
Program
Europe and Central Asia
Turkey Social Risk Mitigation Project
Latin America and Caribbean
Argentina Programa Familias
Bolivia Juancito Pinto
Brazil  Bolsa Alimentação; Bolsa Escola; 
Bolsa Família; Programa de 
Eradicacão do Trabalho Infantil
Chile  Chile Solidario; Subsidio Unitario 
Familiar
Colombia  Familias en Acción; Subsidio 
Condicionado a la Asistencia 
Escolar–Bogotá
Dominican Republic  Solidaridad; Tarjeta de Asistencia 
Escolar
Ecuador Bono de Desarrollo Humano
El Salvador Red Solidaria
Guatemala Mi Familia Progresa
Honduras Programa de Asignación Familiar
Jamaica  Program of Advancement through 
Health and Education
Mexico  Oportunidades (formerly 
PROGRESA)
Nicaragua  Atención a Crisis; Red de Protección 
Social
Panama Red de Oportunidades
Paraguay Tekoporã/PROPAIS II
Peru Juntos
Middle East and North Africa
Yemen, Republic of  Basic Education Development 
Project
South Asia
Bangladesh  Female Secondary School Assistance 
Program; Primary Education 
Stipend Program; Reaching 
Out-of-School Children
India Apni Beti Apna Dhan
Pakistan  Child Support Program; 
Participation in Education through 
Innovative Scheme for the Excluded 
Vulnerable; Punjab Education 
Sector Reform Program/Punjab 
Female School Stipend Program
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Table A.1 Targeting Methods Used in CCT Programs
Region/Country/Program
Categorical Household identifi cation
Geographic Other
Proxy 
means 
test
Means 
test
Community 
assessment
Africa
Burkina Faso: Orphans and 
Vulnerable Childrena
x x
Kenya: CT-OVCa x Orphan and vulnerable children 
incidence
x
Nigeria: COPE x x
East Asia and Pacifi c
Cambodia: CESSP x Gender and ethnic minority x
Cambodia: JFPR x Gender x
Indonesia: JPS xb Genderc x
Indonesia: PKH x x
Philippines: 4Ps x x
Europe and Central Asia
Turkey: SRMP x
Latin America and the Caribbean
Argentina: Programa Familias x Benefi ciaries of Jefes y Jefas program, 
with two or more children, head has 
not completed secondary schoold
Bolivia: Juancito Pinto xe
Brazil: Bolsa Alimentação x x
Brazil: Bolsa Escola x x
Brazil: Bolsa Família x x
Brazil: PETI x x
Chile: Chile Solidario x
Chile: SUF Not part of social security system x
Colombia: Familias en Acción x x
Colombia: SCAE-Bogotá x
Dominican Republic: Solidaridad x x
Dominican Republic: TAE/ILAE x x
Ecuador: BDH x
El Salvador: Red Solidaria x xf
Guatemala: Mi Familia Progresa x x
Honduras: PRAF x xg
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Region/Country/Program
Categorical Household identifi cation
Geographic Other
Proxy 
means 
test
Means 
test
Community 
assessment
Jamaica: PATH x
Mexico: Oportunidades x x
Nicaragua: Atención a Crisisa x x
Nicaragua: RPS x x
Panama: Red de Oportunidades x x
Paraguay: Tekoporã/PROPAIS IIh x x
Peru: Juntos x x
Middle East and North Africa
Yemen, Republic of: BEDPa x Gender
South Asia
Bangladesh: FSSAP x Gender
Bangladesh: PESP xi x
Bangladesh: ROSC x x
India (Haryana): Apni Beti Apna Dhan x Gender x
Pakistan: CSPa Benefi ciary of food support program x
Pakistan: Participation in Education 
through Innovative Scheme for the 
Excluded Vulnerable
x x
Pakistan: PESRP/Punjab Female 
School Stipend Program
x Gender
Source: Program profi les.
Note: BDH = Bono de Desarrollo Humano; BEDP = Basic Education Development Project; CESSP = Cambodia Education Sector 
Support Project; COPE = Care of the Poor; CSP = Child Support Program; CT-OVC = Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable 
Children; 4Ps = Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program; FSSAP = Female Secondary School Assistance Program; JFPR = Japan Fund 
for Poverty Reduction Girls Scholarship Program; JPS = Jaring Pengamanan Sosial; PATH = Program of Advancement through Health 
and Education; PESP = Primary Education Stipend Program; PESRP = Punjab Education Sector Reform Program; PETI = Programa 
de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil; PKH = Program Keluarga Harapan; PRAF = Programa de Asignación Familiar; ROSC = Reaching 
Out-of-School Children; RPS = Red de Protección Social; SCAE = Subsidio Condicionado a la Asistencia Escolar; SRMP = Social Risk 
Mitigation Project; SUF = Subsidio Unitario Familiar; TAE/ILAE = Tarjeta de Asistencia Escolar/Incentivo a la Asistencia Escolar. 
a. Program at the pilot stage.
b. Is at both the national level (to identify the poorer districts) and the district level (to identify the poorer subdistricts/schools).
c. At least half of the scholarships at school level were to be allocated to girls. 
d. The Jefes y Jefas program started in the crisis as a workfare program for unemployed heads of household. 
e. Covers all children in public schools up to fourth grade. 
f. Targeting is only in the 68 less-poor municipalities. Targeting in the poorest 32 municipalities is geographic only. 
g. Only households in the area covered by the Inter-American Development Bank project may participate. 
h. PROPAIS II is a project fi nanced by the Inter-American Development Bank, that builds on the Tekoporã program and fi nances 
additional benefi ciaries using similar procedures. 
i. Only certain types of schools in rural areas may participate.
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Table A.2 Targeting Structure in CCT Programs
Region/Country/Program
Basis of benefi t variation
Household 
income
Household structure
Age/grade 
of children Gender
Length of 
time in 
program
Number 
of 
children Cap
Other 
household 
members
Africa
Burkina Faso:  Orphans and 
Vulnerable Childrena
x x
Kenya: CT-OVCa x
Nigeria: COPE x x
East Asia and Pacifi c
Cambodia: CESSP xb No
Cambodia: JFPR No x
Indonesia: JPS x No x
Indonesia: PKH x Yes x x
Philippines: 4Ps x x Max = 3c x x
Europe and Central Asia
Turkey: SRMP x Yesd xe x x
Latin America and the Caribbean
Argentina: Programa Familias x Max = 6
Bolivia: Juancito Pinto xf No
Brazil: Bolsa Alimentação x Max = 3 xg
Brazil: Bolsa Escola x Max = 3
Brazil: Bolsa Família xh x Max = 3 x
Brazil: PETI x Yesi
Chile: Chile Solidario x
Chile: SUFj x
Colombia: Familias en Acción x  xk
Colombia: SCAE-Bogotá x No
Dominican Republic: 
Solidaridad
x Yesl
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Region/Country/Program
Basis of benefi t variation
Household 
income
Household structure
Age/grade 
of children Gender
Length of 
time in 
program
Number 
of 
children Cap
Other 
household 
members
Dominican Republic: TAE/
ILAEm
Ecuador: BDH xn
El Salvador: Red Solidaria xo
Guatemala: Mi Familia Progresa x
Honduras: PRAF x xp xq x
Jamaica: PATH x Max = 20 xr xs x
Mexico: Oportunidades x Yes x x x x
Nicaragua: Atención a Crisisa xt
Nicaragua: RPS xu x
Panama: Red de Oportunidadesv x
Paraguay: Tekoporã/PROPAIS II x Max = 4 x
Peru: Juntosw
Middle East and North Africa
Yemen, Republic of: BEDPa Max = 3 x x
South Asia
Bangladesh: FSSAP x No xx
Bangladesh: PESP x Yesy
Bangladesh: ROSC x x
India (Haryana): Apni Beti Apna 
Dhan
x Max = 3 x
Pakistan: CSPa x Yesz
Pakistan: Participation in 
Education through Innovative 
Scheme for the Excluded 
Vulnerable
x No
Pakistan: PESRP/Punjab Female 
School Stipend Program
x
Source: Program profi les.
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Note: BDH = Bono de Desarrollo Humano; BEDP = Basic Education Development Project; CESSP = Cambodia Education Sector Support 
Project; COPE = Care of the Poor; CSP = Child Support Program; CT-OVC = Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children; 4Ps = 
Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program; FSSAP = Female Secondary School Assistance Program; JFPR = Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction 
Girls Scholarship Program; JPS = Jaring Pengamanan Sosial; max = maximum; PATH = Program of Advancement through Health and 
Education; PESP = Primary Education Stipend Program; PESRP = Punjab Education Sector Reform Program; PETI = Programa de 
Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil; PKH = Program Keluarga Harapan; PRAF = Programa de Asignación Familiar; ROSC = Reaching Out-
of-School Children; RPS = Red de Protección Social; SCAE = Subsidio Condicionado a la Asistencia Escolar; SRMP = Social Risk Mitigation 
Project; SUF = Subsidio Unitario Familiar; TAE/ILAE = Tarjeta de Asistencia Escolar/Incentivo a la Asistencia Escolar. 
a. Program at the pilot stage.
b. Children with the highest poverty ranking in each local management committee will receive the higher amount of the scholarship. 
c. Cap applies only to education grant.
d. The health support part of the transfer is a fl at benefi t independent of the number of eligible children in the household. The education 
support part of the transfer is paid per eligible child. 
e. Health benefi t for pregnant and lactating women, as well as additional payment for delivery in a health clinic. 
f. Benefi t was per child for all children in public schools up to fi fth grade in 2006 and sixth grade in 2007. 
g. Pregnant or lactating women in the household also are eligible. 
h. If the household’s monthly per capita income is below R$60, the household receives a fl at benefi t as well as a variable benefi t that 
depends on the number of eligible children in the household; if income is between R$61 and R$120, the household receives only the vari-
able benefi t. 
i. Varies across states. 
j. If there are two qualifying children, the mother would get two SUF benefi ts. Subsidy to mother also is paid where the mother is 
qualifi ed. 
k. Benefi t varies both with grade/age of children attending school (different amounts for primary and secondary school) and with the 
age of other minors in the household (because of the nutrition subsidy paid for minors aged 0–7 years). There is no limit on the number 
of benefi ciaries. Benefi t also varies by location because it is different in large urban areas where they are pilot-testing different structures 
of subsidies for secondary school and eliminating the subsidy for primary education in some cities. For those locations, the program also 
extends the nutrition subsidy to older children in some cases to avoid “dropping” the family if the only subsidy it would have received is for 
primary school attendance. 
l. There is a fl at benefi t for the “Comer es Primero” component; and an education benefi t that ranges from $9 for one to two children, to 
$14 for three children, to $19 for four or more children. 
m. Transfers were independent of the size of the household. 
n. There is a fl at benefi t, but different amounts if the head of household is disabled or elderly. 
o. There is a fl at benefi t for both education and health ($15); there is a different amount if the household has children whose ages qualify 
them for both benefi ts ($20). 
p. Health incentive has a maximum of two children; education incentive has a maximum of three children. 
q. There is an additional payment for delivery in a public facility. 
r. Starting October 1, 2008, a new benefi t scheme took effect. Benefi ts for secondary grades were increased by 50 percent, relative to the 
base benefi t level; and benefi ts for upper-secondary grades were increased by 75 percent. PATH students who complete high school and 
move to a tertiary institution receive a one-off bonus of J$15,000 to assist with that transition. 
s. Starting October 2008, boys receive a benefi t that is 10 percent higher than the benefi t that girls receive at their respective grade. 
t. In addition to the traditional CCT component, this pilot program also included an occupational training component and a business 
grant component. Those components were allocated randomly across eligible households. In the program’s fi nal design, benefi ciary house-
holds were allocated one of the following three interventions: (1) CCT component, (2) CCT plus occupational training, or (3) CCT plus 
a business grant component. 
u. Only the school material support payment and teacher incentive are paid per child; the rest of the benefi t is paid per household. The 
benefi ts are for children aged 7–13 who have not completed the fourth grade of primary school. The second phase of the RPS varied slightly 
in terms of benefi t amounts and structure. 
v. This is a fl at benefi t. 
w. This is a fl at benefi t. 
x. Both the stipend paid to the benefi ciary and the tuition paid directly to the school by the program are increasing for each grade of the 
fi ve years of secondary school. 
y. Tk 100 per household per month, Tk 125 per household each month if there is more than one student in the household. 
z. Each benefi ciary family is entitled to receive PRs 200 a month for one child and PRs 350 a month if there are two or more children 
in the family.
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Table A.3 Payment Schedules
Region/Country/Program Payee
Frequency of 
payments Payment system
Africa
Burkina Faso: Orphans and 
Vulnerable Childrena
Parent/guardian Quarterly Through the village committee against 
HIV/AIDS
Kenya: CT-OVCa Parent/guardian Bimonthly In 30 of the 37 districts, through the existing 
government structure via district treasuries; in 
the remaining 7 districts, through post offi cesb
Nigeria: COPE Mother and 
designated 
household member
Monthly Through microfi nance agencies and local 
community banks
East Asia and Pacifi c
Cambodia: CESSP Parent/guardian Three 
installmentsc
Cash handed out at ceremonies in the school
Cambodia: JFPR Parent/guardian Three 
installments
Cash handed out at ceremonies in the school
Indonesia: JPS Directly to the 
students (or their 
families)
Monthly Cash paid through local post offi cesd
Indonesia: PKH Mother or woman 
who takes care of the 
children in family
Quarterly Cash paid through local post offi ces
Philippines: 4Ps Mother Monthly Land Bank of the Philippines 
Europe and Central Asia
Turkey: SRMP Mother Bimonthlye Through a banking institution; where the bank 
has no branches, through the postal service 
Latin America and the Caribbean
Argentina: Programa Familias Mother Monthly Through debit cards with the Banco de la 
Nacion Argentina
Bolivia: Juancito Pinto Child (accompanied 
by parent or 
guardian)
Annually Army distributes cash payments at school sites
Brazil: Bolsa Alimentação Mother Monthly Transfers were credited to a magnetic card 
that could be used to withdraw cash at offi ces 
of a federally owned bank; in very isolated 
municipalities, at lottery agents or shops
continued
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Region/Country/Program Payee
Frequency of 
payments Payment system
Brazil: Bolsa Escola Mother Monthly Transfers credited to a magnetic card that 
could be used to withdraw cash at offi ces 
of a federally owned bank; in very isolated 
municipalities, at lottery agents or shops
Brazil: Bolsa Família Mother Monthly Transfers credited to a debit card distributed to 
benefi ciaries
Brazil: PETI Mother Monthly Deposited into a benefi ciary’s bank account
Chile: Chile Solidario Mother Monthly Through National Social Security Institute 
service centers or payment points
Chile: SUF Mother Monthly Through National Social Security Institute 
service centers or payment points
Colombia: Familias en Acción Mother Bimonthly Through the banking system
Colombia: SCAE-Bogotá Student Bimonthlyf Through benefi ciary’s bank account with 
associated debit card
Dominican Republic: 
Solidaridad
Head of household Bimonthlyg Through debit cards that can be used only in 
certain stores for certain products (food and 
education supplies)
Dominican Republic: TAE/
ILAE
Mother Bimonthly By checks distributed through the schools
Ecuador: BDH Women Monthly Collected at any branch offi ce from the largest 
network of private banks (Banred) or from the 
National Agricultural Bank 
El Salvador: Red Solidaria Mother Bimonthly In cash at payment posts; payments are 
outsourced to a commercial bank
Guatemala: Mi Familia Progresa Mother Bimonthly Through a government-owned bank (BanRural)
Honduras: PRAF Mother Every six 
months
Vouchers cashed at branch offi ces of 
BANHCAFE
Jamaica: PATH Family representative 
or his/her agent
Bimonthly Checks disbursed through post offi ces; prepaid 
cash cards
Mexico: Oportunidades Mother Bimonthly Cash at payment points and payments through 
benefi ciary’s savings account with BANSEFI
Nicaragua: Atención a Crisisa Child’s caregiver Bimonthly Cash at payment points
Nicaragua: RPS Child’s caregiver Bimonthly Cash at payment points
Panama: Red de Oportunidades Mother Bimonthly At post offi ces and commercial banks
Paraguay: Tekoporã/PROPAIS II Mother Bimonthly Mobile cashier
Peru: Juntos Mother Monthly Through benefi ciary’s bank account at the 
Banco de la Nacion and associated debit card
Table A.3 continued
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Region/Country/Program Payee
Frequency of 
payments Payment system
Middle East and North Africa
Yemen, Republic of: BEDPa Mother for some 
schools; father in 
others
Quarterly Cash handed out at parent meetings in school
South Asia
Bangladesh: FSSAP Female student Twice yearly Through direct deposit to a bank account in 
the girl’s name
Bangladesh: PESP Benefi ciary’s 
guardian
Quarterly By direct transfer to benefi ciary’s bank account
Bangladesh: ROSC Mother/guardian Twice yearlyh By direct transfer to benefi ciary’s bank account
India (Haryana): Apni Beti 
Apna Dhan
Girls Once Savings bond that matures when benefi ciary 
turns 18 years of age
Pakistan: CSPa Parent/guardian Quarterly At post offi ces
Pakistan: Participation in 
Education through Innovative 
Scheme for the Excluded 
Vulnerable
Student’s household Quarterly Direct transfer via postal money order 
Pakistan: PESRP/Punjab Female 
School Stipend Program
Student’s household Quarterly Through direct transfer via postal money order 
from the education district offi ce
Source: Program profi les.
Note: BANHCAFE = Banco Hondureño del Café; BANSEFI = Banco del Ahorro Nacional y Servicios Financieros; BDH = Bono de 
Desarrollo Humano; BEDP = Basic Education Development Project; CESSP = Cambodia Education Sector Support Project; COPE 
= Care of the Poor; CSP = Child Support Program; CT-OVC = Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children; 4Ps = Pantawid 
Pamilyang Pilipino Program; FSSAP = Female Secondary School Assistance Program; JFPR = Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction Girls 
Scholarship Program; JPS = Jaring Pengamanan Sosial; PATH = Program of Advancement through Health and Education; PESP = 
Primary Education Stipend Program; PESRP = Punjab Education Sector Reform Program; PETI = Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho 
Infantil; PKH = Program Keluarga Harapan; PRAF = Programa de Asignación Familiar; ROSC = Reaching Out-of-School Children; 
RPS = Red de Protección Social; SCAE = Subsidio Condicionado a la Asistencia Escolar; SRMP = Social Risk Mitigation Project; SUF 
= Subsidio Unitario Familiar; TAE/ILAE = Tarjeta de Asistencia Escolar/Incentivo a la Asistencia Escolar.
a. Program at the pilot stage.
b. Other payment modalities will be tested and evaluated in the upcoming second phase of the program.
c. October, January, and April.
d. This later changed to the schools collecting the funds directly “on behalf of the parents.”
e. Bimonthly for the education grant, monthly for the pregnancy grant, one-time grant for birth at a clinic.
f. The pilot program comprises three types of interventions with different payment schedules: (1) bimonthly payments; (2) bimonthly 
payments of a partial benefi t, the rest being accumulated and made available at the beginning of the school year (December); and (3) 
bimonthly payments, an additional payment being made upon graduation and enrollment in higher education.
g. The Comer es Primero component is paid monthly, and the ILAE component is paid bimonthly.
h. March/April and September/October.
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Table A.4 CCT Programs at a Glance
Region/Country Program Evaluation
Africa
Burkina Faso Orphans and Vulnerable Childrena
Kenya CT-OVCa
Nigeria COPE
East Asia and Pacifi c
Cambodia CESSP x
JFPR Girls Scholarship Program x
Indonesia JPS x
PKHa
Philippines 4Ps
Europe and Central Asia
Turkey SRMP x
Latin America and the Caribbean
Argentina Programa Familias
Bolivia Juancito Pinto
Brazil Bolsa Alimentação x
Bolsa Escola x
Bolsa Familia x
PETI x
Chile Chile Solidario x
SUF
Colombia Familias en Acción x
SCAE-Bogotáa x
Dominican Republic Solidaridad
ILAE (formerly TAE)
Ecuador BDH x
El Salvador Red Solidaria
Guatemala Mi Familia Progresa
Honduras PRAF x
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Region/Country Program Evaluation
Jamaica PATH x
Mexico Oportunidades (formerly PROGRESA) x
Nicaragua Atención a Crisis
RPS x
Panama Red de Oportunidades
Paraguay Tekoporã/PROPAIS II
Peru Juntos
Middle East and North Africa
Yemen, Republic of BEDPa
South Asia
Bangladesh FSSAP x
PESP
ROSC x
India (Haryana) Apni Beti Apna Dhan (Our Daughter, Our Wealth)
Pakistan CSPa
Participation in Education through Innovative Scheme for 
the Excluded Vulnerable
PESRP/Punjab Female School Stipend Program x
Source: Program profi les.
Note: BDH = Bono de Desarrollo Humano; BEDP = Basic Education Development Project; CESSP = Cambodia Education Sector 
Support Project; COPE = Care of the Poor; CSP = Child Support Program; CT-OVC = Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable 
Children; 4Ps = Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program; FSSAP = Female Secondary School Assistance Program; JFPR = Japan Fund 
for Poverty Reduction Girls Scholarship Program; JPS = Jaring Pengamanan Sosial; PATH = Program of Advancement through Health 
and Education; PESP = Primary Education Stipend Program; PESRP = Punjab Education Sector Reform Program; PETI = Programa 
de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil; PKH = Program Keluarga Harapan; PRAF = Programa de Asignación Familiar; ROSC = Reaching 
Out-of-School Children; RPS = Red de Protección Social; SCAE = Subsidio Condicionado a la Asistencia Escolar; SRMP = Social Risk 
Mitigation Project; SUF = Subsidio Unitario Familiar; TAE/ILAE = Tarjeta de Asistencia Escolar/Incentivo a la Asistencia Escolar. 
a. Program at the pilot stage.
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Burkina Faso
Program: Orphans and Vulnerable Children
Year started 2008 (October)
Status Active
Targeting
Target population Poor households of OVC with HIV/AIDS in villages of the Nahouri region; the 
program in the Sanmatenga Province has not yet been launched
Targeting method Geographic targeting and proxy means testing
Coverage 3,250 households 
Incidence Not available
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure •  Children aged 0–6: CFAF 1,000/quarter or CFAF 4,000/year
•  Children aged 7–10: CFAF 2,000/quarter or CFAF 8,000/year
•  Children aged 11–15: CFAF 4,000/quarter or CFAF 16,000/year
•  In villages with CCTs, payments are made as described below under 
“conditions.” In villages with UCTs, payments are made without conditions.
Payee Parent/guardian
Payment method Through the village committee against HIV/AIDS
Payment frequency Quarterly
Duration 2 years
Additional benefi ts Health and education 
Conditions
Health Children aged 0–6 regularly attend a health center; this is confi rmed by a health 
care provider
Education At least 90% school attendance in a 3-month cycle 
Other None
Verifi cation of compliance–method Benefi ciaries receive forms/booklets on which their compliance with conditions is 
confi rmed by health and education service providers; benefi ciaries provide these 
forms to the local program offi ce on a regular basis
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Quarterly
Compliance statistics Not yet recorded
Program Administration
Institutional arrangement Le Conseil national de lutte contre le VIH/SIDA et les IST 
Program costs Budget: $1.4 million (program and impact evaluation)
Source: World Development Indicators database 2008.
Note: OVC = orphans and vulnerable children; PPP = purchasing power parity.
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Country Context
General
Population (total) 14.8 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2006 $) $1,120 (2007)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day Not available
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 47.8% total (2006)
42.9% for girls, 52.5% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 12% total (2006)
10% for girls, 14% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
35% (2006)
Births attended by skilled health staff 53.5% (2006)
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Kenya
Program: Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children
Year started 2004
Status Active
Targeting
Target population Poor households fostering OVC aged 0–17 
Targeting method Geographic targeting and community assessment
Coverage 12,500 OVC in 37 districts (the program aims to target 100,000 households at full 
scale, reaching an estimated 300,000 OVC)
Incidence Not available
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure K Sh 1,000 ($13.70) for 1–2 OVC, K Sh 2,000 ($20.50) for 3–4 OVC, and 
K Sh 3,000 ($27.40) for 5 or more OVC aged 0–17 
Payee Parent/guardian
Payment method Through district treasuries and post offi cesa
Payment frequency Bimonthly
Duration As long as eligible, or maximum of 5 years in the program
Additional benefi ts Referral to other programs for anti-retroviral treatment for benefi ciaries who 
voluntarily declared themselves to be HIV/AIDS positiveb
Conditions
Health •  Health facility visits for immunizations for children aged 0–1 six times per year
•  Health facility visits for growth monitoring and vitamin A supplement for 
children aged 1–5 twice a year
Education •  School attendance of at least 80% at basic school institutions for children aged 
6–17 
•  Attendance at awareness sessions for adult members once a year
Other None
Verifi cation of compliance–method •  District children’s offi ce provides forms to the health and education service 
providers responsible for recording attendance of benefi ciary children
•  Volunteer children’s offi cers collect forms and deliver them to the district 
children’s offi ce where the information is entered into the management 
information system
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency •  Every 2 months for children aged 0–1 
•  Every 6 months for children aged 1–5 
•  Every 2 months for children aged 6–17 
•  Every 12 months for adult awareness sessions
Compliance statistics Not available
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Program Administration
Institutional arrangement Department of Children’s Services in the Ministry of Home Affairs
Program costs •  Total cost: $2.2 million, reaching 3,000 households (FY2006). Full-scale 
program is estimated to cost $31.6 million, reaching 100,000 households 
(FY2011). 
•  Administrative costsc (as percent of transfers): 183.5% (FY2006). At full scale, 
the administrative costs are estimated to decrease to 13.9%.
Sources: Government of Kenya 2006b, 2007; Pearson and Alviar 2006; country context: World Development Indicators database 2008.
Note: OVC = orphans and vulnerable children; PPP = purchasing power parity.
a. Other payment modalities are under discussion as program is being scaled up.
b. The link with these programs is still under discussion.
c. The administrative costs do not include costs of design, targeting, enrollment, and capacity building.
Country Context
General
Population (total) 36.5 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $1,421 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 58.3% (1997)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 75.8% total (2005)
76.1% for girls, 75.5% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 41.5% total (2005)
41.8% for girls, 41.3% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
35.8% (2003)
Births attended by skilled health staff 41.6% (2003)
220
Nigeria
Program: Care of the Poor
Year started 2008
Status Active
Targeting
Target population •  Female-headed households
•  Aged parent–headed households
•  Physically challenged people–headed households (for example, leprosy patients)
•  Transient-poor–headed households (for example, seasonal farmers)
•  VVF (Vesico vaginal fi stula) patients, HIV-affected households
Targeting method Community targeting with proxy means testing
Coverage 3,000 households each in 12 pilot states by end of 2009
Incidence
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure Cash transfer (the Basic Income Guarantee) based on number of children per 
household: 1 child, =N1,500; 2–3 children, =N3,000; 4 or more children, 
=N5,000. A compulsory saving of =N7,000 monthly in favor of the participants 
to be disbursed as a lump sum after a year for the establishment of viable 
microenterprises after undergoing training.
Payee Mother and designated household member
Payment method Through microfi nance agencies and local community banks
Payment frequency Monthly
Duration As long as eligible
Additional benefi ts None
Conditions
Health Pregnant women within benefi ting households must attend and show evidence of 
antenatal care.
Education Benefi ciaries must ensure school enrolment of school-age children up to basic 
education level (that is, primary to junior secondary education). At least 80% 
monthly school attendance is necessary to access transfer.
Other Trainable member of the benefi ting household must attend training in life and 
vocational skills, basic health, and sanitation as available to the community.
Verifi cation of compliance–method Benefi ciaries receive forms on which their compliance with conditions is confi rmed 
by health and education service providers; they provide these forms to the local 
program offi ce on a regular basis.
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Monthly
Compliance statistics Not available
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Program Administration
Institutional arrangement National Poverty Eradication Program offi ce at federal and state levels; state 
agencies for CCT, local government offi ce
Program costs Not available
Sources: Bank staff and World Development Indicators database 2008.
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity.
Country Context
General
Population (total) 148 million (2007)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $1,731
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 54.4% (2004)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 63% total (2006)
58% for girls, 68% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level Not available
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
27% (2003)
Births attended by skilled health staff 36% (2003)
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Cambodia
Program: Cambodia Education Sector Support Project
Year started 2005
Status Ongoing
Targeting
Target population Children who have completed grade 6
Targeting method Geographic targeting of schools, then “scoring” of application forms in each school 
by the LMCs 
Coverage 100 secondary schools located in the poorest communes across the country, with 
each small school (less than 200 students) receiving 30 new scholarships a year, 
and each large school (more than 200 students) receiving 50 new scholarships a 
year; about 3,850 new scholarship recipients in each year, in approximately 14% of 
lower-secondary schools
Incidence 32% to the poorest quintile
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure “Poorest” (according to the proxy means score) half of the scholarship students 
within each school receive a scholarship of $60; the less-poor half receive $45.
Payee Parent/guardian (usually mother)
Payment method Cash handed out at ceremonies in the school
Payment frequency 3 installments
Duration 3 years of lower-secondary school
Conditions
Health None
Education •  Enrollment in school
•  Regular school attendance (no more than 10 days of absence in a year without 
“good reason”)
•  Maintaining a passing grade
Other Agreement to use scholarship funds toward education (not verifi ed)
Verifi cation of compliance–method School monitors enrollment, attendance, and grade progression; provides 
information to the LMCs as needed
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency • Attendance: ongoing
• Progression: at end of school year
Compliance statistics Not available
Program Administration
Institutional arrangement Directorate General of Education at the central level; LMCs located at school level, 
supported by the provincial and district education offi ces
Program costs Overall budget: $5 million over 5 years 
Sources: Royal Government of Cambodia 2005; country context: World Development Indicators database 2008.
Note: LMC = local management committee; PPP = purchasing power parity.
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Country Context
General
Population (total) 14.19 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $1,569 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 77.7% (1997)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 89.9% total (2006)
89.0% for girls, 90.9% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 23.9% total (2005)
21.9% for girls, 26.0% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
43.7% (2006)
Births attended by skilled health staff 43.8% (2005)
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Cambodia
Program: Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction Girls Scholarship Program
Year started 2002
Status Closed (but continued in modifi ed form under CESSP)
Targeting
Target population Girls starting grade 7
Targeting method Geographic targeting of schools, then “scoring” of application forms in each school 
by the LMCs, with additional subjective assessment by LMCs
Coverage 93 secondary schools located in the poorest communes across the country, with 
each school receiving 45 scholarships for poor girls to go into grade 7 (that is about 
4,185 girls and 15% of lower-secondary schools)
Incidence
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure Flat benefi t of $45/girl
Payee Parent/guardian (usually mother)
Payment method Cash handed out at ceremonies in the school
Payment frequency 3 installments
Duration 3 years of lower-secondary school
Conditions
Health None
Education •  Enrollment in school
•  Regular school attendance (no more than 10 days of absence in a year without 
“good reason”)
•  Maintaining a passing grade
Other Agreement to use scholarship funds toward education (not verifi ed)
Verifi cation of compliance–method School monitors enrollment, attendance, and grade progression; provides 
information to the LMCs as needed
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency •  Attendance: ongoing
•  Progression: at end of school year
Compliance statistics Not available
Program Administration
Institutional arrangement Directorate General of Education at the central level; LMCs located at school level, 
supported by the provincial and district education offi ces
Program costs Overall budget: $3 million over 3 years
Sources: Collins 2006; Filmer and Schady 2006; country context: World Development Indicators database 2008. 
Note: CESSP = Cambodia Education Sector Support Project; LMC = local management committee; PPP = purchasing power parity.
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Country Context
General
Population (total) 14.19 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $1,569 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 77.7% (1997)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 89.9% total (2006)
89.0% for girls, 90.9% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 23.9% total (2005)
21.9% for girls, 26.0% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
43.7% (2006)
Births attended by skilled health staff 43.8% (2005)
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Indonesia
Program: Jaring Pengamanan Sosial
Year started 1998
Status Closed
Targeting
Target population 6% of enrolled students at primary schools, 17% at junior secondary schools, and 
10% at senior secondary schools
Targeting method Geographic targeting to poorest districts, then community assessment by district 
committees to identify schools and by school committees to identify studentsa
Coverage •  Between 1.2 and 1.6 million scholarships (1998/99 academic year)
•  9.5% (2001), 5.9% (2002), and 7.6% (2003) of households with children 
attending primary to senior high schools (with higher coverage in poorer 
regions)
•  14.9% (2001), 9.4% (2002), and 12.1% (2003) of poorest quintile
Incidence 39.3% to poorest quintile (2004)
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure •  Rp 10,000 a month for students in primary school
•  Rp 20,000 a month for students in junior secondary school
•  Rp 25,000 a month for students in senior secondary school
Payee Directly to the students (or their families)
Payment method Cash paid through local post offi cesb
Payment frequency Monthly
Duration As long as eligible
Additional benefi ts Block grant to schools
Conditions
Health None
Education Remain enrolled in school
Other None
Verifi cation of compliance–method Not available
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Not available
Compliance statistics Not available
Program Administration
Institutional arrangement
Program costs $114 million for the fi rst year (1998/99 academic year), $350 million over 3 yearsc
Sources: Cameron 2002; Pritchett, Sumarto, and Suryahadia 2003; World Bank 2006c; Sparrow 2007; country context: World Development 
Indicators database 2008. 
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity.
a. A minimum of 50 percent of scholarships were to be allocated to girls, if at all possible.
b. This later changed to the schools collecting the funds directly “on behalf of the parents.”
c. Rp 2.7 trillion in 2003; the program was expanded in 2005 to Rp 6.3 trillion, approximately Rp 5.1 trillion of which is allocated to block 
grants to schools, and only about Rp 272 billion goes to scholarships for students in senior secondary schools.
227
Country Context
General
Population (total) 223 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $3,347 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 52.4% (2002)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 94.5% total (2005)
92.8% for girls, 96.2% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 57.4% total (2005)
57.1% for girls, 57.7% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
28.6% (2004)
Births attended by skilled health staff 71.5% (2004)
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Indonesia
Program: Program Keluarga Harapan
Year started 2007
Status Ongoing
Targeting
Target population Poorest households
Targeting method Proxy means testing
Coverage •  In 2007: 348 subdistricts in 49 districts, 7 provinces; includes 387,928 poorest 
households (target in 2007 is 500,000 poorest households)
•  In 2008: fi gure in 2007 above plus new locations (292 subdistrict, 22 districts, 
6 provinces); includes new members numbering approximately 245,371 poorest 
households
Incidence No data yet
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure Minimum Rp 600,000; maximum Rp 2,200,000
Payee Directly to mother or woman who takes care of the children in the family
Payment method Cash paid through local post offi ces
Payment frequency Quarterly
Duration As long as eligible during 6 years. Recertifi cation will be made twice (for example, 
after 3 and 6 years of implementations). Members will be excluded if the fi rst 
recertifi cation (after 3 years) confi rms they are not eligible in terms of poverty. 
Members will be excluded regardless of the second recertifi cation results (after 
6 years). Exit strategies will be developed for those who are still in poverty. 
Additional benefi ts Members automatically are eligible for both AskesKin (health insurance for the 
poor) and Bantuan Opersional Sekolah (school fee waiver and transportation 
assistance) programs.
Conditions
Health •  Children aged 0–6 visit health clinics to use health services as outlined in the 
Department of Health protocols. 
•  Pregnant (and lactating) women attend health clinics to receive antenatal (and 
postnatal) examinations, according to the Department of Health protocols
Education •  Children aged 7–15 enroll and attend a minimum of 85% of school days
•  Children aged 15–18 who have not completed 9 years of basic education enroll 
in an education program to complete the equivalent of 9 years of basic education
Other None
Verifi cation of compliance–method Still sporadic; management information system is under construction
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Every 3 months
Compliance statistics No data yet
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Program Administration
Institutional arrangement The National Development Planning Board (design), the Central Statistics Agency 
(targeting), Ministry of Social Welfare (implementation), PT Post Indonesia 
(payment), Coordinating Ministry of Social Welfare (control and coordination)
Program costs Rp 1 trillion 
Sources: Government of Indonesia 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d; country context: World Development Indicators database 2008.
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity.
Country Context
General
Population (total) 223 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $3,347 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 52.4% (2002)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 94.5% total (2005)
92.8% for girls, 96.2% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 57.4% total (2005)
57.1% for girls, 57.7% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
28.6% (2004)
Births attended by skilled health staff 71.5% (2004)
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Philippines 
Program: Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program
Year started 2008
Status Active 
Targeting
Target population •  For health grant: Poor households with children less than 5 years old and/or 
pregnant women 
•  For education grant: Poor households with children aged 6–14 
•  Total benefi ciaries: approximately 380,000 households
Targeting method National household targeting system based on proxy means testing
Coverage Poor households in 140 of the poorest municipalities and 10 cities
Incidence Not measured yet
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure •  Health transfer currently set at =P500 ($11)a per household per month (for a 
period of 12 months per year), regardless of the number of children
•  Education transfer is =P300 (US$7)a per month (for a period of 10 months per 
year), up to a maximum of 3 children
Payee Mother
Payment method Land Bank of the Philippines (cash cards and payroll)
Payment frequency Monthly
Duration 2008 (prepilot); currently targeted total benefi ciaries to be covered for 5 years 
(2009–13)
Additional benefi ts Nutrition, breastfeeding seminars, family planning sessions for mothers and 
parents
Conditions
Health Children and pregnant women attend health centers and posts to get regular 
preventive health checkups and immunizations, according to the Department of 
Health’s protocol
Education Children enroll in schools and attend more than 85% of school classes
Other None
Verifi cation of compliance–method Schools and health centers report monthly nonattendance of benefi ciaries to the 
municipal link; information is processed at municipal or regional level to update 
central database and make payments accordingly
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Quarterly
Compliance statistics Not available
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Program Administration
Institutional arrangement Department of Social Welfare and Development acting as executing agency, in 
partnership with Departments of Health and Education
Program costs $471 million over 5-year period (2009–13)
Sources: Bank staff; for population: National Statistics Offi ce; for GDP per capita: World Development Indicators 2008; for headcount ratio: 
World Bank; for country context/education: Philippines Department of Education; for country context/health: World Development Indicators 
2008, National Statistical Coordination Board.
a. $1 = =P 45.
Country Context
General
Population (total) 88.6 million (August 2007)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) 2,956
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 56.1%
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 83.2% (2007)
Net enrollment in secondary level 58.6% (2007)
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
34% (2003) 
Births attended by skilled health staff 70.4% (2006)
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Turkey
Program: Social Risk Mitigation Project
Year started 2001
Status Active
Targeting
Target population Poor families with children aged 0–6 or in primary or secondary school, and 
pregnant mothers (poorest 6% of the population)
Targeting method Proxy means testing
Coverage 855,906 households; that is, about 2.5 million benefi ciaries or 2.8% of population 
(end 2006)
Incidence Not available
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure •  Education grant per month: primary—$13 per boy, $16 per girl; 
secondary—$23 per boy, $30 per girl 
•  Health grant: $12.50 a month per child aged 0–6, over 12 months
•  Pregnancy grant: $13 per month during pregnancy and a 2-month lactating period
•  Delivery at a health clinic: one-time payment of $41 
Payee Mother
Payment method Through a banking institution and the postal service (for areas in which the bank 
does not have any branches)
Payment frequency Bimonthly (education grant), monthly (pregnancy grant), and one time 
(institutional delivery grant)
Duration As long as eligible
Additional benefi ts •  In addition to health grant, mothers are informed/trained about child care, 
nutrition, and other relevant medical information at the health clinics when they 
bring their children for regular medical examination
•  Services for adults: the local initiative component of the SRMP, and other 
project supports of the Directorate General, allow for support to needy citizens 
(or parents of CCT benefi ciaries) for employability training, temporary 
employment, or income-generating projects
Conditions
Health Health grant and pregnancy grant: visit the clinic regularly, according to the table 
given by the Ministry of Healtha
Education •  School attendance of at least 80% of the total education days each month
•  Not to repeat the same grade more than once
Other Noneb
Verifi cation of compliance–method Local social assistance offi ces send follow-up forms to the schools and health clinics 
that CCT benefi ciaries attend; offi ces receive completed forms in return. Local 
offi ces enter the data in Web-based software; payment amounts for each benefi ciary 
are calculated automatically on the basis of that data.
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Monthly
Compliance statistics Not available
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Program Administration
Institutional arrangement Project Coordination Unit of the Directorate General of Social Assistance and 
Solidarity of the Turkish Prime Ministry, local offi ces of the Directorate General
Program costs Budget: $360 million (0.14% of GNP; May 2006)
Sources: Ahmed, Gilligan et al. 2006; Kudat 2006; Adato et al. 2007; country context: World Development Indicators database 2008. 
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity; SRMP = Social Risk Mitigation Program.
a. In the health grant, health follow-up periods are (1) children aged 0–6 months require regular checkups every month, (2) children aged 
7–18 months require regular checkups every 2 months, and (3) children aged 19–72 months require regular checkups every 6 months. For the 
pregnancy grant, follow-up periods are (1) regular checkups are required every month until the birth, (2) birth will be given in a hospital, and 
(3) postpartum checkups are required following the birth.
b. Implicitly, it is to obtain documentation, because benefi ciaries must present birth and marriage certifi cates to be able to apply for the 
benefi t.
Country Context
General
Population (total) 70.5 million (2007)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $8,157 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 18.7% (2003)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 97.4% total (2005)
96.1% for girls, 98.5% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 58.6% total (2005)
58.8% for girls, 61.2% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
16% (2004)
Births attended by skilled health staff 83% (2003)
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Argentina
Program: Programa Familias
Year started 2002
Status Active
Targeting
Target population Families with a current benefi ciary of the Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupadosa 
program, who have at least 2 children to take care of and who have not completed 
secondary schoolb
Targeting method Categorical; criteria are heads of household (self-declared), pregnant (or with 
pregnant spouse), children below 18 or disabled, not included in any federal 
records
Coverage 504,784 families (August 2007)
Incidence Not available
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure Arg$155–305 a month per child aged 5–19, depending on the number of children 
(minimum 2, maximum 6)
Payee Mother
Payment method Through debit cards with the Banco de la Nacion Argentina
Payment frequency Monthly
Duration As long as eligible
Additional benefi ts •  Monthly benefi t of Arg$50 for youth and adults in the family who want to 
complete their education or vocational training
•  Activities to encourage and support completion of education, literacy campaigns, 
training, community development
Conditions
Health •  Compliance with the National Immunization Plan for children under 19 years
•  Bimonthly checkups for pregnant women
Education •  School enrollment 
•  Regular school attendance by each child aged 5–19, or completion of the 
secondary level or “polimodal”
Other None
Verifi cation of compliance–method Benefi ciaries must provide proof of compliance with conditions at the local 
program offi ce 
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Twice a year
Compliance statistics Not available
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Program Administration
Institutional arrangement Ministry of Social Development, local program offi ces
Program costs Budget: $853.3 million in phase I (IADB loan amount)
Sources: Program Web site: http://www.desarrollosocial.gov.ar/planes/pf/default.asp; country context: World Development Indicators database 
2008.
Note: IADB = Inter-American Development Bank; PPP = purchasing power parity.
a. Transfer program for unemployed heads of household.
b. Benefi ciaries of the Jefes program migrate to the Programa Familias on a voluntary basis. It is not in addition to the Jefes benefi t. Up to 10 
percent of benefi ciaries may come in through proxy means testing rather than through Jefes. 
Country Context
General
Population (total) 39.1 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $11,615 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 17.4% (2004)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 98.8% total (2003)
98.4% for girls, 99.2% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 78.9% total (2004)
82.5% for girls, 75.5% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
8.2% (2005)
Births attended by skilled health staff 99.1% (2005)
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Bolivia
Program: Juancito Pinto
Year started 2006
Status Ongoing
Targeting
Target population Public school children up to grade 6
Targeting method Categorical (universal coverage offered to children)
Coverage 1.2 million children
Incidence Not available
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure Bs 200 ($25) per child per year
Payee Child accompanied by parent or guardian
Payment method Army distributes cash payments at school ceremony
Payment frequency Annually
Duration As long as eligible
Additional benefi ts None
Conditions
Health Not available
Education Attend class at least 75% of the school year
Other Not available
Verifi cation of compliance–method Schools required to present their enrollment records to the district government 
offi ce
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Annually
Compliance statistics Not available
Program Administration
Institutional arrangement Ministry of Education
Program costs $30 million per year
Sources: World Bank 2007; country context: World Development Indicators database 2008. 
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity.
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Country Context
General
Population (total) 9.4 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $3,815 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 42.2% (2002)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 94.9% total (2006)
95.3% for girls, 94.5% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 70.9% total (2004)
70.0% for girls, 71.7% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
32.5% (2004)
Births attended by skilled health staff 66.8% (2003)
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Brazil
Program: Bolsa Alimentação
Year started 2001
Status Stopped (integrated into Bolsa Família starting end of 2003)
Targeting
Target population Poor families with pregnant and lactating women and young children aged 0–6, 
and with a monthly PCI below R$90.21
Targeting method Geographic targeting and means testing
Coverage 1.5 million benefi ciaries in 2003 (24,175 families in December 2005)
Incidence Not available
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure R$15 per child per month, for a maximum of 3 children
Payee Mother
Payment method Transfers were credited to a magnetic card that could be used to withdraw cash at 
offi ces of a federally owned bank, or in very isolated municipalities with lottery 
agents
Payment frequency Monthly
Duration 6 months initially, and after verifi cation of compliance, additional 6-month periods
Additional benefi ts None
Conditions
Health •  Complying with a minimum schedule of visits for prenatal and postnatal care 
•  Monitoring the growth of children
•  Keeping their vaccinations up-to-date
•  Participating in nutritional education seminars
Education None
Other None
Verifi cation of compliance–method The health ministry of each municipality verifi ed the attendance of each 
benefi ciary at clinics, and informed the federal authorities by sending a list of 
complying benefi ciaries every 6 months.
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Varied across municipalities; reporting to federal authorities every 6 months
Compliance statistics Not available
Program Administration
Institutional arrangement Ministry of Health
Program costs •  Budget: R$8.3 million (2005) 
•  Administrative cost: 3.42% of program costa (2003)
Sources: Government of Brazil 2004; Morris, Olinto et al. 2004; country context: World Development Indicators database 2008. 
Note: PCI = per capita income; PPP = purchasing power parity.
a. This is the ratio of administrative costs to transfers.
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Country Context
General
Population (total) 189.3 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $8,673 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 21.2% (2004)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 94.7% total (2004)
95.2% for girls, 94.2% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 77.7% total (2004)
81.3% for girls, 74.2% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
10.5% (1996)
Births attended by skilled health staff 96.6% (2003)
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Brazil
Program: Bolsa Escolaa
Year started 2001
Status Stopped (integrated into Bolsa Família starting end of 2003)
Targeting
Target population Families with children ages 6–15 and monthly PCI no greater than R$90 ($43)
Targeting method Geographic targeting and means testing
Coverage 8.2 million children in 4.8 million families (end 2001), 1.9 million families in 
December 2005
Incidence 40% to poorest quintile (2003)
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure R$15 ($7) per month per child for a maximum of 3 childrenb
Payee Mother
Payment method Transfers credited to a magnetic card; benefi ts could be withdrawn at Caixa 
Econômica Federal branch offi ces or in very isolated municipalities with lottery 
agents
Payment frequency Monthly
Duration As long as eligible
Additional benefi ts None
Conditions
Health None
Education School attendance at least 85% of school days
Other None
Verifi cation of compliance–method School directors sent attendance data to municipal secretary of education, who 
entered them in Ministry of Education system (Internet or CD-ROM)
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Bimonthly
Compliance statistics 19% of schools reporting attendance information
Program Administration
Institutional arrangement Ministry of Education
Program costs •  Budget: R$626 million (less than 0.2% of GDP; 2005)
•  Administrative cost: 5.3% of program costs (2002)
Sources: World Bank 2001a; de Janvry et al. 2005; country context: World Development Indicators database 2008. 
Note: PCI = per capita income; PPP = purchasing power parity.
a. This refers to the federal Bolsa Escola program. Before its creation, a number of similar programs operated in many municipalities.
b. School attendance is only monitored for these three children, but not for the rest of the school-age children in the family.
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Country Context
General
Population (total) 189.3 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $8,673 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 21.2% (2004)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 94.7% total (2004)
95.2% for girls, 94.2% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 77.7% total (2004)
81.3% for girls, 74.2% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
10.5% (1996)
Births attended by skilled health staff 96.6% (2003)
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Brazil
Program: Bolsa Famíliaa
Year started 2003
Status Active
Targeting
Target population Poor and extremely poor families:
•  Poor families: monthly PCI from R$60.01 to R$120.00b
•  Extremely poor families: monthly PCI up to R$60.00
Targeting method Geographic targeting and means testing (self-declared)
Coverage 11.1 million families (June 2006)
Incidence 73.7% to poorest quintile, 94% to poorest 40% (2006)
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure •  Basic benefi t (R$62) for extremely poor families
•  Variable benefi t (R$15) per child (maximum 3c less than 15 years of age) for 
both extremely poor and poor families
•  Variable benefi t (R$30) per youth (maximum 2d aged 15–17) for both extremely 
and poor families
Payee Mother
Payment method Through a debit card distributed to the benefi ciaries
Payment frequency Monthly
Duration As long as eligible, with recertifi cation every 2 years
Additional benefi ts The adult literacy and education program (Brazil Alfabetizado) targets Bolsa Família 
benefi ciaries who have less than 4 years of schooling. The government of Brazil is 
developing a national training program targeted to adult members of Bolsa Família 
households (one member per family) to improve their skills and provide employment 
opportunities through the Programa de Aceleracao do Crescimento strategy (a federal 
civil works program). Some municipalities either are topping up the benefi t or are 
targeting the benefi ciaries with other services, such as social worker accompaniment, 
professional training and other active labor market programs, and microcredit.
Conditions
Health •  Children aged 0–6: vaccine schedules, regular health checkups, and growth 
monitoring 
•  Pregnant and lactating women: prenatal and postnatal checkups, and 
participation in educational health and nutrition seminars offered by local health 
teamse
Education •  School enrollment of all children aged 6–15 and youth aged 15–17 
•  Daily school attendance of at least 85% each month for all school-age children
•  Participation in parent-teacher meetings
Other None
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Verifi cation of compliance–method •  Education: municipalities consolidate attendance information; Caixa Econômica 
Federal consolidates and passes to the Ministry of Education and the Bolsa 
Família program in the Ministry of Social Development
•  Health: health service providers at the municipal level enter information into a 
national health information system; municipality consolidates information for 
the Bolsa Família benefi ciaries and passes it on to the Ministry of Health twice a 
year; Ministry of Health provides consolidated information to the program
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency •  Education: bimonthly
•  Health: twice a year
Compliance statistics •  Education: 4.6% of students did not comply with the attendance requirement in 
May/July 2006 (information available for 71% of Bolsa Família students)
•  Health: 99.5% of families were in compliance in the fi rst semester of 2006 
(information available for 38.3% of families)
Program Administration
Institutional arrangement Ministry of Social Development, in cooperation with the ministries of health and 
education, the Caixa Econômica Federal, the municipalities, state governments, 
and control agencies
Program costs •  Budget: R$10.4 billion ($5 billion) in 2005 (0.36% of GDP)
•  Administrative cost: 4% of program budget
Sources: Lindert et al. 2007; program Web site: http://www.mds.gov.br/bolsafamilia/; country context: World Development Indicators database 
2008.
Note: PCI = per capita income; PPP = purchasing power parity.
a. The Bolsa Família program resulted from a merger of the following prereform cash transfer programs: Bolsa Escola, Bolsa Alimentação, 
Auxílio Gás, and Cartao Alimentação. In 2006, the cash transfers paid under the Child Labor Eradication Program (PETI) also were merged 
into the Bolsa Família program. 
b. Originally, these income ceilings were set at R$50 for the extremely poor, and R$100 for the poor. They were increased in 2006 to account 
for increases in the cost of living.
c. Education and health conditionalities apply to all the children in the family, not only the three for which the variable benefi t is paid.
d. Conditionalities apply only to the individual youth for whom the benefi t is paid.
e. Participation in these seminars is not monitored by the federal government.
See page 245 for Country Context table.
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Brazil
Program: Programa de Eradicacão do Trabalho Infantil
Year started 1996
Status Stopped (integrated into Bolsa Família in 2006a)
Targeting
Target population Poor households with PCI below one-half the minimum wage (roughly equal to 
$65/month) and children aged 7–14 involved in the worst forms of child laborb
Targeting method Geographic targeting and means testing
Coverage 400,000 students (2000), 1,010,057 children (2005), 3.3 million benefi ciaries 
(2002)
Incidence 66% to poorest quintile (2003)
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure •  Urban areas (capitals, metropolitan regions, and municipalities with more than 
250,000 habitants): monthly transfer of R$40 per child (to family) 
•  Rural areas: R$25 per month (to family) for each child registered 
•  For after-school activities: R$10 (urban areas) and R$20 (rural areas) to schools 
for each child or adolescent enrolled 
•  For 15-year-olds at extreme risk: transfer of R$65 per month and of R$220 per 
year for school activities 
Payee Mother
Payment method Through bank accounts
Payment frequency Monthly
Duration As long as eligible
Additional benefi ts None
Conditions
Health None
Education •  School attendance of at least 80% 
•  Attendance at after-school sessions (jornada ampliada) that roughly doubled the 
length of the school day
Other Households need to sign a contract stipulating that their child would not work
Verifi cation of compliance–method Not available
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Not available
Compliance statistics Not available
Program Administration
Institutional arrangement Ministry of Social Development and municipalities
Program costs R$535 million in 2005
Sources: World Bank 2001b; country context: World Development Indicators database 2008. 
Note: PCI = per capita income; PPP = purchasing power parity.
a. Only the cash transfer part was incorporated into Bolsa Família, not the jornada ampliada.
b. Not all such children in the family had to be enrolled.
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Country Context
General
Population (total) 189.3 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $8,673 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 21.2% (2004)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 94.7% total (2004)
95.2% for girls, 94.2% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 77.7% total (2004)
81.3% for girls, 74.2% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
10.5% (1996)
Births attended by skilled health staff 96.6% (2003)
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Chile
Program: Chile Solidario
Year started 2002
Status Active
Targeting
Target population 268,000 households (the estimated number of indigent households in the country)
Targeting method Proxy means testing
Coverage 256,000 
Incidence 56% to poorest quintile (2003) 
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure •  Decreasing monthly benefi ts for the fi rst 24 months: $21 per month for the fi rst 6 
months, $16 per month for the second 6 months of the program, $11 per month  for 
the third 6 months, and fi nally $8 for the last 6 months, an amount equivalent to the 
family allowance (SUF) adjusted yearly for infl ation; these amounts are for 2006a
•  After 24 months, “exit grant” equivalent to a monthly SUF for 3 years 
Payee Mother
Payment method Through National Social Security Institute service centers or payment points
Payment frequency Monthly
Duration 5 yearsb
Additional benefi ts •  Psychosocial support in the form of intensive social worker accompaniment for 
the fi rst 2 years
•  Preferential access to other social programs for which the household is eligible 
Conditions
Health Signature and compliance with a contract committing to participate in the 
activities identifi ed, together with personalized assistance in 7 areas (health, 
education, employment, housing, income, family life, and legal documentation) 
Education
Other
Verifi cation of compliance–method Regular meetings with the social worker to monitor progress toward unmet goals
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency •  In the fi rst 6 months: once a week for 2 months, twice a month for 2 months, 
and once a month for 2 monthsc
•  In the next 6 months: every 2 months
•  In the fi nal 12 months: every 3 months
Compliance statistics 15,972 (6%) families “interrupted” (2006)d
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Program Administration
Institutional arrangement Ministry of Planning and Cooperation, and Fondo de Solidaridad e Inversión 
Social, in cooperation with the municipalities
Program costs •  Budget: 0.3% of social protection spending (0.08% of GDP; 2005)
•  Administrative cost: 20% of program costs, half of that being the cost of the 
social worker accompanimente
Sources: Galasso 2006; program Web site: http://www.chilesolidario.gov.cl/; country context: World Development Indicators database 2008.
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity; SUF = Subsidio Unitario Familiar.
a. This amount is equivalent to the amount paid by the SUF, the basic social assistance program.
b. Psychosocial support covers the fi rst two years only. The cash transfer is graduated over fi ve years, as described under benefi t structure.
c. This can be extended or reduced, depending on the family’s progress on their contract.
d. This means it was decided that they did not satisfy the overall requirements to continue their participation and were dropped by the 
program.
e. “The direct cost per family to access the Chile Solidario System (via the Puente Program) is estimated to be around $330, of which $275 
(about 80%) correspond to the transfer itself. The social worker accounts for about 10% of the direct cost.”
Country Context
General
Population (total) 16.4 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $12,627 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 5.6% (2003)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level Not available
Net enrollment in secondary level Not available
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
1.4% (2004)
Births attended by skilled health staff 99.8% (2003)
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Chile
Program: Subsidio Unitario Familiar
Year started 1981
Status Active
Targeting
Target population Poor households (in the bottom 40% of the income distribution) with pregnant 
women, school-age children, or disabled members
Targeting method Proxy means testing
Coverage 1.2 million individualsa
Incidence 60% to poorest quintile (2003)
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure Ch$5,393 ($10) per month (2007)b
Payee Mother
Payment method Through National Social Security Institute service centers or payment points
Payment frequency Monthly
Duration As long as eligible
Additional benefi ts None
Conditions
Health Regular medical controls for children less than 6 years
Education Regular school attendance for children aged 6–18
Other None
Verifi cation of compliance–method Not available
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Once a year
Compliance statistics Not available
Program Administration
Institutional arrangement Ministry of Planning and Cooperation
Program costs Budget: $70 million in 1998
Sources: Program Web site: http://www.mideplan.cl/fi nal/categoria.php?secid=49&catid=126; country context: World Development Indicators 
database 2008.
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity; SUF = Subsidio Unitario Familiar.
a. This is the estimate for 2007 and represents an expansion of the program.
b. In the case of disabled members of the household, it is double this amount—that is Ch$10,786 ($20). In the case of an expectant mother, 
the so-called maternity benefi t in the amount of Ch$53,930 ($100.20) for the whole pregnancy applies. After the child’s birth, the family will 
receive the SUF.
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Country Context
General
Population (total) 16.4 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $12,627 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 5.6% (2003)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level Not available
Net enrollment in secondary level Not available
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
1.4% (2004)
Births attended by skilled health staff 99.8% (2003)
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Colombia
Program: Familias en Acción
Year started 2001
Status Active
Targeting
Target population Extremely poor familiesa with minors aged 0–6 not participating in other programs 
(health subsidy), and/or minors aged 7–17 enrolled in school (education subsidy)
Targeting method Geographic targeting and proxy means testing
Coverage 1.7 million households by end of 2007
Incidence Not available
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure •  Education subsidy: in elementary school, Col$15,000 per month (approximately 
$8) for each minor attending grades 2–5;b in high school, Col$25,000–60,000 
per month (approximately $14–33) per minor attending grades 6–11c
•  Health subsidy: Col$50,000 per month (approximately $3,028) per family with 
members aged less than 7 yearsd
Payee Mother
Payment method Through the banking system
Payment frequency Bimonthly
Duration As long as eligible
Additional benefi ts Health and nutrition education and empowerment of mothers through their 
organization in groups
Conditions
Health Meet the growth control and development checkups scheduled every 2 months 
for children aged 0–1, 3 times a year for children up to 2 years, and 2 times a year 
thereafter up to 7 years
Education At least 80% school attendance in a 2-month cycle (maximum of 8 unjustifi ed 
absences in a 2-month period)
Other None
Verifi cation of compliance–method Benefi ciaries receive forms on which their compliance with conditions is confi rmed 
by health and education service providers; they provide these forms to the local 
program offi ce on a regular basise
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Bimonthly
Compliance statistics 90% for health and education
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Program Administration
Institutional arrangement Presidential Agency for Social Action and International Cooperation, local 
program offi ces
Program costs •  Budget: $200 per month (0.2% of GDP; 2007)
•  Administrative cost: 5.0% of program budget (1.0% is for materials related to 
verifi cation of compliance), plus 3.4% in banking commissions
Sources: Attanasio, Battistin et al. 2005; Attanasio, Fitzsimmons, and Gómez 2005; Attanasio, Gómez et al. 2005; Institute for Fiscal Studies, 
Econometría, and Sistemas Especializados de Información 2006; program Web site: http://www.accionsocial.gov.co/contenido/contenido.
aspx?catID=204&conID=157; country context: World Development Indicators database 2008.
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity.
a. Sistema de Identifi cación de Benefi ciarios level 1, or part of Sole Registry for Displaced Populations.
b. In 12 cities, including Bogotá, no education subsidy is paid for grades 2–5.
c. The education subsidy is paid for 10 months per year, and amounts vary according to geographic area.
d. The health subsidy is paid for 12 months per year. In the 12 cities, including Bogotá, where no education subsidy is paid for grades 2–5, if 
families have only minors aged 7–11, they are paid a nutrition subsidy of Col$20,000 (approximately $11).
e. The process of verifi cation of conditions is changing because the program is further expanding and needs to adapt accordingly. 
Country Context
General
Population (total) 45.6 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $6,181 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 17.8% (2003)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 88.5% total (2006)
88.4% for girls, 88.6% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 64.9% total (2006)
68.5% for girls, 61.5% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
12% (2005)
Births attended by skilled health staff 86.4% (2000)
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Colombia
Program: Subsidio Condicionado a la Asistencia Escolar–Bogotá
Year started 2005 (pilot program)
Status Active
Targeting
Target population Poor students in grades 6–11
Targeting method Proxy means testing
Coverage 10,000 benefi ciaries
Incidence Not available
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure 3 types of transfers:a
•  $15 per month conditional on attendance
•  $10 per month to the household and approximately $50 ($5 a month for 10 
months) at the end of the academic year
•  $10 per month and $240 at the end of secondary school, conditional on 
completionb
Payee Student
Payment method Through benefi ciary’s bank account with associated debit card
Payment frequency Bimonthly
Duration As long as eligible
Additional benefi ts None
Conditions
Health None
Education School attendance and/or completion, depending on the type of transfer tested (see 
benefi t structure)
Other None
Verifi cation of compliance–method Students’ principals report attendance/completion information to the Secretary of 
Education for the city of Bogotá
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Bimonthly
Compliance statistics Not available
Program Administration
Institutional arrangement Secretary of Education for the City of Bogotá 
Program costs Not available
Sources: Barrera-Osorio et al. 2008; program Web site: http://www.sedbogota.edu.co/secretaria/export/SED/svirtuales/subsidios_condicio-
nados.html; country context: World Development Indicators database 2008.
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity.
a. Transfer only paid during the academic year.
b. The city decided in favor of the fi rst type of transfer.
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Country Context
General
Population (total) 45.6 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $6,181 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 17.8% (2003)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 88.5% total (2006)
88.4% for girls, 88.6% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 64.9% total (2006)
68.5% for girls, 61.5% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
12% (2005)
Births attended by skilled health staff 86.4% (2000)
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Dominican Republic
Program: Solidaridada
Year started 2005
Status Active
Targeting
Target population Families living in extreme or moderate poverty with children aged 0–16 or adults 
16+ lacking identifi cation
Targeting method Geographic targeting and proxy means testing
Coverage • 461,446 families (December 2008)
•  10% of total population (2006)
Incidence Not available
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure •  Education (ILAE): RD$300 ($9) for 1 or 2 children, RD$450 ($14) for 3 
children, and RD$600 ($19) for 4 or more children aged 6–16 per month
•  Food income component (Comer es Primero): RD$700 ($20) per month
•  Identifi cation component: covers the fees to obtain the birth certifi cate and/or 
identifi cation card for children and adults in Solidaridad families
Payee Head of household
Payment method Through debit cards that can be used only in certain stores (colmados) for certain 
products (food and education supplies)
Payment frequency Monthly (Comer es Primero) and bimonthly (ILAE)
Duration 3 years, with recertifi cation and possible continuation for another 3 years
Additional benefi ts Bonogas: subsidy ($6.5/month) for the purchase of domestic gas. Unconditional 
transfer ($8.6/month) for benefi ciary households with members ages 65 or older 
and without a job or pension.
Conditions
Health Regular visits to health center for examinations, growth and development 
monitoring, and immunizations, for children aged 0–12 months (every 2 months) 
and children aged 1–5 years (every 4 months)
Education •  School enrollment
•  School attendance on at least 85% of actual school days for children aged 6–16 
Other •  Attendance at capacity-building sessions for household head and spouse (every 4 
months)
•  Obtaining identity documents (birth certifi cate, identifi cation card) for family 
members who lack them
Verifi cation of compliance–method •  Health: program liaison staff at the community level collects the forms with 
compliance information at the health centers (similar process for documentation 
and capacity-building conditions)
•  Education: school directors send attendance information on a regular basis 
through the education sector to the State Secretariat for Education
•  Social Subsidy Administration agency compiles the information and links it to 
the transfer payments
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Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Every 4 months
Compliance statistics Health 56.6%; training 94.9%; documentation 69%
Program Administration
Institutional arrangement Coordination of the Cabinet for Social Policies
Program costs Budget: $124,944,407 in 2008
Sources: Regalía and Robles 2005; program Web site: http://www.gabsocial.gov.do/solidaridad/; country context: World Development Indicators 
database 2008.
Note: ILAE = Incentivo a la Asistencia Escolar ; PPP = purchasing power parity.
a. In September 2005, the government established by presidential decree the Solidarity Program as an amalgamation of two existing CCT 
programs, Comer es Primero and Incentivo a la Asistencia Escolar.
Country Context
General
Population (total) 9.6 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $5,684 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 16.2% (2004)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 77.5% total (2006)
78.5% for girls, 76.5% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 52.1% total (2006)
57.4% for girls, 46.9% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
9.8% (2007)
Births attended by skilled health staff 97.8% (2008)
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Dominican Republic
Program: Tarjeta de Asistencia Escolara
Year started 2001
Status Stopped (replaced by ILAEb and then integrated into Solidaridad)
Targeting
Target population Poor households with children aged 5–15 enrolled in schoolc
Targeting method •  Geographic targeting of municipalities, and of schools with less than 300 
students; identifi cation of eligible mothers through parents’ school committee 
and other community organizations
•  In second stage of expansion, poverty map was not used when identifying 
schools with 750 or more students in urban marginal areas; socioeonomic 
information was gathered for identifying eligible mothersd
Coverage •  88 SEE districts, 2,115 schools, and 29 provinces, benefi ting approximately 
100,000 households (2003)
•  4.1% of households (2004)
Incidence 59.1% to poorest 40% (2004)
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure RD$300 per eligible household (fl at benefi t)
Payee Mother
Payment method Payments made by checks distributed through the schools
Payment frequency Bimonthly
Duration As long as eligible
Additional benefi ts None
Conditions
Health None
Education • School enrollment
• School assistance at least 85% of school days
• Satisfying school performance (also was supposed to be monitored)
Other None
Verifi cation of compliance–method No structure in place
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency No structure in place
Compliance statistics No structure in place
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Program Administration
Institutional arrangement SEE, through its Planning Offi ce
Program costs RD$236.6 million ($5.7 million) in 2004e
Sources: Regalía and Robles 2005; World Bank 2006a; country context: World Development Indicators database 2008.
Note: ILAE = Incentivo a la Asistencia Escolar; PPP = purchasing power parity; SEE = State Secretariat of Education; TAE = Tarjeta de 
Asistencia Escolar.
a. The design of a plan to strengthen TAE’s operations started at the end of 2003. In late 2004, the restructuring plan for the TAE program 
began to be implemented under a new name (Incentivo a la Asistencia Escolar) and with a new team of about 15 people in the SEE.
b. A proxy means test began to be implemented, and payments began being made to students rather than to households.
c. Since the very beginning, a prerequisite for mother’s enrollment was possession of a valid personal identifi cation document. This prerequisite 
caused the exclusion of one out of fi ve mothers deemed eligible.
d. According to the program’s rule, the criteria that should have been used to identify eligible mothers were (1) women heads of household, and 
(2) families whose parents were unemployed or under-employed but not self-employed. These criteria made the benefi ciary selection mechanism 
problematic. An initial revision of specifi c cases, during January–September 2004, caused 3,700 mothers to be taken off the roster of benefi ciaries 
because they did not have any children or did not meet other eligibility criteria.
e. Amount of transfers executed in 2004.
Country Context
General
Population (total) 9.6 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $5,684 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 16.2% (2004)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 77.5% total (2006)
78.5% for girls, 76.5% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 52.1% total (2006)
57.4% for girls, 46.9% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
11.7% (2002)
Births attended by skilled health staff 95.5% (2002)
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Ecuador
Program: Bono de Desarrollo Humanoa
Year started 2003
Status Active
Targeting
Target population Households with children aged 0–16 in the poorest 2 quintiles, and poor 
households with elderly and/or disabled members
Targeting method Proxy means testing
Coverage •  1,060,416 households (January 2006) (approximately 5 million people)
•  40% of population
Incidence 33% to poorest quintile (2004)
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure •  $15 per month per family
•  Senior and disabled heads of household: $11.50 per month
Payee Women
Payment method Can be collected at any branch offi ce from the largest network of private banks 
(Banred) or from the National Agricultural Bank 
Payment frequency Monthly
Duration As long as eligible
Additional benefi ts None
Conditions
Health Children aged 0–5: bimonthly visits to health posts for growth and development 
checkups and immunizations
Education •  School enrollment for children aged 6–15 
•  School attendance at least 90% of school days 
•  Must be enrolled in school and have attendance at basic education classes of at 
least 80% (including both justifi ed and unjustifi ed absences)
Other None
Verifi cation of compliance–method No verifi cation of compliance with conditions
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency No verifi cation of compliance with conditions
Compliance statistics No verifi cation of compliance with conditions
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Program Administration
Institutional arrangement Social Protection Programme under the Ministry of Social Welfare
Program costs •  Budget: $194 million in 2005 (0.6% of GDP, 2.25% of total nonfi nancial 
public expenditure)
•  Administrative cost: $8 millionb
Sources: Paxson and Schady 2008; Ponce and Bedi 2008; Schady and Araujo 2008; Schady and Rosero 2008; program Web site: http://www.
mbs.gov.ec/MBS/index.htm; country context: World Development Indicators database 2008.
Note: BDH = Bono de Desarrollo Humano; PPP = purchasing power parity.
a. In 2004, the BDH was created by integrating the Bono Solidario, a cash transfer originally designed to compensate the poor for the removal 
of electricity and gas subsidies, and the Beca Escolar, a CCT program providing a small cash transfer to families whose school-age children were 
enrolled and regularly attending school.
b. From country program profi les for the Third International Conference on Conditional Cash Transfers, Istanbul, 2006 (http://www.
virtualcct.net).
Country Context
General
Population (total) 13.2 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $6,925 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 40.8% (2004)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 97.3% total (2005)
97.8% for girls, 96.8% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 55.4% total (2005)
56.0% for girls, 54.7% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
29% (2004)
Births attended by skilled health staff 74.7% (2004)
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El Salvador
Program: Red Solidaria
Year started 2005
Status Active
Targeting
Target population Families living in extreme poverty with children aged 0–15 in rural El Salvador
Targeting method Geographic targeting and proxy means testing
Coverage 77 municipalities in 2008
Incidence •  24,106 families in 32 municipalities in 2006
•  89,000 households in 77 municipalities by 2008
•  Expected 100,000 households (roughly 800,000 population) in the 100 poorest 
municipalities by the end of 2009 
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure •  Education: $15 per month per household with children aged 6–15 
•  Health: $15 per month per household with children aged 0–5 and/or pregnant 
women
•  Health and education: $20 per month per household for households that qualify 
for both health and education benefi ts
Payee Mother
Payment method In cash at payment posts; payments are outsourced to a commercial bank
Payment frequency Bimonthly
Duration 3 years
Additional benefi ts Program has two additional components: (1) a supply-side component to strengthen 
basic health and nutrition services in the targeted areas, and (2) a family support 
component of activities outsourced through NGOs to help benefi ciaries comply with 
their co-responsibilities, understand program operation, and collect their payments.
Conditions
Health Compliance with immunization and regular health and nutrition monitoringa
Education •  School enrollment in primary school
•  School attendance rate of at least 80%b for children aged 5–15 
Other Families sign a contract stipulating their responsibilities
Verifi cation of compliance–method Health and education service personnel provide compliance information to staff 
of the contracted NGO, who then compile the information and pass it on to the 
social fund, FISDL, which implements the program.
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Bimonthly
Compliance statistics •  Education: Average level of compliance from January to October 2008 was 
96.18%
•  Health: Average level of compliance from January to October 2008 was 99.7%
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Program Administration
Institutional arrangement Technical Secretariat of the Presidency directs the Red Solidaria program. The 
FISDL is the implementation agency and is responsible for the coordination with 
the NGOs at the local level. Payments are outsourced through a commercial bank.
Program costs Budget: $51.4 million
Sources: Program Web site: http://www.redsolidaria.gob.sv/; country context: World Development Indicators database 2008.
Note: FISDL = Fondo de Inversión Social para el Desarrollo Local; NGO = nongovernmental organization; PPP = purchasing power parity.
a. The health and nutrition transfer would require that households fulfi ll the separate co-responsibilities, specifi cally that (1) parents ensure 
that all children less than 5 years old are immunized fully under the established health protocols; and (2) children less than 5 years old, as well 
as pregnant mothers, participate in regular health and nutrition monitoring, again according to the established health and nutrition protocols.
b. Applies to all children in the family who are older than 5 and younger than 15, and who have not completed primary education already.
Country Context
General
Population (total) 5.9 million (number adjusted according 
to the latest census [2005])
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $5,587 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 35% (2007)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 94% total (2006)
94.1% for girls, 93.9% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 54.2% total (2006)
55.5% for girls, 52.9% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
24.6% (2003)
Births attended by skilled health staff 92.4% (2003)
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Guatemala
Program: Mi Familia Progresa
Year started 2008
Status Active
Targeting
Target population Extremely poor families with minors aged 0–15, living in the 130 most vulnerable 
municipalities
Targeting method Geographic targeting and proxy means testing
Coverage Target is about 250,000 households by end 2009
Incidence Not available
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure •  Education subsidy: in elementary school for children aged 6–15, Q 150 per 
month (approximately $20) regardless of the number of eligible children
•  Health subsidy: Q 150,000 per month (approximately $20) per family with 
members less than 16 years old
Payee Mother
Payment method Through a government-owned bank (BanRural)
Payment frequency Bimonthly
Duration As long as eligible
Additional benefi ts Not available
Conditions
Health Meet the growth control and regular checkups scheduled for pregnant women and 
children aged 0–16
Education At least 90% school attendance
Other None
Verifi cation of compliance–method Not fully implemented; program’s staff at local level works with education and 
health institutions to verify compliance with conditions
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Bimonthly
Compliance statistics Not available
Program Administration
Institutional arrangement Secretaria de Coordinación Ejecutiva de la Presidencia, a ministry-level secretariat
Program costs •  Budget: $200 per month (0.2% of GDP, 2007)
•  Administrative cost: 5.0% of program budget (1.0% is for materials related to 
verifi cation of compliance), plus 3.4% in banking commissions
Source: Bank staff and World Development Indicators database 2008.
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Country Context
General
Population (total) 13.3 million (2007)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $4,075
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 51%
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 86.4%
Net enrollment in secondary level 37.5%
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
54.3%
Births attended by skilled health staff 41% (2002)
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Honduras
Program: Programa de Asignación Familiar
Year started 1998
Status Active
Targeting
Target population Poor households with children aged 6–12 who have not completed grade 4 of 
primary school (education), and poor households with pregnant women and/or 
children less than 3 years old (health)
Targeting method Geographic targeting (the poorest 1,000 communities in the poorest 17 
departments) and proxy means testing (in 4 departments)
Coverage •  240,000 households, 17 departments, 133 municipalities, 1,115 towns
•  15% of population
Incidence 49.6% to poorest quintile (2004)
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure In all 17 departments, food security (nutrition) benefi t is $113 per household per year
In 4 departments (where IDB supports the PRAF), additional education and 
health benefi ts are
• Education benefi t: $60 per household
•  Health benefi t: $40 per household
•  Delivery incentive: $60 per pregnant woman
Payee Mother
Payment method Vouchers cashed through local offi ces of BANHCAFE or mobile units
Payment frequency Every 6 months (payments are made irregularly)
Duration As long as eligible
Additional benefi ts Communities where PRAF operates promote access to an integrated package of 
services, including nutrition (AIN-C), health care, and basic services
Conditions
Health Compliance with required frequency of health center visits;a compliance enforced 
only in the 4 departments where PARF is supported by the IDB; in the remaining 
13 departments, households are encouraged only to send children to school/take 
them for health visit
Education •  School enrollment
•  Regular school attendance of at least 85%
Other None
Verifi cation of compliance–method No verifi cation in 13 departments because of diffi culty of enforcing conditions 
when the supply is missing. However, the program carries out promotion of co-
responsibilities. The verifi cation is enforced in 4 departments where IDB supports 
PRAF.
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Every 6 months
Compliance statistics Not available
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Program Administration
Institutional arrangement PRAF is an autonomous program under the Secretaria de la Presidencia. IDB 
piloted a similar intervention with limited coverage (PRAF I, II, III). Each of the 
PRAF programs has its own independent institutional structure but efforts are in 
place to standardize processes and operations across PRAF.
Program costs $20 million (2008)
Sources: Glewwe, Olinto, and de Souza 2003; Moore 2008; Morris, Flores et al. 2004; program Web site: http://www.gob.hn/portal/
poder_ejecutivo/desconcentrados/praf/; country context: World Development Indicators database 2008.
Note: AIN-C = Atención Integral de la Niñez en la Comunidad; BANHCAFE = Banco Hondureño del Café; IDB = Inter-American Development 
Bank; PPP = purchasing power parity PRAF = Programa de Asignación Familiar.
a. Children aged 0–3: those less than 2 years old must have visited the health center at least once a month; those aged 2–5 must have visited 
the health center every three months. Main benefi ciaries must have attended training courses four times per year. Mothers with children less 
than 2 years old must undergo AIN-C control. Pregnant mothers must have at least fi ve prenatal checkups. Delivery at a public facility should 
be verifi ed. Main benefi ciary must have attended training courses at least four times per year.
Country Context
General
Population (total) 7 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $3,433 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 35.7% (2003)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 96.4% total (2006)
97.2% for girls, 95.7% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level Not available 
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
29.9% (2006)
Births attended by skilled health staff 66.9% (2006)
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Jamaica
Program: Program of Advancement through Health and Education
Year started 2001
Status Active
Targeting
Target population • Children aged 0–19 (or until they graduate from secondary school)
• Poor people aged 60 and older
• Pregnant or lactating women up to 6 months after delivery
• People with disabilities
• Poor adults
Targeting method Proxy means testing
Coverage 300,000 people or 12% of total population (September 2008); of that total, 
70% are children, 11% are disabled, and 19% are elderly or are pregnant and/or 
lactating mothers
Incidence 59.6% to poorest quintile (2004)
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure J$650 per month per benefi ciary (established limit of 20 benefi ciaries in any one 
family).a Beginning December 2008, a new differentiated scheme of benefi ts is in 
place: boys receive 10% higher benefi ts than girls at all grades; lower-secondary 
students receive 50% higher than base benefi t; upper-secondary students receive 
75% higher than base benefi t; all other categories receive the base benefi t of $650.
Payee Family representative or his/her agent
Payment method Checks disbursed through prepaid cash cards
Payment frequency Bimonthly
Duration As long as eligible; recertifi cation after 4 years
Additional benefi ts •  Secondary level students have free access to the government’s textbook rental 
scheme
• Free lunch in schools where there is a government-run school feeding program
• Free health care for benefi ciaries
Conditions
Health •  4 health center visits per year for children aged 0–11 months (in keeping with 
the immunization schedule stipulated by the Ministry of Health)
•  2 health center visits per year, at 6-month intervals, for children aged 12–59 
months
•  Health center visits every 2 months for pregnant women, and at 6 weeks and 2 
months postpartum for lactating women
•  2 health center visits per year, at 6-month intervals, for people with disabilities, 
elderly people, and other adult benefi ciaries
Education Regular school attendance of at least 85% for children aged 6–19 
Other None
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Verifi cation of compliance–method MLSS staff give schools and health providers lists of the PATH participants 
and forms for the providers to report school attendance/health care data for the 
previous 2 months. MLSS staff pick up the completed forms from the providers. 
Data are entered into PATH’s management information system and used as the 
basis for compliance and payment determinations.
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Every 2 months, MLSS staff provide the lists of PATH benefi ciaries to service 
providers; 4 weeks later, they return to collect the completed forms
Compliance statistics • 88% of girls and 84% of boys complied with education requirements 
•  88% of children aged 0–11 months complied with health requirements 
(May–June 2007)
Program Administration
Institutional arrangement MLSS
Program costs •  Budget: J$1.7 billion (approximately $245 million) during FY2007/08 
•  Administrative costs: 13% of program’s overall budget
Sources: Levy and Ohls 2003; 2007; ODI 2006; Government of Jamaica 2006; program Web site: http://www.mlss.gov.jm/pub/index.
php?artid=23; country context: World Development Indicators database 2008.
Note: MLSS = Ministry of Labour and Social Security; PPP = purchasing power parity.
a. Starting October 1, 2008, the base benefi t increased to J$600 per month. Relative to the base benefi t, benefi ts for students in lower-secondary 
school are increased by 50 percent (to J$990 for boys and J$900 for girls); benefi ts for students in upper-secondary school are increased by 75 per-
cent (to J$1,150 for boys and J$1,050 for girls). Boys in primary grades receive J$660, and all other categories will receive J$600 per month.
Country Context
General
Population (total) 2.7 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $7,333 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 14.4% (2004)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 90.3% total (2005)
90.4% for girls, 90.1% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 78.3% total (2005)
80.1% for girls, 76.5% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
4.5% (2004)
Births attended by skilled health staff 96.7% (2005)
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Mexico
Program: Oportunidades (formerly PROGRESA)
Year started 1997
Status Active
Targeting
Target population Extremely poor households
Targeting method Geographic targeting and proxy means testing
Coverage 5 million households,a approximately 18% of the country’s total population
Incidence 35% of poorest quintile
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure •  Education: primary school—varies by grade, $12–$23 per child per month 
plus $23 per child per year for school materials; secondary—varies by grade and 
gender, $34–$43 per child per month plus $29 per child per year for school 
materials; middle/higher—varies by grade and gender $57–$74 per child per 
month plus $29 per child per year for school materials
•  Education: $336 in a savings account upon completion of high school (grade 12)
•  Health: $17 per household per month
•  $23 per month per adult over 69 years old who is part of a benefi ciary family
Payee Mother
Payment method Cash at payment points and payments through benefi ciary’s savings account with 
BANSEFI
Payment frequency Bimonthly (education benefi t of $336 paid only once)
Duration As long as eligible
Additional benefi ts None
Conditions
Health •  Compliance by all household members with the required number of preventive 
medical checkups
•  Attendance of family member older than 15 years at health and nutrition 
lectures
Education •  School enrollment and minimum attendance rate of 80% monthly and 93% 
annually
•  Completion of middle school
•  Completion of grade 12 before age 22
Other None
Verifi cation of compliance–method Program state coordination agency provides forms to the state education and health 
agencies, which pass them on to the local service providers responsible for fi lling in 
the compliance information. Forms are returned to the state coordination agency, 
which compiles the information and passes it on to the national coordination 
agency in charge of generating the list of benefi ciaries and amounts to be paid each 
period.
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Bimonthly
Compliance statistics 98% of benefi ciary families receive benefi ts (November/December 2007)b
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Program Administration
Institutional arrangement Secretariat for Social Development, national and state coordination agencies of the 
program, and education and health service providers
Program costs •  Budget: $3,181,214,484 in 2006 (1.75% of net total expenditure; 0.4% of 
GDP)c 
•  Administrative cost: 9.05% ($288,007,275)
Sources: Levy 2006; Lindert, Skoufi as, and Shapiro 2006; evaluations: http://evaluacion.Oportunidades.gob.mx:8010/en/index.php; opera-
tions manual: http://www.Oportunidades.gob.mx/htmls/reglas.html; program Web site: http://www.Oportunidades.gob.mx/; country context: 
World Development Indicators database 2008.
Note: BANSEFI = Banco del Ahorro Nacional y Servicios Financieros; PPP = purchasing power parity.
a. At 92,208 localities and 2,444 municipalities (October 2007).
b. This refers to the percent of benefi ciary families receiving benefi ts in October 2007, which refl ects their compliance in July-August 2007.
c. Budget broken down by component (prorated): support to education, 47.29 percent; support to food intake, 30.02 percent; food supplement, 
6.56 percent; support to the elderly, 6.29 percent; support to youngsters under Oportunidades, 0.78 percent.
Country Context
General
Population (total) 104.2 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $11,801 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 11.6% (2004)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 97.7% total (2005)
97.3% for girls, 98.1% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 68.6% total (2005)
68.4% for girls, 68.8% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
15.5% (2006)
Births attended by skilled health staff 83.3% (2004)
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Nicaragua
Program: Atención a Crisis
Year started 2005
Status 1-year pilot program, ended in December 2006
Targeting
Target population Poor households residing in region affected by drought
Targeting method Geographic targeting and proxy means testing
Coverage 3,000 households
Incidence 90% of households
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure •  Food transfer: $145 per household per year 
•  Education transfer: $90 per household per year
•  School “supply-side” transfer: $13 per child (1-time transfer at the beginning of 
the school year)
•  School “backpack” (supplies): $25 per child per year
•  Health transfer: $90 per household per year (was to be paid to health provider, 
but was never implemented)
•  $15 per household per month while participating in training courses, up to 6 
months
Payee Child’s caregiver
Payment method Cash at payment points
Payment frequency Bimonthly
Duration 1 year
Additional benefi ts •  In addition to the traditional CCT component, the pilot program also included 
occupational training and a business grant component. These were allocated 
randomly across eligible households. In its fi nal design, benefi ciary households 
were allocated one of the following three interventions: (1) CCT component 
(with benefi ts as described above); (2) CCT plus occupational training; or (3) 
CCT plus a business grant.
•  For occupational training, additional benefi ts included (1) opportunity cost 
transfer (up to $90 per household per year), (2) course costs up to $140 per 
household per year
•  For the business grant, additional benefi ts included a business grant transfer of 
$200 per household plus technical assistance to develop a business plan
Conditions
Health Pilot program design envisioned close coordination between the Ministry of 
Family and the Ministry of Health to improve the supply of health services for 
the benefi ciaries, and to monitor health-related conditions. Despite strong and 
repeated efforts to reach interministry coordination and synergies, this supply-side 
health component was never implemented.
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Education •  Enrollment in grades 1–6 for children aged 7–15 
•  Regular attendance of 85%, (that is, no more than 5 absences without valid 
excuse every 2 months)
•  Deliver teacher transfer to teacher
Other •  For occupational training: household needed to decide on member who takes 
course, and payment is conditional on attendance at course 
•  For the business grant: business plan approved by technical team in the Ministry 
of Family
Verifi cation of compliance–method Through forms sent to service providers (schools and health providers) and fed into 
the management information system
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Bimonthly
Compliance statistics •  Less than 5% of benefi ciaries were penalized
•  No terminations were made as a result of noncompliance
Program Administration
Institutional arrangement •  Funding and administrative oversight by the Ministry of Family.
•  A technical team at the Ministry of Family was responsible for the program 
design, targeting and benefi ciary selection, and the program’s overall 
implementation, monitoring, and coordinating activities (for example, with 
the ministries of education and health, the National Institute for Vocational 
Training, and each of the municipal administrations and local actors involved in 
different components of the program).
•  In each municipality, a local staffperson was assigned to serve as a liaison 
between the Ministry of Family and the benefi ciary households to facilitate, 
coordinate, and monitor various program activities at the municipal level.
•  Private service providers were contracted to provide technical assistance for 
benefi ciaries allocated the occupational training or the business grant.
•  In each community, benefi ciaries were organized in small groups (of about 
10 people), and each group elected 2 members as the group’s promotoras/es to 
coordinate program-related information given to all benefi ciaries, clarifying 
program rules and conditions, ensuring participation of all benefi ciaries in 
program meetings and activities, and providing informal guidance and support 
to benefi ciaries.
Program costs •  Budget: $1.8 million (0.1% of GDP)
•  Administrative cost: $0.4 million
Sources: Macours and Vakis 2008; impact evaluation Web site: www.worldbank.org/atencionacrisisevaluation; country context: World 
Development Indicators database 2008.
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity.
See page 273 for Country Context table.
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Nicaragua
Program: Red de Protección Sociala
Year started 2000
Status Stopped
Targeting
Target population Poor households with children aged 7–13 enrolled in primary school grades 1–4 
(education); health care services are targeted to children aged 0–5 
Targeting method Geographic targeting
Coverage 20,000 households during phase 1; 16,016 additional households during phase 2
Incidence Not available
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure •  School attendance grant (bono escolar): C$240 ($17) per family every 2 months; 
school material support (mochila escolar): C$275 ($20) per child per year
•  Health and nutrition (bono alimentario): C$480 ($34) per family every 2 months
Payee Child’s caregiver
Payment method Cash at payment points
Payment frequency Bimonthly
Duration Not available
Additional benefi ts Education: supply incentive (bono a la oferta)—C$80 ($6) per student per year, 
given to teacher/school
Conditions
Health •  Bimonthly health education workshops (all households)
•  Attendance at prescheduled health care visits every month (aged 0–2) or 
bimonthly (aged 3–5), adequate weight gain and up-to-date vaccinations (aged 
0–5) for all households with children aged 0–5b
Education •  Enrollment in grades 1–4 for children aged 7–13 
•  Regular attendance of 85% (that is, no more than 5 absences without valid 
excuse every 2 months)
•  Grade promotion at end of school yearc
Other None
Verifi cation of compliance–method Through forms sent to service providers (schools and health providers) and fed into 
the program’s management information system
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Not available
Compliance statistics •  Approximately 10% of benefi ciaries were penalized at least once; therefore they 
did not receive, or received only part of, their transfer in the fi rst 2 years of the 
program
•  Less than 1% of households terminated during the fi rst 2 years of transfer 
deliveryd
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Program Administration
Institutional arrangement •  Funding and administrative oversight by the Emergency Social Investment Fund
•  Municipal planning and coordination by committees of delegates from the 
health and education ministries, representatives from civil society, and program 
personnel
•  At district (comarca) level: 12 program representatives worked with promotoras 
and local school and health care service providers
•  Promotoras were responsible for communication with benefi ciary householdse
Program costs Budget: $3.7 million in phase I (10,000 households), (0.2% of GDP)
Sources: Maluccio and Flores 2005; country context: World Development Indicators database 2008. 
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity.
a. Note that this table refers to the fi rst phase of the program. During the second phase, a proxy means test was introduced and small changes 
to benefi ts were made. 
b. The up-to-date vaccination condition was deemed unfair and not enforced when it was found that there was a delay in the delivery of 
vaccines. Also, punishment of children who did not have adequate weight gain was dropped at the end of the pilot phase because of a concern 
about the role of measurement error and the fi nding that the poorest households were more likely to be punished.
c. Because some schools practiced automatic promotion, enforcement of the grade promotion condition was deemed unfair and therefore 
never enforced.
d. But 5 percent voluntarily left the program, by dropping out or migrating out of the program area.
e. Their responsibilities included keeping them informed about upcoming health care appointments for their children, upcoming payments, 
and any failures in fulfi lling the conditions. Each promotora had, on average, 17 benefi ciaries in her charge, although that average masked sub-
stantial variation ranging from 5 to 30 benefi ciaries.
Country Context
General
Population (total) 5.5 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $2,702 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 79.9% (2001)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 89.8% total (2006)
89.9% for girls, 89.6% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 43.4% total (2004)
46.6% for girls, 40.2% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
25.2% (2001)
Births attended by skilled health staff 66.9% (2001)
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Panama
Program: Red de Oportunidades
Year started 2006
Status Active
Targeting
Target population Families living under the extreme poverty line (about 16.6% of the population, 
70,000 households)
Targeting method Proxy means testing in rural nonindigenous areas, indigenous areas, and urban 
areas (different cut-offs)
Coverage Nationwide
Incidence Not available
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure $35 per month per household; the amount was increased to $50 in July 2008 as a 
response to food price infl ation. The amount is fl at per household, irrespective of 
the number or ages of children.a
Payee Mother
Payment method Post offi ce in remote areas, banks in urban areas
Payment frequency Bimonthly
Duration 5 years
Additional benefi ts Acompañamiento: (planned) accompaniment through teams to link benefi ciaries to 
other services, programs, and so forth
Conditions
Health • Immunizations for children aged 0–5 
• Visits to basic health services providers
Education • Regular school attendance of children 
• Participation in parent-teacher conferences in school
Other Participation in capacity-building events
Verifi cation of compliance–method Not available
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Not available
Compliance statistics Not available
Program Administration
Institutional arrangement Ministry of Social Development
Program costs •  Budget: $160.1 million for transfers in 5 years
•  Administrative cost: 20% 
Sources: Program Web site: http://www.mides.gob.pa/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=48&Itemid.com; country 
context: World Development Indicators database 2008.
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity.
a. Per family in indigenous areas.
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Country Context
General
Population (total) 3.3 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $8,969 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 18% (2003)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 98.5% total (2006)
98.2% for girls, 98.8% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 64.2% total (2006)
67.5% for girls, 61.0% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
18.2% (1997)
Births attended by skilled health staff 91.3% (2004)
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Paraguay
Program: Tekoporã/PROPAIS II
Year started Tekoporã: 2005, PROPAIS II: 2006
Status Active
Targeting
Target population Extremely poor families with children aged 0–14 and pregnant women, rural areas 
only
Targeting method Geographic targeting (Indice de Piorizacion Geografi ca), life quality index (Indice 
de Calidad de Vida) for Tekoporã and other proxy means testing for PROPAIS II
Coverage Tekoporã: 14,000; PROPAIS II: 5,800
Incidence Not available
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure Flat benefi t (G/ 60,000) + variable component (G/ 30,000 per child up to a 
maximum of 4). Benefi t range: G/ 90,000–G/ 180,000 (equivalent to $18–$36) 
Payee Mother
Payment method Mobile cashier
Payment frequency Bimonthly
Duration 3 years
Additional benefi ts Family support (counseling and advice)
Conditions
Health Follow the vaccination calendar; child health checks, age groups 0–5 and 6–14
Education School matriculation and attendance
Other None
Verifi cation of compliance–method Compliance department at Presidential Agency for Social Assistance (Asuncion) 
checks the information (photocopies of certifi cates) handed to family guides during 
household visits
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Bimonthly
Compliance statistics Approximately 70% for health and education as of 2006
Program Administration
Institutional arrangement Presidential Agency for Social Assistance
Program costs •  Budget: US$9.6 million (0.08% of GDP; 2007)
•  Administrative cost: approximately 10% of program budget
Sources: Bank staff; country context: World Development Indicators database 2008.
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Country Context
General
Population (total) 6.1 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $1,967 (2006) 
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day Not available
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 94% total (2004)
95% for girls, 95% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 57% total (2004)
59% for girls, 57% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
Not available
Births attended by skilled health staff 77% (2004)
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Peru
Program: Juntos
Year started 2005
Status Active
Targeting
Target population Poor households with children less than 14 years old
Targeting method Geographic targeting, proxy means testing, and community validation
Coverage 453,823 (June 2008)
Incidence Not available
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure S/.100 ($33) per month
Payee Mother
Payment method Through benefi ciary’s bank account at the Banco de la Nacion and associated debit 
card
Payment frequency Monthly
Duration 4 years
Additional benefi ts None
Conditions
Health Regular health visits for pregnant women and for children less than 5 years olda
Education School attendance of at least 85% for children aged 6–14 who have not completed 
elementary education
Other •  Participation in the Mi Nombre (My Name) program by all families with 
children who lack birth certifi cates and/or are older than 18 years and have no 
identifi cation card
Verifi cation of compliance–method Not available
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Every 3 months
Compliance statistics •  2.7% of benefi ciaries suspended for noncompliance (end-September 2007)
•  96% compliance with health center visits
Program Administration
Institutional arrangement Not available
Program costs Budget: S/.300 million ($100 million) in 2006 (0.11% of GDP)
Sources: Jones, Vargas, and Villar 2008; program Web site: http://www.juntos.gob.pe/intro.php; country context: World Development 
Indicators database 2008.
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity.
a. For pregnant mothers: prenatal controls; postnatal controls; full inoculations schedule; vitamin A, iron, and folic acid supplements; and 
attendance at nutritional, reproductive health, and food cooking chats. For children up to 5 years old: full inoculations schedule, iron supple-
ment, growth and development monitoring, and deworming.
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Country Context
General
Population (total) 27.6 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $US) $6,872 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 30.6% (2003)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 96.4% total (2005)
97.1% for girls, 95.7% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 70.2% total (2005)
69.9% for girls, 70.5% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
31.3% (2000)
Births attended by skilled health staff 86.9% (2006)
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Yemen, Republic of
Program: Basic Education Development Project
Year started 2007
Status Ongoing pilot program
Targeting
Target population Girls in grades 4–9 in all basic schools that satisfy school selection criteria in one 
governorate; girls in grades 4–9 in randomly selected rural schools that satisfy 
selection criteria in second governorate (for impact evaluation)
Targeting method Geographic targeting
Coverage 215 school catchment areas in one governorate and 67 areas in the second 
governorate
Incidence Not available
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure •  Girls in grades 4–5: $35 per year
•  Girls in grade 6: $35 per year, plus achievement bonus of $5
•  Girls in grades 7 and 9: $40 per year
•  Girls in grade 8: $40 per year, plus achievement bonus of $5 conditional on 
performing well in an external examination
Payee Mother or father (randomly divided between benefi ciary school areas)
Payment method Cash provided at school parent-teacher meetings; looking at mobile ATM cards 
option
Payment frequency 3 times per year: beginning of the school year and end of each semester
Duration 7 years maximum
Additional benefi ts None
Conditions
Health None
Education Child attends 80% of all classes in a 2-month period
Other Additional payment upon successful completion of a grade level; passing score on 
achievement test
Verifi cation of compliance–method Through regular attendance records collected from schools by a dedicated group of 
personnel hired for monitoring; also random spot-checks in place
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Monthly 
Compliance statistics Not available
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Program Administration
Institutional arrangement Ministry of Education responsible for oversight under the program. Funds 
disbursed through the ministry with verifi cation from the project administration 
unit. The various groups monitoring at various levels include the Girls Education 
Sector (GES), Governorate Education Offi ce, District Education Offi ce, postal 
service, project administration unit, CCT implementation team (consisting of 
6 consultants who work under the GES), and CCT technical team (comprising 
experts from the GES and the World Bank).
Program costs Approximately 3% of the total amount distributed
Sources: Fasih 2008; country context: World Development Indicators database 2008.
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity.
Country Context
General
Population (total) 21.7 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $US) $2,194 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 45.2% (1998)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 75.2% total (2005)
64.9% for girls, 85.1% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 37.4% total (2005)
25.8% for girls, 48.5% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
Not available
Births attended by skilled health staff 26.8% (2003)
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Bangladesh
Program: Female Secondary School Assistance Programa
Year started 1994
Status Active (as FSSAP II)
Targeting
Target population Unmarried girls who completed primary school and are enrolled in a recognized 
secondary school
Targeting method Geographic targeting of districts (thanas) and gender targeting
Coverage 723,864 girls (2005)b or about 76% of girls in the project schools 
Incidence Not available
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure Combined stipend and tuition subsidy: Tk 906 for nongovernment schools; 
Tk 847 for government schools
Payee Female student
Payment method Direct deposit to a bank account in the girl’s name
Payment frequency Twice a year
Duration From grade 6 to grade 10
Additional benefi ts • Book allowance, paid to student
• Examination fees, paid to student
• Tuition subsidy paid directly to school
• Additional supply-side support to school
Conditions
Health None
Education • Attends 75% of school days
• Attains 45% of class-level test scores
Other Remain unmarried until passing the secondary school certifi cate examination
Verifi cation of compliance–method Not available
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Not available
Compliance statistics About 4% of girls were dropped because of noncompliance with one or more of 
the three conditions (school attendance, passing grades, remaining unmarried) in 
2005c
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Program Administration
Institutional arrangement Ministry of Education Directorate of Secondary and Higher Education
Program costs •  Budget: Tk 1.5 billion in 2004, ($40 million); more than 4 million benefi ciaries 
annually
•  Administrative costs: approximately 18% of program cost
Sources: World Bank 2006e; Khandker, Pitt, and Fuwa 2003; program Web site: http://www.dshe.gov.bd/female_stipend.html; country 
context: World Development Indicators database 2008.
Note: FSSAP = Female Secondary School Assistance Program; PPP = purchasing power parity.
a. The Nationwide Female Stipend Program is implemented through four projects that operate in different districts and are funded by dif-
ferent donors. They include the FSSAP supported by the World Bank and the government, the Female Secondary Stipend Project (FSSP) sup-
ported through government funds, the Secondary Education Sector Improvement Project (SESIP) supported through the African Development 
Bank and government funds, and the Female Education Stipend Project (FESP) supported through the Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation.
b. The four secondary-school girls’ stipend programs (FSSAP, FSSP, SESIP, FESP) together covered 2.2 million girls in 2005, representing 
about 83 percent of girls in the schools covered. 
c. Total number of girls dropped from the program for either noncompliance or other reasons was approximately 4.7 percent in 2005.
Country Context
General
Population (total) 156 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $1,119 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 84% (2000)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 88.8% total (2004)
90.5% for girls, 87.4% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 40.1% total (2004)
40.2% for girls, 41.8% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
47.8% (2005)
Births attended by skilled health staff 20.1% (2006)
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Bangladesh
Program: Primary Education Stipend Programa
Year started 2002
Status Active
Targeting
Target population Poor families with children of primary-school age 
Targeting method Geographic targeting combined with community assessmentb
Coverage More than 5.3 million benefi ciaries per year
Incidence Not available
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure Tk 100 per month (one student per family), Tk 125 per month (more than one 
student per family)
Payee Benefi ciary’s guardian
Payment method Direct transfer to benefi ciary’s bank account
Payment frequency Quarterly
Duration As long as eligible
Additional benefi ts None
Conditions
Health None
Education • Attends 85% of school days
• Obtains at least 40% marks in the annual examinations
Other None
Verifi cation of compliance–method Not available
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Not available
Compliance statistics Not available
Program Administration
Institutional arrangement Department of Primary Education, Ministry of Education
Program costs •  Budget: $103.63 million in FY2003/04
•  Administrative costs: about 5% of program costsc
Sources: Tietjen 2003; World Bank 2006e; country context: World Development Indicators database 2008.
Note: PESP = Primary Education Stipend Program; PPP = purchasing power parity.
a. In 2002 the PESP replaced the Food for Education program, which was a food-based CCT program with objectives similar to those of 
the PESP.
b. The following criteria are used to identify households at the community level: (1) destitute woman-headed family (destitute means widowed, 
separated from husband, or divorced); (2) principal occupation of the household head is day-labor; (3) family of low-income professionals (such 
as those engaged in fi shing, pottery, blacksmithing, weaving, and cobbling); (4) landless households or households that own 0.50 acres of land 
(marginal or share-cropper).
c. This does not include administrative costs of lower levels of government.
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Country Context
General
Population (total) 156 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $1,119 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 84% (2000)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 88.8% total (2004)
90.5% for girls, 87.4% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 40.1% total (2004)
40.2% for girls, 41.8% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
47.8% (2005)
Births attended by skilled health staff 20.1% (2006)
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Bangladesh
Program: Reaching Out-of-School Children
Year started 2004
Status Ongoing
Targeting
Target population Children who have not had an opportunity to attend primary school in remote 
areas and dropouts from primary school
Targeting method Geographic targeting
Coverage 500,000 children
Incidence Not available
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure •  In 36 subdistricts: Tk 100 per month to children and approximately Tk 25,000 
per year to community school 
•  In 24 subdistricts: no stipend to children, but approximately Tk 55,000 per year 
to community school 
Payee Mother/guardian
Payment method Direct transfer to benefi ciary’s bank account
Payment frequency Twice a year
Duration As long as student is in primary education (5 years)
Additional benefi ts Support given to organizations (mainly NGOs) to train teachers and oversee 
quality of education in community schools
Conditions
Health None
Education 75% attendance and 75% performance in examinations, as judged by school 
teacher
Other None
Verifi cation of compliance–method Random third-party monitoring survey and project offi ce monitoring
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Third-party survey undertaken during the year covers 20% of institutions. Project 
offi ce monitoring occurring on a monthly basis is also random.
Compliance statistics Students not meeting criteria are excluded from program (about 5%)
Program Administration
Institutional arrangement Ministry of Primary and Mass Education
Program costs $63 million
Sources: World Bank 2004a; country context: World Development Indicators database 2008. 
Note: NGO = nongovernmental organization; PPP = purchasing power parity.
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Country Context
General
Population (total) 156 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $1,119 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 84% (2000)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 88.8% total (2004)
90.5% for girls, 87.4% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 40.1% total (2004)
40.2% for girls, 41.8% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
47.8% (2005)
Births attended by skilled health staff 20.1% (2006)
288
India (Haryana)
Program: Apni Beti Apna Dhan (Our Daughter, Our Wealth)
Year started 1994
Status Active
Targeting
Target population Girls born on or after October 2, 1994, in poor households (based on offi cial 
below-poverty-line estimates) and certain castes. Girls have to be fi rst, second, or 
third child in the family. Families with more than 3 children are not eligible.
Targeting method Using offi cial poverty-line estimates
Coverage Not available
Incidence Not available
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure Incentive for female births plus marriage delay: within 3 months of girl’s birth, 
Re 2,500 is invested in Indira Vikas Patras, a federal government savings bond 
scheme in which the invested amount doubles in 5 years. The sum is reinvested 
every fi fth year. The girl can withdraw the maturity amount of Re 25,000 when she 
turns 18, provided she is unmarried. 
Payee Girl
Payment method Savings bond
Payment frequency Once, when girl turns 18 years of age
Duration Girls exit the program at age 18
Additional benefi ts •  Mothers receive a cash amount (called postnatal assistance) of Re 500 upon 
daughter’s birth. They receive cash at home or through local health workers or 
health centers.
•  A higher maturity amount (Re 35,000) for girls who agree to defer cashing in 
their securities, plus a credit subsidy for entrepreneurship loans 
Conditions
Health The program implicitly aims to reduce child mortality among girls and the 
abortion of female fetus 
Education Girls receive bonus for completing grade 5 and grade 8
Other Marriage delay: girl must be unmarried at age 18
Verifi cation of compliance–method Benefi ciaries submit application form to local early-childhood development worker 
(anganwadi worker) in rural areas, or to the health offi cer in urban areas. With this 
application form, parents must submit daughter’s birth certifi cate. 
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Upon birth of girl and when the girl becomes eligible to redeem the savings 
certifi cate
Compliance statistics Not available
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Program Administration
Institutional arrangement The state’s Department of Women and Child Welfare manages the program. The 
program is implemented through the institutional apparatus of the early-childhood 
development program, called the Integrated Child Development Scheme. 
Program costs Not available
Sources: World Bank 2004; country context: World Development Indicators database 2008. 
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity.
Country Context
General
Population (total) 1.12 billion (2007)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) 2,230
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day Not available
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 89% total (2005)
87% for girls, 90% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level Not available
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
48%
Births attended by skilled health staff 46%
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Pakistan
Program: Child Support Program
Year started 2006
Status Running on pilot basis
Targeting
Target population Food Support Program benefi ciaries with children aged 5–12 
Targeting method Proxy means testing
Coverage 13,265 being paid (March 2008) 
Incidence On launch of the program in the district
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure PRs 200 per month for family with 1 child and PRs 350 per month for family with 
more than 1 child
Payee Parent/guardian
Payment method At post offi ces
Payment frequency Quarterly
Duration Until child completes primary education
Additional benefi ts Food Support Program subsidy of PRs 3,000 per year
Conditions
Health None
Education Admission of children, 80% attendance, and passing of fi nal examination
Other None
Verifi cation of compliance–method Compliance reports generated through the management information system.
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Quarterly
Compliance statistics Not available
Program Administration
Institutional arrangement Program design at Pakistan Bait-ul-Maal head offi ce, coordination at provincial 
offi ce, and implementation through Pakistan Bait-ul-Maal district offi ce, with close 
coordination of district education department
Program costs •  Budget: PRs 120 million per year for 5 districts
•  Targeting cost: PRs 7,011,000
•  Enrollement cost: PRs 8,022,655
•  Other administrative costs: PRs 650,000
•  Total administrative costs: PRs 15,683,655
Sources: Government of Pakistan 2007; Mohammad Farooq, program offi cial; country context: World Development Indicators database 
2008.
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity.
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Country Context
General
Population (total) 159 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $2,288 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 73.6% (2002)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 65.6% total (2006)
57.3% for girls, 73.5% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 29.7% total (2006)
25.8% for girls, 33.3% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
41.5% (2001)
Births attended by skilled health staff 31% (2005)
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Pakistan
Program: Participation in Education through Innovative Scheme for the Excluded Vulnerable
Year started 2003
Status Pilot and closed
Targeting
Target population Children of poor and disadvantaged people 
Targeting method Geographic targeting of union councils/districts, using literacy rate; selection on 
the basis of poverty ranking
Coverage 8,000 students
Incidence Not available
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure PRs 600 quarterly for 1 child, and an additional PRs 200 quarterly if the 
household has 2 or more children
Payee Student’s household
Payment method Direct transfer via postal money order 
Payment frequency Quarterly 
Duration As long as eligible 
Additional benefi ts None 
Conditions
Health None
Education •  Enrollment in grades 0–5 (primary) in a government school in a target district/
union council
•  School attendance on at least 80% of school days
Other None 
Verifi cation of compliance–method NGOs and education department monitor the compliance through attendance 
records maintained by the schools
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Monthly and quarterly reports 
Compliance statistics Not available
Program Administration
Institutional arrangement National Education Foundation, Project Management Implementation Unit of 
provincial and district education departments, with district governments and local 
NGOs
Program costs $706,500
Sources: Nangar Soomro, program offi cial; country context: World Development Indicators database 2008.
Note: NGO = nongovernmental organization; PPP = purchasing power parity.
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Country Context
General
Population (total) 159 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $2,288 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 73.6% (2002)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 65.6% total (2006)
57.3% for girls, 73.5% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 29.7% total (2006)
25.8% for girls, 33.3% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
41.5% (2001)
Births attended by skilled health staff 31% (2005)
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Pakistan
Program: Punjab Education Sector Reform Program/Punjab Female School Stipend Program
Year started 2004
Status Implemented in selected districts of Punjab
Targeting
Target population Girls at secondary-school level 
Targeting method Geographic targeting of districts, using literacy rate
Coverage 186,503 (2003); 279,928 (2006); 455,259 (2007)
Incidence Not available
Household Benefi ts
Benefi t structure PRs 200 per student per month (about $3)
Payee Student’s household
Payment method Direct transfer via postal money order from the education district offi ce 
Payment frequency Quarterly 
Duration As long as eligible 
Additional benefi ts Provision of free textbooks to all school children in grades 1–7 across Punjab
Conditions
Health None
Education • Enrollment in grades 6–8 in a government girl’s school in a target district
• School attendance of at least 80%
Other None 
Verifi cation of compliance–method Education department attendance reports and school progress reports
Verifi cation of compliance–frequency Quarterly
Compliance statistics Not available
Program Administration
Institutional arrangement Project Management Implementation Unit of provincial and district education 
departments, with district governments
Program costs •  FY2005: PRs 450 million
•  FY2006: PRs 960 million
Sources: Chaudhury and Parajuli 2008; country context: World Development Indicators database 2008. 
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity.
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Country Context
General
Population (total) 159 million (2006)
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 $) $2,288 (2006)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2/day 73.6% (2002)
Education
Net enrollment in primary level 65.6% total (2006)
57.3% for girls, 73.5% for boys
Net enrollment in secondary level 29.7% total (2006)
25.8% for girls, 33.3% for boys
Health
Prevalence of child malnutrition 
(stunting)
41.5% (2001)
Births attended by skilled health staff 31% (2005)
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A P P E N D I X  B
Review of CCT Impact 
Evaluations
CCTS HAVE BEEN REMARKABLE IN A VARIETY OF WAYS. ONE OF 
those ways is that perhaps more than any intervention in develop-
ing countries, CCTs have been evaluated credibly for their impact 
on a variety of outcomes—consumption, labor market participation, 
poverty, nutritional status, and schooling to name but a few. Indeed, 
it would not have been possible to write this report, at least not in its 
current form, without these evaluations to draw upon. This appendix 
discusses the strengths and weaknesses of some of the evaluations of 
CCTs that have been conducted. It does not, however, attempt to be 
an exhaustive methodological discussion of all available evaluations of 
CCT programs.
Impact evaluations involve credibly estimating counterfactual out-
comes—the value an outcome would have taken if a given individual 
who benefi ted from a program had not received the benefi t. (The same 
logic obviously also applies to other units, such as households, schools, 
or municipalities.) However, a given individual is never observed hav-
ing both received and not received an intervention at the same point 
in time. Impact evaluation therefore can be thought of as a problem of 
missing data.
Drawing on the medical literature, studies of impact evaluation often 
refer to comparisons between a “treatment” group (those who received 
an intervention) and a “comparison” or “control” group (those who did 
not receive it). The comparison or control group is constructed in such a 
way as to make it an appropriate counterfactual for the treatment group. 
The diffi culty therefore involves making those two groups comparable, 
except for the presence or absence of an intervention. For example, an 
evaluation of the impact of a CCT program on schooling would attempt 
to ensure that treatment and control groups are truly comparable in 
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terms of both their “observable” characteristics (variables like parental 
education) and their “unobservable” characteristics (variables like the 
motivation or inherent ability of children). A failure to make the two 
groups comparable in terms of those and other characteristics could 
bias the results. 
There are different ways of estimating counterfactual outcomes, 
including random assignment, “quasi-experimental” methods like 
instrumental variables and regression discontinuity (RDD), and 
nonexperimental methods like regression techniques, matching, and 
double (or higher-order) differencing. All of those methods have their 
strengths and weaknesses, and all will be more credible in some settings 
than in others. Indeed, one of the most important lessons from the 
rapidly growing literature on impact evaluation is that blindly applying 
a given method or technique is unlikely to be a sensible approach to the 
evaluation problem. Rather, what is needed is a careful and thoughtful 
analysis of the extent to which the assumptions made by each of those 
methods are likely to hold when attempting to answer a particular ques-
tion with a given data set.
The evaluations of CCTs have used a variety of methods. A num-
ber of programs have been evaluated using random assignment. 
Randomization involves using a lottery to assign one group to treatment 
and another to control. If the sample is large enough, this method has 
the virtue of equating all characteristics, observable as well as unob-
servable, of the treatment and control groups. Differences in outcomes 
between the two groups after the intervention then can be interpreted 
credibly as causal estimates of program impact. Because randomization 
requires no further assumptions, it is often regarded as the gold standard 
for evaluations. 
When Mexico’s Oportunidades program began its operations in rural 
areas in the late 1990s, it randomly assigned a subsample of eligible vil-
lages to treatment and control groups. The fi rst group of villages began 
receiving the program in 1998, whereas the second group was held back 
for approximately one year. In addition, rather than conducting an in-
house evaluation, Oportunidades administrators hired the International 
Food Policy Research Institute and a respected consortium of interna-
tional researchers to conduct the evaluation. Also, the data from the 
evaluation were made available to the public on the Internet so that 
other researchers could replicate or challenge the fi ndings. Considering 
that it was diffi cult to predict ex ante whether the program would work, 
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these decisions were very brave—and infl uential. But the decisions have 
been vindicated: the Oportunidades data have been used in dozens of 
studies, and were infl uential in causing the spread of CCTs beyond the 
countries where they fi rst were implemented, Brazil and Mexico.
In this report, we draw heavily on the Oportunidades data, both 
using existing studies and in our own calculations. Some of the more 
inf luential papers using the Oportunidades data include Schultz 
(2004), Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd (2005), and de Janvry and 
Sadoulet (2006) on education outcomes; Gertler (2004), Rivera et al. 
(2004), and Behrman and Hoddinott (2005) on nutrition outcomes; 
and Hoddinott and Skoufi as (2004) and Skoufi as (2005) on consump-
tion patterns and poverty. More recently, the random assignment 
of Oportunidades has been used to estimate longer-term effects on 
outcomes, including completed schooling and test scores (Behrman, 
Parker, and Todd 2005), and investment and savings behavior (Gertler, 
Martínez, and Rubio-Codina 2006)—and we draw heavily on those 
studies as well. Finally, a handful of recent reports make use of the 
randomized assignment in Oportunidades to estimate structural behav-
ioral models (Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago 2005; Todd and Wolpin 
2006a). 
Nevertheless, even the Oportunidades data have their limitations 
(see, in particular, thoughtful discussions by Parker and Teruel [2005] 
and Parker, Rubalcava, and Teruel [2008]). Despite the experimental 
design, there appear to have been some signifi cant differences between 
individuals who received transfers and those who did not (Behrman 
and Todd 1999). As a result, many studies using the Oportunidades 
data have focused on differences in the growth rates of outcomes 
between treated and control communities or individuals—a so-called 
differences-in-differences approach—rather than on simple differences 
in outcomes at follow-up. This approach is sensible and will tend to 
remove the source of bias if it is time invariant and additive—probably 
a reasonable assumption. 
Another shortcoming of the Oportunidades data is that merging 
the data across waves of the surveys, which is necessary to construct 
the panels needed for a differences-in-differences approach, appears 
to have been a serious problem, with large fractions that could not be 
merged, especially in the evaluations that have used the data on anthro-
pometrics. This shortcoming leaves researchers analyzing the impact of 
Oportunidades transfers on nutrition outcomes with the diffi cult choice 
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between two options: (1) to work with a smaller panel of households 
or children that could be merged effectively (the approach taken by 
Behrman and Hoddinott [2005]), which could result in biases associ-
ated with large and possibly nonrandom attrition out of the sample; 
or (2) to ignore any baseline differences between the two groups (the 
approach taken by Gertler [2004]), which essentially assumes that 
the differences between the two groups are negligible. More generally, 
attrition across survey rounds in Oportunidades appears to be non-
negligible and correlated with the likelihood of being in the program, 
which also can introduce biases (see the discussion in Parker, Rubalcava, 
and Teruel [2008]).
Following from the Oportunidades evaluation, a number of pro-
grams in other countries launched randomized evaluations. These 
included evaluations of the RPS and Atención a Crisis programs in 
Nicaragua, PRAF in Honduras, and the BDH program in Ecuador. 
We use those evaluations quite extensively here, although some have 
limitations that we discuss below.
The evaluations of the RPS and Atención a Crisis programs in 
Nicaragua seem to have worked well. In both cases, the randomized 
design was successful—there appear to be no signifi cant differences 
between treated and control households at baseline. Attrition rates in 
the evaluation of RPS were reasonably low (approximately 15 percent 
over four years) and, in the case of the evaluation of Atención a Crisis, 
extremely low (only 1.3 percent of households were lost between base-
line and follow-up, although the period between the two surveys was 
short—approximately nine months). Moreover, attrition appears to be 
uncorrelated with treatment status, and the characteristics of attrited 
and other households were very similar—again, limiting the potential 
for important biases. Finally, there was no contamination of the control 
group, and take-up among eligible households was high. For all of those 
reasons, reports based on those evaluations—including Maluccio and 
Flores (2005), Maluccio (2005, 2008), and Macours, Schady, and Vakis 
(2008)—are likely to provide robust evidence of the impact of CCT 
programs in Nicaragua, at least during a pilot phase.
The randomized evaluation of PRAF in Honduras also appears to 
have worked reasonably well, although it faced a number of challenges. 
On the health side, the evaluation design originally considered four 
groups: (1) one group of municipalities in which households would 
receive the CCT, (2) another group in which there would be a supply-
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side intervention to improve health services, (3) a group of municipali-
ties that would receive both interventions, and (4) a group that would 
serve as a control. In practice, however, the supply-side intervention was 
not implemented and so could not be evaluated (Morris, Flores et al. 
2004). Moreover, because of the relatively small number of households 
involved, there were some important baseline differences. For example, 
at baseline, the fraction of households that had received fi ve or more 
antenatal visits was 37.9 percent in the group randomly assigned to 
receive the CCT intervention only, and 48.9 percent in the control 
group. That fi nding raises the possibility that some of the impact that 
was estimated—an 18.7 percentage point impact on the probability that 
a woman had received fi ve antenatal visits—could be a result of mean 
reversion, as treated households simply caught up with those in the 
control group. Also, the evaluation of the effects of PRAF on education 
faced a problem in that the baseline survey was collected fi rst among 
households in the treatment group (between August and October 2000) 
and only then for households in the control group (between November 
and December 2000). As Glewwe and Olinto (2004) discuss, that 
complicates matters because November and December are important 
coffee-harvesting months in Honduras and therefore baseline levels of 
child labor were signifi cantly higher in control than in treatment areas, 
and school attendance levels were lower. For most outcomes, the authors 
reasonably focus on single-difference estimates of program impact (dif-
ferences between treatment and control groups at follow-up), rather 
than differences-in-differences (differences in the growth rates between 
treatment and control groups), because the latter could have been 
biased by the artifi cially high levels of child labor at baseline among the 
control group. That kind of unexpected complication underlines the 
challenges of running randomized evaluations in practice, although 
some of the same problems obviously can occur with nonexperimental 
evaluations.
In Ecuador, there have been numerous evaluations of the BDH 
program. Paxson and Schady (2008) use panel data to estimate pro-
gram effects on measures of child health and cognitive development. 
Households were assigned randomly to treatment and control groups, 
and there were no differences in observables at baseline between the two 
groups. Take-up among the treated was reasonably high (approximately 
75 percent) and contamination of the control group was low (less than 
4 percent). Attrition in the survey was low as well—6 percent of the 
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sample at baseline could not be re-interviewed at follow-up—and is 
uncorrelated with treatment status. 
Other evaluations of the BDH pose more serious identifi cation chal-
lenges. The data used by Edmonds and Schady (2008), Schady and 
Araujo (2008), and Schady and Rosero (2008) to analyze the impact of 
the program on school enrollment, child work, and household consump-
tion patterns also are based on a randomized experiment. A lottery was 
used to assign households with school-age children to treatment and con-
trol groups, and that lottery appears to have been successful (the authors 
document that there are no baseline differences between the two groups 
in observable characteristics). However, there was a substantial contami-
nation of the control group, 48 percent of whom received transfers. The 
precise reasons for the contamination are unclear. It appears that the list 
of households randomly excluded from the program was not passed on 
immediately to operational staff activating households for transfers. That 
situation was corrected after a few weeks but, as the authors explain, with-
holding transfers from households that already had begun to receive them 
was no longer feasible. Moreover, the contamination of the control group 
clearly was nonrandom: Schady and Araujo (2008) document signifi cant 
differences between households that actually received transfers and those 
that did not (as opposed to lottery winners and lottery losers), especially 
with regard to education levels.
The solution adopted by Edmonds and Schady, Schady and Araujo, 
and Schady and Rosero is the following. They fi rst focus on differ-
ences in outcomes between households assigned to the treatment and 
control groups by the lottery, rather than on differences between those 
who received the transfers and those who did not receive them. These 
so-called intent-to-treat effects abstract from the contamination of the 
experiment, and provide a lower-bound on the estimated impact of 
the BDH. The authors also present estimates in which assignment by 
the lottery is used as an instrument for receiving BDH transfers. That 
approach—using “partial randomization” as an exogenous source of 
variation, as proposed by Imbens and Angrist (1994)—is convincing 
because lottery status is clearly random, and Schady and Araujo show 
that there is a strong fi rst stage. Nevertheless, it is not without costs. The 
estimated coeffi cients are local average treatment effects (LATE) that 
apply to “compliers”—those whose probability of receiving transfers was 
affected by the lottery (see Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996). Those 
compliers cannot be identifi ed without additional assumptions. If there 
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is heterogeneity of treatment effects, the LATE coeffi cients (although 
unbiased for the group of compliers) may not be relevant for other 
households in the sample. The external validity of the results reported in 
these papers, as in any other instrumental-variables regression, therefore 
may be somewhat limited. 
Another paper that uses the Ecuador data to estimate BDH program 
effects on school enrollment is by Oosterbeek, Ponce, and Schady 
(2008). The authors begin by reproducing results very similar to those 
in Schady and Araujo (2008). As they point out, however, the sample of 
households used by Schady and Araujo are all drawn from “around” the 
20th percentile of the proxy means. The reason for this is that the BDH 
originally envisioned two tiers of transfers, corresponding to households 
in the fi rst and second quintiles of the proxy means. The original evalu-
ation design therefore was based on RDD, with two cut-offs—one at 
the threshold between the fi rst and second quintiles, another at the 
threshold between the second and third quintiles. However, after the 
sample was drawn, but before any of the households started receiving 
transfers, President Lucio Gutiérrez announced that all households in 
the fi rst and second quintiles of the proxy means would receive transfers 
of the same magnitude. That decision obviously invalidated the original 
evaluation design for households around the threshold between the fi rst 
and second quintiles. As a solution to this problem, it was agreed that 
the sample of households around that lower threshold would be assigned 
randomly to treatment and control groups—regardless of whether they 
were “just above” or “just below” the original cut-off.
Oosterbeek, Ponce, and Schady (2008) compare BDH program 
effects “around” the 20th percentile of the proxy means—estimated 
by instrumental variables, as described above—with those “around” 
the 40th percentile of the proxy means. Those latter estimates use 
RDD. In practice, this is a case of “fuzzy” RDD—households below 
the cut-off established by the 40th percentile of the proxy means are 
much more likely to receive transfers than those above, but a small 
fraction of ineligibles (approximately 8 percent) nonetheless received 
BDH transfers. Oosterbeek, Ponce, and Schady therefore instrument 
receiving BDH transfers with a dummy variable that takes on the value 
of 1 for households below the cut-off given by the 40th percentile, after 
fl exibly accounting for the relationship between school enrollment and 
the score on the proxy means test. On the basis of those estimates, they 
conclude that the BDH had an impact on the enrollment decisions 
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made by “very poor” households (those around the 20th percentile of 
the proxy means) but no effect for “less poor” households (those around 
the 40th percentile). That conclusion is plausible, given that there is a 
good deal of evidence suggesting that CCT program effects on human 
capital outcomes, including school enrollment, tend to be larger among 
poorer households (for example, Maluccio and Flores [2005] on the 
RPS in Nicaragua; Filmer and Schady [2008] on the JFPR program in 
Cambodia). Nevertheless, the fact that the LATE estimates around the 
20th and 40th percentiles of the proxy means refer to different groups 
of “complier” households somewhat muddies the interpretation put 
forward by Oosterbeek, Ponce, and Schady.
Two other evaluations of CCT programs use instrumental variables. 
Morris, Olinto et al. (2004) and Braido, Olinto, and Perrone (2008) 
evaluate the impact of the Bolsa Alimentação program in Brazil. The 
identifi cation in those reports is ingenious. Both papers describe a series 
of administrative errors whereby some potential benefi ciaries inadver-
tently were excluded from program benefi ts. Entire batches of benefi cia-
ries were lost when fi les were transferred from participating municipali-
ties to a central data-processing unit in Brasilia, and the data-processing 
software initially rejected applications with names having nonstandard 
characters, such as é, ç, or ô. Morris, Olinto et al. and Braido, Olinto, 
and Perrone argue that this source of variation is as good as random, 
and therefore is uncorrelated with potential outcomes. That argument 
seems convincing. But given that these are LATE, the external validity 
of the estimated effects is unclear.
During the Indonesian crisis of 1997–98, the government made 
children in poor households eligible for a “scholarship” program. Given 
the crisis context, it is not surprising that little attention was paid to a 
possible evaluation of the effect of the program. Sparrow (2007) runs 
ordinary least squares regressions that suggest the program increased 
enrollment for children aged 10–12 by about 8 percentage points. He 
also uses “mistargeting” resulting from outdated poverty data as an 
instrument for receipt of the scholarship program. On the basis of those 
calculations, he estimates a larger program effect on enrollment (about 
10 percentage points) for children aged 10–12. However, the identify-
ing assumption—in effect, that enrollment decisions respond to current 
but not lagged poverty levels—is open to question. 
A reasonably large number of papers have used RDD to estimate 
CCT program effects. In addition to Oosterbeek, Ponce, and Schady 
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(2008), discussed above, these include evaluations of Chile Solidario 
(Galasso 2006), of the PATH program in Jamaica (Levy and Ohls 
2007), of the CESSP program in Cambodia (Filmer and Schady 2009a, 
2009b, 2009c), and of the Turkey Social Risk Mitigation Project 
(Ahmed, Adato et al. 2006; Ahmed, Gilligan et al. 2006; Ahmed et 
al. 2007).
Levy and Ohls (2007) report intent-to-treat estimates of the impact 
of PATH. Take-up was high among eligible households (those below 
the cut-off of the proxy means)—approximately 80 percent—and the 
fraction of ineligible households (those above the cut-off) was reasonably 
low—approximately 10 percent. The authors collected both baseline and 
follow-up data. They experiment with various control functions for the 
proxy means, and settle on a linear formulation. They also present the 
results from a variety of placebo experiments, all of which suggest that, 
controlling for a linear formulation, there are no jumps at the threshold of 
the proxy means at baseline in any of a large number of observables. That 
fi nding adds considerable credibility to the identifi cation strategy. One 
potential source of concern is the fact that the group of households that 
received PATH transfers (the treatment group) appears to have applied 
to the program somewhat earlier than those who did not receive transfers 
(the comparison group). That fact raises the possibility that there was 
selection on some unobservable related to “eagerness” or “need.” However, 
the solution adopted by Levy and Ohls—to control for the date of appli-
cation in all of the main regressions—seems reasonable. 
Ahmed, Adato et al. (2006) and Ahmed, Gilligan et al. (2006) also 
use RDD to estimate the impact of the CCT program in Turkey. As 
with other CCTs, the score on the proxy means is a signifi cant but 
imperfect predictor of treatment: about 9 percent of households do 
not “comply” with their assignment (either eligible households that do 
not receive transfers, or ineligible households that do receive them). A 
conservative and standard approach to the problem of imperfect compli-
ance would have been to use the initial assignment by the proxy means 
to calculate intent-to-treat estimates of program effects, or to calculate 
LATE estimates by instrumenting program participation with the eligi-
bility rule based on the proxy means. Instead, the authors simply drop 
those groups of “ineligible benefi ciaries” and “eligible nonbenefi ciaries” 
from their sample, despite the fact that, as they acknowledge, “dropping 
those households from the sample for estimation contributes potential 
bias to the impact estimates” (Ahmed et al. 2007, p. 123).
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Other papers have used double- or triple-differencing techniques 
to estimate CCT program effects. Both Filmer and Schady (2008) 
and Chaudhury and Parajuli (2008) estimate the effect of a CCT 
program for which girls, but not boys, are eligible in Cambodia and in 
the Punjab area of Pakistan, respectively. Filmer and Schady fi rst com-
pare the growth rates of girls’ enrollment in districts that were eligible 
for the JFPR scholarship program with those that were not eligible. 
However, they show that preprogram growth rates in girls’ enrollment 
were already higher in eligible districts, which suggests that the com-
mon trends assumption underlying their double-differencing estimates 
is unlikely to hold. They therefore use triple-differencing techniques, 
comparing the growth rate of girls’ enrollment, relative to boys’ enroll-
ment, in JFPR-eligible and in other districts. The authors show that 
this growth rate is higher in JFPR-eligible districts. A similar approach 
(using boys as an additional control in estimation), with similar conclu-
sions, is followed by Chaudhury and Parajuli in their analysis for the 
Punjab area of Pakistan. 
Triple-differencing of this sort can provide credible estimates of 
program effects under reasonable assumptions—essentially, that in the 
absence of the program, the enrollment of girls, relative to that of boys, 
would have grown by the same amounts in treated and control districts. 
Showing that preexisting trends in the relative enrollment growth rate 
are very similar, as is done in Filmer and Schady (2008), provides reas-
surance on the identifi cation strategy. In addition, both Chaudhury 
and Parajuli and Filmer and Schady compare the results from this 
triple-differencing technique with other estimates, using different data 
sets (for example, household data rather than administrative data), and 
they show that the estimated effects are very similar. 
Separately estimating program effects using household and admin-
istrative data is also the basis of Khandker, Pitt, and Fuwa’s (2003) 
analysis of the Female Stipend Program in Bangladesh. The authors 
show that estimates of program effects on girls’ enrollment are similar 
using both sources of data. They also present estimates of program 
effects for boys, who were ineligible for the program. Using household 
data, they fi nd no effect on boys’ school enrollment; but using the 
administrative data, they estimate a worryingly large, negative effect 
of the program—29 percentage points, or about three times the mag-
nitude of the positive effect on girls’ enrollment. The authors point 
out that the administrative data cover only Female Stipend Program 
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schools, whereas the household data cover enrollment at any school, 
regardless of whether it was included in the program. Khandker, Pitt, 
and Fuwa suggest that the difference in boys’ effects in the administra-
tive and household data is a result of the transfer of boys out of program 
schools.1 Although that suggestion is plausible, the very large magnitude 
of the coeffi cient raises some concerns about the estimation strategy and 
results in the Bangladesh study.
Attanasio, Battistin et al. (2005), Attanasio, Gómez et al. (2005), 
and Attanasio et al. (2006) identify program effects on the basis of 
changes over time in treatment and a matched set of ineligible com-
munities to estimate the impact of the Familias en Acción program 
in Colombia. The identifying assumption therefore is that outcomes 
would have followed the same trends in both groups of communities 
in the absence of the program. As with any evaluation that matches 
eligible and ineligible communities, there is a concern that the charac-
teristics that defi ne eligibility are themselves correlated with outcomes 
or changes in outcomes. This is untestable, but the authors provide 
some ancillary support for their identifi cation strategy: They show that 
average per capita household labor income was higher in comparison 
communities than in treatment communities prior to the implementa-
tion of the Familias en Acción program, but the trends in income over 
three preprogram years are similar. Nevertheless, that evaluation faced 
other challenges, including the fact that participation in the Familias 
program made households ineligible to participate in a community-
based child care program, Hogares Comunitarios.
Another complication that arose in the Familias en Acción evalua-
tion resulted from the program already having been announced in the 
treatment areas at the time the baseline survey was collected. As a result, 
families in treatment areas may have anticipated the effect of the pro-
gram by enrolling their children in school. Under those circumstances, 
differences-in-differences that focus on changes in enrollment Et–Et–1 
would likely underestimate the true program effects. Foreseeing this 
problem, the evaluation team collected retrospective data on schooling 
at the time of the “baseline” survey, and constructed a “pre-baseline” 
measure of school enrollment, Et–2. This, rather than the measure Et–1, 
is used in the differences-in-differences estimation. 
A similar estimation strategy—first differences combined with 
matching—is also the basis for a number of evaluations of the impact 
of the urban Oportunidades program in Mexico. However, the pattern 
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of program effects estimated with those data is somewhat surprising. 
For example, Todd et al. (2005) estimate that the largest impacts of 
urban Oportunidades on school enrollment are found among children 
aged 6–7 years at baseline—a fi nding that is puzzling on a number of 
grounds: baseline enrollment in the urban sample for this age group is 
high, and decreases with child age; children in this age group would 
have been enrolled in grades that were ineligible for subsidies; and 
fi nally, the results for the Oportunidades sample in rural areas suggest 
that program effects are largest for children in age groups close to the 
transition from primary to secondary school, rather than for the young-
est children (Schultz 2004). Although it is conceivable that the pattern 
of program effects in rural and urban areas of Mexico are very different, 
it is also possible (and perhaps more likely) that the double-differencing, 
matching estimation strategy introduced some hard-to-correct-for 
biases into the urban estimates.
Given that all communities in the original (randomized) Opor-
tunidades rural sample started receiving payments in December 1999, 
more recent evaluations of the impact of Oportunidades in rural areas 
also have had to rely on matching to create a set of comparison com-
munities. However, that effort has faced a number of important diffi -
culties. One hundred fi fty-two comparison communities were matched 
from a pool of 14,000 potential communities that had not received 
the program. The matching was done on the basis of the locality-level 
information from the 2000 Mexican census. 
There are a number of reasons why this comparison group—and 
estimates of program effects that use it—should be treated with cau-
tion.2 First, the comparison communities were drawn from different 
geographic areas than was the treatment group, and therefore they may 
have had other local area effects that could affect the levels or changes 
in the outcomes of interest. Second, although there appear to be no 
differences between the matched sets of treatment and comparison 
communities (not surprising, given that community characteristics were 
used to create the matches), individuals in the two sets of communities 
differ signifi cantly in virtually every characteristic analyzed, and the 
differences often are large. For example, mean schooling levels of the 
household head and his spouse are approximately 2.7 in the original 
Oportunidades communities, but 4.5 in the matched comparison com-
munities. Clearly, this could introduce a number of important biases. 
Third, to construct a “pre-intervention baseline” for the comparison 
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communities, data were collected on households in those communities 
in 2003, asking them about their characteristics in 1997. It seems rea-
sonable to assume that this would introduce a good deal of measurement 
error based on recall bias to those data. Indeed, some recent work on 
China suggests that such data collection can work quite poorly (Chen, 
Mu, and Ravallion 2006). Moreover, these retrospective, pre-interven-
tion data were collected in the matched set of communities, but not in 
the original Oportunidades communities for which the data originally 
collected in 1997 were used. As a result, recall bias may affect the pro-
pensity score used for matching. Finally, migration may have introduced 
selection problems if the sample of people living in the comparison com-
munities in 2003—those who were asked about their characteristics 
in 1997—was different from those people who actually lived there in 
1997. For all of those reasons, and because of the abundance of studies 
on Mexico that use the original, randomized (and likely more credible) 
data collected in the fi rst generation of Oportunidades evaluations, in 
this report we do not make extensive use of these “second-generation” 
data collected in recent rounds of the Oportunidades evaluations. Our 
choice obviously has some costs because it limits the extent to which 
we can discuss program impacts on outcomes that only recently have 
been collected in the Oportunidades surveys (for example, adult obesity, 
hypertension, diabetes, or child cognitive development).
Similarly, we do not make extensive use of a handful of other evalu-
ations, including two that are available for CCT programs in Latin 
America. In Brazil, Cardoso and Portela Souza (2004) use data from 
the 2000 population census to evaluate the impact of the Bolsa Escola 
program. They conclude that children in households that received cash 
transfers were 3–4 percentage points more likely to attend school than 
were matched children in the control group. However, the set of covari-
ates used to construct the propensity score is small, and it is not imme-
diately clear why “comparable” households received transfers in some 
cases but not in others. Moreover, Cardoso and Portela Souza are not 
able to disentangle transfers made by Bolsa Escola, the CCT program, 
from other income transfer programs in Brazil.
An evaluation also is available for the Programa Nacional de Becas 
Estudiantiles in Argentina. Heinrich (2007) uses matching methods 
to make two sets of comparisons: fi rst, between children who were in 
the Becas program and other children, and, second, between children 
who were in the Becas program for one year only and other children 
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who were in the program for two years or longer. Following Behrman, 
Cheng, and Todd (2004), who analyze the impact of a preschool 
program in Bolivia, Heinrich refers to the fi rst set of comparisons as 
estimates of “average” impacts of the program, and to the second set of 
comparisons as estimates of “marginal” effects. Heinrich argues that 
the marginal program effects are less likely to be biased if selection into 
the program is determined by student characteristics unobserved by 
the researcher, but the duration of program exposure is not. However, 
estimates of “marginal” program effects need not be free of endogeneity 
biases. More able students, or students who are different in hard-to-
observe ways, may not only be more likely to receive Becas; they may 
also be likely to stay in the program for longer. Indeed, in an earlier 
version of the paper (Heinrich and Cabrol 2005) it appears that, after 
the fi rst year, students who eventually would receive the Becas for two 
years had signifi cantly lower grade repetition and signifi cantly higher 
grade averages than those who would receive the program for only one 
year. This suggests that selection is a serious concern with this identi-
fi cation strategy. Also, interpretation of the estimated grade repetition 
effects reported by Heinrich (2007) may be problematic because there 
is anecdotal evidence that some teachers promoted Becas benefi ciaries 
to ensure that they would remain eligible for the program, a point dis-
cussed by Heinrich.
In sum, there are many evaluations of CCT program effects. Broadly 
speaking, these evaluations can be grouped into four categories: First, 
there are evaluations of small-scale pilot programs, often based on ran-
dom assignment. These evaluations generally have worked well, as is the 
case with the evaluations of the RPS and Atención a Crisis programs in 
Nicaragua and of the PRAF evaluation in Honduras. Random assign-
ment appears to have equated the baseline characteristics of treatment 
and control groups effectively; attrition has been low. Under these 
circumstances, simple comparisons of means at follow-up between 
both groups provide credible estimates of program effects. The main 
limitation of these evaluations—and an important one—is the fact that 
the programs were small-scale pilot projects. For a variety of reasons, 
it is unclear how well the fi ndings from these evaluations approximate 
the impacts of large, nationwide programs. Households participating 
in the pilot programs may be aware that they are participating in an 
experiment, and that may lead them to behave differently in a variety 
of ways—for example, they may be more likely to comply with the 
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conditions or be receptive to the program’s social marketing; staff 
administering these pilots may be particularly motivated to demon-
strate that the pilot programs work. As a result, these small-scale pilots 
may not be an accurate refl ection of how well a much larger program 
administered by average staff would work in practice. Put differently, 
the evaluations of the small-scale, randomized pilot programs provide 
very accurate estimates of the impact of those pilots, but the external 
validity of the fi ndings may be somewhat open to question.
Second, there are attempts to randomize large-scale programs for a 
period of time—often by randomizing the timing of the expansion of 
a program. That was the case with the rollout of the Oportunidades 
program in rural areas and the expansion of the coverage of the BDH 
program in Ecuador. Because both programs already had been imple-
mented on a large scale, their evaluations face fewer questions about 
external validity than do the evaluations of pilot programs in Nicaragua 
and Honduras. Nevertheless, both evaluations also faced diffi culties. 
Pressure to enroll all eligible benefi ciaries shortened the period for 
which the original Oportunidades control communities did not receive 
transfers. Moreover, the rapid expansion of the program, even before 
households in the original control communities started receiving trans-
fers, meant that control communities often literally were surrounded 
by other communities that were already receiving them. Under such 
circumstances, it is likely that households in the control communities 
may have expected to receive Oportunidades transfers before they actu-
ally started to receive them, which complicates interpretation of the 
estimated program effects. In the case of the BDH evaluation, there 
was substantial contamination of the control group in the sample used 
to estimate impacts on schooling, child labor, and consumption (see 
Edmonds and Schady 2008; Schady and Araujo 2008; Schady and 
Rosero 2008), although not in the sample that was used to estimate 
program effects on child health and development (Paxson and Schady 
2008). The general point is that maintaining random assignment in a 
large-scale program is extremely diffi cult for political reasons. In addi-
tion, the Oportunidades data have faced other problems, including 
what appear to be very high levels of attrition and diffi culties merging 
data across survey rounds, particularly for the anthropometric data. 
Third, a number of evaluations have used RDD, including evalua-
tions in Cambodia, Chile, Ecuador, Jamaica, Pakistan, and Turkey. A 
clear advantage of RDD is that it generally does not require program 
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administrators to alter the rules whereby potential benefi ciaries are 
made eligible or ineligible for transfers. As a result, the pressure to incor-
porate households in the control group into the program tends to be less 
serious than with randomized experiments. Some contamination of the 
study design is not unusual (in a number of countries, some ineligible 
households received transfers and some eligible ones did not), but the 
solution to that problem is well known: estimating intent-to-treat effects 
on the basis of the initial assignment, or LATE estimates instrument-
ing program receipt with assignment. The main shortcoming of these 
RDD evaluations is that the estimated effect is “local,” applying only 
to households around the eligibility threshold. There appears to be con-
siderable evidence of heterogeneity of CCT treatment effects (Maluccio 
and Flores 2005; Filmer and Schady 2008; Paxson and Schady 2008). 
For this reason, it is not clear that these estimates are relevant for other 
households whose value of the proxy means places them well below 
the threshold. This heterogeneity is perhaps less of a concern for the 
evaluations of programs in Chile and Turkey, where the CCT attempts 
to reach only a very small fraction of households (around 5 percent), 
than for evaluations in Ecuador, where the CCT attempts to make 
payments to fully 40 percent of households. A second potential disad-
vantage of RDD is that, as the value of the threshold becomes better 
known, households or sympathetic local program offi cials may attempt 
to manipulate scores to place some families who would normally have 
been ineligible for the program “just” below the eligibility threshold. 
Because that kind of manipulation is likely to be selective, affecting 
some households more than others (possibly on the basis of unobserv-
able household characteristics), it could introduce serious biases into 
estimates of program effects.3
Finally, a number of evaluations have used differences-in-differ-
ences, often combined with matching, to estimate program effects. 
In some cases, as in the evaluation of the Familias en Acción program 
in Colombia, matching was done before the program began. In other 
cases, as with the second-generation Oportunidades evaluations dis-
cussed above, matching was done after the fact on the basis of admin-
istrative and retrospective data. This second approach adds a layer of 
uncertainty to the matches and the estimated program effects. Many 
of the more convincing evaluations using differences-in-differences also 
present a variety of validation exercises—for example, showing that 
preexisting trends are not different in the two groups of households or 
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communities, or showing that outcomes that one would not expect to 
have been affected by the treatment did not change differentially for 
the two groups. Attempts to triangulate the results with more than one 
source of data also can add to the credibility of the results.
CCTs truly have been unusual in how much and how seriously they 
have been evaluated. Few, if any, of these evaluations are without fault. 
However, the body of credible research on the impact of CCTs on a 
variety of outcomes is arguably without parallel in development. We 
conclude this appendix by discussing some areas that should receive 
high priority in impact evaluations (and research, more generally) on 
CCTs in the future.
First, much more needs to be known about the long-term effects of 
CCT programs in a variety of dimensions. Do CCTs lead to long-term 
reductions in poverty, as might be suggested by the results from Mexico 
that show households investing some of the transfer? Or does it take lon-
ger for households to respond to transfers by reducing their labor supply, 
in which case the short-term effects on consumption may overestimate 
the long-term effects? Do the children of families who received CCTs 
complete more schooling and eventually earn higher wages, or do the 
somewhat mixed and limited effects on learning and nutritional status 
translate into only small wage gains? Do families change their fertility 
and composition in the long term in response to transfers? Those are 
particularly diffi cult questions to answer because they involve revisiting 
households that received transfers many years earlier, and there is a great 
likelihood that they (or their children) have moved. Re-interview rates 
may be correspondingly low, and the possibility for substantial estima-
tion biases is serious. Nevertheless, the returns to carefully constructing 
and studying long-term panels of this sort should be very high, and 
doing so is a priority for future evaluation work.
Second, although much is known about the effect of CCTs on some 
outcomes—such as consumption levels, school enrollment, health 
service utilization—much less is known about a variety of other impor-
tant outcomes: Under what circumstances do CCTs affect learning 
outcomes, and how does that interact with the quality of the supply of 
schooling? Can CCTs be used to seek changes in sexual behaviors, as 
has been proposed in discussions about how best to limit the transmis-
sion of HIV/AIDS? In many countries, CCTs make payments through 
the banking system, and in some cases a fraction of payments is depos-
ited directly into a savings account for a household. Have those payment 
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methods resulted in positive spillover effects in households’ ability to 
access and use fi nancial services?
Third, more needs to be done to unpack the CCT effects on out-
comes. Are the changes that are observed a result of the cash, the condi-
tions, the social marketing that generally accompanies the program, or 
the fact that transfers are made to women? How much, and for what 
outcomes, does the magnitude of the transfer matter? Understanding 
the answers to these and related questions is important for the design 
of effi cient CCT programs in the future.
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Notes
Overview
 1. For evidence from a variety of settings, see Thomas (1990, 1994); Lundberg, 
Pollak, and Wales (1997); Dufl o (2003); and Ward-Batts (2008).
 2. For example, see Miguel and Kremer (2004) on deworming and Gimnig et 
al. (2003) on insecticide-treated bednets. There is a large body of literature 
on externalities associated with immunization.
 3. On Colombia, see Attanasio, Battistin, and Mesnard (2008); on Ecuador, 
see Schady and Rosero (2008); on Mexico, see Hoddinott, Skoufi as, 
and Washburn (2000) and Angelucci and Attanasio (2008); and on 
Nicaragua, see Maluccio and Flores (2005) and Macours, Schady, and 
Vakis (2008).
 4. On Brazil, see Yap, Sedlacek, and Orazem (2008); on Cambodia, see 
Filmer and Schady (2009c); on Ecuador, see Edmonds and Schady (2008); 
on Mexico, see Skoufi as and Parker (2001) and Schultz (2004); and on 
Nicaragua, see Maluccio (2005). Exceptions are Attanasio et al. (2006), 
who fi nd the Familias en Acción program has no effect on child work in 
Colombia (although the program does appear to have reduced the amount 
of time dedicated to domestic chores); and Glewwe and Olinto (2004) 
who fi nd the Programa de Asignación Familiar has no effects on child 
work in Honduras.
 5. On remittances, see Teruel and Davis (2000) and Albarran and Attanasio 
(2003) for Mexico, and Nielsen and Olinto (2007) for Honduras and 
Nicaragua. Stecklov et al. (2006) analyze fertility effects of CCT pro-
grams in Honduras, Mexico, and Nicaragua. Angelucci and de Giorgi 
(2008) study village-level general equilibrium effects associated with 
Oportunidades in Mexico. Medium-term effects of transfers are analyzed 
by Gertler, Martínez, and Rubio-Codina (2006) for Mexico, and by 
Maluccio (2008) for Nicaragua. For Mexico and Nicaragua, respectively, 
Skoufi as (2002) and Maluccio (2005) study program effects on the extent 
to which recipient households can smooth income shocks.
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 6. The impact of CCTs on child nutritional status is analyzed by Morris, Olinto 
et al. (2004) for Brazil; by Attanasio, Gómez et al. (2005) for Colombia; 
by Paxson and Schady (2008) for Ecuador; by Gertler (2004), Rivera et al. 
(2004), and Behrman and Hoddinott (2005) for Mexico; and by Maluccio 
and Flores (2005) and Macours, Schady, and Vakis (2008) for Nicaragua.
 7. CCT program effects on school attainment by adults are discussed in 
Behrman, Parker, and Todd (2005). The lack of impact on test scores, 
even among children who have received more schooling, is found by Ponce 
and Bedi (2008) for Ecuador; by Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd (2000) 
for Mexico; and most convincingly, from a methodological point of view, 
by Filmer and Schady (2009b) for Cambodia; and Behrman, Parker, and 
Todd (2005) for Mexico.
 8. de Brauw and Hoddinott (2008) and Schady and Araujo (2008) exploit 
glitches in program implementation in Mexico and Ecuador, respectively. 
Filmer and Schady (2009c) analyze differences in effects across siblings 
for the CESSP program in Cambodia, in which transfers are conditional 
on the enrollment of only one sibling. Simulation methods and structural 
modeling also have been used to estimate the relative importance of income 
and price effects associated with transfers in Brazil (Bourguignon, Ferreira, 
and Leite 2003) and Mexico (Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago 2005; Todd 
and Wolpin 2006a).
Chapter 1 
 1. Several programs that have most of the CCT design features transfer 
not cash but food stamps (the Dominican Republic’s Comer es Primero 
program or Costa Rica’s Supremos) or food (the Bangladesh Food for 
Education program). These programs might be expected to have effects 
similar to those of CCTs.
 2. In Brazil, Bolsa Família is beginning to encourage more explicit links to 
social worker support services for families who are not complying with 
conditions and for especially vulnerable families. Colombia has developed 
the Juntos program, which provides social worker accompaniment similar 
to that of Chile Solidario and eventually might be linked to the CCT 
program. In El Salvador, the CCT program itself provides assistance to 
help families give birth. The government there also has designed parallel 
interventions in the same target municipalities to improve livelihoods for 
small farmers through small-scale productive projects and microcredit. 
 3. Most recently, CCTs have been created in New York City and Australia 
for use among indigenous communities. The New York City CCT built 
explicitly on the experience from developing countries. Staff from the offi ce 
of Mayor Michael Bloomberg and a number of city agencies traveled to 
Mexico to learn about the program. Numerous informational meetings 
also were facilitated by the World Bank so that policy makers design-
ing Opportunity NYC could learn from the experience in developing 
countries—an example of the North learning from the South.
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Chapter 2
 1. Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2008) have pointed out correctly that improv-
ing the functioning of fi nancial markets in developing countries should be 
seen as the “fi rst-best” response to failures that originate in those markets. 
The arguments to address these failures through redistribution instead 
should be seen as conditional on the fi rst-best solution being too costly to 
implement, or be viewed as a temporary substitute.
 2. The net effect of aggregate economic shocks on health and education 
investments varies substantially across countries, depending on the relative 
strength of substitution and income effects (Ferreira and Schady 2008). 
Severe idiosyncratic shocks often lead to investment pauses that can be 
costly.
 3. The “true” private optimal is defi ned counterfactually by the absence of 
misguided beliefs, intrahousehold principal–agent problems, or hyperbolic 
discounting. 
 4. In an excellent survey of the theory and empirics of redistribution in 
kind and in cash, Currie and Gahvari (2007) note that “paternalism is 
intimately related to the idea of merit goods and merit wants, and may be 
a key reason for government intervention” (p. 6).
 5. The concept of merit goods also is related closely to James Tobin’s (1970) 
idea of specifi c egalitarianism. In the context of the United States in the 
late 1960s, Tobin argues that there are some instances, notably education 
and medical care, where “a specifi c egalitarian distribution today may be 
essential for improving the distribution of human capital and earning 
capacity tomorrow” (p. 277). Implicit in that claim is the notion that 
society would value a more egalitarian distribution of earning capacity in 
the future above and beyond the value placed by individual agents on their 
own (or their children’s) improved capacity.
 6. Das, Do, and Özler (2005) and de Janvry and Sadoulet (2006) discuss 
how some of those issues provide justifi cation for CCT programs.
 7. A third use of children’s time—leisure—is ignored in this model. The 
three-way choice among education, child labor, and leisure is analyzed 
both theoretically and empirically by Ravallion and Wodon (2000). 
Those authors fi nd that an enrollment subsidy in Bangladesh (an in-kind 
precursor to the CCTs) leads to increased enrollment, and that most of 
that increase comes from child leisure rather than from child work. The 
authors are careful to recognize that theirs is a very imperfect measure of 
child work, and that some of the time implicitly classifi ed as leisure may 
be spent in homework or other cognitively important activities. The broad 
argument in Ferreira (2008), on which we draw here, will hold if child 
leisure and schooling are complements in the human capital “production 
function.”
 8. It is critical to remember that, although we do not consider other policy 
alternatives (such as investing in the quality of the supply of health or 
education services, or setting up a workfare scheme), it well may be that, 
in general equilibrium, those policies make more sense than either a UCT 
or a CCT. 
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 9. See Piketty (1995) for the original model. Bénabou and Tirole (2006) show 
that stable multiple equilibria can arise in such models, with “incorrect” 
beliefs arising endogenously, being privately rational, and persisting.
 10. There are many reasons why we should expect insuffi cient information 
in low-income settings. For example, if there is residential segregation by 
income, most poor households will observe very few high-education/high-
income adults. Furthermore, if migration is correlated with ability so that 
high-ability people are more likely to migrate, and those high-education 
people who are left behind have low ability, the information problem may 
be more severe. Jensen (2006) discusses this possibility.
 11. Dominitz and Manski (1996) start this line of research in the United States. 
They fi nd no evidence that high school and college students underestimate 
the realized rates of return to schooling. In developing countries, informa-
tion problems could be more severe for a variety of reasons because people 
have less education (and thus less ability to process information on the true 
returns), and less information may be available. There is also an extensive 
body of literature suggesting that education is particularly benefi cial at 
times of economic disequilibria—such as times of signifi cant technologi-
cal change (see classics such as Nelson and Phelps [1966] and Foster and 
Rosenzweig [1996]). It is not clear that households would or could factor 
in these potential gains when making education decisions. Not only does 
education confer benefi ts now (the wage returns in equilibrium), but it 
also is likely to yield even larger benefi ts if things change rapidly.
 12. Trang Nguyen (2007) fi nds that both the mean and the dispersion of per-
ceived (by parents) and realized earnings are similar in Madagascar, a fi nd-
ing that suggests information is not that much of a problem. Nevertheless, 
an intervention in which students and their parents are informed of the 
mean realized returns does induce more effort (more attendance, higher 
test scores). Somehow, the information must (1) lead those parents who 
hold low-return beliefs to correct their beliefs—and therefore to exert 
more effort—without a countervailing effect on the effort of those who 
are overstating the expected returns; or (2) convey the (possibly incorrect) 
notion that the dispersion in returns is low—a notion that would lead 
risk-averse households to invest more in schooling (holding the average 
return constant).
 13. This statement assumes that a child’s education is seen only as an invest-
ment by the household. If education is at least partly seen as a consumption 
good (including as a source of status), there could be an income effect 
even under functioning credit markets. 
 14. As we pointed out in note 13, results change if schooling is seen, at least 
in part, as a consumption good. In that case, the effect of incomplete 
parental altruism will depend on who is seen as consuming schooling. If 
it is seen as the child’s consumption, then the CCT will have an effect 
even under perfect markets. If it is seen as the consumption of the parents 
(for example, by affording higher status or providing child care), then the 
CCT is not needed.
 15. An experiment whereby a specifi ed amount is given to children rather than 
to adults would not solve the problem because it would be confounded 
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by other factors, such as the likely higher discount rate of children and 
possibly irrational behavior among children. For example, Bettinger and 
Slonim (2006) fi nd that children’s choices are consistent with hyperbolic 
discounting: 25 percent of children in their experiment do not make 
rational intertemporal choices within a single two-period time frame. 
 16. The nonwage returns to more education are likely to be at least as large 
for girls as for boys—for example, in terms of health investments.
 17. There is also some evidence that women and men may value boys and girls 
differently, with women investing more on girls than on boys (Thomas 
1994; Dufl o 2003). In those circumstances, conditions can act as a means to 
ensure “equal treatment” regardless of who receives the transfer payment.
 18. The only exception to this pattern is the social assistance transfer to 
the elderly poor and poor disabled (known as the Benefício de Prestação 
Continuada da Loas), which is not conditioned. It should be noted, though, 
that the target groups (elderly, disabled) often are considered “deserving 
poor” because of who they are and not because of what they do.
 19. See Kooreman (2000) for evidence on child benefi ts in the Netherlands, 
and see Schady and Rosero (2008) for evidence from Ecuador.
Chapter 3
 1. For recent reviews of the general literature on design and implementation 
of social assistance programs, see, for example, Samson, van Niekerk, and 
MacWuene (2006); and Grosh et al. (2008). 
 2. To date, only Bolivia’s Juancito Pinto program is targeted broadly to all 
fi rst-graders in public schools.
 3. Coverage is the portion of a population group (for example, decile of 
per capita expenditure [PCE] net of the CCT transfer) that receives the 
transfer. Coverage rates refl ect the time at which the data were collected. 
Some programs have expanded rapidly since the years of the surveys used 
in this study. For example, Brazil’s Bolsa Família program has expanded 
from 5.0 million households in 2004 to 11.1 million in 2006, and its 
coverage in fi gure 3.2 is therefore underestimated.
 4. The CCT programs included Chile Subsidio Unitario Familiar (SUF) 
and Chile Solidario; Brazil’s Bolsa Escola, Bolsa Alimentação, Auxílio 
Gás, and PETI; the Dominican Republic’s Tarjeta de Asistencia Escolar 
(TAE); Mexico’s Oportunidades; and Argentina’s Jefes y Jefas.
 5. Carrillo and Ponce (2008) also estimate that reducing travel time by 60 
minutes to the closest town with a payment agency would increase the 
value of the transfer by about 4 percent—a modest amount. 
 6. Originally, stipends provided by the FSSAP amounted to $18–$45 per 
student per year, but they were reduced to $5–$16 by 2001 (World Bank 
2003). Because the amount of the stipend was fi xed in nominal terms, the 
current transfer is even lower in real terms after adjusting for infl ation.
 7. In Brazil, for example, costs of food and housing are nearly double in São 
Paulo compared with rural areas. More formally, the Laspeyres price index 
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based on food and housing is 1.000 for São Paulo, 0.797 for metropolitan 
Brazil, 0.633 for urban areas excluding metropolitan Brazil, and 0.568 
in rural areas (World Bank 2007). Even in small, more geographically 
homogeneous Honduras, the cost of living in Tegucigalpa is 12 percent 
higher than in rural areas. The Laspeyres index is 1.000 nationally, 1.081 
in Tegucigalpa, and 0.967 in rural areas (World Bank 2006b). 
 8. See chapter 4 of this report for a summary of CCT programs’ impacts on 
fertility.
 9. In Lindert, Skoufi as, and Shapiro (2006), the computations are based on 
posttransfer welfare. In this research report, we principally present results 
based on welfare net of the program transfer. Thus the results for CCTs in 
fi gure 3.1 are not exactly the same as those shown in fi gure 11 of Lindert and 
her coauthors. The comparison with other programs, however, is valid. 
 10. For compliance, see Mutzig (2006) on Brazil, Roberts-Risden (2006) 
on Jamaica, and Government of El Salvador (2008) on El Salvador; for 
Mexico compliance information, see http://www.oportunidades.gob.mx/
indicadores_gestion/main.html.
Chapter 4
 1. Bolsa Alimentação is one of the pilot precursors of the larger CCT pro-
gram now known as Bolsa Família. The analysis of impact in the fi rst and 
second sections uses the evaluation data for Bolsa Alimentação because it 
included expenditure information and therefore is comparable to the other 
countries. In the third section, when we consider the impact of CCTs on 
the national level of poverty, we analyze Bolsa Família’s impact on income 
poverty using less-robust methods.
 2. These programs were chosen because (1) their evaluation studies collected 
consumption or income data, (2) the methods employed to measure impact 
are robust enough, and (3) we have access to the evaluation data and can 
carry out comparable analysis.
 3. Two household surveys were conducted before the start of Oportunidades 
in Mexico. The fi rst survey did not have a consumption module. The 
second one did have a consumption module, but problems in the imple-
mentation of this survey render the consumption data unusable. In 1998, 
a third survey with a consumption module was carried out a few months 
after the start of the program. The results presented in tables 4.1 and 4.2 
are from that third survey and two follow-up surveys done in June and 
October 1999.
 4. The lack of impact of Oportunidades in 1998 is not unexpected because 
the 1998 survey was carried out only a few months after the start of 
the program, and many benefi ciary households had yet to receive their 
transfers.
 5. A number of recent papers consider the impact of the Chile Solidario pro-
gram on employment, consumption, and poverty. Carneiro and Galasso 
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(2008) use regression discontinuity techniques and report very large 
impacts. Their estimates suggest that Chile Solidario resulted in an increase 
of 11 percentage points in the probability that a head of household is 
employed, and a reduction in poverty of 8–11 points. However, Larrañaga, 
Contreras, and Ruiz Tagle (2008) use differences-in-differences techniques 
and fi nd no signifi cant impacts of the program on either employment or 
income. More research is needed to understand the difference between 
these two studies, particularly because of the innovative nature of the 
Chile Solidario program.
 6. In the case of Brazil, we conduct this analysis for the newer Bolsa Família 
program. (Beginning in 2003, Bolsa Família incorporated the earlier and 
smaller Bolsa Alimentação program.) 
 7. This possibility of bias is especially the case for Brazil because there was 
no random assignment of program by location or individual households. 
Benefi ciary households and poor areas were targeted purposefully. In the 
case of Mexico, although Oportunidades was allocated randomly at the 
village level, the randomization was carried out only within a set of prese-
lected rural villages with high poverty levels. Thus, although estimates of 
poverty impacts within that set of preselected villages should be unbiased, 
that may not be true for estimations of poverty impact at the national 
level.
 8. Encouraging effects of CCTs on national poverty are reported elsewhere. 
Brown and Agostini (2008) use census and survey data to estimate the 
extent to which Chile’s success in reducing poverty results, at least in 
part, from a variety of cash transfer programs. The authors use the Elbers, 
Lanjouw, and Lanjouw (2003) methodology to combine census (a 2002 
population census) and survey (the 2003 Caracterización Socioeconómica 
Nacional) data. On the basis of these calculations, they estimate income 
for every individual in the census with and without the transfers. They 
fi nd that transfers signifi cantly reduce the incidence of poverty, and that 
estimated headcount ratios fall by 5–68 percent, with considerable geo-
graphic variation. 
 9. In theory, increases in food consumption could be positive, resulting in 
reductions in child wasting or stunting, for example; or they could be nega-
tive, resulting in increases in obesity and adult diseases such as diabetes.
 10. See Thaler (1999) for a general discussion; and see evidence in Fraker, 
Martini, and Ohls (1995), Kooreman (2000), Jacoby (2002), and Islam 
and Hoddinott (2009). 
 11. A similar pattern is reported by others. Averaging across the three survey 
rounds, Hoddinott, Skoufi as, and Washburn (2000) fi nd that the increase 
in monthly consumption of 151 pesos is substantially smaller than the 
average transfer of 197 pesos per month. Attanasio and Mesnard (2006) 
report that benefi ciaries of Familias en Acción spend only 53,000 pesos 
out of an average transfer of 100,000 pesos per month. 
 12. Payment is made to students older than 16.
 13. See also the discussion of the incentive effects of the Bolsa Alimentação 
program in Brazil in chapter 5.
C O N D I T I O N A L  C A S H  T R A N S F E R S :  R E D U C I N G  P R E S E N T  A N D  F U T U R E  P O V E R T Y
322
Chapter 5
 1. Also see Ravallion and Wodon (2000) for an evaluation of the Food 
for Education program, which antedated the FSSAP program in 
Bangladesh.
 2. For a sample of benefi ciaries around the 20th percentile of the national 
distribution of the proxy means, treatment by the BDH was randomized; 
that is the basis for the estimates by Schady and Araujo (2008). The 40th 
percentile of the proxy means is the cut-off point for BDH program eligi-
bility; Oosterbeek, Ponce, and Schady (2008) use regression discontinu-
ity techniques to estimate program impacts around that threshold, and 
they compare the estimated effects to those found in Schady and Araujo 
(2008). 
 3. One exception to this pattern of larger CCT program effects among 
poorer households is found in Bangladesh. Khandker, Pitt, and Fuwa 
(2003) estimate larger FSSAP effects on girls in households with larger 
landholdings. 
 4. However, the fraction of women who reported fi ve antenatal visits was 11 
percentage points lower in the treatment group at baseline, and that raises 
the possibility that some of the observed changes may be the product of 
reversion to the mean. 
 5. Although children who benefi t from CCT programs are more likely to 
be enrolled in school and to attend classes more frequently than they 
would have otherwise, the program effects on years of schooling could be 
muted for a variety of reasons. First, children receiving transfers may not 
always be promoted to the next grade (although some programs, including 
Oportunidades in Mexico and the RPS in Nicaragua, place limits on the 
number of times a child can repeat a grade before he or she is disqualifi ed 
from receiving further transfers). Second, even in the absence of grade 
repetition, CCTs could increase enrollment and grade attainment in the 
short run without affecting long-term outcomes. Consider a scenario in 
which school enrollment is intermittent (for example, if enrollment is 
determined partly by conditions in the labor market) or one in which 
parents have a target grade they want their children to attain (perhaps 
completion of primary school) and that target is not affected by the CCT 
program. Under such circumstances, parents who are eligible for the CCT 
may choose to enroll their children in school now rather than later because 
transfer income now is preferable to more uncertain transfer income in the 
future. An evaluation that focuses on the short-run impact of the CCT 
program then would fi nd positive program effects on enrollment and 
grade completion. On the other hand, an evaluation that focuses on the 
“medium-run” effects might fi nd negative program effects on enrollment 
(as CCT-treated children drop out of school when they have attained their 
target grade, whereas control group children continue to be enrolled inter-
mittently) and muted or no program effects on grade attainment. Finally, 
an evaluation that focuses on long-term effects might fi nd that there are 
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no differences between treated and control households in school attain-
ment. More generally, this example points to the advantages of revisiting 
CCT-treated and control children when they are old enough plausibly to 
have completed their schooling.
 6. In practice, Behrman, Parker, and Todd (2005) fi nd much larger differences 
in wage income between girls who started receiving transfers in 1998 and 
girls who started receiving transfers in 2000 (on the order of 25 percent), 
and they fi nd no effects for boys. Those estimates are noisy, however, and 
arguably are too large to be credible. 
 7. Nevertheless, even in those countries, aggregate effects on poverty in the 
next generation may be lower than those estimated by simple back-of-the-
envelope calculations for a variety of reasons. First, a large increase in the 
fraction of members of an age cohort who have completed a given school 
cycle is likely to depress the returns to schooling. (Card and Lemieux 
[2001] present results for Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States; Manacorda, Sánchez-Páramo, and Schady [2008] report on fi ve 
Latin American countries.) Second, the returns to schooling for the mar-
ginal child brought into school by the CCT may be lower than those for 
the average child.
 8. Alderman and Behrman (2006), and Galiani (2007) present calculations 
in a similar spirit.
 9. PRAF also envisioned a program to transfer resources to health centers 
to improve the quality of the supply, but the transfer of resources to local 
health units that had been envisioned was not implemented properly 
(Morris, Flores et al. 2004; Hoddinott 2008). 
 10. It is not clear exactly how the presence of the Hogares Comunitarios 
child care program may have affected the estimates of Familias en Acción 
program effects. Hogares Comunitarios is a community-based child care 
program. Participating children receive a nutritional supplement, among 
other things. Because parents are not allowed to enroll their children in 
the Hogares Comunitarios program and also receive transfers made by 
the Familias en Acción program, participation in Hogares is lower in the 
municipalities where the Familias program has been implemented than 
in the comparison communities. That situation could introduce biases—
for example, the estimates of Familias program effects in Attanasio et al. 
(2005) could be biased downward if Hogares Comunitarios has a positive 
effect on child nutritional status. 
 11. No baseline measures of adult health status are available, so the identifi ca-
tion relies on comparisons between the two groups at follow-up. 
 12. The results for obesity and hypertension are signifi cant at the 1 percent 
level, whereas those for diabetes are insignifi cantly different from zero, 
perhaps because of the relatively small number of adults who were tested 
for diabetes in the study.
 13. A third study (Fernald, Gertler, and Neufeld 2008) assesses the impact of 
receiving larger Oportunidades transfers on cognitive outcomes in early 
childhood. The authors conclude that doubling the magnitude of the 
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transfer would result in substantial improvements in motor development, 
cognitive development, and receptive language acquisition. The paper 
exploits the facts that program benefi ts vary for girls and boys and that 
there is a cap on the total amount of benefi ts that a household can receive, 
regardless of the number of children it has. This feature of program design 
generates variations in the amount of transfers received by program-eligible 
households. However, it is not clear that the identifi cation strategy is robust 
to the presence of economies of scale or “quantity-quality” trade-offs in 
child outcomes, which is a source of concern. Some specifi cations directly 
control for household size and composition. In those specifi cations the 
program impacts appear to be identifi ed off nonlinearities in the effect of 
household size and composition on the amount of transfers for which a 
household can be eligible. 
 14. In Nicaragua, 82 percent of households in the sample live on less than $1 
per capita per day, compared with 34 percent in the sample of households 
in the Ecuador evaluation
 15. Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997) conclude from their analysis of a 
British transfer program that the identity of the recipient matters—when 
transfers are made to women, for example, a larger fraction is spent on child 
clothing than when the transfers are made to men. Also see the results in 
Thomas (1990, 1994) and Dufl o (2003). 
 16. For evidence on the importance of social marketing in the allocation of 
expenditures, see Fraker, Martini, and Ohls (1995), who show that when 
there are food stamp “cash-outs” (whereby food stamps are replaced with 
income transfers), families continue to spend a disproportionate share of 
their food stamp income on food in the United States; in the Netherlands, 
spending on children’s clothing out of child benefi t income is much larger 
than out of other sources of income (Kooreman 2000). 
 17. As a validation exercise to test their identifi cation strategy, de Brauw and 
Hoddinott (2008) show that there are no differences in the acquisition 
of calories between households that did and did not receive the forms. 
Because both groups received the same cash transfer, and because there is 
no obvious reason why caloric intake should have been affected by school-
ing conditions attached to transfers, this exercise suggests that unobserved 
differences between households that did and did not receive the forms are 
not the main reason for the measured differences in their school enrollment 
behavior.
 18. Specifi cally, local elected leaders (the heads of the Juntas Parroquiales) 
were encouraged to hold townhall-style meetings in which the BDH 
was presented as a compact between the state and benefi ciaries: the state 
agreed to transfer resources to poor households, and those households in 
turn agreed to send their children to school; for a brief period, the BDH 
program aired a series of radio and television spots that explicitly linked 
transfers with school enrollment; some BDH administrators also appear to 
have stressed the enrollment requirements when they signed up households 
for transfers. 
 19. See box 6.3 for a discussion of the methods used.
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Chapter 6
 1. It should be noted that CCT programs can be justifi ed also in the absence 
of redistributive objectives. Indeed, when private investment in human 
capital is socially suboptimal, monetary incentives may be needed to 
change behaviors—even if those incentives are not large enough to have 
any measurable effect on short-term poverty. Our focus, however, is on 
those cases in which redistribution is part of the rationale for a CCT.
 2. Grant and Behrman (2008) examine a number of demographic and health 
surveys and fi nd that gender differences in schooling attainment generally 
do not favor boys. Boys apparently fail and repeat grades a lot more often 
than girls do. As a result, although enrollment rates are higher for boys, 
attainment rates are not.
 3. Miguel and Kremer (2004) fi nd positive spillover effects of deworming 
both within and across neighboring schools in Kenya. They also fi nd 
that simply informing parents and students of the benefi ts of deworm-
ing (through health education) led to no changes in behavior, and that 
user fees led to the collapse of the program. On that basis, and given the 
positive spillover effects, they argue there is a strong justifi cation for the 
subsidized provision of deworming drugs. Although the free provision 
of drugs may be suffi cient in the case of children in school, other cases 
may require further incentives (for example, in the form of a CCT). The 
presence of externalities is not a proof that a CCT is needed, but it does 
provide the basis to consider if one makes sense.
 4. A full description would consider less than full take-up among group B 
households. For simplicity we do not consider it here. In essence, the extent 
of take-up among group B is a function of the size of the transfer. 
 5. It would be incorrect, however, simply to extrapolate those estimates 
and assume that average effects among the extremely poor would remain 
unchanged as a result of the retargeting, particularly because that would 
not be a marginal change in coverage.
 6. For rural areas, Duarte Gómez et al. (2004) fi nd that program benefi -
ciaries have better knowledge on health practices, but the authors cannot 
test whether that is the result of the health education sessions. For urban 
areas, they are able to compare knowledge among people attending and 
not attending the sessions, but they must rely on propensity score matching 
for those comparisons. They also use qualitative methods to complement 
their analysis.
 7. The extent to which conditions are likely to affect benefi ciaries’ behavior 
depends on a combination of implementation factors that vary from 
country to country. First is the frequency with which compliance with 
conditions is verifi ed. Second is the speed with which information on 
compliance becomes available to trigger sanctions—often a function of 
administrative capacity. As shown in chapter 3, even in a relatively high-
capacity environment like Mexico, the benefi t amount paid refl ects the 
compliance or noncompliance of the benefi ciary household four months 
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prior to the payment. Third, although all CCT programs specify a schedule 
of sanctions in the case of noncompliance with conditions, both the type 
of sanctions and the degree of enforcement vary quite substantially from 
one program to another. Moreover, as explained in chapter 3, conditions 
are not always viewed as “hard.”
 8. It could be said that, in fact, the program is operating as two separate 
cash transfers using the same targeting mechanism and administrative 
procedures. Moreover, to the extent that the conditions must be satisfi ed in 
order to receive the per-child benefi t, the base benefi t could be interpreted 
as an additional UCT.
 9. Telesecundaria schools rely on videos shown by satellite and have fewer 
teachers, whereas general secondary schools have more infrastructure and 
more specialized instructors.
 10. The cost to build a telesecundaria school is estimated to be 1.38 million 
pesos, and to build a technical secondary school 2.4 million pesos. Annual 
personnel and operating costs are $170,000 for telesecundaria and $427,000 
for technical secondary schools. See Coady and Parker (2004) for a cost-
effectiveness analysis of these supply-side investments.
 11. See Regalía and Castro (2007) for an analysis of how the Nicaraguan 
Ministry of Health outsourced the delivery of health care services while it 
retained supervision over the providers through management agreements 
that were intended to align health service providers’ incentives with better 
health care and health outcomes.
 12. Most of these programs were infl uenced by a community nutrition model 
known as Atención Integral de la Niñez en la Comunidad, fi rst established 
in Honduras (see Van Roekel et al. 2002; Griffi ths and McGuire 2005). 
Typically, other primary health services have been added.
 13. The earlier RPS program relied instead on nongovernmental providers.
 14. Preliminary results by Leite and Olinto (2008) suggest that in Brazil, 
as coverage of CCT programs increased, local governments adapted the 
supply of education services (consolidating smaller schools, increasing the 
number of secondary schools and teachers, and so forth).
 15. For example, Banerjee et al. (2007) argue that without changes in cur-
riculum and pedagogy that recognize the different needs of poor/excluded 
children, additional educational inputs are not effective in improving 
learning outcomes. They evaluate two experiments that follow that 
approach through remedial education and fi nd positive results on learn-
ing outcomes.
 16. There are different approaches to social pensions: some countries (Bolivia, 
Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, Nepal) follow universal schemes, whereby 
all elderly people are eligible. The cost of those programs either makes 
them too expensive or forces them to pay very low benefi ts, with corre-
spondingly limited effects on poverty. A larger number of countries have 
adopted targeted schemes instead (usually through some form of proxy 
means test) as a way to provide meaningful support at an affordable cost. 
The OAP program in South Africa costs approximately 1.4 percent of 
GDP.
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 17. In principle, CCTs, like other social assistance programs, could crowd 
out participation in (contributive) insurance schemes. This implies there 
is a separate but equally important demand on coordination with social 
protection programs, especially with regard to the relationship between 
CCTs and social insurance programs (see Levy [2008] for Mexico). 
 18. We thank Harold Alderman for bringing this point to our attention.
Appendix B
 1. Also see Filmer and Schady (2009a) for a discussion of the possible effects 
of selective transfers in Cambodia.
 2. In particular, see the discussion in Parker, Rubalcava, and Teruel 
(2008).
 3. One obvious check for that kind of manipulation is to test for an unusual 
concentration of mass in the density of the proxy means right below the 
eligibility cut-off—a clear indication of a problem.
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